TRENDS AND TRANSFORMATIONS IN WORLD POLITICS

EDITED BY

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Introduction to Trends and Transformations in World Politics

Rahman Dağ and Özgür Tüfekçi

International politics have always been connected with and among states constituting the international systems. Thanks to a tremendous number of factors, interactions among states and their speeds are dazzling. Therefore, any efforts to fully understand what is happening in world politics are destined to fall short due to new dimensions added before these efforts come up with a comprehensive analysis of world politics. As this book centers on it, discussions of the world system are a good example of these massive and instant trends and transformations. Especially since the end of the Cold War, for three decades, most of the studies have refrained from defining or naming prevailing world systems via analysis on whether expected multipolarity is more prone to conflict or is more stable than bipolarity and unipolarity (Saperstein, 1991; Kegley, Jr., and Raymond, 1992; Wohlforth, 1999; Waltz, 2000; Monteiro, 2011). During the last decade of the twentieth century, the unipolarity discussion ended up calling the decade a unipolar initiative, not a unipolar system. The early years of the twenty-first century brought up the multipolarity discussion, but there is still no consensus as there has been on the Cold War bipolarity. Such difficulties led to the creation of new concepts that describe world systems, such as "multi-polar Cold War" (Harutyunyan, 2007), "era of regionalism" (Buzan, 2011: 16), "new age of World," and "the Lonely Superpower" (Huntington, 1999). These alternate concepts indicate uncertainties regarding how to define current world politics or systems. This is where the above quotations make perfect sense. Krauthammer emphasized that the rhetoric of post-Cold War years implied that a new world order was going to be established and led by the United States, but realities on the ground might prevent the realization of the rhetoric of the "uni-polar moment" (1990/1991).

This process is not unique to the post-Cold War period and could be applied to initial developments that created bipolarity and multipolarity discussions

in the late 1940s and early 2000s, respectively. Therefore, defining the world order we are in is a process that goes through several phases to convince most academics and policymakers. Initially, the accumulation of new political, social, and economic developments channels the debates and ideas to one direction and then analyzes whether these new developments take the path leading to that direction. If so, we have an agreement on which world order we are in. If not, different approaches or seeking alternate explanations based on these new developments would come up as a result of this effort. Within the last century, discussions of all international systems have been made for certain time periods. To start, the First World War was a turning point where international politics experienced a massive change. Great Britain was gradually losing its weight in leading world politics, and other states were waiting to get their share of influence, parallel to their relative power, from the power vacuum in international politics. These motions were all centered on European states, as they were colonial powers controlling most of the world. The Second World War enlarged the center of world politics from Europe to the Atlantic, and European states had to hand over the leadership of world politics to the United States of America. Counterarguments on how world politics would be shaped created two power poles, and they struggled to cover every realm of states at the international level. As the Soviets lost their position of power, debate about unipolarity erupted, in which the United States took the throne of world politics. Every national and international issue in the last decade of the twentieth century were considered tests to determine whether unipolarity worked (Monteiro, 2011). Such debates were suddenly interrupted by the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, as they were the first attacks on the nation's mainland since the attacks on Pearl Harbor.

The developments in the early years of the twenty-first century ignited the discussion on whether the United States could maintain the position of world leadership and the international policing mission to get global politics in order. For those who gathered around and allied with the United States, the possibility that the nation could not handle its role urged the others—being allied with, neutral toward, and opposed to—to consider all options to guarantee their survival within the anarchic international system. This urge by states has kept the system alive since then, and that is why current world politics has not become an established order in which policy preferences of main actors—regardless of being states, multinational companies, or transnational social movements—are certain. Uncertainty also keeps feeding the anarchic nature of world politics, and thus a vicious circle would seem to continue until a superpower takes control and is able to sustain a world system or power polarities appear to set their boundaries.

Such a picture of world politics can also be detected with international relation theories that facilitate the comprehension of how world politics work,

but most have fallen short of explaining what is going on and have also faced severe criticism. From each major international theory perspective, it is obvious that there is ongoing change in world politics. To start, the basic assumption of realism, being the state as the main actor of international politics, has been challenged as nonstate social and armed groups have affected world politics as much as states. Defining the main actors of world politics, rational states lose ground because recently elected leaders do not seem rational or seem obsessed with their national interests. In terms of liberalism, the idea of free movements of goods, capital, and labor has undergone a test with populist movements, terrorism, and migrations. States that are building fences on their borders eliminate core assumptions of liberalism and the free movement of goods, services, and labor. Additionally, the constructivist approach indicates that if there is a change in international norms, it is imperative it would change the international order from bottom to top. Rising populist and ultranationalist sociopolitical movements to the decision-making ranks to constructivism would lead to states acting in a protective way. Moreover, structuralism and institutionalism fell short since the international structure established right after the Second World War seemed to shatter and rising powers demanded institutional reforms for international organizations.

At the same time, realists had looked for a country, or countries, to replace the Soviet Union and its role as a requirement of their fundamental principle of balance of power. To realists, "Countries have always competed for wealth and security, and the competition has often led to conflict" (Waltz, 1993: 64). It is then argued that every single state inevitably compares other states' power and capabilities with its own. Because of a possible attack, states have to balance their powers with others. In this sense, a trend of looking for possible candidates to balance the United States' power emerged, and then Germany, Japan, and the European Community (later the European Union) were examined in terms of their willingness to take the responsibility and whether they had adequate capabilities (Waltz, 1993; Wallerstein, 1993: 4). By foreseeing the current nature of world politics, Waltz suggests that

> changes spawn uncertainties and create difficulties, especially when the changes are structural ones. Germany, Japan, and Russia will have to relearn their old great-power roles, and the United States will have to learn a role it has never played before: namely, to coexist and interact with other great powers. (1993: 72)

Their levels of economic development and the estimated period of time, when possible, that candidates would militarily, economically, and politically reach the United States' capabilities were subjected to discussions in international relations literature. Along with it, the changing nature of international politics

has also been emphasized—such as nuclear deterrence, economic interdependency of the core state, and global issues that no state could deal with alone.

Given that international relations are full of uncertainties and states must increase their power relative to others in order to be sure of their survival, it would be necessary to examine the influence of significant events that have initiated and constituted trends and transformations in world politics. Of course, the degree of influence of an event is relative, but at least a couple of them might be agreed on by most. To delve into the context of this book, several events and concepts will be examined to see their potential to affect trends and transformations in world politics. These events also entail debates on the nature of basic concepts in international relations, which have to be discussed together with the events.

CONSTANT CHANGES LEADING TO TRENDS AND TRANSFORMATIONS

Unrest in World Politics

Systemic changes trigger new dynamics and lead to changes in state foreign policies, as such a huge shift makes all states reconsider their positions in a new or about-to-emerge world system. In theory, post-Cold War conflicts that erupted in the territories in which the United States and Soviet Union fought for influence were freed from the balancing principle of bipolarity. Under the international bipolarity system, every individual state has to take the nature of the system into account while making domestic and foreign policies. That is not just for second-tier or periphery states but also superpowers.

The first implication of unipolarity in world politics in terms of political unrest happened in the Middle East via international intervention in Iraq; because of that, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait.[1] The main question that has been asked is this: If it was in times of the bipolar Cold War, would the United States intervene or not? The fundamental aim of this question is to emphasize the balance between two major superpowers that bipolarity provided. On the other hand, the question can be asked from another perspective as to whether or not Iraq would have invaded Kuwait if the Cold War had not ended. There is no way to have clear answers to these questions. However, these questions imply that the structure of world politics has a tremendous effect on states' domestic and foreign policies.

Immediately after the end of the Cold War, Eastern Europe went into protracted political conflicts that have not yet been politically solved, as Kosovo has not yet been recognized by Russia (Larrabee, 2010). In practical terms, one of the most significant factors keeping Yugoslavia together was the

bipolar dynamic its government, other federal states, other nations, and even Yugoslavian citizens were aware of. The end of bipolarity changed the ways of thinking of all these actors about how to react to the new developments within the federal state structure, making them think they could go for an independent state. Therefore, armed conflicts for more territory and sovereignty erupted, which lasted for almost a decade. Within this decade, political unrest after a systemic change does not work one-sidedly but affects regional and international powers' approaches. The initial response of European states was to wait for US intervention. The United States did not want to directly take responsibility, as there was no direct threat to its security and it did not want to take on the economic burden. Under these circumstances, the rest of the world looked at the US government to solve the conflict either militarily or politically.

The early years of the twenty-first century saw the tragic 9/11 attacks on the United States mainland by a nonstate armed terrorist group, al-Qaeda. The reaction of the United States to this terrorist attack was the declaration of the global war on terror, suggesting military intervention to the states sponsoring terror or providing sanctuary for terrorist groups. The United States also made its intentions clear to the rest of the world by challenging whether other nations were with or against the United States in this mission. It had instant victories in Iraq by deposing Saddam Hussein from power and in Afghanistan by changing the regime. This reminded the world once again of all its power as the United States did during the Second World War after Japan's military attack on Pearl Harbor. This comparison might not seem applicable as the time and conditions are different, but in terms of systemic perspective, the reactions of the United States could lead to embedded unipolar world order by giving an ultimatum to the entire world. The course of these invasions have not gone as planned, since the United States has been struggling with Iraq and Afghanistan missions. The results show that state invasion and the rebuilding process are not easy tasks, even for a superpower. Pursuing policy at a global level definitely requires an alliance to complete; otherwise, military, economic, and political burdens reverse the gains obtained in the initial phase.

Once there is a power vacuum or the inadequacy of the leading power surfaces in world politics, it is inevitable to be seen by the others, and so they initiate their own strategies to fill the gap in accordance with individual national interests. As long as American missions do not get concrete results, more regional and great powers become involved. That is, a way of multipolarity has been opened via great power politics, and they do not have to have the same or more capability to initiate a counterweight. That is why there are multiple dimensions and various actors involved in the political unrest all over the world. The cases of Syria, Libya, Ukraine, Venezuela, the eastern

Mediterranean, Yemen, and so on are robust examples that there is a transformation to multipolarity happening at the global and regional levels.

DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

Distribution of power, from a realist perspective, has been used as one of the vital criteria to evaluate a state's position in world politics, and that has revealed the nature of the world system if uni-, bi-, or multipolarity prevails. This sort of evolution based on hard power and technological and military capabilities has been used to guess the result of a possible conflict or war since Thucydides. In the multipolar world of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the military powers of European states were considerably and relatively close to one other, and economic capacity to sustain military advancement was regarded as essential to win a war while making war plans. The end of the First World War altered the power balance among the European states so that a new European system was established via external powers (United States). This same analysis can be applied to world politics in the post-Second World War period, and it would suggest that two states were powerful enough to stand once the war was ended, leading to bipolarity. From the distribution of power perspective, the political dissolution of the Soviet Union ended the existence of a state that could even come close to having US capabilities, which arouses enthusiasm for the unipolar moment of American ascendency.

This obvious pattern continued in the last decade of the twentieth century as academics started to talk about possible rivals, such as Germany and Japan—although, they were both in the security alliance of the United States in eastern Asia and Europe. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, however, Russia and China took the place of Germany and Japan as rivals of American supremacy. The economic richness and social welfare have been critical indicators of a state's distribution of power since economic capability is directly related to subsidizing technological advancement and research and development in every aspect, including military technologies. As argued by Thompson, "Until or unless US military predominance is based on economic predominance, the effects of unipolarity are likely to be relatively weak and probably also short-lived" (2006: 1). Comparing the GDPs of states and predicting a trend for the near future have already been argued in the literature. Even before the end of the Cold War, several academics (Gilpin, 1987: 347; Kennedy, 1987: 534; Pape, 2009) already mentioned that American economic supremacy was downgrading and could be caught up by the immediate followers. In this same sense, Layne (2012: 206) reemphasized this argument in the twenty-first century as "declinists." Layne evaluates annual world GDP shares in 1980, 1995, and 2014, and they clearly indicate that the United

States' share declined from 22 percent in 1980 to 18 percent in 2014. Whereas China's share increased from 2 percent in 1980 to 15 percent in 2014 (Layne, 2012: 206). What he meant by the title of his article "This Time It's Real" is that the Great Recession in 2008 that originated from the mortgage system in North America and Europe and was considered a domestic economic deficit might cause a lack of ability to finance international politics, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. These are the places that the United States invaded in the very early years of the 2000s but could not solve the issues of and had to leave. Since the Obama administration, the nation has spent tremendous efforts for safe exit from these two countries for both itself and themselves (Varisco, 2013: 3). In sum, Layne suggests that "without the 'hard' power (military and economic) upon which it was built, the Pax Americana is doomed to wither in the early twenty-first century. Indeed, because of China's great-power emergence, and the United States' own domestic economic weakness, it already is withering" (2012: 205).

The economic rise of China is mainly conceptualized by a peaceful rise, meaning that China does not intend to threaten established world order and leading actors but instead concentrated on its economic development in the 2010s (Schweller and Pu, 2011; Abb, 2020). The ability to convert economic growth into hard military power through financing cutting-edge technological development, telecommunication projects, regional and international free trade zones, and transnational socioeconomic cultural projects (Belt and Road Initiative) (Lukin, 2016: 100; Sarieddine, 2021) has made the other states consider China as a new geopolitical superpower, which can counterweight the American-established and liberal international order. Such a distinction is well symbolized with the analogies of the cute panda (peaceful rise) and the evil dragon (emerging superpower) (Cao, 2020). In the same manner, the most recent concept of the trade war that the foreign policies of the administration of former President Donald Trump created indicates that the United States thinks China has an economically advantageous position under current international economic systems and laws. As a result, the Trump administration played with a tax increase on strategic and significant products and sought to force China and European states to sign a new trade agreement that would allow the United States a more advantageous, or at least equal, position. These actions of the Trump administration did not just worsen the global economy and international trade laws but also shattered the foundations of Pax Americana, or the liberal international order that the United States built. The administration of President Joe Biden delivers immense hope that its era would not be like that of the Trump administration, but it is certain that the wound made during Trump's administration will not heal as quickly as it was made.

The distribution of power not only has an economic dimension but can be extended to political, military, cultural, demographic, and geographic aspects. Furthermore, the types of power can range from hard to soft and from smart to sharp power. Mainly, it depends on how one defines the concept of power. For instance, Robert Dahl defines power as when one has "power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do" (1957: 202–203). From that perspective, Joseph Nye develops the definition, writing that "power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes you want. You can affect their behaviour in three main ways: threats of coercion ('sticks'); inducements or payments ('carrots'); and attraction and persuasion that makes others want what you want" (2020: 94). On the basis of this definition, Nye mentions that there are three different types of power. Hard power is "the ability to get others to act in ways that are contrary to their initial preferences and strategies" (Nye, 2011: 11). This is the ability to coerce through threats and inducements (sticks and carrots). Soft power is the ability to get others to want the outcomes that you want and, more particularly, "the ability to achieve goals through attraction or persuasion rather than coercion" (Nye, 2004: 5). And his third type is smart power. Nye argues that while hard power is the use of coercion, soft power is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through attraction. Yet, he believes that a state can be more successful if it applies smart strategies by combining the tools of both hard and soft power (Nye, 2009: 160). In addition to these three popular types of power, Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig (2017) develop a new type, called sharp power, that seeks to impair free expression, compromise and neutralize independent institutions, and distort the political environment.

Regarding the power competition, we do not know yet whether these types of power would solve the most pressing problems in the international system or would make them more complicated. In any case, scholars keep producing arguments in their writings, and actors aim to use and apply them to bend the international system to their own interests. That might be assumed to be either the result or cause of the trends and transformation in world politics, respectively.

EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY

Seventeenth-and eighteenth-century multipolarity came up with the concept of the sovereignty of states in their internal affairs and territories. The main reason it developed was that each relatively similar power intervened in the other's internal and colonial affairs to weaken that state (Lee, 2004). Centuries-long multipolarity of European powers was based on the balance of power. As self-reflected, it suggested being against the one who sought to

change the balance and who acted in the offensive. In practical terms, if a European power planned to dominate all other European powers, the others aligned to prevent offensive power's actions. This scenario occurred when France and Germany intended to take control of the entirety of Europe. While these colonial powers employed their full force against each other in the territories of their colonies, the conflict did inevitably spread to the mainland, and it was then that they sat and drew the basics of their relations. The full sovereignty of a state over its territory in the sea, land, and airspace was conceived out of great European powers and became an embedded norm of international law and politics through the Westphalia, Paris, and Vienna agreements (Ikenberry, 2011a: 58; Deyermond, 2016: 962). By the end of the nineteenth century, these major powers transformed their state structure from imperial to central nation-states, changing the understanding of the full sovereignty of a state. It was because they instrumentalized ethnic and religious minorities in other states and a new form of colonialism as mandate. In the first half of the twentieth century, world politics clearly indicated that Germany formalized a policy of combining German-speaking nations. The United Kingdom and France mandated their previous colonies, and Italy, Spain, and Portugal reclaimed political influence over their former colonies. After almost three centuries, European-centered multipolarity ended with two world wars, and they lost their superiority to the United States and the Soviets.

The new world order was established by the United States, which created its opponent, the Soviets, after the Second World War. A bipolar world system embedded itself throughout the world with many more states due to the decolonization processes. Absolute sovereignty, which had been a part of international law, was also theoretically applied for newly emergent nation-states, and the norm of noninterference was legitimized by the United Nations charter (Xuetong, 2013). However, they needed political and economic supports, so they followed the directions coming from great powers. Even though they were all sovereign, they were and are called different names that degenerated their sovereignty, such as bandwagon states, a great power's sphere of influence, second-tier states, periphery states, and third-world states. As Goldgeier and McFaul denote, "Since the world economy is organized and regulated by core states, peripheral states must accept their rules to participate" (1992: 480). As touched upon before, the survival of these states and governments was dependent upon protection and support originating from either the Western or Eastern bloc. Initiated in the European multipolarity and continued during the Cold War period to the present, ethnic and religious minority rights, human rights, democratic deficits, and authoritarianism have been detrimental in keeping the sovereignty of new states intact.

Additionally, and most recently, humanitarian intervention, meaning that international society can intervene in a state in case of civil war, degenerated

further absolute sovereignty of a state (Murray and Hehir, 2012). Nowadays, human rights reports prepared by major powers on the other states have been quite influential in the domestic politics of other states. There is no need to mention the cruelty of several states violating their own citizens' human rights, and there has to be something international society can do, but still, it is another fact that humanitarian intervention invalidates the full sovereignty of a state. Currently, Russia articulates its right to protect Russian minorities in post-Soviet states, which means an indirect involvement in these states' internal affairs, and criticizes some western states for not respecting state sovereignty (Malyarenko and Wolff, 2018). European states and the United States employ human rights violations or authoritarian tendencies for political and economic sanctions over certain states. Moreover, social upheavals causing government or regime changes in Middle Eastern, Latin American, Eastern European, and Central Asian states have been politically and financially supported by regional and international powers while mostly adhering to and advocating that territorial integrity connotates state sovereignty.

In sum, the concept of sovereignty via the principle of the right to protect has evolved into something whose meaning can be elasticized according to regional and international powers' national interests (Murray and Hehir, 2012: 397). Trends of its uncertainty have been in line with the systemic change in world politics. It was strictly applied in the European multipolarity between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, was a bit stretched out during the Cold War, and is now hard to define in practical terms. As long as trends and transformations in world politics continue, it will be hard to see a common and accepted version of it.

EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY

In order to have a solid ground to define which world order prevails, having several criteria seems detrimental for further analysis. Such an initiative was already done by Kenneth Waltz (1979) and then developed by other prominent scholars (Goddard and Nexon, 2005; Glaser, 2010; Wagner, 2010).

Uncertainties can be detected in the inadequacy of mainstream international relations theories to explain current world politics, order, and the changing nature of basic concepts and the proliferation of some others in world politics. It can be seen within the context of a concept that has been enlarged and deepened to contain new developments at national and international levels. For instance, the security concept is connected to the idea that it could be maintained by military and economic power, but now it extends these two main areas and reaches human and environmental security. That indicates that conventional understanding of security is not able to encompass

what is meant by it now, as it entangles national, international, and transnational issues and no actors can refrain themselves from it. They are articulated to legitimize an envisioned world order and foreign policies. That is also directly related to trends and transformations in world politics.

The end of the Cold War not only ended the superpower position of the Soviets but also changed the paramount necessity of security for major European countries. European states were under the protection of American military power against Soviet threat, which designated the European position as defensive. However, after the elimination of the imminent threat from the Soviets, the European position changed to offensive—not militarily but ideationally as the European continent. This created the European integration process as Eastern European states that once were under Soviet control looked to major European states to be accepted in the European Community (later the European Union). In other words, systematic change rebuked the horizons and visions of major European powers. Unwillingness to intervene and unilateral actions of the United States in the post-Cold War conflicts in Eastern Europe (Keohane and Martin, 1995; Waltz, 2000: 22) accelerated the European powers' concern about their own security, near and abroad. Since then, European nations have sought their own defense and security policies to respond to the conflicts in the neighbouring countries (Posen, 2006) in the case of unilateral policies of hegemonic power (Beeson and Higgott, 2005). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) position within the post-Cold War period from a European perspective is parallel to the changing position of major European powers (mainly Germany and France).

As there was no more Warsaw Pact, NATO's main ontological reason to exist was gone, but it has been able to adapt itself to new developments. The adaptation of NATO to the new developments in world politics, as discussed by Luis Tomé in the second chapter of the book, still does not eliminate the different foreign policies of member states. To start, major European states do not want to have missile deployment in Poland, while the United States is eager to do so. In addition, with the decay of the Cold War, the economic burden of NATO has become another fierce issue between the United States and the European nations. Current disagreements between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean seas have been pushing the boundaries of security alignment among members. It is a fact that NATO not only is a security organization but extends its role, ranging from an instrument of mediation among states to military power for humanitarian intervention to an international policing force against international human trafficking, piracy, and irregular migrations. In sum, NATO is a quite functional international organization that can serve multiple purposes and encourages certain ways of politics, but ideational cracks among members have gradually been surfacing, which endangers future projections of NATO.

THE WAY OF INTERACTIONS WITH OTHERS

Centuries-long great power politics among European states prior to the First World War features gaining the advantage of resources by conquering territories within Europe and colonies in the world (Nye, 1990: 178). Absolute control over territories or lands meant resources to sustain war politics and provided free exploitation. It was thought that territorial control was a secure way of opening and keeping new markets for their dramatically increased industrial products (Hobson, 1972). The post-First World War period changed the nature of colonization with mandate regimes all over the world until the Second World War opened a sphere of influence by keeping newly independent states in alliances that great powers led. This change configured the world system as bipolar since there were just two states powerful enough to ideologically, economically, militarily, and politically pull other states to their orbits. The United States and the Soviets established their own ways of doing politics and made them robust by supporting their own ways with military, economic, and political organizations. There was no direct war to conquer lands from the other side, but they mostly struggled with changing the minds of states to make them switch alliances and sometimes supported military coups to replace regimes or governments in second-tier states and the third world (Blechman and Kaplan, 1979). "The United States as well as the Soviet Union intervened widely in others' affairs and spent a fair amount of time fighting peripheral wars" (Waltz, 1993: 47). Within the years of bipolarity, there was no direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, but their protracted struggle had been in every aspect of world politics, such as common norms and beliefs, international organizations, and practices. There was no annexation and invasion that changed political borders in the multipolar world system in the pre-First World War period.

However, decolonization processes in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America led to the creation of new independent national states as members of world politics, which the United States and Soviet Union sought to get under their spheres of influence. By then, the scramble trends in world politics were to open a political and military channel through which military and developmental aids and agreements were made. To be part of these mechanisms established by the great powers was mostly dependent on the way of doing politics and state formation being in line with the respective great power. In this way, newly emergent independent states felt they had to take a side to complete their nation-building process and guarantee their survival in an anarchic environment (David, 1991). The ultimate aim of the two superpowers was to get "political control over as many countries as possible, so bringing them happiness by imposing the only current development model

[that] is inseparable in this political frame" (Lukin, 2016: 97). Once these were aligned, political regimes and democratization processes were accordingly mapped. Moreover, each side—the Western Bloc led by the United States and the Eastern Bloc led by the Soviets—did not take the path to direct invasion of the states that preferred to reside with the other. However, political, military, and economic pressure and sanctions were applied to states in order to encounter the depredations caused by their preferences.

Keeping military power at a first-class level with a high deterrent function against others requires first-class economic power to substantiate the economic burden of being a superpower. As Waltz argues, that was the reason détente had found ground in world politics, and both the United States and Soviet Union took a short breath to regulate their own internal political and economic reforms (1993: 50). Once one declined to the level of not being able to sustain its way of doing politics—that would be the Soviets—the whole world, especially academics and policymakers, looked to the United States to see what the next step was and how a single superpower would act and shape world politics. American involvements in conflictual zones in the world have been considered a testing ground to see whether or not it can secure its own and those who relied on its interests**.** In other words, the states that have been sided with the Atlantic alignment, regardless of where they were, looked for the capability of the United States as a single superpower to protect their security and deter rivals from engaging with them. In the case of not making them feel secure enough, it is not surprising that they would seek alternative paths and their own foreign policies. This has been happening in the twenty-first century in Europe, South Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, and Latin America. Second-tier or third-world countries might not have adequate economic and technological capabilities to establish their own security apparatuses. However, major powers and great powers or rising powers might gradually prefer to invest more in their own armies or military capabilities. Under these conditions, that kind of preference can also be regarded by the United States as counterbalancing moves leading to realist assumptions of the balance of power and balance of threat.

RISING NUMBER OF NUCLEAR POWERS

The Cold War period was marked by two ideological superpower rivalries and provided control and balance in every aspect of world politics, including the spread of conventional weaponry and nuclear power. Despite the experience of the independence movements led by Brazil, Egypt, and India, the superpowers had agreed not to transfer nuclear technology to third parties among their alliances. However, the post-Cold War period not only damaged

the control and balance in world politics but increased uncertainty, which states are most afraid of, and some looked for obtaining nuclear technology in order to weaponize it to increase their level of deterrence. As one of the key agendas of world politics, obtaining nuclear technology for peaceful means and using it for economic development has been popular for rising powers or regional powers to ensure their higher and effective positions in international and regional developments. The cases of Iran exporting uranium from Russia to enrich it in the clandestine facilities, Turkey signing a contract with Russia for erecting nuclear plants as a means of energy resources, Pakistan already having nuclear weapons but struggling with political instabilities, India desperately looking to become a nuclear power, Israel denying but believed to have it already, etc., are examples of rising and regional powers and their nuclear capabilities. Most scholars stressed the detrimental role of nuclear weapons during the Cold War because of polarization among the two camps. Several more states in different regions have nuclear technology that can easily be turned into a weapon or have already obtained said weaponry. This reality, despite increasing global interdependence, backs the discussion of the transition from bipolarity to multipolarity.

Together with political instability in these rising powers and nonstate terrorist groups, there is an increased level of concern that rogue states might be able to obtain nuclear technology and might be irrational enough to use it against their perceived enemies. As Andrea Edoardo Varisco suggests, "The presence and availability of nuclear weapons will indeed allow even middle and small powers and non-state actors to seriously threaten and undermine the global security and peace of the future multi-polarity" (2013: 1).

POLITICAL STABILITY AT NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS

In his seminal structural realism paper (2000), Kenneth Waltz suggests that a unipolar world system is the least durable compared with others and emphasizes two reasons for that. First of all, a dominant power (United States) takes too many responsibilities to keep the world running according to its interests and position in the world, which causes a downgrade trend in its power. Second, other states apart from the dominant ones always worry about their own futures as they cannot be sure of how the dominant power would react in the future, even if it is acting moderately at the moment. That would naturally lead to a balancing process by other states, and that would also mean a gradual trend toward systemic change (Waltz, 2000: 28). To avoid these two main reasons that might cost the United States to lose its unipolar position in world politics, a dominant power has to be careful when, how, and for

how long it would intervene in conflicts that are not direct threats to its own security. As mentioned earlier, the reluctance of the United States to intervene in the conflicts in Eastern Europe sounded alarms for the western European states in terms of security, relying on the United States regarding imminent conflicts close to their borders. From that point to the present, European states (the European Union) have always had an idea of a European army or military power to protect their own interests, as in the case of the discussion on NATO. For instance, the president of France, Emmanuel Macron, stated that the brained death of NATO has occurred, which meant NATO was no longer functional for European security.

Additionally, the initiation of the global war on terror by the United States rocketed offensive foreign policy conceptualized with preemptive war. As a result, the United States called the entire world to be with or against America and intervened in Iraq and Afghanistan. This sort of foreign policy and its implementation might originate from the preponderant military and economic capabilities of the United States (Krauthammer, 2002: 7), but not sustaining such policy proves the first reason the unipolar system is the least durable, as argued by Waltz (2000). Because of that, both the Iraq and Afghanistan operations have been considered failures of unilateral actions by the United States despite these operations being announced as clear military successes within a couple of years. The state-building process of these states was still crippled, and the United States could not find a way of secure withdrawal from these territories. That is why the United States repeatedly asked the international society for military and economic support to secure these areas from terror and terrorism that would be beneficial not only to itself but also to other major powers that occasionally suffered from terrorist attacks.

Moreover, these interventions and their long-term consequences sent a signal to rival great powers and regional powers to counterbalance the dominant power. Russia and China, as possible great powers, and Pakistan, India, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia as regional powers, have to consider that these interventions only serve American national interests or America's superpower position in world politics and defect their own national interests in the region. Obviously, these possible rivals are not going to get on the bandwagon as during the Cold War period but seek to protect their own interests by intervening as much as possible, even if endangering American interests.

THE NATURE OF THREATS IN WORLD POLITICS

As if legitimatizing the argument of American reactions to 9/11, Krauthammer (2002) argues that, as a feature of post-Cold War world politics, a new source of threats comes from rogue states that have weapons of mass destruction, not

from other great powers as it did before. In parallel, he also suggests that there would be more wars in the post-Cold War than in the pre-Cold War period. In other words, nonstate armed terrorist groups sheltered by rogue states could benefit from political instability to obtain a weapon of mass destruction and mobilize it to the mainland of America and Europe. Nonstate actors pose threats because they are sheltered by rogue states and become a source of national and regional instability that disrupts the natural course of political and economic relations among states (Glaser, 2011: 141). In order to deal with them, the United States and other major powers initiated several international operations, but these nonstate actors are hard to specifically find and destroy as they do not have the same structural entities as states (Bergesen and Lizardo, 2004).

Individual terrorist initiatives or terrorist networks have been quite effective in world politics as they are working in two ways. To be clear, some consider them freedom fighters, whereas some think they are terrorists. Whatever the origin of their actions and whatever method they use to reach their aim, most nonstate armed actors or terrorist groups have been politically and financially supported by rival states at regional and international levels (Dag, 2018). This also makes the nature of threats much more complicated, as it is sometimes impossible to separate legitimate and illegitimate great power politics.

Transnational issues—such as climate change, irregular migrations, hand covering of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons among nonstate actors, and human trafficking—require a multinational effort to be taken. However, those who are able to contribute to possible solutions to these issues are in a difficult position between their national interests and global security. Global issues are threatening human habitats and creating disturbances in domestic politics and economies (Goodman and Schimmelfennig, 2020). For instance, for a very long time, but recently with increased density, irregular migrations have been a major issue in the national agendas of the United States and European Union. Their established social, economic, cultural, and political structures are in shock due to the increasing number of human flows from all over the world (Richmond, 1994; Hatton, 2020).

EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AT NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS

During the multipolarity from the eighteenth century to the twentieth century, determined by the countries that had relatively close capabilities, great powers had not yet completed democratic transformations at their national levels (Craig and George, 1990). They thus did not have domestic, social,

and political pressure affecting their foreign policies. Thus, they did not have to convince their constituents to follow a certain foreign policy, and allying with other great powers did not require an internal political struggle for approval (Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992: 472). This point can be extended until the 1950s and 1960s because universal suffrage was not given by then by great powers in Europe and North America. Since then, transnational and international social movements have gained the power to direct states' foreign policies (Waterman, 1993). Social movements mainly were affiliated with deep requests for change in the third-world or second-tier countries, but their demands could not be transformed into revolution without the political and economic support of great powers during the Cold War. The last decade of the twentieth century fueled their power of self-initiation in the decision-making process (Ekins, 2005; Cox, 1999), and this empowerment surfaced in the first decade of the twenty-first century—as in cases of post-Soviet states in Latin American and Middle Eastern states (Arab Spring).

Nonetheless, recent social movements—such as Occupy Wall Street, anti-lockdown protests against government policies regarding COVID-19, and anti-migration protests in the Western world, which are mostly occurring in great powers—have been, to some extent, detrimental to governments' domestic and foreign policies. Considering all these governments of great powers principally need to get an adequate number of votes in elections, it can be argued that protests are paramount factors in international politics. Most recently, the American Senate was raided by pro-Trump protestors during the meeting to approve Biden's presidency. Those who supported Trump and those who were pro-Biden have been regarded as having two different approaches to both domestic and foreign policies. This cracked open the democratic principles on which the American democracy strictly relies. In this sense, even at national levels, social movements can be added to the list of factors affecting world politics, as people have their own power to impact national, regional, and international politics.

Thinking that social movements could translate themselves into revolutions in periphery countries that are democratically, economically, and militarily underdeveloped has lingered. They might not cause a social or political crisis in established liberal democracies, as in great Western powers. However, they still seem powerful enough to change the course of their domestic and foreign policies. In practice, social and political critics at the domestic level toward governments of powerful states might reconsider their policies or force them to do something (Dag, 2020: 20). For example, the Biden administration is now under national and international pressure to sanction Prince Salman of Saudi Arabia for ordering the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, a *Washington Post* contributor (Aghamohammadi and Omidi, 2018; Milanovic, 2020). In addition, in the twenty-first century, ideas,

new methods, and hopes do not recognize political or natural borders but flow everywhere in the world almost instantly. From this perspective, the emotion and deviations at the ideational level cannot be contained and are destined to spread. Regardless of what reasons mobilize people to fill the streets, people have been quite influential in daily politics at national and international levels. Thus, they have a significant influence on national and international politics throughout the world.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIETY IN WORLD POLITICS

The liberal institutional theory claims that despite the fact that all international institutions have been established with multilateral treaties signed by the states, they have been playing a role of restraining against unilateral actions of states, especially great and rising powers (Finnemore, 2009). Once they are formed and become operational, they constitute several rules that all signatory states abide by. It is mostly agreed that a Pax Americana consisting of international economic, defensive, social, and cultural organizations was established in the post-Second World War period and these institutions have been financially subsidized by the United States (Layne, 2012: 204). As a major financier and source of legitimacy, the United States is believed to have had control over the agenda of these institutions, especially during the Cold War and the unipolar moment. However, recent developments indicate that the United States is in trouble with these institutions while financing them but could not get them to decide in alignment with its own interests. NATO's reluctance to be involved in the Afghanistan war, UNESCO's (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) and the United Nations General Assembly's recognition of Palestine, the World Health Organization's unwillingness to blame China for spreading COVID-19, and so on are all regarded as paramount examples of this contradiction. That is why the United States has made statements that it would no longer finance these institutions as it did before. John Ikenberry's studies (2008; 2011a; 2011b) on liberal international order from an institutional perspective clearly mention that the United States was the founder of the system but no longer is in full control. He adds up that the system itself will prevail since most of the states have benefited from it, even second-tier states, rising regional powers and global powers whose main argument is about not replacing the system with an alternative but reformation (Ikenberry, 2018; Acharya, 2018).

In addition, the constructivist suggests that these institutions act as carriers of certain norms among the states and thus facilitate the establishment of international norms above the states (Wendt, 1995). In the fields of international

human rights (Donnelly and Whelan, 2020), epistemic communities (Haas, 2007), international courts (Alter, 2012), core principles of democracy, and populist political and social movements (Dag, 2020), there is an extremely high level of national and international social activity and political communication that transcends territorial borders. These transnational activities are mostly conducted via international institutions or joint actions of national institutions (Flynn and Farrell, 1999: 509). In this regard, the core understating forming these institutions sets the rules and imposes them over member states or parties taking part in these initiatives. Jeffery W. Legro suggests that "how international politics is defined, not just by the structure of power, but also by the dominant ideas within nations and across the international society of nations . . . the interaction and conjoint influence of power and ideas best explains outcomes" (2011: 344). From this perspective, international norms constituted by the international organizations and accepted by international society are crucial in the decision-making of every state, including super or great powers.

As mentioned above, the declining effectiveness of international organizations can originate from the declining dominant ideas and ideals of world politics. The search for alternative transnational and regional organizations, especially for economic and defense cooperation, is also a part of this descending of the dominant ideas in world politics. From the economic point of view, since the capitalist economic structure was hit and severely damaged by the 2008 financial crisis, the search for alternative ways has gradually been gaining momentum given the economic growth of several Asian (especially Chinese) economies. From the political point of view, liberal democracy has also been in crisis, as European and American politics cannot prevent rising populist movements. Authoritarian tendencies are prevailing among rising powers, as in the case of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) states. In sum, the universality of Western ideas has been challenged by those who want to be accepted into the club as they are. That is also one of the significant points indicating there is a trend and transformation leading to a new or reformed international order.

CONCLUSION

It is apparent that there has always been a trend and transformation in world politics. A classification or conceptualization is made to analyze ongoing developments and instant changes in a certain time period. Regarding the context of this book, there is an intensive change in the basics of the world system that has not yet reached an established structure. That is why academics and practitioners could not unanimously name it. Preponderant

ideas are in favor of a multipolar world system as there have been several more superpower and great power candidates. Moreover, they have already been in action to reset their lines of influence via regional and transnational institutions, economic alliances, regional projects, and involvement in the conflicts so they may be influential when they end. Although the multipolar world system is prevalent in international relations literature, there are other perspectives, such as the consideration of current multipolarity as a prep phase for bipolarity between the United States and China (Xuetong, 2015) or the United States keeping its leading role in world politics but downgrading influence.

From the ideological perspective, Western powers and civilizations have always considered themselves to create universal values, rules, laws, and models. Due to the economic and political ascendancy of the West for centuries, these mighty positions of the Western states and values have been prevailing. In this sense, the end of the Cold War not only was a victory of the United States over the Soviet Union but also symbolized the supremacy of liberal ideas, norms, and systems. Therefore, most of the states that emerged after the Cold War—even Russia to some extent—were extremely eager to be part of this Western ascendancy by adapting their social, economic, political structures to these universal European features. This is quite expected by the countries located in Eastern Europe, and even Russia, as they have had a relatively common history and religion as well as political interactions for centuries. However, alternative ways of thinking and understanding have been rising in world politics, which are in resistance to fully accepting Western universality in every aspect (Buzan, 2011). China and India can take the first two places in the list of ideal resistance to the West, and Russia, Turkey, Brazil, and Iran can also be added as followers. The possible ways of understanding are getting space in domestic and foreign policies as the Western universality decreases in line with power share in world politics. As Lukin suggests, "The West is much more worried about the prospects of a multi-polar world emerging in the future. It has no idea how to westernise vast China, and things are not going quite as planned in India, Brazil and many other places either" (2016: 99).

Systemic debates on world politics are generally ending up with the fact that there has been a considerable time period in which there was no war among great powers but disregards minor conflicts. In concert with Europe, multipolarity created a balance and prolonged peace among the great powers but resulted in two world wars. During the bipolarity, there was no war between the United States and Soviet Union, as they kept each other in balance (Fettweis, 2017). This was considered to be "the long peace" (Lebow, 1994), but the dissolution of the Soviet Union melted down the frozen issues of the Cold War and led to dramatic regional conflicts all over the world. In

general, it can be argued that the embeddedness of a world system actually provides a certain level of balance, preventing the eruption of major wars and containing regional and national conflicts until they become unbearable for one of the great powers. Within the last two decades, there has been no direct confrontation among super and great powers, which is called "new peace," but they have constantly been in a struggle in every realm and are practically taking sides in regional and national conflicts. In other words, "Old wars may be on the decline, but perhaps new wars, which kill more innocents and are more disruptive to society, have taken their place" (Fettweis, 2017: 427). Recent trends and transformations in world politics may not cause a war between great powers, but they extend national conflicts into regional, and international conflicts extend among great powers. Seemingly, these trends and transformations will continue to be the nature of international politics until a new world order—whether or not being multi, bi, or unipolar—becomes an embedded one.

The conceptual uncertainties and new ways of doing international politics are clear indicators of a trend and transformation toward new world order. A single one or all of them are not adequate to claim that a specific order is developing but enough to claim that a new one is coming. It has to be admitted that current international relations literature on world politics suggests that two possible options are emerging. First, a multipolar world system is more likely to appear, but its basics are yet to be determined as the transformation leads to a more systemic structure. Second, regional concentration of powers (Falk, 1995; Buzan, 2011) seems to be self-constructing via regional economic and political institutions and resisting regional powers toward superpower's regional interventions (Posen, 2009). These two are not against each other but can coexist once these current trends and transformations lead to a certain way of international politics.

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NOTES

1. The Iraqi Army invaded and occupied Kuwait on August 2, 1990. It led to the Gulf War, which was a war waged by coalition forces from 35 nations led by the United States against Iraq.

PART I

Chapter One

From Stasis to Change

The Structural Context of the Second Cold War

Richard Sakwa

The international system established in the post-war years is under unprecedented challenge, as are the various world orders that inhabit that system.[1] The revolutionary power system that took shape in the form of the Soviet Union and its allies was one of those world orders, but its disintegration between 1989 and 1991 allowed the major alternative, the Atlantic power system, to bask in self-declared triumph. There was no post-Cold War peace settlement, and the uneasy arrangements established at that time are beginning to unravel. First, the era of the cold peace between 1918 and 2014 has given way to the onset of a second Cold War. The idea of a new Cold War is highly contested, but it is used here in the very specific context as an analogy between the first and the second world wars. Just as the Second World War differed in scope, regional context, key actors, and ideological configuration from the First World War, so, too, does the second Cold War differ from the first in these characteristics. Despite this, a new bipolarity is emerging, focused on Beijing and Washington, D.C., and Europe is once again divided. Second, just as was the first Cold War, the second is also about the conflicting views of world order as the US-led liberal international order (LIO) is challenged by the emergence of a putative anti-hegemonic alignment between Russia, China, and their allies in the emerging alternative architecture of world affairs—especially the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Third, the Atlantic power system is eroding, with the European Union (EU) striving for greater "strategic autonomy" and a greater geopolitical presence in world affairs,

while in Washington, the Trumpian disruption reflected some long-held concerns about burden-sharing and the problem of priorities—which was defined as the "pivot to Asia" in the Barack Obama years. This means that in the second Cold War, the confrontation will be focused on the confrontation between two states, the United States and China; and although bloc politics will certainly figure, as the United States seeks to shore up its alliance system and to prevent allies from defecting, China has no aspiration to create an alliance system analogous to that created by the Soviet Union. More than that, China is careful to learn the lessons of the Soviet Union's demise and seeks to avoid the same fate. It may well be that the United States should also take a lesson from that experience. With burgeoning fiscal and trade deficits, no country is immune to the lessons of "imperial overstretch" (Kennedy, 1988).

WHAT STASIS, AND WHAT CHANGE?

Periodization is an important heuristic device, and thus it is important to establish the baseline for continuity and change. International relations in the post-war era in Europe have developed through three main stages. The first stage between 1945 and 1989 was marked by the onset of the first Cold War with enduring confrontation between the two superpowers that developed after the 1956 Suez Crisis—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States—as well as by various proxy wars and periods of détente, which were accompanied by the development of a ramified arms-control architecture. The second period is that of the cold peace between 1989 and 2014, in which the tensions, failings, and contradictions of the post-Cold War non-order became increasingly apparent. Two issues predominated at this time. The first was the question of how the Atlantic power system and its leading power, the United States, would interpret the period. Amid intense discussion, a consensus emerged on a type of universalism based on an expansive agenda. It was assumed that the "unipolar moment" meant that the world could be reshaped in the image of the victorious powers. From this perspective, modernity took one main form to which other cultures and civilizations would have to adapt. In geopolitical terms, this meant the attempt to apply a type of universal Monroe Doctrine, to prevent any power challenging US primacy. The second issue flows from this question: What would happen to those powers that refused to adapt and instead sought to assert their sovereign independence, cultural autonomy, and civilizational specificity? This was not the first time that Russia faced the question, and so it was not surprising that Russia was the first to find itself in an orthogonal relationship with the expansive universalism of the Atlantic power system (in its liberal world order guise), especially when it was faced with the institutional enlargement

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU on its doorstep. Ultimately, China would also be proclaimed an antagonist, if not an outright adversary, as a result of the dynamics of adaptation and resistance.

This is what gave rise to the third phase since 2014, the second Cold War. At first, this focused on the contradiction between Russia and the Atlantic power system, with the struggle over Ukraine reflecting the long-gathering tensions. Elements of the first Cold War were reproduced in Europe, with a virtual and moveable "iron curtain" once again dividing the continent, accompanied by elements of remilitarization as semipermanent NATO forces were stationed in the Baltic republics and Poland. However, even before this, the Obama administration had begun the "pivot to Asia," which later assumed an increasingly ramified neocontainment strategy that consolidated and developed the already extensive US base network in the Asia-Pacific region, repeated "freedom of navigation" operations in the South China Sea, and sustained traditional alliance networks as well as created new ones (such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP). Donald Trump eschewed these new bodies but reinforced containment strategies and added new elements, including a trade war and the attempt to achieve the technological isolation of China. Given that the United States and China are the only two major peer powers, the struggle between the two exerts a powerful magnetic field in global affairs. Just as in the first Cold War, few powers can escape the bloc-forming tendencies, although most devise their own strategies to avoid being sucked in as proxies. By comparison, we can now see that the Soviet Union was a rather limited challenger, and despite its undoubted economic and social achievements, its main power was its military and, above all, nuclear parity with the United States from the mid-1970s. In the end, the USSR proved to be an artificial creation and disintegrated along the lines of its union republics in 1991, whereas the Chinese state has roots reaching back more than two thousand years. It will prove a more enduring and serious competitor, and thus this second Cold War may well be equally enduring.

After a quarter-century of stasis, the pattern of international politics is changing. The inter-Cold War period of the cold peace is giving way not to a thaw but to the entrenchment of bipolar confrontation in new forms. At the heart of the change, however, there lies a paradox. Change is taking place in the context of a deep impasse rooted in the clash of models of world order. In effect, the more change, the deeper the impasse becomes. Like the first Cold War, the second is also about conflicting views of world order, although the language and modalities differ. The US-led LIO order is challenged by the emergence of a putative anti-hegemonic alignment (Sakwa, 2017). This phenomenon is much bigger than simply the reemergence of China as a global actor or Russia's neorevisionist stance that challenges the practices of the previously hegemonic world order. Both countries defend the multilateral norms

of the international system but challenge the assumption that the liberal world order is synonymous with the order itself. The two countries—and to varying degrees their allies in the emerging alternative architecture of world affairs, notably SCO and BRICS—have adopted elements of the neorevisionist position, and this provides the ideational framework for the emerging anti-hegemonic world order. This renewed bipolarity drags all states, corporations, and civil society into its gravitational pull, including Russia and the EU, and exposes their relative powerlessness in the new constellation.

However, it is important to note that China has never accepted or used the concept of bipolarity, which runs against the grain of the Chinese philosophy of international relations, while the idea of some sort of shared governance (G2) between the United States and China is even more alien to its thinking. At the same time, Russian official thinking still advances the idea that the US-led unipolar model of international relations is giving way to multipolarity (Zhao and Kortunov, 2020). Nevertheless, material realities and the shifting center of gravity of the global economy to Asia give a tangible form to a renewal of the East-West confrontation, this time probably in more enduring forms and with the "East" better positioned to resist the hegemony of the Atlantic powers. Members of the anti-hegemonic alignment seek to play down the confrontational element and stress that it is not directed against anyone. The stated goal is to restore balance in world affairs within the framework not simply of multipolarity (although polycentrism, as Russians put it, is a key value) but through a positive agenda of a new model of international relations. The alignment is thus not *counter*-hegemonic, which would simply replicate the existing pattern of international behavior, but *anti*-hegemonic, questioning the very idea that a single state and its allies can claim primacy in world affairs or that their ideology can be considered universal. This position was already implicitly asserted in 1945 in the Yalta system of great power relationships but was then "democratized" through the principles enunciated in the Helsinki Final Act of August 1975. This is the Yalta-Helsinki international system (discussed in greater detail below), in which the state sovereignty principles enunciated in the early post-war period were modified. They had already been tempered by the universalist principles embodied in the United Nations' (UN) Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international conventions, but this was further tempered by the human rights principles codified in the Helsinki Final Act.

In the first Cold War, the US-led order was challenged by the Soviet Bloc within the framework of a bipolar international order, but in the post-1989 period, the assertion of unipolarity undermined the principles of both Yalta and Helsinki (Ikenberry, 2011). Today, the aspirations for multipolarity are embedded in the broader emergence of contesting visions of world order (Smith, 2013). In other words, the early second Cold War confrontation

between Russia and the Atlantic system as well as its later mutation into the Sino-Atlantic conflict can be understood only in the larger context of the struggle between representations of global political order. The confrontation between the expansive LIO and the resistance of a group of states provoked the second Cold War, and the terrain of the struggle is not only geopolitics but also contested representations of normative order. The Trump phenomenon emerged as an intervening variable, challenging both post-war representations of American hegemony and those who were coalescing in resistance to it. Hence, we need to understand the dynamics of the strategic impasse in global affairs that provoked the second Cold War.

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The international system created at the end of the Second World War continues to provide the overarching framework for international politics. The early post-war years were the foundational moment for the Yalta-Helsinki international system. It is comparable to its predecessors: the Westphalian system of sovereign states from 1648, the Congress system of spheres of influence and anti-revolutionism established in Vienna in 1815, and the Versailles model of liberal institutionalism and neocolonialism designed in 1919. These all contributed to the post-1945 order, but the elements were incorporated in novel forms to create a new system. Created in conditions of multipolarity (the United States, USSR, Britain, and France), the operating code of the Yalta order is sovereign internationalism, and its fundamental principle is multipolarity, although this was occluded in the first Cold War, as it has been later.

The international system can be understood in terms of three layers (or three stories of an edifice) with multiple links between the three without links necessarily all going through the middle (Sakwa, 2017: 36–68). The top floor of this ternary system is occupied by what the English School calls the secondary institutions of international society. These are the multilateral institutions of global governance, above all the UN with its five permanent members of the Security Council (P5) as well as the various UN agencies, such as the World Health Organization (WHO). Here also are found the Bretton Woods institutions, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, flanked by international legal, environmental, and other economic governance institutions. These are complemented by an increasingly ramified network of international law and normative expectations. They cover the institutions of international financial governance and the system of global economic governance, notably the World Trade Organization (WTO). Here also are the international legal and environmental covenants as well as those covering the rules of war and international humanitarian practices. The top

floor is where the regulatory framework for international trade, commerce, and financial flows is generated. Some of this is bilateral or regional, but as globalization gathered pace after 1989, agencies such as the WTO gained in stature to ensure competitive markets and to break down restrictive trade and employment practices.

This is where we move to the second level. Beneath the solidarity of international governance institutions, we have competing states whose relations in English School thinking are governed by the primary institutions of international society: sovereignty, territoriality, balance of power, war, international law, diplomacy, and nationalism (Buzan, 2014: 32–36). In the original English School formulation, the international society of states devised in Europe expanded in successive waves to encompass the whole world (Bull and Watson, 1984). This really was an "expansion," enlarging a system into which peripheral countries were incorporated (for Russia, see Neumann, 2011; for a recent analysis, see Dunne and Reus-Smit, 2017). However, the original expansion model is based on a single-level system, but with the development of "secondary institutions" and their associated sharing of sovereignty on functional issues (such as the environment), the single-planed model becomes inadequate. These are the structures of universalism and interstate cooperation that became increasingly ramified after the Second World War (Slaughter, 2005). It is on this middle floor that we find competing states and their accompanying "world orders," such as the US-led LIO and the Russo-Chinese alignment in defense of sovereign (or conservative) internationalism. This gives rise to what some call a "multi-order world" (Flockhart, 2016). Others stress the "multiplex" character of relations between states (Acharya, 2017). Great power relations are accompanied by attempts to advance their hegemony, which takes the form of competing world order agendas. In other words, political and military confrontation is accompanied by an epistemological struggle over how to interpret world order.

This epistemological struggle takes place on the ground floor, where civil society groups, think tanks, policy institutes, media outlets, and civil associations try to shape the cultural landscape of politics. Groups trying to push responses to the climate catastrophe up the global agenda are found here, as are movements fighting for racial and historical justice, and it is where grassroots nationalism is fostered. This is also where transnational corporations compete as well as where some of the "new oligarchs" seek to shape international affairs. At the head of the Open Society Foundations, George Soros has long been a major player in this respect, arousing the ire of not only countries such as Hungary or Russia, where he is accused of interfering in domestic matters, but also the United States when he challenges some of the country's policies. The COVID-19 pandemic also brought forth major health care and

epidemiological institutes, notably the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, again provoking no end of conspiracy theories.

COMPETING ORDERS WITHIN THE SYSTEM

Within the system, we have *orders*, defined as specific models of globalism. Up to 1989, two orders predominated: the Soviet and the one based on the Atlantic alliance (the political West as it was constituted during the Cold War). After 1989, the Atlantic system rebranded itself as the LIO and claimed to be universal, along with its accompanying sponsorship of a distinctive type of globalization. As the second Cold War deepened, the LIO was more explicitly challenged by the anti-hegemonic alignment of Russia and China, along with some other states with varying degrees of commitment to this alignment, grouped primarily in the "post-Western" institutions mentioned earlier, notably the SCO and BRICS (Stuenkel, 2015, 2016). It was also challenged from within by national populist resistance to globalization, the financial oligarchy, and burgeoning neoconservative and liberal interventionism. The fruits of this are Brexit and the Trumpian disruption.

Four types of global order have shaped international politics in the post-1945 era. The classical version is of sovereign nation-states, competing in an anarchical system for advantage and benefits. This was challenged after 1945, and even more so after 1989, by the liberal world order created under the sponsorship of the United States; but it gained a certain universal status that, in the end, proved damaging to its viability because it blurred the distinction between system and order. It is as if a software program were to try to assume the characteristics of the system in which it operated, blurring a fundamental distinction that threatens the integrity of both.

SOVEREIGN INTERNATIONALISM

The first type of globalism is the one now associated with Russia, China, and their allies. This model of conservative internationalism emphasizes sovereign decision-making by nation-states, but it also understands the importance of internationalism, which can take a variety of institutional forms. As in the two-level EU, where the Commission and its agencies exercise elements of supranationalism while the member states retain large areas of intergovernmental autonomy in decision-making, so the international system in this sovereign internationalism model operates on the three levels of the international system presented earlier. For conservative internationalists, it is the middle floor that is the most important (for Trumpians and international

relations realists, it is the only one that matters), but this does not preclude a strong normative commitment to the secondary institutions of the international society on the top floor—including, as we noted earlier, the UN and the whole ramified network of international legal, economic, environmental, and social governance.

Although many of these bodies were sponsored by liberal globalists, exponents of the conservative model of globalism insist that they do not belong to them. As far as sovereign internationalists are concerned, drawing in part on the Yalta principles defended by the Soviet Union, they belong to all of humanity. On the middle floor, there are the competing states, representing the type of globalism defended by Trumpians, for whom the institutions of global governance are little more than a nuisance. Conservative internationalists tend not to have much time for independent civil society activism, since they emphasize the legitimacy of legally-constituted governments. They strongly reject democracy promotion activities sponsored by outside powers as well as human rights concerns, which they condemn as interference in the internal affairs of states. Nevertheless, given the need to preempt popular uprisings and colour revolutions, they pay close attention to popular moods.

THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER

The second is the US-led LIO (liberal international order), which was born in the early years of the twentieth century and then formulated by Woodrow Wilson in terms of a commitment to an Atlantic-based system of universal order. The LIO is based on an expansive dynamic of universal rules and economic interactions. This has been the most vigorous international order of the modern era, transforming much of the world in its image. The LIO combines military, economic, and political (normative) suborders, each operating according to a specific dynamic but coalescing to create a polymorphic and energetic international order (Chalmers, 2019).

We can observe three phases in its development. The original liberal order was rooted in Wilsonian internationalism and the Atlantic Charter of August 1941. The version that took shape in the Cold War years between 1945 and 1989 drew on these traditions and was initially a relatively modest affair. It was based on the UN Charter defending the territorial integrity of states (although also committed to anti-colonial national self-determination), multilateral institutions, and open markets. The Soviet Union could pragmatically accept the basic principles of this order, even though, in ideological terms, it opposed the system's economic and political foundations. In the later years of this phase, the LIO moved away from the Bretton Woods era of controlled capital markets and toward the financialization of goods and services,

accompanied by more open markets formulated as the four freedoms of labor, capital, goods, and services. This was accompanied by a prohibition on the use of force except in self-defense. The neoliberal advance was shrouded by the advance of the Helsinki human rights principles.

In the second phase after the Cold War ended in 1989, the liberal world order, as the only surviving system with genuinely universal aspirations, assumed more ambitious characteristics, including a radical version of globalization, democracy promotion, and regime change. The prohibition on the use of force except with the sanction of the UN was weakened, and the adoption of Responsibility to Protect in the mid-2000s represented a move away from sovereign internationalism toward the validation of humanitarian interventionism (Cunliffe, 2020a). Russia's typically equivocal stance meant that while it clearly had reservations about the shift, it was ready to engage with the issues (Averre and Davies, 2015). Critics argue that this radicalized version of liberal hegemony was "bound to fail" since its ambitions were so expansive as to classify as delusional, which in the end provoked domestic and external resistance (Mearsheimer, 2018, 2019). The exceptionalist ideology of the post-Cold War version of the liberal order was accompanied by what was perceived as the aggressive expansion of the Atlantic power system. Rather than the order being undermined by authoritarian challengers, the decline was provoked by the system's internal contradictions. Above all, the LIO's utopianism clouded issues of judgment, diplomacy, and pragmatism, and it instead imposed an inflexible ideological framework and universalist dogmatism in its relations with outside powers and domestic alternatives (Bacevich, 2020). While proclaiming pluralism as its fundamental value, the system had a rigid value system that meant it became intolerant at home and aggressive abroad (Cunliffe, 2020b).

The third phase began at the moment of the liberal order's greatest power, reflecting the contradictions of that power as the system entered into a prolonged "interregnum" (Babic, 2020). This gave rise to the Trumpian rejection of some of the fundamental postulates of the LIO; although, there had long been challenges to some of its principles. For example, Trump's questioning of the utility of NATO and its centrality in US strategic thinking had been prefigured in the debates about "burden-sharing" and Obama's "pivot to the East." Nevertheless, Trump's transactional and mercantilist approach and rejection of multilateralism represented the repudiation of the principles on which US foreign policy had been conducted since 1945. Trumpian nationalism represented a return not to the sovereign internationalism of the Yalta system but to something more visceral and nationalistic, reminiscent of the pre-1914 era of great power competition and imperialism. In the third phase, the one in which we now find ourselves, the expansive liberal order met its limits both domestically (in the rise of national populism and a revived leftist

internationalism) and in international affairs in the emergence of coherent alternative models of world order. In part, this reflects the broader shift of economic power from the West to the East, but also from the larger failure of the expanding US-led LIO to find ways to incorporate the periphery without the former outsiders fearing for the loss of their identity. In the Russian case, resistance, in the end, took the form of the second Cold War, while in the case of China, long-term civilizational contradictions have reemerged. China and Russia challenged the attempted substitution and defended the autonomy of the international system. This meant defending international law rather than the "rules-based order" (Lavrov, 2020a). As the Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, repeatedly notes, a "rules-based order" (2020a) is not the same as the rigorous application of international law, as vested in our times in the UN and its institutions. The United States also began to defect from the LIO, with Trump rejecting some of its fundamental postulates. The overall effect, as Lavrov laments, is that "the international security architecture [is] crumbling" (2020b).

In the post-Cold War era, the LIO effectively claimed to be synonymous with the order itself. The corollary is that the international system as a whole came to be seen as the extension of domestic politics into the international domain. In the post-Communist era, this gave rise to what can be called democratic internationalism (Sokov, 2018). Exaggerated claims to hegemony undermined its claims to universality and in the end provoked resistance. In our three-storied model of the international system, the institutions of global governance are held effectively to be the property of one of the competing orders. It is this claim to universality that was challenged by proponents of alternative models of globalism.

MERCANTILIST NATIONALISM

The third type of globalism has gained increasing traction as the national-populist anti-globalist wave has swept the Atlantic world. This is the transactional and mercantilist approach adopted by Trump and the various national populist movements of our time (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018). For Trump, the international sphere is simply the extension of the market into the larger domain where zero-sum logic predominates and there is a ruthless battle for market share. The strong become stronger, while the weak endure what they must. There is no room for multilateral agencies or international alliances, which, in Trump's view, only constrain the United States. Values are humbug, everything is transactional, and there is no need for democracy promotion. This is a stark model of Westphalian internationalism, harking back to the era before 1914 when imperialism took classic colonialist forms.

Today, the revolt against globalization takes place in the very countries that had taken the lead in outsourcing jobs and services. The benefits of globalization have been spectacularly badly distributed, and while lifting millions out of poverty in China, destroyed the industrial heartlands of the advanced capitalist democracies while allocating increased wealth to the rich. This is accompanied by a cultural revulsion against not only globalization but also the apparently heedless cosmopolitanism with which it became associated. This is why the *policies* advanced by elites in the Anglo-Saxon world are so readily dismissed, and the marginalized masses instead increasingly look for *meaning*.

TRANSFORMATIVE (REVOLUTIONARY) INTERNATIONALISM

The fourth type of globalism is the one represented until 1991 by the Soviet Union and its allies, which for a time in the 1950s included China. Revolutionary socialism is no longer the source of transformative change in international politics, although the ameliorative agendas of various forms of ethical socialism and social democracy still contribute to debates about the appropriate forms of radical social change. This is accompanied by the emergence of new movements calling for the transformational renewal of the international system, notably those responding to the urgency of the climate emergency. The climate crisis demands new forms of social organization and a thorough rethinking of growth-led models of economic development and is perhaps the greatest force pushing for change against the stasis of the past. The decarbonization agenda will change not only technological but also social relations. Emerging disruptive digital technologies and biotechnologies are already changing the way that people live and work, and we are only at the beginning of this new revolution. The twenty-first century has seen a number of epidemiological events—with SARS from 2002 to 2004, H1N1 in 2009 to 2010, and Ebola from 2013 to 2016—but preparations for the inevitable new pandemic were inadequate (Osterholm and Olshaker, 2020). The devastating effect of SARS-CoV-2 (the official name for COVID-19) in 2020 was amplified by its specific characteristics, including ease of transfer, delay in the appearance of symptoms, lethality, inadequate testing facilities, and the lack of vaccines and personal protective equipment. The coronavirus pandemic of 2020 made clear that the relationship between man and nature was precarious and that the emergence of a pathogen in one part of the world could soon bring the global economy to a halt. In the end, a new form of radical internationalism may be the only answer to the survival of humanity on this planet.

This type of globalism returns to the aspirations voiced by Mikhail Gorbachev and others at the end of the Cold War for a qualitative transformation of international politics. Realists denounce this transformational aspiration as hopelessly idealistic and unrealistic, and they have powerful arguments to support their case (Wohlforth and Zubok, 2017). However, the absence of ideational and institutional innovation at the end of the first Cold War only perpetuated confrontational and containment practices. After 2014, these reemerged in full force to divide Europe once again and to roil the world. The prospect of some sort of greater European partnership was wholly realistic and probably essential at the end to avoid a renewed bout of Cold War. The failure (so far) of ideas of some sort of European confederation prompted attempts to give institutional form to the political subjectivity of Eurasia and the attempt to delineate some sort of political community for East Asia and Europe in the Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) (Diesen, 2017).

PROBLEMS OF HEGEMONY AND THE END OF STASIS

The Great Pandemic exposed some of the structural weaknesses of the LIO, above all the contradictions of liberalism at its heart. This includes the long-term hyperdevelopment of the military power of its leading member while allowing its society, governance, and infrastructure to decay. At the end of the Cold War, the United States did not become "a normal country in a normal time," and contrary to the advice of Jeane Kirkpatrick, continued its "unnatural focus" on trying to change the world (Smith, 2020). Instead, the contradictions accumulated, to be exposed at a time of stress.

After 1978, China took advantage of US-managed globalization, which transformed the country in social and economic terms. However, the political system retained its sovereignty. Although, for a time, the leadership was ready to tolerate the imputed claims of the LIO as a substitute for the system, a day of reckoning would inevitably arrive. Beijing defends the autonomy of the international system in the form of the independence of the UN and the impartiality of globalization processes (Lee, 2020). Russia was never quite so supportive, arguing from the first that the substitution was illicit and part of the hegemonic claims of the LIO. Russia supported the multilateral bodies on the top floor but resisted their appropriation through hegemonic claims of the LIO. Russia instead defended the autonomy of international governance institutions. This is the underlying structural reason for the estrangement between Russia and the political West. The alienation was deepened by the enlargement of the military wing of the LIO, with NATO advancing to Russia's borders. The Atlantic powers argue, with good reason, that there was

no sustained attempt to exclude the country, but still, there was "no place for Russia" (Hill, 2018).

Joining the Atlantic power system would have entailed Moscow accepting Washington's hegemony. There is a constituency in Russia that argues that this would have been the wisest course of action. Russia would have become like France or the United Kingdom, part of the most successful joint enterprise in history. Given China's history, this was never a strategy that could be accepted by the country. Although, its leader's conduct of international politics sought to delay the moment of confrontation. This moment was clearly on the cards with the clear neocontainment message contained in Obama's "pivot to Asia." In her landmark speech on the subject in October 2011, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said China's rise was an emerging threat and outlined a comprehensive strategic response, including reinforcing traditional security alliances, broadening trade and investment as well as multilateral partnerships, expanding military presence in new arenas, and advancing democracy and human rights. This agenda was intensified in the Trump years by the addition of trade wars, and the confrontation was exacerbated during the pandemic as each side accused the other of mismanaging the crisis.

Russia's stance is sometimes perceived as a reactionary defense of the Yalta system, which gave birth to the UN and endowed the country with a privileged status in the UN Security Council. However, Moscow's concern is not with recreating patterns of dominance with which Yalta is associated but about the narrower agenda of defending the model of internationalism represented by the Yalta-Helsinki system. The Russian charge of double standards against the LIO arises because of its hegemonic assertions, which include the right to define how and when international law is applied. Paradoxically, as the backlash in the United States and some other countries grew against what were perceived to be excesses of globalization, including the outsourcing of manufacturing and technological innovation to other countries, internationalism and multilateralism also became subject to critique. This is why defenders of liberal internationalism were so alarmed by Trumpian nationalism, fearing that the baby of liberal hegemony would be thrown out with the bathwater of disadvantageous globalization.

The emergence of a putative alternative model of world order promises to disrupt the long stasis in international affairs that has predominated since 1945, although in conditions of the continuing systemic impasse. Although 1989 brought important changes to the practice of international politics, the international system was not fundamentally transformed (Pouliot, 2010). Equally, the key subaltern actors do not intend for the current period of dynamic change to revise the international system, only its practices. This is why Russia and China are not revisionist powers but neorevisionist: seeking to change how the existing works rather than changing the system itself. In

the quarter-century of the inter-Cold War years (1989 to 2014), otherwise known as the period of the cold peace, the LIO became more ambitious (within the framework of the ideology of globalization and the "end of history"), but the post-1945 order prevailed. The main process that occurred after 1989 was the enlargement of the liberal order accompanied by extensive claims to hegemony. From that perspective, 1989 did not represent such a radical break, other than for the countries directly involved. Only when the expanding liberal order "hit reality" did some rethinking begin (Mearsheimer, 2018). The unexpected durability of the Atlantic alliance system mystifies realist theorists.

Only now, some 70 years after the end of the Second World War, is a major shift taking place in the international system. The central point is not only that unipolarity has given way to multipolarity but that the framework for relations between orders marks a qualitative change in international relations and thus represents a return to the "transformative" agenda outlined by Gorbachev at the end of the first Cold War. The inter-Cold War period was characterized by the tension between enlargement and transformation. However, with the onset of the second Cold War in 2014, the long period of stasis when the US-led liberal order predominated (although challenged by the Soviet Union and its allies for some of the time) is now giving way to a renewed period of confrontation. While Gorbachev and his successors at the head of the Russian state sought a positive transformation within the framework of the post-Second World War international system, the second Cold War is characterized by a negative transformation in which the logic of confrontation has been restored.

CONCLUSION

Is an alternative possible? Some years ago, Andrew Hurrell noted that the four BRICS countries had a certain "capacity to contribute to the production of international order, regionally or globally" (2006: 1). At that time, Russia was considered the outlier since "the reality of the past two decades [there was] one of decline and the dissolution of power" (MacFarlane, 2006). Hurrell noted that while a central theme of the twentieth century was the struggle of revisionist states to achieve equal rights, "the recognition of regional spheres of influence, and the drive for equality of status within formal and informal international institutions," and although in the recent period the currency of power may have changed, the issue of recognition "has been sharpened by the growth of the idea that international society should aim to promote shared values and purposes rather than simply underpin coexistence and help to keep conflict to a minimum" (2006: 2). In the second

decade of the twenty-first century, Russia reemerged as an active player in international affairs, and although still only barely in the top dozen countries economically, its impressive military reform and reequipment since the 2008 Russo-Georgian war allowed it to punch above its weight. Stasis and change now balance each other, and although the post-first Cold War order is unraveling, this has given rise to both a second Cold War and the emergence of an anti-hegemonic alignment. The question today is whether the latter can help transcend the former.

Although the sinews of a post-Western world are emerging, notably in the form of SCO and BRICS, it remains to be seen whether these bodies and countries behind them will be able to sustain the multilateralism of the last seven decades and the international system in which they are embedded. Does the absence of the hegemon that provided the security and support for multilateralism represent a danger or an opportunity? The post-Western world may well assume the characteristics of the pre-Western international system, dominated by vast competing empires. National populist realism entails partial deglobalization. Equally, it would be the supreme irony if liberal internationalism and open markets were to be saved by the leaders of the anti-hegemonic alignment. This could herald a new age of post-hegemonic internationalism, but it could equally inaugurate a new era of zero-sum conflict, protectionism, a drive to the bottom in regulatory standards, and another three-decade-long Cold War.

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NOTES

1. This chapter draws on some of the ideas in my chapter, "Stasis and Change: Russia and the Emergence of an Anti-Hegemonic World Order," in Emel Parlar Dal and Emre Erşen's (eds.) *Russia in the Changing International System* (2019) as well as my book *The Lost Peace* (forthcoming).

Chapter Two

NATO—The Urgent Need of Adaptation (Again) in a Changing World

Revitalization of Political Dimension, Southern Flank, and China Factor

Luis Tomé

The ability to adapt to the geopolitical context and strategic circumstances is the reason for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) success and longevity. It was its adaptive capacity that enabled the Atlantic Alliance to succeed in the face of the Soviet threat while consolidating itself as a trans-atlantic community of security and values, supporting European integration, and favoring economic development and the well-being of all allies.[1] It was also its adaptation to the post-Cold War "new order" that allowed it to counter those who said that the acronym NATO came to mean "No Alternative to Obsolescence." It did so by embracing former opponents, developing a wide range of instruments and capabilities to address a wider and more diverse range of threats and risks; launching security missions and operations and crisis management mechanisms; projecting itself "out of area"; and fostering cooperative security with external partners. Thanks to its adaptive capacity, NATO remains the cornerstone of the security and defense of its current thirty member states and of the Euro-Atlantic security. And its contribution to the expansion of democracy in Europe, "European reunification," international security, and the liberal international order is undeniable.

Despite a successful track record, NATO is undergoing existential and identity crises, as exposed by the well-known expressions that it would become "obsolete" or "brain dead" by US former President Donald Trump

and French President Emmanuel Macron, respectively. President Joe Biden's arrival at the White House has restored normality in American foreign and security policy and created political conditions for NATO to begin to emerge from the crisis it is facing. For Biden, the United States' commitment to NATO "is sacred" (Biden, 2020). Biden said, "The transatlantic alliance is back. . . . The United States is fully committed to our NATO Alliance" (2021a). The change in the US administration favors the transatlantic alliance and new understandings among allies, but it does not solve NATO's existential problems, nor does it mean that the organization has adapted to current circumstances and challenges. Trump's disruptive legacy is just one of many factors that mark a geopolitical, geostrategic, and security context that has changed dramatically since NATO approved its 2010 Strategic Concept. Indeed, there are systemic changes in the world power structure in the pattern of international interactions and in international and Euro-Atlantic security. NATO is not what it was during the Cold War, but neither can it continue to be what it has been in the face of a new reality to which it is no longer adapted.

Therefore, the main argument of this chapter is that the Atlantic Alliance needs to urgently readjust to a rapidly changing world in order to remain effective and relevant. The first objective is to justify why NATO must adapt; it is not so much to suggest what it should do—recommendations to that effect are proposed, in particular, in the NATO's Reflection Group report (NATO, 2020). A second argument is that the readjustment of the Atlantic Alliance requires the revitalization of its political dimension and the reinforcement of its political role. And in this regard, I highlight two particular challenges to NATO's external environment that require the readaptation of the Atlantic Alliance: the "Southern flank" and the "China factor." The three parts in which this chapter is structured illustrate these arguments and objectives sequentially, following a demonstrative-analytical model.

ADAPTATION, ADAPTATION . . . AND THE URGENT NEED OF ADAPTATION BY REVITALIZING NATO'S POLITICAL ROLE

NATO has the ability to adapt to strategic circumstances in its DNA. The establishment of the Atlantic Alliance in April 1949, shortly after the end of the Second World War and when the Cold War began, represented a large-scale strategic adaptation of twelve sovereign states[2] on both sides of the North Atlantic. It is a multilateral collective defense that went far beyond what the previous alliances had implied. When created, and despite being an "alliance of democracies," NATO included among its founders the autocratic regime of Portugal, essentially due to the strategic importance of the

Azores archipelago located in the middle of the North Atlantic (Tomé, 2010). Geostrategic considerations later also led the Alliance to include Greece and Turkey (in 1952), the Federal Republic of Germany (in 1955), and even Spain (in 1982, after the democratic transition). In the meantime, during the dispute with the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, NATO changed its initial strategy from "massive retaliation" to "graduated response," accommodated the nuclearization of the United Kingdom and France, and successively adapted its doctrines and command structure and forces. As it has adapted to the arms control and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) counter-proliferation regimes (from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I and II to the Non-Proliferation Treaty), to the East-West *detente* phases (including the Federal Republic of Germany's *ostpolitik*, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the Helsinki Accords) or the occasions of greatest tension with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact (as in the second Berlin Crisis or NATO's "double decision" in the Euromissiles Crisis).

On the other hand, from the beginning, NATO was more than a military alliance, as evidenced by the second and fourth articles of its founding Washington Treaty,[3] and it has consolidated itself as a central political forum for a transatlantic community of shared values and interests. Hence, during the Cold War, in addition to its success in the collective defense of the allies and in the realization of the anti-USSR *containment*, NATO played a key role in maintaining peace in Western Europe by integrating traditionally rival European countries into the Alliance (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany as well as Turkey and Greece); in strengthening Democracy in Europe; in promoting the universalization of "Western" values and concepts on human rights, freedom, democracy, and free trade; in favoring economic and commercial interdependencies among allies and, therefore, mutual development, prosperity, and well-being; and also in encouraging the process of European integration and of the communities that preceded the European Union (EU).

With the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet threat that justified its origin, the Alliance made a substantial adaptation to the new international order. Since then, it has embraced former adversaries and expanded to include new allies, almost all from Eastern Europe, increasing from sixteen to thirty member states,[4] in addition to the former German Democratic Republic through the unification of Germany. It restructured its organization, agencies, and command structure. It created new forces, including the NATO Response Force and the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). It prepared itself to face a wider range of threats and risks, from terrorism to WMD, maritime piracy, ballistic missile defense, cyber defense, energy security, and hybrid threats. It overcame the strict collective defense of allied territories, populations, and sovereignties to assume responsibility for

"Euro-Atlantic security." It launched distinct security and/or crisis management missions and operations, including "out of area" ones—ranging from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and North Macedonia to Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, the Gulf of Aden, and off the Horn of Africa; Pakistan earthquake relief assistance; securing the Mediterranean Sea; assisting the African Union in Darfur; and air policing over Albania, Montenegro, and Slovenia as well as the Baltic region. And it established partnerships and cooperative security mechanisms with other organizations and third countries, ranging from the Partnership for Peace program and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council to the United Nations (UN), EU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and African Union, from Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia to the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), and the "partners across the globe" network (with Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, and Pakistan).

Meanwhile, in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, for the first and only time, the Alliance invoked Article V of the Washington Treaty, the central collective defense clause. This was a sign of the times, not in the face of state or coalition of states aggression against a European ally but as a result of an attack by a nonstate actor (al-Qaeda) on US territory. NATO then readjusted itself to a dramatically changed strategic environment, based on a common political and military agenda designed to project defense capabilities, security, and political stability beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. Also, following the illegitimate annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014, NATO readjusted its defensive and deterrent stance, reinforced its involvement with Ukraine and Georgia, and embarked on improving defense spending and capabilities across the Alliance.

Throughout its adaptive evolution after the Cold War, NATO revised its Strategic Concept in 1991, 1999, and 2010. The latter, entitled "Active Engagement, Modern Defence" (NATO, 2010), was approved at the summit in Lisbon as the Alliance's roadmap for the following ten years but is still in effect. An updated Strategic Concept is not a panacea. NATO's challenges do not arise from the lack of such a document, and many elements of the existing Strategic Concept, including, most notably, the three core tasks of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security, remain highly pertinent. However, the geopolitical and geostrategic context has changed dramatically since 2010. This Strategic Concept suggests, for example, the promotion of a strategic partnership with Russia, makes limited mention of terrorism, and does not even refer to China. Also, the multiple repercussions of the "Arab Spring," the possibility of Russia being successful in interfering with elections and referendums in NATO countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, the emergence of ISIS as a new global jihadist

entity, the transformations in the geopolitics of energy, and the impact of the "China factor" were not predicted.

In particular, there have been profound and even systemic changes in world geopolitics and international security. The world power structure has changed drastically since the hegemony and unipolarity of post-Cold War US *hyper-puissance* to a "uni-bi-multi-polar" configuration, where the increasingly incomplete American primacy coincides with several other global powers (China, Russia, the EU, Japan, and India) and regional powers (from the UK, Germany, and France to Korea, Brazil, and Pakistan, from Turkey to Saudi Arabia, Iran, Indonesia, and South Africa), of which resurgent China stands out. And in a hierarchy of power in transition and under great pressure, there is the tendency for United States-China bipolarization. This new reality is recognized by the Biden administration: "We must also contend with the reality that the distribution of power across the world is changing, creating new threats. China, in particular, has rapidly become more assertive. . . . The United States cannot return to business as usual, and the past order cannot simply be restored" (United States, 2021: 7–8). Also, the interactions between the main actors have evolved toward a hybrid pattern of "*congagement*," that is, combining containment and engagement. Here, the main actors compete and conflict, but at the same time dialogue and cooperate, at bilateral and multilateral levels in an environment perceived as volatile and where the course of events and the behavior of others is uncertain (Tomé, 2016). Likewise, the *international security complex* mixes aspects of competitive security, cooperative security, collective security, and community security. Still, there are strong trends for interactions and for the international security complex to become more competitive. The NATO Reflection Group even considers "the main characteristic of the current security environment [to be] the re-emergence of geopolitical competition—that is, the profusion and escalation of state-based rivalries and disputes over territory, resources, and values" (NATO, 2020: 16). Hence, the Atlantic Alliance's geopolitical and geostrategic calculations should include Russia, China, and other global and regional powers, from India and Japan to Iran and Saudi Arabia.

In the distribution of global power, the former strategic and economic supremacy and centrality of the transatlantic axis have given way to an increasingly central Asia-Pacific in world geopolitics and economics. Take, for example, the evolution of the world's share GDP based on purchase power parity (PPP): In 1990, North America had a share of 26.6 percent, Western Europe of 26.2 percent (added together, they represented a share of 52.8 percent), and Asia-Pacific of 27.37 percent; in 2010, these shares were 26.6 percent, 17.23 percent (43.83 percent joint share), and 38.35 percent, respectively; and in 2021, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates a share of 18.99 percent for North America, 15.36 percent for Western Europe (34.35

percent joint share), and 45.31 percent for Asia-Pacific (IMF Datamapper). Another example is the evolution of military expenditure: According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), between 2010 and 2019, the military expenditure of North America decreased from $867 billion to $741 billion, and those in Western Europe from $262 billion to $261 billion, while in Asia and Oceania, they rose from $352 billion to $531 billion (SIPRI Military Expenditure database; values at constant 2018 prices and exchange rates). In addition to the concentration of economic and military power, the centrality of Asia-Pacific also results from other positive and negative factors, such as its growing weight in world trade and global energy consumption, the reduction of poverty and the exponential growth of the middle class, demographic pressure and profound changes in the composition of some Asian societies (namely China and India, the most populous countries in the world), the increase in global carbon dioxide emissions, many challenges to liberal democracy and human rights, rivalries between regional powers or the numerous territorial and border conflicts and disputes—including several hot spots, such as Afghanistan, Kashmir, China-India territorial and border disputes, the South China Sea, Taiwan, the East China Sea, and North Korea's nuclear and missile program.

The fact is that the dynamics and interactions in the Asia-Pacific are increasingly affecting the destinies of the world, and the region has become the priority of the United States' foreign and security policy, reducing the strategic importance of Europe. For example, in 1987, the United States had twice as many soldiers in Europe as it had in the Asia-Pacific—354,000 and 184,000, respectively. The situation has been reversed, and, currently, there are double the American soldiers stationed in Asia-Pacific than in Europe—132,000 and 66,000, respectively (Japan Ministry of Defense, 2020: 55; Fig. I-2–1–3). On the other hand, in 1987, the United States had eighty military bases across Europe, but today, there are only thirty-seven. Additionally, twenty of the thirty-two major bases have been closed since 1987 (Wood, 2021). Inevitably, this has had profound implications for the transatlantic alliance: European allies fear that the United States' commitment to European security will diminish as its focus on the Asia-Pacific increases. And it is precisely to assuage these fears that one of President Biden's first announcements was the following, "I've ordered the halting of withdrawal of American troops from Germany. . . . The United States is determined to reengage with Europe, to consult with you, to earn back our position of trusted leadership" (2021a).

In terms of international security, there are other factors to be stressed. Transnational risks and threats continue to be among the main security concerns of the Atlantic Alliance and of international security. Terrorism remains one of the biggest and most immediate asymmetric threats. Although the

number of terrorist attacks has declined globally in recent years, jihadist terrorism continues to carry out attacks in allied countries, seriously disturbing the Middle East and North Africa. Jihadist terrorism is expanding in areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa and southern Asia, and terrorist acts for extremist political motivations in North America and Europe are increasing (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2020). Transnational organized crime linked to trafficking in people, weapons, and drugs as well as WMD proliferation, resource disputes, maritime piracy, pandemics, and climate change are other risks and threats that affect Euro-Atlantic and global security. The emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) are increasingly relevant in terms of security, both regarding strategic competition and by aggravating transnational threats. In addition, cyber capabilities have become important instruments of state power and shape the nature of the conflict. Similarly, hybrid attacks have proliferated, creating a "grey zone" of conflict that blurs the traditional boundaries between the internal and external dimensions of security.

On the other hand, organizations and *ad hoc* coalitions that promote peace, security, and crisis management operations have multiplied: At the beginning of 2021, multilateral missions of the UN, NATO, EU, OSCE, African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Lake Chad Basin Commission, Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel), Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and the Organization of American States are active, as well as *ad hoc* coalitions, such as the International Monitoring Team, Joint Control Commission/Joint Peacekeeping Forces, Multinational Force and Observers, Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and Office of the High Representative (SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database). At the same time, preventive crisis and conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization have become crucial aspects of security and stabilization missions, requiring a more diverse range of instruments and capabilities and also the multiplicity of different actors with different natures and objectives in the same theater of operations. Since NATO is one of many organizations and multilateral mechanisms involved in crisis management and security and stabilization missions, it must necessarily articulate with many others in certain scenarios and define with others what each does and where, in a logic of complementarity—in particular with the EU (Nunes, 2020).

In the midst of all these transformations, the "liberal international order" eroded and started to be contested and disputed again. Generically, the liberal international order is based on international rules and norms (international law); multilateralism and international institutions; a certain sharing of sovereignty in order to find common solutions to common problems; political liberalism or conception of liberal democracy (as opposed to authoritarianism); economic liberalism and free trade (as opposed to protectionism and economic nationalism); free navigation of the seas (as opposed to practices

of *mare nostrum*/*mare clausum*) and accessibility for all to "global commons"; recognition of the legitimacy of different international actors; and on a view of human rights that implies the safeguarding of individual freedom and human dignity as well as respect for minorities and ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity (as opposed to a conception rooted only in certain economic rights). The liberal international order was built, promoted, and cherished by NATO allies, "becoming universal" at the end of the Cold War, always sustained by the supremacy of the United States and the "West." However, in the last few years, it regressed under the pressure of the major, more sovereign powers (including China and Russia) and due to the expansion of authoritarianisms, nationalisms, protectionisms, populisms, and "illiberal democracies."

Democracy is under pressure across the world. According to the latest annual report by Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2021 marked the 15th consecutive year of decline in global freedom . . . . The expansion of authoritarian rule, combined with the fading and inconsistent presence of major democracies on the international stage, has had tangible effects on human life and security, including the frequent resort to military force to resolve political disputes" (2021). This dire picture is confirmed by other studies. In the 2020 edition of its *Democracy Index*, The Economist Intelligence Unit (2021) recorded the worst state of global democracy since the index was first published in 2006. True, democracy has not been a prominent item on the international agenda for many years.

Whereas China has been the biggest beneficiary of the post-Cold War order (see below in point three), Russia considers itself to be its main victim—and President Vladimir Putin does not hesitate to state that "the liberal idea has become obsolete" (2019). In fact, an increasingly assertive China and a revisionist Russia are two of the main contributors to the erosion of the liberal international order. They flagrantly challenge the assumptions of that order by threatening their neighbors, exporting authoritarianism, subverting democratic processes, minimizing the international rules to which they are bound, and shaping multilateral institutions to their interests. In addition, the Sino-Russian partnership has a multiplier effect in other regions and countries, eroding the liberal order and the global primacy of the United States and the West. The Biden administration acknowledges this:

> Democratic nations are also increasingly challenged from outside by antagonistic authoritarian powers. Anti-democratic forces use misinformation, disinformation, and weaponized corruption to exploit perceived weaknesses and sow division within and among free nations, erode existing international rules, and promote alternative models of authoritarian governance. Reversing these trends is essential to our national security. (The White House, 2021: 7)

As such, the old Westphalian order—summarily characterized by the idea that the State is the only legitimate actor in the "international arena"; by a narrow conception of sovereignty, and the absolutization of the principle of "non-interference in internal affairs"; by power politics, including regional areas of influence; by indifference to oppressive ideologies and regimes; the resolution of disputes only through direct negotiations or the imposition of will by one of the parties (refusing mediation and arbitration processes carried out by international organizations and/or courts); and an "international order" that results only from the balance of power between great powers—gained strength. In fact, the liberal and Westphalian international orders have coexisted for the past 100 years, and it was over the Westphalian order that the liberal one was built and then expanded after the Cold War. But the point is that, in the last few years, the international order has become less liberal and more Westphalian.

Even under pressure in this new context of its existence, NATO's mission continues to be closely associated with the preservation and promotion of a liberal international order (Dijk and Sloan, 2020). As stated in the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty, allies "are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law . . . to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area" (NATO, 1949). And the basic ingredients for this mission have not changed: They remain, as always, military strength and political solidarity combined with the pursuit of a long-term favorable international environment. In other words, NATO needs to assume itself again as the central pillar of the liberal international order, as an alliance of democracies, and in cooperation with other democracies—once again, reinforcing its political dimension and role.

These changes and evolutions as a whole show that the environment and the external circumstances of the Atlantic Alliance have changed dramatically. As recognized by the Biden administration in its *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* published in early March 2021, "We face a world of rising nationalism, receding democracy, growing rivalry with China, Russia, and other authoritarian states, and a technological revolution that is reshaping every aspect of our lives" (United States, 2021: 6). And as also acknowledged by NATO's Reflection Group, "The world of the next ten years will be very different than the world that the Alliance inhabited either during the Cold War or the decades that immediately followed" (2020: 5). Therefore, NATO urgently needs to readapt to new geopolitical, geostrategic, and security contexts in metamorphosis; otherwise, the paralysis will lead to withering and irrelevance.

Some previous NATO adaptations remain relevant and appropriate, particularly in the military domain. These include NATO's integrated command

structure, force generation process, and interoperability standards (Ellehuus, 2019). The Alliance's collective power is demonstrated each time it makes the political decision to deploy forces, as they are able to operate according to an established military plan. While the so-called "coalitions of the willing" and other multinational organizations can also deploy forces, such formations lack the advanced military planning, political legitimacy, and staying power of NATO operations. Strong and adequate steps also included the recent adaptation of the NATO command structure establishing a new Joint Force Command for the Atlantic; new command to support logistics, reinforcement, and military mobility; and a new cyber operations center at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). On the other hand, NATO's core Article V and collective defense remains robust and has been strengthened. Beginning with the launch of the Readiness Action Plan at the NATO summit in Wales in 2014, Allies have taken a number of steps to reinforce deterrence and defense, such as the establishment of high readiness forces; an enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic States and Poland; measures to reinforce security in the Southeast; and, most recently, the launch of the Readiness Initiative. In sum, many of NATO's "vital core tools remain 'fit for purpose'" (Ellehuus, 2019).

However, the previous adaptations are not enough in view of all the transformations in the geopolitical and geostrategic contexts. In particular, there is a clear gap between a more vigorous and robust military dimension of NATO and a limited political dimension of the Transatlantic Alliance. This is even more relevant when the bulk of the new challenges in the external environment where the Alliance stands require strengthening its political role. In other words, in a changing world with systemic challenges and diverse and proliferating threats, NATO needs to complement the comprehensive military adaptation it has made and must continue with the revitalization and projection of its political dimension.

This is recognized by the Alliance heads of state and government who, at the London summit in December 2019, asked NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to undertake a Forward-Looking Reflection Process to assess ways to strengthen the political dimension of the NATO Alliance. To this end, in April 2020, Stoltenberg appointed an independent Reflection Group and tasked it with providing recommendations in three areas: a) reinforcing allied unity, solidarity, and cohesion, including cementing the centrality of the transatlantic bond; b) increasing political consultation and coordination between allies in NATO; and c) strengthening NATO's political role and relevant instruments to address current and future threats and challenges to Alliance security emanating from all strategic directions. At the end of November 2020, the Reflection Group delivered the *NATO 2030: Unity for a*

New Era report, offering 138 recommendations, of which the following are some of the main ones:

> 1. Update the 2010 Strategic Concept; 2. Continue the dual-track approach of deterrence and dialogue with Russia; 3. Devote much more time, political resources, and action to the security challenges posed by China; 4. Emerging and disruptive technologies are a challenge but also an opportunity for NATO; 5. Terrorism poses one of the most immediate, asymmetric threats to Allied nations and citizens; 6. Articulate a consistent, clear, and coherent approach to the South; . . . 12. Better utilising its partnerships to advance NATO strategic interests; . . . and 14. A strong political dimension to match its military adaptation. (NATO, 2020: 12–15)

The need for NATO to readapt by revitalizing its political role seems to be also recognized by the current US President:

> We are not looking backwards; we are looking forward, together . . . . The challenges we face today are different . . . the global dynamics have shifted. New crises demand our attention. And we cannot focus only on the competition among countries that threaten to divide the world, or only on global challenges that threaten to sink us all together if we fail to cooperate. We must do both, working in lockstep with our allies and partners. (Biden, 2021a)

The good expectations for the renewed transatlantic relationship and NATO's need to readapt are evident in the remarks made by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg:

> We now have a historic opportunity to build a stronger Alliance. . . . Because we are facing great challenges . . . we are working on an ambitious agenda for the future of our Alliance. . . . We should update NATO's strategic concept, to chart a common course going forward. And reaffirm the fundamentals of our Alliance. Second, we must broaden our approach to security. (Stoltenberg, 2021)

In the readjustment NATO needs to make to face the external environment, the "Southern flank" and the "China factor" are two of the most pressing vectors. In fact, in addition to the gap between the military and political dimensions of the Alliance, there is a gap between the best-achieved adaptations that NATO made on its "Eastern flank" and the obvious lack of political and strategic articulation in relation to its "Southern flank." For its part, although not comparable to the former USSR nor as close to the Euro-Atlantic area as Russia, China's resurgence affects the world power structure extraordinarily and represents a powerful challenge to the liberal international order.

SOUTHERN FLANK

When the periphery of NATO is more secure and stable, so is the Atlantic Alliance; and when the Alliance manages to project security and stability to its periphery, it increases the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and of the allies. However, NATO has never managed to strike a balance between the dominant security interests of its members from eastern and southern Europe, whose security mindset is quite different: eastern European allies regard Russia as the biggest threat, while southern NATO members are mainly worried about the spill-over effects of instability and conflict in the Middle East and Africa, such as failed states, conflicts, irregular migration, terrorism, and organized international crime. Moreover, given that NATO territory in the South is not threatened by a large-scale military force, "the challenges from the East will continue to dominate the NATO efforts to reinforce its deterrence and defence posture" (Zandee, 2019).

On the other hand, in its post-Cold War transformation, the Alliance was able to adapt to its new Eastern flank—a task facilitated by the previous long experience of focusing on this direction, the expansion to eastern European countries, and having to deal with essentially a single major challenger, Russia. In the mid-2010s, NATO allies were facing the resurgence of a Russian threat at their borders. After the Crimean crisis, the "NATO 360-degree" concept adopted during the Warsaw summit shows cohesion among the allies. This unity is also present in the Alliance's adaptation and decision-making process. Despite the allies' diverging interests, they focused on the East and collective defense (Calmels, 2020). Analyzing NATO's reaction to Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014, Tomáš Karásek concludes that, despite some problems and remaining challenges, "NATO's readjustment to Russian revisionism can be characterised as a moderately successful strategic sampling" (2020). On the contrary, NATO has never found cohesion and the right approach to project security and stability on its Southern flank.

The Alliance's interest and commitment to the Southern flank fluctuated, as did its goals toward the South. NATO has always had a strategic interest in the Mediterranean, which was renewed in the 1980s. After the Cold War, the majority of NATO countries considered the Southern flank to have lost relevance and interest. The 1991 Strategic Concept pointed out that risks would arise as a consequence of political, economic, and social difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes. However, these risks were focused on the old members of the Warsaw Pact. Under pressure from southern European allies, NATO could not avoid dealing with its Southern flank, and the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) was initiated in 1994 by the North Atlantic Council. It currently involves Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,

Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. The 1999 Strategic Concept stated that the Alliance was committed to progressively developing the political, civil, and military aspects of the MD with the aim of achieving closer cooperation. However, little progress was made. The 9/11 terrorist attacks and the United States' intervention in Iraq did not change the conceptual framework, but they fundamentally altered the aim of the MD itself. In the 2004 Istanbul summit, NATO's leaders decided to elevate the MD to a "genuine partnership" in the face of common challenges, such as terrorism and WMD proliferation. On the same occasion, NATO launched the ICI, with the inclusion of Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. NATO did not have a strategy for the South, but through the MD and the ICI, it had two distinct spaces of security and partnership in its Southern flank. Again, at the Lisbon summit in 2010, NATO leaders stated that stability in the South was essential for Euro-Atlantic security, and the new Strategic Concept identified "cooperative security" as a key priority.

Soon after, the Arab Spring broke out, renewing the allies' interest in the Southern flank. In particular, following the Qaddafi regime's targeting of civilians in February 2011, NATO answered the UN's call to the international community to protect the Libyan people. In March 2011, a coalition of NATO allies and partners began enforcing an arms embargo, maintaining a no-fly zone, and protecting civilians and civilian-populated areas from attack or the threat of attack in Libya under Operation Unified Protector (OUP)—*successfully* concluded on October 31, 2011, according to NATO (see NATO, 2015). Now, there was hope that the old security and instability problems would disappear if NATO allies and partners concentrated efforts to support the transformation of dictatorships into democracies, spread neoliberal norms and institutions, and promote democracy and human rights. However, expectations that things would go as well as they did on the Eastern flank in the late 1980s and early 1990s were not confirmed in the Southern flank. The Arab revolutions did not lead to major political transformation, and new authoritarian power structures were restored in most countries after the chaos. Several countries have become failed states; sectarian conflict has soared; terrorist and extremist groups, warlords, and criminal groups have proliferated; external interference in most countries and in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region as a whole has skyrocketed; countries like Libya, Yemen, and Syria have fallen into civil war; regional and global powers have taken advantage of the opportunity to expand their interests; several proxy wars have erupted; and new dividing lines and realignments have been forged (see Hamati, 2019; Ishay, 2019; Schaar, 2019; Achcar, 2020; Dinçer and Hecan, 2020; Rósza, 2020; Zartman, 2020; Barak and Miodownik, 2021; Masoud, 2021; Morana, 2021). In this fragmented context, the Alliance's

common objectives regarding the Southern flank became more difficult to define, program, and plan.

The rise of the self-proclaimed "Islamic State" (Tomé, 2015) prompted NATO to offer support to its southern partners in building counter-terrorism capabilities, institutions, and local capacity. But this new course was not exempt from uncertainties, taking into account the perceptions of a good part of the societies of the MENA countries, increasingly influenced by political Islamism and extremist Islamist movements. In 2014, 2016, and 2018, NATO endorsed new Packages on the South, which include a range of political and practical cooperation initiatives aimed toward a more strategic, focused, and coherent approach to the MENA region. Within that overall strategic aim, NATO pursued three main objectives: to strengthen NATO's deterrence and defense against threats emanating from the South; to contribute to international crisis management efforts in the region; and to help regional partners build resilience against security threats, including the fight against terrorism.

NATO has always claimed it wants to enhance its role in projecting stability to the South. And it is true that, since 1994, NATO has sought a common approach to the Southern flank, launching a series of initiatives with MD and ICI partners and other MENA countries. But "projecting stability without a NATO strategy for the Med, shared with partners, weakens and limits the reach of the practical initiatives" (Marquina, 2019: 223). Most of these difficulties result from the extraordinary intrinsic diversity and complexity of the MENA region, where several rivals and even enemy powers reside and, in parallel, multiple factors of insecurity and instability intersect: fragile, failed, or collapsed states and poverty and underdevelopment; sectarian, ethnic, and religious rivalries and conflicts; autocratic regimes; organized crime; terrorism; economic, energy, environmental, and human insecurity; and many internal, international, and "proxy" conflicts. Over the past decade, the security situation has deteriorated significantly across the whole MENA region. In addition, new competitor actors that were not initially contemplated are now present in the closer NATO's South: Russia, Iran, new terrorist and criminal groups, and even China (Malmvig, 2018; Katz, 2018; Stent, 2020; Rósza, 2020; Anderlini, 2020). Thus, a new and concerning trend in the South is the confluence of conventional challenges by state actors with growing asymmetric threats. At the same time, as Johan Schaar notes, there is a

> confluence of crises, on Water, Climate and Security . . . . The growing challenge of climate change progressively undermines human security and contributes to factors that increase the risk of violent conflict . . . . The impacts of climate change are particularly complex in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). It is a region with a diverse range of rich and poor countries, where fossil fuels have created deep dependencies among exporters as well as importers. The

> region suffers from violent conflicts and severe water scarcity, while climate models show more serious scenarios here than in other regions. The security of the MENA region is inscribed in a new climate reality. (Schaar, 2019: 1)

NATO has long recognized the existence of threats and risks to Euro-Atlantic security from the South. There is no doubt that challenges from NATO's southern neighbors affect all allies. But there have always been differences among the allies on the seriousness of certain challenges and the order of priorities in the set of risks and threats that the Alliance faces. "If not carefully managed," as acknowledged by the NATO's Reflection Group,

> they may impair the Alliance's ability to respond to security challenges in the region and risk the cohesion of the Alliance. Conversely, a stable South holds the prospect of realising the immense latent potential of societies and economies in this region, with attendant benefits for the countries of the Euro-Atlantic area. (NATO, 2020: 34)

The Southern flank gives rise to not only a myriad of threats and risks to Euro-Atlantic security but also other dilemmas that affect the cohesion of European states and NATO. For example, the situation in the MENA region promotes massive movements of migrants and refugees who cross the Mediterranean to reach Europe. This, in turn, continues to divide European countries and favors the expansion of populist and nationalist movements. At the same time, Turkey never stopped pressing the EU and several of its NATO allies with the possibility of "opening the tap" of migrants and refugees on their way to Europe. Meanwhile, in the context of the 2015 to 2016 migration crisis, the NATO Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean increased maritime situational awareness, which supports EU and national action in the areas of border protection activities and the fight against terrorism. However, political motives—to fly the NATO flag in the Mediterranean—rather than military requirements triggered the launching of Operation Sea Guardian in 2016. Ships and other assets could easily have been deployed in the context of the EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Mediterranean Operation Sophia, which had started a year earlier. It is indeed difficult for the Alliance to play a major role in addressing the main security concerns of its southern member states.

On the other hand, the United States has been downsizing its regional role in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. US energy self-sufficiency has altered one of the traditional assumptions and priorities with which Washington has long faced the Middle East. And the Trump administration's regional policy—in Syria, Libya, and Yemen, the change regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the support for the exclusive interests of Israel and Saudi Arabia or hostility escalation toward Iran, including the

unilateral US exit from the Iran nuclear P5 + 1 agreement (formally the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action)—created new problems in the region and deepened divergencies among NATO Allies. Although Trump was responsible for many ill-conceived policy decisions, the partial withdrawal of the United States from the region actually started under Barack Obama (Kadomtsev, 2019; Calabrese, 2019; Anderlini, 2020; Barnes-Dacey, 2020). Sean Yom even argues,

> In the Middle East, critics have harangued the Trump Doctrine as an even hastier surrender of the US hegemony that has defined regional order since the 1980s. In reality, American interest in this region has been declining for a decade as expressed by its rising reluctance to leverage its economic and military supremacy to constrain, regulate, and destroy perceived foes as it once did. This waning interventionism precedes the Trump Doctrine. It stems not from any ideological turn, or the financial and military exhaustion of a cresting superpower, but rather a structural dynamic: the Middle East no longer generates credible threats against the US. Whereas in the past alarmist fears of communism and energy insecurity propelled Washington's regional imperium, today the perceived enemies of US interests—radical Islamism and Iran—do not endanger the political institutions and economic prosperity of American society. Absent a catastrophic terrorist attack, the US will continue to relinquish its hegemonic mantle, turning away from overt interventionism as the logic of coercively dominating a region of diminishing importance runs its course. (2020: 75)

The Biden administration seems unlikely to reverse this trend in any significant way.

The void left by the United States has set off a scramble for power and influence in the Mediterranean and the Middle East not only by regional powers—like Iran and Saudi Arabia—and global powers, like Russia and China, but also among NATO member countries. In addition to the tensions in recent years between Turkey and the United States over Syria and Kurdish YPG, the Fethullah Gulen affair and the Turkish purchase of S400 missiles from Russia, the traditional sources of friction between Turkey and Greece now dovetail with another set of interlocking maritime and energy disputes in the eastern Mediterranean and the Libyan conflict (Bagci and Erdurmaz, 2017; Dag and Firat, 2020; Dalay, 2021). These issues, in turn, have substantially changed the nature of the relationships of Turkey and Greece, Cyprus, France, and the EU. No doubt, this is a crisis situation not only for NATO's southern neighbors but also within the Atlantic Alliance. To make matters worse, eastern Mediterranean maritime disputes, energy exploration, and the Libyan conflict morphed into new geopolitical confrontations and power struggles with extensive ramifications. For example, there are Turkey's strange ties (competition and cooperation) with Russia and Iran and its partnerships with

Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and China (see Fernandez, 2021; Tol and Isik, 2021; Rafiq, 2021). Some observers refer to the "Emergence of Golden Ring Axis: Alliance of China, Russia, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran" (Shakeel, 2020). There is also the *Philia Forum*—a Greek initiative bringing together Cyprus, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, and France (inaugurated at a meeting in Athens on February 11, 2021)—and the *EastMed Gas Forum*, established by Greece, Egypt, Cyprus, Italy, Israel, Jordan, and Palestine (whose charter was signed in September 2020 and entered into force on March 1, 2021) (see Antonopoulos, 2021; Bianco and Rocha, 2021; Ghafar, 2021; Morana, 2021).

These developments and the imbroglio of competitive and cooperative interactions across the Eastern Mediterranean and the MENA region illustrate the complexity of the challenges that NATO faces on its Southern flank. But they also justify the Alliance's need to adapt to its "new South" and to try to work out a convincing strategy and a coherent approach. The deteriorating security situation and the return of geopolitics to the Southern flank have a huge impact on Euro-Atlantic security. On the other hand, the geographical range of the Southern flank has been widened:

> It was expanded to the Persian Gulf, after the US intervention in Iraq, the destabilization of this country and later the war in Syria and the increasing influence of Iran; and to the Sahel in North Africa, after the European and NATO intervention in Libya and its impact on the bordering States. These broader areas were not contemplated in the initial NATO Med initiatives. (Marquina, 2019: 223)

Although the real meaning of the Southern flank to NATO remains ambiguous, the Alliance's approach to the South now includes working with more countries and with the EU, African Union, and other regional and international organizations where relevant.

In order to project stability and develop a more strategic approach to partnerships, NATO needs to clarify first how it sees the present South strategic space and how it wants to project its values and interests; the role of partners; and, in general, the real possibilities of engagement in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and crisis management. Once again, all this requires consultation and political articulation between allies and NATO with other partners. To this end, the NATO's Reflection Group makes the following main recommendations:

1. NATO must articulate a consistent, clear, coherent approach to the South, addressing both the traditional threats emanating from this region like terrorism and new risks, including the growing presence of Russia, and to a lesser extent China. The relationship between multiple

frameworks and activities (Projecting Stability, Framework for the South, Defence Capacity Building, Partnerships) needs to be defined more effectively—with ownership of different portfolios clearly allocated as they are in areas such as the Eastern and Northern flanks.
2. NATO must therefore maintain political focus on building up military preparedness and response for the Southern/Mediterranean flank . . .
3. NATO should strengthen ties and cooperation, especially with the EU, in the framework of a coordinated approach. . . . It should engage more with partners in the South, regional organisations, including African Union (AU), League of Arab States (LOAS), Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and via continued out-reach out to international organisations, including the United Nations, to establish a cooperative security network across the region.
4. NATO should increase the frequency of political consultations, including at the NAC level, on the South. . . . In this context, NATO's Russia policy should be updated to include a Mediterranean component. (NATO, 2020: 34–35)

CHINA FACTOR

China's resurgence is one of the most impactful aspects of global geopolitics, and its evolution and interactions are increasingly determining for the security environment and the international order. Strangely, it was only in 2018 and 2019 that NATO leaders started referring to China within the framework of the Alliance. Several observers have suggested a NATO approach to China similar to the anti-USSR *containment* during the Cold War. To a large extent, this view results from the more competitive stance that the Trump administration took against China (Nye, 2020; Lo, 2020; Tomé, 2019, 2020). This goes hand in hand with the NATO crisis, leading some to see in China (or the China-Russia axis) the new "common enemy" that can give the Alliance its new *raison d'être*. However, we are not in a "second cold war." The world and the international system are completely different and much more complex. China is not USSR 2.0; the rivalry between China and the United States is not primarily of a military nature; the level of China's involvement and interactions with all regions and with all NATO countries is much deeper and more diverse; there are many risks and challenges that are truly global and concern everyone; and the allies' widespread perception of China is not that of an enemy. Gone is the iron curtain. China represents a powerful challenge for both the international liberal order and the Atlantic Alliance, but NATO's adaptation to the "China factor" has to be based on policies and approaches

that are appropriate to the contemporary context and in line with the current reality.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is a "country of superlatives" and the paradigm of a "resurgent" power. And the basis for its resurgence is primarily economic. Thanks to very sharp and continuous GDP growth, China's share in the world's GDP in terms of purchase power parity (PPP) jumped from 2.27 percent in 1980 to 18.56 percent in 2020—surpassing the United States, whose share in the same period decreased from 21.41 percent to 15.41 percent (IMF Datamapper). On the commercial front, China's rise is equally impressive: Between 1993 and 2019, its share in world exports rose from 2.5 percent to 13.6 percent, and in the world imports from 2.7 percent to about 12 percent, becoming the largest exporter in the world and also the largest importer if we add Hong Kong's share (WTO, 2020: 80–82). Meanwhile, PRC has become the "factory of the world," the largest market for almost everything, the largest consumer of energy and the largest trading partner of about 100 countries worldwide. China may soon have the largest world economy in real/nominal terms, which may be accelerated by the consequences of the pandemic crisis (Mahbubani, 2020). According to IMF estimates, PRC will be the only major economy to have GDP growth in 2020 (about 1.9 percent), while the United States and the Eurozone will have very negative changes (-4.3 percent and-8.3 percent, respectively); and in the year 2021, the Chinese economy will recover more quickly with a GDP growth of 8.2 percent, compared with only 3.1 percent in the United States and 5.2 percent in the Eurozone (IMF Datamapper). Under these conditions, it will be very difficult for other actors to opt for "decoupling" strategies vis-à-vis China.

China is also making remarkable progress in the field of science and technology, from transport and communications to aerospace engineering, the pharmaceutical industry, robotics, and artificial intelligence. The examples are many and they follow one another, but two are particularly symbolic. In 2019, for the first time, China dethroned the US in the leadership of the countries with the highest number of registered patents, in addition to the fact that four Chinese companies appear in the Top 10 companies with more patents in a ranking led by Chinese Huawei Technologies for the third consecutive year (WIPO, 2020). And in 2020, a group of Chinese researchers presented the world with a prototype quantum computer—called *Jiuzhang*—100 trillion times faster than the world's fastest existing supercomputer and 10 billion times faster than the 53-qubit quantum computer developed by Google, which took just over 3 minutes to complete a task that the fastest conventional supercomputer could not solve in 600 million years (Xinhuanet, 2020).

China's power is also evident in the strategic domain. A nuclear power since 1964, its People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the largest army in the world with about 2 million soldiers in active service, investing continuously

and significantly in defense: having the 2nd largest defense expenditure just after the US, China's military expenses increased 85 percent between 2010 and 2019, reaching an estimated USD 261 billion and a worldwide share of 14 percent, with China accounting for half of the military expenditure across Asia and Oceania (SIPRI Military Expenditure database). Along with large budgets, Beijing has embraced a "Revolution of Military Affairs with Chinese characteristics," developing and modernizing its capabilities in the naval, air, missile, transport, communications, space, and cyber fields. The US Pentagon acknowledges that "China has already achieved parity with—or even exceeded—the United States in several military modernization areas . . . . The PRC has the largest navy in the world . . . . China is the top ship-producing nation in the world by tonnage and is increasing its shipbuilding capacity and capability for all naval classes" (United States, 2020: vii). On the other hand, in August 2017, China inaugurated its first military base in foreign territory, Djibouti, and

> is very likely already considering and planning for additional overseas military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces. The PRC has likely considered locations for PLA military logistics facilities in Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, and Tajikistan. (United States, 2020: x)

Similarly, China has been projecting its political-diplomatic influence across all regions of the globe and with most other states—it has formal strategic partnerships with more than 120 countries and organizations around the world and within international and regional organizations and bodies—from the UN and its agencies to the WTO, G20 or APEC—trying to shape them to its interests and values in a kind of "embedded revisionism." At the same time, China has been promoting new frameworks and multilateral mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation, examples of which include BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China International Import, Expo Hongqiao International Economic Forum, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, Forum of China and Community of Latin American and the Caribbean States, Boao Forum for Asia, Conference on Dialogue of Asian Civilizations, World Internet Conference, and the Macao Forum (with seven Portuguese speaking countries). Another paradigmatic example is the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013, and around 140 countries and regional organizations from Oceania to Europe have joined.

Within the framework of the proclaimed "Chinese dream," Beijing continues to assert that it has no hegemonic intentions; its foreign policy is based on the traditional "five principles of peaceful coexistence"; its strategy is one

of "peaceful rise" and "win-win," taking advantage of a "period of opportunity"; and its defense policy is of a "defensive" nature (Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China, 2019). However, at the same time, Chinese leaders have declared that China has entered a new era, the meaning of which is explained by President Xi Jinping in a speech to the Nineteenth Chinese Communist Party Congress:

> China moving closer to center stage . . . new era of great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics . . . take an active part in leading the reform of the global governance system . . . a leading position in terms of economic and technological strength, defense capabilities, and composite national strength . . . crossed the threshold into a New Era. (Xi, 2017)

The reality is that the restoration of China's centrality and of a sphere of Chinese influence seems to be one of the primary goals of Beijing, showing itself to be increasingly assertive in its claims (Tomé, 2019, 2020).

On the other hand, China represents the most powerful challenge to Western values and the liberal international order. China's policies and values are closely associated with and subject to the worldview and interests of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). An example of this is the repression in Tibet and Xinjiang as well as the threats against Taiwan under the pretext of "unity in China." Another is the proclaimed "China's dream," referring to "two Centenaries" that are symbolic for the communist regime: the centenary of the founding of the CCP in 2021 and the centenary of the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Its concepts of democracy, rule of law, and human rights are very different from those of NATO's allies. The "Chinese model" is attractive to many autocratic leaders because of the coexistence of economic development with political authoritarianism and the power and influence of China boycott efforts by Americans and Europeans to promote democracy, the rule of law, and human rights from Africa to Latin America. Likewise, the principle of "non-interference in internal affairs" is widely used by the Chinese regime to turn a blind eye to repressive and corrupt practices by some governments or to civil wars while promoting China's business and other interests. In addition, Beijing refuses mediation and international arbitration to peacefully resolve disputes involving it while advancing its territorial claims by creating *de facto* situations. And given its behavior in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, the Chinese regime seems to have abandoned a *Mare Libero* position to impose a logic of *Mare Clausum* or *Mare Nostrum*.

The growth of its comprehensive national power has turned China into an emerging superpower and, therefore, a natural systemic rival of the United States. As recognized by the Biden administration, "China . . . is the only

competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system" (United States, 2021: 7–8). In these conditions, a reference to the G. Allison (2017) "Thucydides' Trap" or the classic dilemma of "hegemonic transitions" is inevitable. The competitive logic between the United States and China is fueled by the many differences, divergences, and disputes, ranging from trade issues to human rights, from technology to Taiwan. The confrontation has risen, as attested by the assertiveness of Xi Jinping's China and the confrontational rhetoric of the Trump administration, which worsened in 2020 in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and the campaign for the American presidential elections (Tomé, 2020). The fact is that the "special challenge" that China represents has become relatively consensual in the United States, with President Biden saying, "We must prepare together for a long-term strategic competition with China . . . . Competition with China is going to be stiff" (2021a). And in the *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, he adds that "this agenda will strengthen our enduring advantages and allow us to prevail in strategic competition with China . . . we will ensure that America, not China, sets the international agenda" (United States, 2021: 20).

However, "Washington's new rivalry with Beijing isn't a reprise of the Cold War. It's much more complicated" (Brands and Cooper, 2020). In addition to the competition, the China-United States relationship has a cooperative facet in a very broad and diverse agenda (ranging from the situation in the Korean Peninsula to combating climate change) both at the bilateral level (the United States and China have a formal Constructive Strategic Partnership) and in multilateral frameworks—from the International Atomic Energy Agency to Interpol, G20, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, or, inevitably, the UN, of whose Security Council they are both permanent members. For example, between 2000 and 2018, China supported 182 of 190 UN Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on states violating international rules (mostly proposed by the United States or the UK and France). And the economic and commercial interdependence between the two largest economies in the world is huge: Even in a trade war, and despite Trump's "decoupling" effort, in 2019, China was the United States' fourth largest trading partner, representing a share of 13.5 percent in American foreign trade; and the United States was China's second-largest trading partner, with a share of 11.9 percent (European Commission, 2020).

The China-United States relationship is, in fact, a mix of competition and cooperation. According to Chinese President Xi Jinping,

> We should stay committed to international law and international rules instead of seeking one's own supremacy . . . to consultation and cooperation instead

> of conflict and confrontation . . . . China is on course to finish building a moderately prosperous society in all respects . . . . As China enters a new development stage . . . China will continue to take an active part in international cooperation . . . . China will continue to implement a win-win strategy of opening-up . . . . China will continue to promote a new type of international relations . . . . Let us all join hands and let multilateralism light our way toward a community with a shared future for mankind. (2021)

As for President Biden, he said, "We cannot and must not return to the reflexive opposition and rigid blocs of the Cold War. Competition must not lock out cooperation on issues that affect us all," (Biden, 2021a) and "we are ready to work with Beijing when it's in America's interest to do so" (Biden, 2021b).

"Congagement" is indeed the pattern of interactions followed by most US allies and partners with China. Even China's neighbors that have historical rivalries and territorial disputes with it and the EU, which has come to recognize China as a "strategic competitor," have intense cooperation with China. On multiple occasions and in various matters, and particularly during the Trump administration, most of the United States' allies and partners found themselves on the opposite side of the United States and on the same side as China (from the nuclear agreement with Iran to the Paris Agreement on climate change to the WHO). At the same time, economic and commercial interdependence is very extensive. For example, in 2019 the top five of China's largest trading partners are made up of the United States and its allies and partners: The EU27 is its first partner (with a share of 13.5 percent in total Chinese trade), and after the United States, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (8.3 percent share), Japan (6.9 percent), and South Korea (6.3 percent) (European Commission, 2020). For its part, China is by far Japan's largest trading partner (representing a 20.9 percent share in Japanese foreign trade), South Korea (23.3 percent), the ASEAN10[5] group (22.5 percent), and Australia (32.5 percent) (ibid.). Even more significant, China is now the 27EU's biggest trading partner, overtaking the United States for the first time in 2020. Trade between China and the EU was worth $709 billion last year, compared with $671 billion worth of imports and exports from the United States (*BBC News*, 2021). On the other hand, according to the European Commission data, in 2020, cumulative flows of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) into the EU27 amounted to almost 120 billion euros, and the EU's FDI into China was even higher at more than 140 billion euros (European Commission, 2020).

Two examples clearly demonstrate that the United States' allies and partners reject exclusive competitive approaches to, and "decoupling" from, China. On November 15, 2020, the ten ASEAN countries, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

(RCEP) with China, which was negotiated for a decade, and established the largest free trade area in the world. And on December 30, 2020, the EU and China agreed to the terms of the "Comprehensive Agreement on Investment" (CAI) that had been negotiated for seven years. It is significant, moreover, that the signing of the RCEP and the CAI agreements occurred after Biden's victory in the US presidential election and before his inauguration.

This hybrid framework of interactions is particularly relevant in the framework of NATO and the transatlantic relations, where the "China factor" has an enormous fracturing potential. Trade and investment with China are vital to most European countries, and many of them have resisted not only the idea of "decoupling" but also American pressures in the technological domain—as has been seen regarding 5G technology and Huawei and other China-based companies. Despite the concerns expressed by Washington, several European countries have been selling arms to Beijing, namely France, which, in the period from 2015 to 2019, was the second-largest arms supplier to China with a share of 8.8 percent of total Chinese arms imports (even though at a long distance from Russia, which represented a 76 percent share) (SIPRI, 2020). And in addition to bilateral partnerships with the EU and many European countries, China has created other frameworks for dialogue in Europe, with emphasis on China+16 Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC),[6] which has since started to involve Greece (now China+17). It is worth noting that fifteen of these seventeen countries are NATO members. At the same time, the Turkish leadership has stopped criticizing China for its treatment of Uyghur Muslims (Turkey hosts a significant exile community of Uyghurs) to promote its relationship with Beijing. Moreover, Turkey is becoming an enthusiastic partner of China's Eurasian ambitions: In December 2020, the first transport train from Turkey to China (through Azerbaijan) carried household appliances from Istanbul to Xian in just two weeks, covering two continents and five countries. The relationship is not limited to trade: China has been involved in missile technology transfers to Turkey for years, and Turkey's battlefield Bora ballistic missile is based on a Chinese design (it was first used against the PKK in Iraq in 2019) (Fernandez, 2021).

In addition, there is a dramatic shift in the Europeans' perception of US power vis-à-vis China. In a pan-European survey of more than fifteen thousand people in eleven countries[7] commissioned by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and published in January 2021, 60 percent of respondents think that China will become more powerful than the United States within the next ten years—a view shared by 79 percent in Spain and by 72 percent in Portugal and Italy (Krastev and Leonard, 2021: 8). On the other hand, the ECFR's poll shows that in today's Europe, there is no dream of a return to a bipolar world in which the West would face off against China and its allies as it once did against the Soviet Union: At least 50 percent

of respondents in every surveyed country would like their government to remain neutral in a conflict between the United States and China. According to Krastev and Leonard, "This may reflect the fact that, although both Europeans and Americans are toughening up their approaches to China, their long-term goals are somewhat different. While Americans want to do so to decouple from and contain China, Europeans (above all Germans) still hope to bring China back into the rules-based system" (2021: 17).

As such, we should not underestimate China's influence on transatlantic cohesion: "It will be no mean feat to keep US and European decisions relating to China in close enough coordination to prevent a collapse of the transatlantic defence relationship" (Heisbourg, 2020). And nor should we underestimate its impact on Euro-Atlantic security. Although China is not as militarily close as Russia, it is expanding its military reach to the Atlantic, Middle East, Africa, and the Arctic, deepening defense ties with Russia and developing force projection capabilities. NATO allies increasingly feel China's influence in all areas. And the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, the Polar Silk Road, and the Cyber Silk Road are spreading rapidly, attracting countries from Europe, Eurasia, the Middle East, and Africa, while Chinese companies acquire and control infrastructures across Europe. Basically, as the NATO's Reflection Group report states, "The scale of Chinese power and global reach poses acute challenges . . . . China is therefore best understood as a full-spectrum systemic rival, rather than a purely economic player or an only Asia-focused security actor" (NATO, 2020: 27).

NATO has finally assumed that it cannot remain indifferent to China. At the London Leaders Meeting in November 2019, the allies recognized that China presents both opportunities and challenges that must be addressed together as an Alliance. As such,

> NATO must devote much more time, political resources, and action to the security challenges posed by China—based on an assessment of its national capabilities, economic heft, and the stated ideological goals of its leaders. It needs to develop a political strategy for approaching a world in which China will be of growing importance. (NATO, 2020: 12)

Fortunately, the allies' views of China seem to be aligning, combining competition and cooperation. For example, according to Norway's minister of foreign affairs,

> China and the West . . . value sets meet, compete, and are played out in the same arenas . . . as NATO Allies, we must strengthen efforts to build resilient societies. Not to contain China, but to tackle the inherent weaknesses and challenges . . . . We have to find the right balance between cooperation and competition. Between security and prosperity . . . . Inevitably, there will be competition,

> disagreement and also the potential for conflicts. But I firmly believe that vigilance and engagement within the framework of a strong multilateral system is the answer. Containment, confrontation and decoupling are not. (Søreide, 2020)

In the same vein, in its *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, the Biden administration states:

> When the Chinese government's behavior directly threatens our interests and values, we will answer Beijing's challenge . . . . We also recognize that strategic competition does not, and should not, preclude working with China when it is in our national interest to do so . . . . We will conduct practical, results-oriented diplomacy with Beijing and work to reduce the risk of misperception and miscalculation. We will welcome the Chinese government's cooperation on issues such as climate change, global health security, arms control, and nonproliferation where our national fates are intertwined. As we do, we will rally our allies and partners to join us, pooling our negotiating leverage and showing our collective power and resolve. (United States, 2021: 20–21)

CONCLUSION

The external circumstances impacting the Transatlantic Alliance and international and Euro-Atlantic security have undergone substantial transformations since NATO approved its Strategic Concept in 2010. In particular, there are systemic changes in the global power structure and in the pattern of interactions between the main international players as well as the erosion of the liberal order and a new confluence of conventional challenges by state actors with growing asymmetric threats. These new geopolitical and strategic dynamics require the urgent readjustment of the Alliance. NATO's adaptive capacity is the reason for its success and longevity, and adaptation is the keyword for future success.

Some previous adaptations remain relevant, just as the three of NATO's core tasks of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security remain valid. However, some of the transformations that have occurred and are underway are of such magnitude that NATO must readapt quickly or it will lose relevance in the face of new realities. And in this regard, if NATO's military dimension remains robust, the Alliance's political dimension and political role will be undervalued and underused. The scale and complexity of current challenges require political dialogue, consultation, and articulation. At the same time, it is part of NATO's mission to defend and promote democracy and a liberal international order, which implies playing a central role as an Alliance of democracies in articulation with other democracies.

That is a "NATO *plus* other democracies" platform not only for coordinating democracy promotion but also for establishing and coordinating common value-based policies and sanctions against gross human rights abusers. Therefore, the revitalization of the Alliance as a community of security and values and its role as the main forum for consultation and articulation among allies and with external partners is vital for the readjustment of the Transatlantic Alliance.

The stability of the NATO periphery is a condition of greater security for the allies and the Transatlantic Alliance as a whole. But whereas NATO has adapted to the dynamics of its new Eastern flank, it appears fragmented and unable to project security and stability on its southern periphery. Meanwhile, the security situation in the MENA region has deteriorated and become more complex over the past decade. NATO has long recognized that the risks and threats in its southern neighborhood affect the security of all allies and the Euro-Atlantic area. However, there are still differences between the dominant security priorities of the eastern and southern European allies and the place that these risks and threats occupy in the ranking of NATO's concerns. On the other hand, cooperation mechanisms, such as the MD and the ICI or other Alliance initiatives, will always be limited without a coherent, shared strategy involving regional partners. This means that political liaising is urgently needed within the Alliance and with partners so that NATO can be more effective in projecting security and stability to the South.

China is another crucial factor that requires NATO's readjustment. The Chinese resurgence has altered the world power structure, but the emerging United States-China bipolarization does not mean a return to the old Cold War. Given that the basis of China's resurgence is economical and its interdependence is very dense with all NATO's allies, the "China factor" implies new dilemmas for the transatlantic Alliance in the equation between security and prosperity and has a fracturing potential of the Alliance's cohesion. At the same time, China is what the Chinese Communist Party wants it to be, and the growth of China's "comprehensive national power" serves the goals of the CCP—and the China party-state confronts Western values and subverts the liberal international order. Therefore, China must appear on NATO's political agenda for consultations and understanding among the allies and articulation with other democracies. The adaptation of NATO to the "China factor" is urgent, and it cannot be based on obsolete conceptions and strategies but rather on the skillful balance between cooperation and competition.

The recommendations of NATO's Reflection Group define a roadmap for the adaptation of the Transatlantic Alliance to the demanding and complex geopolitical, geostrategic, and security context in transformation. On the other hand, the predisposition of the Biden administration is a great

opportunity to relaunch understanding among NATO's allies. It also makes it urgent to adapt the Alliance in the face of uncertainty about possible future changes in Washington. It is a window of opportunity that cannot be missed because NATO urgently needs to adapt (again) to a changing world.

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NOTES

1. This essay was written in mid-2021, long before the crisis and conflict caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine began in early 2022. The developments and outcome are uncertain at the time of this publication.

2. Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

3. Article II states: "The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.." Article IV states that "the Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened." See the North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949.

4. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland (1999); Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia (2004); Albania and Croatia (2009); Montenegro (2017); and North Macedonia (2020)..

5. Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam

6. Albania, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

7. The United Kingdom, Sweden, Portugal, Poland, Netherlands, Italy, Hungary, France, Spain, Denmark, and Germany.

Chapter Three

Effect of Cases on the Rivalry Between National Sovereignty and Intervention

Ekrem Ok & Özgür Tüfekçi

INTRODUCTION

Humanitarian Intervention (HI) is one of the last decade's outstanding concepts, and it has raised controversies, both when it happens and when it does not. With the end of the Cold War, politicians and academics have started to become interested in matters outside of the two superpowers' competition. The international community has started to deal with issues that have previously been of low importance. The concept of HI is also among the issues that have started to be discussed more after the Cold War. It has emerged from this question: "Do human rights violations in a state concern other states?" And it refers to military intervention by a third country, group of countries, or international organization to the internal affairs of a country with human rights violations with or without consent of that country.

As countries intervened for humanitarian purposes, the discussions on HI have become fiercer and sharper. As a result of these discussions, several opposing views have emerged, such as intervention versus sovereignty, intervention versus nonintervention, or human rights versus international order. Although it has different names, this debate is essentially between those who think serious human rights violations should require intervention and those who think they should not interfere with domestic affairs. In this study, we

prefer to use the terms interventionists and noninterventionists, respectively, to refer to these two contestants.

This contest flourished spontaneously. Utilizing the concept of sovereignty when opposing HI has led to a natural contrast between HI and national sovereignty terms. It is widely believed that the principle of sovereignty and noninterference, articulated in articles II (IV) and II (VII) of the United Nations (UN) Charter, is based on the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia.[1] Nevertheless, according to Hehir (2010: 45), the basic template of sovereign inviolability was established by the 1555 Peace of Augsburg, in which states declared to respect the principle of *cuius regio eius religio*, and Westphalia reaffirmed these principles.

Another critical step for these principles is the Charter of the United Nations. Articles II (I), II (IV), and II (VII) of the UN Charter, respectively, prohibit hierarchy between states, threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence and intervention in domestic affairs of a state (United Nations, 1945). After the Cold War, in parallel with the rise in human rights debates, the sanctity of sovereignty has started to be questioned.

Before the cold war, these issues were discussed only in India's intervention in Bangladesh, Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia, and Tanzania's intervention in Uganda. Apart from these, other interventions were not based on humanitarian purposes in terms of either purpose or discourse (Hehir, 1998: 34; Wheeler, 2000: 55–139). Since the beginning of the Cold War, the international system's structure has evolved from interstate disputes to intrastate insurgencies. According to Chopra and Weiss (1992: 98), the conflict's nature has evolved from territorial disputes between states into much more complex internal revolts. This new era began with the conflict between the Kurds and Saddam Hussein's forces in northern Iraq. It continued with conflicts between local groups in Somalia, between Hutus and Tutsi in Rwanda, between Jean-Bertrand Aristide and his opponents in Haiti, between the peoples of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Bosnia, between pro-Indonesia forces and independents in East Timor, and between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo.

During these civil wars, extreme human rights violations attracted the international community's attention, and these crimes against humanity raised strong international reactions. The globalizing and growing media and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations drew Western society's attention to these regions because of human rights violations (Hehir, 2010: 51). They had a notable influence on the formation of international public opinion.

With the support of international public opinion, pro-intervention groups expressed that states should not stand by the crimes against humanity and should intervene, if necessary, militarily to stop these crimes. On the other hand, these pro-intervention groups naturally led to the formation of

nonintervention groups. Support for these two views has changed over time. For example, while the idea of intervention was dominant after the Cold War, it has lost its support in time. Notably, the interventions led to significant changes in the balance between these two camps. While pro-intervention groups gain support after the interventions that stop the violence and yield positive results, counter-intervention groups gain support after the interventions that make things worse. Furthermore, we assume that recent HIs have had a significant effect on the arguments of both sides.

At this stage, the question of what the turning points are that led to this wind of change comes to the fore. This study aims to explain the effects of cases on this debate between pro-HI and nonintervention groups. We have identified three turning points regarding this debate; the first was the 1991 Iraq intervention, which was when the concept of HI started to receive generous support. The second, the 2003 Iraq intervention, is when the wind began to turn to the nonintervention side. Lastly, there is the 2011 Libya intervention, when the HI concept lost tremendous confidence and one of its most important arguments. In this study, we first discuss the arguments for and against HI and then try to show the changes in this debate caused by the cases we consider to be turning points.

BATTLE OF THE ARGUMENTS

Arguments for Humanitarian Intervention

It is not a surprise that the debate on HI was raised simultaneously with the debate on human rights. It will be helpful to examine the pro-HI arguments from ethical and legal perspectives. Ethical arguments represent a normative perspective on why other states should intervene in the case of human rights violations. Legal arguments have emerged as arguments against nonintervention that imply HI is illegal.

Ethical arguments

Ethical arguments represent the strong side of HI because these arguments are the revealer of HI. In other words, these arguments are the primary reason for the emergence of HI. Moreover, unlike legal arguments, ethical arguments are not counter-arguments; instead, ethical concerns are the underlying reason for the emergence of HI. Also, these are the only arguments that nonInterventionists could not undermine. As can be seen in the following text, noninterventionists have raised very compelling criticisms of HI. However, they left unanswered questions, like “What is to be done when a community faces

the threat of massacre or genocide?" (Fine, 2007: 81), "What is to be done when a state is unwilling or unable to halt a humanitarian crisis within its territory?" and, alternatively, "What if a country were to create such a crisis?" The given answers generally are based on intervention with the authorization of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Nevertheless, the question of what to do when the veto of any permanent member deadlocks the UNSC is still unanswered.

Many pro-interventionists claim that even if there is no legal ground, humanity's moral duty is to protect civilians from genocide and massacres (Bellamy and Wheeler, 2014: 481). Some severe consequences of nonintervention are among the problems that noninterventionists need to face. For example, between July 12 and July 16, 1995, eight thousand Bosnians were killed in just four days. If any country had intervened there in a timely and coordinated way, would this genocide still stand there (Mirza, 2020: 6), or if the intervention in Rwanda were applied at the right time—before the genocide—could the deaths of thousands of people be prevented?

According to Tesón (1996: 342), the UN was established as a response to the horrors caused by one of the most tyrannical regimes in modern history. In this sense, the Second World War had, partially, a humanitarian aspect. Therefore, noninterventionism is a reward for tyrants and a betrayal of the international order that the UN is obligated to protect. According to the interventionists, the concept of sovereignty becomes authoritarian governments' shield used against their crimes committed within their own countries. It is difficult to convict this perception as wrong; no wonder those who firmly insist on clinging to the concept of nonintervention and sovereignty are mostly authoritarian leaders. For instance, the former president of Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, described sovereignty as "our final defence against the rules of an unjust world" in his speaking immediately after Kofi Annan's call to respect human rights at the UN General Assembly in 1999 (Tharoor and Daws, 2001: 25).

A group of pro-humanitarian interventionists—including former UN secretaries Ban Ki-moon, Kofi Annan, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, and Boutros Boutros-Ghali—reinterpreted and, more precisely, expanded the concept of sovereignty. The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States set out the four criteria for statehood: "permanent population; a defined territory; government; and capacity to enter into relations with the other states" (*Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States - The Faculty of Law*, 1933). This pro-HI group added a new criterion for statehood: responsibility.

According to this view, people have some natural rights given at birth that cannot be withdrawn, belong directly to individuals, and are independent of states. States that are described as sovereign are responsible for protecting

these rights. If the state is unable or unwilling to fulfill this responsibility, it transfers it to the international community (Bellamy and Wheeler, 2014: 481–87). Moreover, it does not seem very sensible to consider that state as sovereign. Fine (2007: 90) graded this responsibility transition. According to Fine, in the case of failing, responsibility first transfers to local authorities. Suppose they fail too; this time, the responsibility transfers to a third-party state that can intervene with the authorization of the UNSC. When a veto deadlocks the UNSC, the state can invoke the UN General Assembly. Furthermore, as a last resort, the state can seek intervention from regional alliances.

Legal Arguments

Paul Christopher (1996: 110–11) legitimizes HIs with a domestic policy analogy. According to Christopher, under a civil government, citizens are not allowed to punish criminals regardless of the nature of their crimes. In other words, citizens cannot secure their own justice. But in the absence of any government or state, every citizen has to protect himself or herself and punish the criminals. The same is fair for the international community. Unilateral responses can be permitted when the UN, which has the right to intervene for humanitarian reasons, fails to fulfill its duty in manifest cases. If the UN's inaction is evident, the right to intervene passes to states or groups of states willing to.

Interventionists also guess that legal problems will be resolved over time. As for Glennon (1999: 7), the state's behavior is a determinant of legal problems. According to him, if states use their power to secure justice, the legal basis will follow. However, it is impossible to detect interveners' real intents—whether they seek to secure justice or follow their interests.

It is also stated that international law on sovereignty is out of date, and therefore, intervening to relieve the suffering people is legitimate, even if not legal (Hehir, 2010: 52). Besides, Duke (1994: 35) states that international law is not static or fixed but is subject to change and reinterpretation. Issues like slavery and genocide were once considered a matter of national sovereignty. Nevertheless, this is not the case today. Likewise, to Duke's view, it is possible to expect that matters like human rights violations and crimes against humanity will transcend national borders in the future, just like slavery and genocide.

Moreover, interventionists claim that HIs do not violate but instead comply with the UN Charter. Primarily, they refer to the following statements: "The Purposes of the United Nations . . . encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion" in Article I (III); "The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for . . . assisting in the realisation of human rights and

fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion" in Article XIII (b); "The United Nations shall promote . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion" in Article LV (c); and "All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55" in Article LVI (United Nations, 1945: articles I (III), XIII, LV (c), and LVI). However, these articles alone cannot constitute a legal basis, but for Duke (1994: 36), these articles' combined effect may provide the legal basis for HI.

Chapter VII of the UN Charter can also be interpreted in a manner that supports HI. Because, according to chapter VII, the Security Council briefly shall determine the existence of any threat to international peace and security, may call upon the parties to comply with provisional measures, and may take such action by air, sea, or land forces (UN Charter, 1945: articles XXXIX, XL, XLI, and XLII). Concerning chapter VII, Duke (1994: 36) states that a severe violation of human rights threatens international peace and security. Besides, if the UNSC is nonfunctional, states or groups of states must stop this threat.

As stated in the next section, one of the fiercest criticisms of the noninterventionists is that HI clearly violates Article II (IV) of the UN Charter that prohibits the threat or use of force against any country. Nevertheless, Duke underlines the clause of "territorial integrity or political independence" (1994: 36) in this article. He states that HI has nothing to do with the states' territorial integrity or political independence; it just aims to solve the humanitarian crisis in the target country. So there is no violation regarding this article.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Criticism for HI can be multidirectional, but it is possible to classify criticisms under three main topics. The first theme is about HI's vulnerability to abuse. The second theme is about the uselessness of HI, and the third is about the legality of HI. Apart from these three themes, there may be criticisms, but principal debates generally revolve around these three issues.

The Problem of Abuse

The vulnerability of HI to abuse is one of the most important arguments of noninterventionists. Just as the concept of sovereignty can be misused by authoritarian regimes, humanitarian reasons can also be abused (Hehir, 2010: 52). It is not possible to ensure whether the intervener decided to intervene

based on its interest or not (Ayoob, 2002: 85). This does not mean that those calling for intervention are not honest. As a matter of fact, Shen (2001: 9–10) admits that there are *bona fide* actors who just care about people suffering and have no other secret reason to interfere. However, when it comes to the decision to intervene, the trio of power, interest, and dominance comes to the foreground. For Shen, HI is nothing more than a convenient tool that can be used to maintain the dominance and supremacy of interveners.

One indicator regarding the problem of abuse is the double standards in interventions. In other words, interveners are treating countries differently under the same circumstances. Noninterventionists argue that if the UN does not intervene in each case of the same situation, it should not intervene in any case. However, in reality, the practice is different. The cases of Somalia and Sudan are good examples of this criticism. Although the two had similar conditions, Somalia aroused an international response. Nevertheless, it is not possible to say the same for Sudan (Weiss, 1994: 61–62). It seems barely possible to solve this double standard and selectivity problem. As Weiss (2000: 20) said, states will pick and choose.

Another indicator regarding the problem of abuse is that interventions are asymmetrical. When we talk about HI, we actually mean an intervention of a powerful actor in the affairs of a weak one, not the reverse. Therefore, we need to be very careful about the right that can be enjoyed by only the powerful actors. For example, it is unlikely that Uruguay would intervene in the United Kingdom (UK) due to its policy in Northern Ireland, that Yemen would intervene in the United States because of the United States' policies toward Black people (Shen, 2001: 10–11), or that Kazakhstan would intervene in China due to its policies toward Uighurs.

The Problem of Uselessness

Another critical argument of noninterventionists is about the uselessness of HI. In other words, according to them, HI cannot solve the existing problems but often makes things worse. Shen (2001: 10–15) asserts that freedom must emerge from the inside of the country, not from the outside, and violence is often counter-productive. Therefore, interventions may worsen matters while trying to be helpful. Also, interventions may encourage separatist movements and terrorism. Giving credit to Shen, it would not be wrong to reckon that the 1991 Iraq intervention that aimed to establish a safe zone strengthened the Iraq Regional Government in the long term and was enough to hold an independence referendum in 2017.

Legal Issues

The legal deficit of HI embodies the most powerful theme of noninterventionists. Many uphold the view that HI is illegal and that interfering in any country's territorial integrity or political independence is a criminal act. The international order can be preserved only when states respect each other's sovereignty and do not interfere in other states' internal affairs (Ayoob, 2002: 81; Davidovic, 2008: 136). By going a step further, Shen (2001: 2) asserts that even intervention without the use of force violates the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention. The only legal examples of the use of force in international law are the right of self-defense and interventions with the invitation of the host state or authorization of the UNSC. Moreover, the purpose of the intervention (humanitarian or not) is not a required criterion for legality (Chopra and Weiss, 1992: 98; Shen, 2001: 2). In other words, regarding legality, the issue is not the aim of the intervention but the way of carrying it out.

The reinterpretation of sovereignty by adding responsibility is also problematic for noninterventionists. In this view, respect for human rights at an at least minimal level is one of the preconditions of sovereignty. However, according to Ayoob (2002: 84–85), this view does not consider the countries below a certain civilization level as sovereign. Also, for this view, these nonsovereign countries will be under the tutelage of sovereign ones. Besides, this view can divide the world into zones of civilized and uncivilized countries and legitimize the former's aggressive policies against the latter.

Noninterventionists also object to the discrediting of the principle of sovereignty. Ayoob (2002: 92) upholds the view that sovereignty is a principle that has contributed significantly to the maintenance of international order and justice for the last four centuries. Respecting sovereignty is also essential for the protection of human rights. It is not possible to talk about freedom and human rights in the absence of national sovereignty. As for Shen (2001: 7–8), sovereignty has risen to the level of *jus cogens*, so it cannot be reinterpreted or discredited.

MILESTONES OF THE DEBATE

In this section, the cases will not be examined in detail. After providing brief overviews of the cases, the effects of the cases on the debate will be analyzed.

1991 Iraq: The Outset of the "Golden Age"

The 1991 Iraq intervention, known as Operation Provide Comfort, was carried out to protect the Kurdish people who had escaped Saddam Hussein's wrath

and fled to the Turkey-Iran border after the Gulf War in 1990. Hussein's loss of power after the defeat in Kuwait led Shiite and Kurdish groups to revolt. According to Wheeler (2000: 139), even if the Kurds in the north had lived relatively autonomously, they had desired to establish their own state since the late nineteenth century. Therefore, they saw Iraqi weakness after the Kuwait defeat as an opportunity to discharge the Baath Party in the north. First, the Shiites revolted in the south. When the Iraqi Army was sent to the south to suppress this rebellion, the Kurds rebelled in the north.

By taking advantage of the power gap, the rebels were initially successful in capturing some key cities. After extensively suppressing the Shiite revolt in the south, the Iraqi Army turned back to the north and retook control of the county by viciously crushing the rebels. Fearing retribution of Saddam's forces, the rebels fled to the mountainous border of Turkey and Iran. Hundreds perished from the cold and disease every day (Wheeler, 2000: 141). Operation Provide Comfort was launched due to this incident and aimed to create a safe haven for these rebels.

These rebel groups created an enormous wave of refugees for both Turkey and Iran. Since they could not deal with these waves of refugees alone, both countries called the UN to take action to stop the refugee influx (Cockayne and Malone, 2006: 125). On April 5, 1991, the UNSC condemned the Iraqi administration for repressing civilians, demanded Iraq stop those pressures, and insisted on letting humanitarian aids reach people in the region (United Nations Security Council, 1991). According to Hehir (2010: 223), resolution 688 was the first time the UNSC had described a humanitarian crisis as a threat to international peace and stability. After that resolution, under the United States' leadership, Operation Provide Comfort was started with twenty-six thousand personnel, and the area north of the thirty-sixth parallel was proclaimed a no-fly zone (McQueen, 2005: 28). Due to these efforts, the Iraqi Army withdrew from the region. However, soldiers did not return to their country. They waited in Turkey for a while in case of further attack from the Iraqi Army (Haulman, 1991: 181–82; Rudd, 2004: 226).

The 1991 Iraq intervention marked the beginning of the decade of 1990 to 2000, which is considered the golden age of HI. It symbolizes a turning point both for the concept of sovereignty and for HI. Moreover, according to Wheeler (2000: 140), the 1991 Iraq intervention is a landmark case supporting a new customary rule of HI in international law. This intervention may have had adverse effects in the long term, such as supporting separatist movements. Nonetheless, it is clear that this intervention prevented the Hussein government, which was inclined to resort to violence on its people, from committing a new massacre. Wheeler (2000: 158) also admits that intervention saved thousands who would otherwise have perished. Therefore, the Iraq

intervention was regarded as successful and led to the start of the golden age for the HI concept.

2003 Iraq: The Outset of the Discredit

It is noteworthy that the golden age started with the Iraq intervention in 1991 and ended with the Iraq intervention in 2003. Therefore, we reckon that Iraq has a special meaning for the concept of HI. In fact, it is hard to count the 2003 Iraq intervention as an HI. The Iraqi intervention does not even meet the most vital criteria of HI. Human Rights Watch also declared that this intervention is not an example of HI (Human Rights Watch, 2004). However, we regard it as the second milestone in this study for two reasons. The first is that the United States resorts to humanitarian concerns for the legitimization of intervention. The second is that this intervention has notable effects on the debate.

For the first reason, this intervention, also known as the Iraq War, started in 2003 as part of the "Global War on Terrorism" policy adopted after the 9/11 attacks. Initially, the main reasons for intervention were allegations of Iraq's stockpile of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and links to Al-Qaeda (Hehir, 2010: 229). According to Roth (2006: 84), over time, George W. Bush's administration's justification lost much of its confidence because no WMDs or severe links to terrorism were discovered. Hehir (2010: 226–29) also argues that the unfounded allegation of the Bush administration regarding WMDs and links to the terrorist organization quickly undermined support for the intervention. So Bush needed a new, robust justification for regaining support. By resorting to a humanitarian rationale, he declared that one of the main objects of the intervention was to "liberate" the people of Iraq (*In the President's Words: The Rights and Aspirations of the Iraqi People*, 2004). As the initial rationales turned out to be groundless, the Bush administration relied on humanitarian justifications.

On the other hand, the humanitarian rationales were hardly persuasive. According to Hehir (2010: 226, 229), although Saddam Hussein was a leader with a history of brutality, there was no sudden upsurge in his brutality at the time of the intervention. Moreover, the United States did not take any actions against Saddam's government in the previous intervention in 1991, which was the most brutal time of that leader.

Regarding the second reason, this intervention has notable effects on the HI debate. Tesón (2005: 1) points out that Iraq's war reignited the passionate HI debate. According to Hehir (2010: 229), many have considered the Iraq intervention to have "dealt a significant blow" to the status of HI. Moreover, Kurth (2006: 88) admits that this intervention reduced the prospects for successful HI in the future. Evans (2004) also argues that abusing humanitarian

justification in the Iraq intervention almost choked the emerging term "responsibility to protect (R2P)" at birth. Clark (2003) warns those who insist that Iraq interventions had humanitarian motives are jeopardizing HI's credibility. Kenneth Roth (2006: 91–92), executive director of Human Rights Watch, also notes that justifying the Iraq War with humanitarian purposes "risk[s] giving HI a bad name" and that it could be devastating for people in need of humanitarian assistance in the future.

The Iraq intervention was severely criticized even during and after the intervention, and this criticism has had a significant effect on increasing suspicion regarding the HI concept. Human rights violations, like civilians' deaths due to air bombings (*The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq,* 2003), torture, torment, and rape allegations (*BBC News*, 2004; *The Age*, 2004), led to an increase in the criticism of HI. For example, according to Iraq Body Count (2003–2011), the civilian deaths toll between 2003 and 2011 was 121,088. Finally, the intervention ended in 2011 with a declaration from former US President Barack Obama (*BBC News*, 2011). Nevertheless, this retreat did not end criticism. Later in 2015, Tony Blair, the former prime minister of the United Kingdom, the US ally in the Iraq Intervention, made confessions about the intervention, apologized for "mistakes" over Iraq, and admitted the view that "invasion helped feed the rise of ISIS" (Osley, 2015). Afterward, the idea that the Iraq intervention made an essential contribution to the emergence of the terrorist organisation ISIS intensified these criticisms.

All this strengthened the opinion that the Iraq intervention was a case of abusing HI. This abuse also strengthened noninterventionists' claims and reduced the credibility of HI. We consider the Iraqi intervention to be the second milestone that led to change in the HI debate for two reasons. The first is that the United States resorts to humanitarian reasons for the legitimization of intervention. The second is that this intervention has striking effects on the debate. We argue that misuse of humanitarian justification in Iraq seriously harmed confidence in HI and led to the end of the golden age of HI.

2011 Libya: Fall of Interventionism

During the 1980s, Muammar Gaddafi was one of the notorious figures in the West due to his direct involvement in murderous attacks in the United States, the UK, France, and Germany. However, after the 2003 Iraq intervention, fearing having to face the same fate as Iraq, Gaddafi abandoned his chemical weapons program and started cooperating with Western countries and the international community (Hehir, 2013: 2). However, in the 2010s, Libya encountered an intervention that resulted from protests that turned into a conflict between the Gaddafi government and opposition forces. These protests were part of the Arab Spring, which began with Mohamed Bouazizi's

self-immolation in Tunisia in 2010. To stop this conflict, the UNSC authorized forces to "take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and populated areas under threat of attack." This authorization also included an arms embargo and travel ban on Libya and the freezing of some of Gaddafi's family members' assets (United Nations Security Council, 2011a; United Nations Security Council, 2011b). The adoption of Resolution 1973 was the first time the R2P was implemented as a legal basis for the use of force (Cronogue, 2012: 141). Afterward, on March 19, 2011, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened in Libya with the authorization of the UNSC.

We accept the Libya intervention as the third milestone because it occupies an essential place for the HI debate in terms of its results since it showed that HI is not limited to just halting human rights violations, unlike interventionist claims, but can also be a determinant in countries' political futures. In this sense, this intervention helped the opponents to win against better-equipped and well-trained Gaddafi forces (Barrie, 2012: 63). In other words, this intervention played a vital role in changing the country's fate. Moreover, Kuperman (2013b: 197) deduces that NATO's primary objective for intervening had become the overthrow of Gaddafi even at the cost of increasing violence in Libya.

To clarify the matter, we need to analyze the intervention quickly. According to Cronogue (2012: 145), some reports claim that NATO bombers aimed at Libyan forces to weaken them before rebels moved in. Besides, they attacked retreating Libyan forces, which were not a threat, and bombed Gaddafi's hometown, where there was no conflict, because residents were Gaddafi supporters. Due to these aids from the intervening states and Gaddafi's proposals for a ceasefire, negotiation and settlement were steadily rejected by the opponents (Kuperman, 2013b: 197, 198). It is evident that this intervention that was supposed to stop violence intensified the violence and nullified opportunities for peace. Furthermore, Kuperman (2013a: 134) states that the Libya intervention also exacerbated the security threat not only for Libya but also for countries in the region, like Syria.

The Libya intervention also inflicts a heavy blow to one of the interventionist arguments: HI has nothing to do with the states' territorial integrity or political independence; it just aims to solve the humanitarian crisis in the target country. Cronogue (2012: 145) also remarks on the effect of the Libya intervention on the HI debate. He argues that if the first use of R2P resulted in a regime change, states would be hesitant to use it again. Besides, after the Libya intervention, intervention calls for Syria were mostly vetoed by Russia and China under the thought that it could lead to a regime change like the one in Libya. In this sense, by undermining one of the most critical

interventionist arguments, the Libya intervention strengthens the arguments of the noninterventionists.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

The concepts of Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention are naturally opposed to each other. Although some interventionists claim that these two concepts do not contest, it is unlikely for them to coexist because the concept of HI has developed as long as it makes a breach in the wall of sovereignty. According to Chopra and Weiss (1992: 110), the concept of HI could not develop if respect for sovereignty always superseded humanitarianism.

Due to this indigenous opposition, it is barely possible that the coexistence of these two terms would be. So as to intervene, the international public opinion must be convinced that the target country is not sovereign. The chance of intervention in a country regarded as a sovereign is meagre, so it must bring the target country's sovereignty up for discussion. That is, the discourse construction on the target country should be based on "the failed state." As for Walling (2015: 389), HIs are likely to come about in two scenarios: claiming that the target state's sovereignty authority is lacking or claiming that the target country's sovereignty authority is illegal. As seen in Syria's example, there is a debate about the Syrian government's legitimacy between those who call for intervention and those who oppose it.

The ethical arguments of HI are the most powerful ones, and noninterventionists cannot offer a solution to these ethical questions. The legal arguments are not as strong as ethical ones because they are not endogenous but exogenous; in other words, they arise as counter-arguments. Furthermore, in most cases, they are hardly convincing. For example, it is a very strained interpretation to deduce a military intervention from articles I, XIII, LV (c), and LVI of the UN Charter. Nonetheless, the argument that HI does not oppose Article II (IV) of the UN Charter because HI has nothing to do with states' territorial integrity or political independence is valid. In theory, HI does not threaten states' territorial integrity and political independence because it is designed only to solve humanitarian crises, eliminate crimes against humanity, and end violence.

On the other hand, the effect of the cases on the HI debate is enormous. After the first milestone of this study, the 1991 Iraq intervention, the golden age of HI began, and states and international organizations were significantly interested in humanitarian issues. However, this golden age ended with another Iraq intervention in 2003. The misuse or abuse of the humanitarian justification in Iraq seriously harmed confidence in HI and led to the end of its golden age. Furthermore, after the third milestone, the Libya intervention,

suspicion for the concept of HI reached its peak due to its contribution to regime change and the increase in violence.

The effects of these cases are also evident in the post-intervention events. For example, after the Iraq intervention, the assembled leaders rejected the section of Blair's draft supporting the principle of R2P (Clark, 2003). Moreover, according to Bellamy (2005: 39), Germany had previously supported the responsibility to protect, but after the Iraq intervention, then-German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder rejected Blair's communique on R2P because of the concern that the United States and the UK would use it to justify the Iraq intervention. As the authors warned above, abusing humanitarian rationales for the Iraq intervention endangered the possibility of future HI. Perhaps the best examples of this effect were the massacres in Sudan that happened without intervention, especially in Darfur. Another example, after the Libya intervention, are the intervention calls for Syria that were mostly vetoed by Russia and China under the excuse that it could lead to a regime change like that in Libya. Even if Russia and China have economic, political, and strategic reasons to oppose intervention in Syria, the Libyan intervention also allowed them to have a robust excuse to object to an intervention in Syria.

The Libya intervention is also vital since it affects one of the essential interventionist arguments that HI has nothing to do with the states' territorial integrity or political independence and that it just aims to solve the humanitarian crisis in the target country. This was one of the influential legal arguments for HI. However, the Libya intervention resulted in a regime change. Moreover, according to Kuperman (2013b: 197), overthrowing Gaddafi was the primary objective of the intervention. In this sense, the Libya intervention not only undermined one of the interventionists' critical arguments but also gave a new strong argument to the noninterventionists.

Libya also was an opportunity to fix this situation. As Murray (2013: 227) maintained, Libya was by far the best opportunity for R2P. Actually, it was also the best opportunity to compensate for the 2003 Iraq intervention's harm on the HI concept. Unlikely, this showed that HIs are not limited to just stopping human rights violations. Unlike interventionist claims, they can also be a determinant in countries' political futures. Moreover, Libya is also one of the best examples that an intervention supposed to stop violence may intensify violence and nullify peace opportunities. This intervention helped the opponents to win against better-equipped and well-trained Gaddafi forces (Barrie, 2012: 63). In other words, it played a vital role in changing the country's fate. In this respect, it would not be wrong to conclude that this intervention contributes to the failure of one of the interventionists' most essential arguments.

The cases examined in this study show that despite the rise in HI's theoretical support, the primary determinant of the international community's support for HI is interventions in the field. States have made efforts to use

humanitarian concerns to conceal their interests. In other words, the problem of abuse harms confidence in the concept of HI. The support for noninterventionism, which started to rise with the 2003 Iraq intervention, reached its peak after the 2011 Libya intervention. At this stage, the question arises regarding whether the HI concept could increase in popularity again. We think that the concept of HI may rise again because the moral questions of today, which are the revealer of HI, are still valid and robust. Nevertheless, in order to rise, HI first needs a meticulous codification to handle the current problems.

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NOTES

1. The Peace of Westphalia was a series of peace treaties signed between May and October 1648 in the Westphalian cities of Osnabrück and Münster. The treaties ended the Thirty Years' War and the Eighty Years' War.

Chapter Four

The Bear has Taken the Honey

Predictability of Putin's Russia

Sónia Sénica

Proclaiming itself as a "sovereign democracy" with centralized and vertical leadership, Russia seeks to project the image of great global power at the international level and legitimize it at home. Being intrinsically linked to these two dimensions, international action derives from the political agenda determined internally under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin based on his vision for the country. The uniqueness of Russian politics and governance refers to a geographically vast country with varied ethnic specificities and latitudes, whose historical heritage is a strong, centralized, and personalized leadership.

Repeatedly extolling Russian honor and patriotism in times of increased external tension, the Russian leadership seeks to legitimize itself and rely on a bureaucratic apparatus loyal to the president and an increasingly conservative civil society. Focusing on the glory of Russian history, language, and culture, the Russian leadership seeks to justify its external action in the face of international opposition. Under the motto of the need for stability, defense of sovereignty, and non-external interference, President Putin seeks to shield himself from possible attacks against the regime either by opening the path to constitutional reform with a plan of staying in power or by excluding from the political game any possible opponents who might challenge his leadership.

But the Russian system also has its weaknesses. In addition to the fear of possible separatist impulses or the mimicry of regime deposition, the overly centralized leadership in Putin has demonstrated—especially in times of crises management, as in the case of the present pandemic—a huge difficulty of decentralization, creating an image of a lack of coordination and internal uniformity. The Russian president devotes much of his function to

high politics, to Russia's foreign policy where it does not seem to be permitted. The Russian political agenda in the world is known and, to some extent, predictable. Although there are several vectors, the priority is the post-Soviet space for political and historical ties and the strong presence of the Russian diaspora. This region is considered vital to the Russian leadership and is intended to be Russian-influenced.

In the face of the current departure from the West, Russia has turned its attention to the more Asian facet of its "Eurasianism"[1] and other regional areas. The strategic partnership with China is equally relevant, and although they are economically asymmetric partners, they are similar at the political and diplomatic levels. However, it is worse than international isolation to stand between the United States and China, and for that reason, Russia promotes a multipolar world with varied alliances.

With the new millennium and the coming to power of Vladimir Putin, regarded by many as the most charismatic Russian leader, in a certain tsarist style, translated into a strong leadership both internally and externally, Russian foreign policy knows new breath. Putin took office in 2000 with a personalized and centralized style of governance, and his decision-making and formulation process enshrined in the regulatory framework and existing political apparatus (bureaucracy) legitimizes his external position with a permanent correlation between internal policy and the external actions adopted.

THE RUSSIAN "INTERMESTICS" POLITICS

The predictability of Russian policy, internal and external, carried out by President Putin results from the possibility of maintaining the country's leadership after the constitutional reform carried out in 2020, enabling the implementation and consolidation of its personal project for Russia as a major global power at the international level and of "sovereign democracy" at the domestic level. This latter concept was publicly announced in the 2006 landmark speech of Vladislav Surkov, a prominent member of the Kremlin, that attempted to produce a kind of ideological project that motivated the governance and the political elite around him on the eve of the presidential elections (Okara, 2007), which was widely disseminated through the official narrative as a form of refusal of other remarks less appreciated to the current Russian regime.

There is an approach in international relations that argues the correlation between domestic and foreign policy, namely, arguing that the former influences and justifies the external actions of the states. The explanation of what is the political-domestic sphere in the field of foreign policy comes as opposed to the systemic or structural explanations that give primacy to

the international system. The importance of endogenous (internal) factors in foreign policy refers to the combination of their internal characteristics and exogenous (external) factors, the russian intermestic, the dependency between domestic and foreign policy, meaning that Russian Foreign Policy is legitimized domestically in order to sustain the decision taken abroad. An illustrative example of this argument is the case of the external policies of democracies in which the normative baseline is the principle of representativeness, and in case of failure of elected leaders in the implementation of the foreign policy, their group of voters may reject the same differing from the case of autocracies or dictatorships where the choices of the leaders stem from their conceptions of interest or national security without having to *a priori* a favorable national public opinion. On the other hand, there is also the example of an effective threat to territorial integrity, the natural choice being the use of military defense, regardless of what leadership and civil society want (Fearon, 1998).

From a post-positivist perspective, the analysis of foreign policy considers that human action and cognition as well as the rules and practices created by policymakers are relevant to international relations (Freire, 2017). It is argued that the changes that occurred in Russian foreign policy occur in the "intermestics" (Manning, 1977), that is, that the internal conditions are inseparable from foreign policy. Also, this principle emerges as structuring for Russia both in the definition and implementation of its policies, demonstrating the ability to adapt to the changes in the international system to which it contributes.

Since foreign policy advances, a process in permanent interaction, the dilution of the border between international and domestic (Putnam, 1988) appears natural, and the changes that occur in the objectives have a direct implication in the transformation of the identity of the actors and, ultimately, can lead to a mutation of the nature of the system. Also, in Russia's case, the domestic dimension has prevailed in the formulation of foreign policy, with a parallel optimization of the results achieved in foreign policy for the strengthening of internal support and consequent legitimization of government action. As illustrative examples emerge, the annexation of Crimea and military intervention in Syria (through an assertive foreign policy, using force and through a political narrative confirming the status of great power), Russia has taken a leading role in demonstrating its capacity for external influence, having achieved broad associated domestic approval. The "macro-objective" of designing and claiming the status of great power remains unchanged; what has changed is that it's called "micro politics" with regard to sovereignty understanding, a greater securitization in the political narrative, and a greater focus on the decay of the West in a constant logic of conjugation of the internal with the international (Freire, 2017).

The distinctive identity of Russia in international politics (Sakwa, 2008), or Russian specificity appears to be more notorious after Putin's presidency—in which the political agenda guided by the recovery and affirmation of the status of the great power and the defense of what are considered to be Russian interests by adopting a pragmatic stance leveraged in an increasingly assertive political narrative. Since the beginning of his governance, Putin has seemingly intended to normalize Russian foreign policy, meaning that Russia should be treated not as a loser of the Cold War or as a disruptive state but only as another great power that wants to achieve its objectives through cooperation and not confrontation and considers itself to be in a very different category from the other countries of the post-Soviet space. The Russian perception of itself as a great power coexists with the desire to be accepted by the West. This balance between the international affirmation of the relevance of its role and the desire to normalize relations with Western countries has motivated its participation in existing institutions to become a kind of unconfirmed participant, even if it has taken a path to a climate of enormous tension with the West, especially since the annexation of Crimea. The Russian leadership has always made a great effort to promote Russia's image in the world and, above all, to project its power, thus justifying its external actions and seeking to legitimize itself internally for those same choices (Sakwa, 2008). The choice between the integration of a country in the existing international system and its repudiation depends on the structure of the system (external factors) and the political culture of the country (endogenous factors).

In the case of Russia, we can identify three currents within the Kremlin: the Atlantists, who favor alignment with the United States and the West; the imperialists, who defend the status of the great power of Russia as opposed to the West; and the Neo-Slavs, who share the same feeling as the imperialists but emphasize the deepening of the country's identity (Ambrosio, 2005). Over the past twenty years, Putin's influence as president has fluctuated and allowed some changes in trends and dynamics of Russia's foreign policy to be seen. This is the logic of the two-level game, where policymakers have to worry about domestic pressures on their external options, in that, on the one hand, intranational games are transposed to the level of international relations with bureaucratic interests relevant to foreign policy and, on the other hand, at the international level, governments seek to satisfy these same domestic pressures (Putnam, 1988).

As the various cycles of Russian foreign policy are identified and the changes in the political agenda are verified, the changes that have occurred in the matrix of vectors and external dynamics themselves may be justified by the changes in perception and identification of strategic interests and objectives that have occurred at the level of its policymakers—in this case, its

president and the bureaucratic system that surrounds him—given the reading they make of the international environment.

Russian foreign policy is the materialization of the desire for affirmation as a regional and global actor in a differentiated, multivectorial, and multipolar international system, adopting an assertive stance in the areas considered a priority and a defensive stance by containing the expansion of the Western sphere of influence in areas of vital interest, as is the case of the post-Soviet space. As is prescribed by the previous framework, in the case of a "sovereign democracy," where the centralization and personalization of power have established strong leadership and a carefully selected political elite based on levels of trust and loyalty to the president, political alignments arise with both internal and external expression, and for Freire, the constitutive character of Russian politics seems to result from the consolidation of power and reaffirmation of its status in the "intermestics" (Freire, 2011a).

Political leadership and its perceptions, as well as domestic institutions, are important factors in explaining Russia's international behavior. Beyond the explanatory proposals that cooperation with the West was an interregnum motivated by Russian weakness after the recovery from which the inevitable competition between great powers has returned or that there is a consistently historical and cultural behavioral pattern that justifies this confrontation, MacFaul (2020) proposes a third way in which the focus is placed on policymakers and their ideas and perceptions. Despite consciously invoking realistic rhetoric and historical traditions, it was President Putin who chose the path to confrontation, demonstrating that he had agency in the process of formulating Russian foreign policy. Ideas matter and there is a unique causal impact of the leaders' perceptions, and MacFaul (2020) points out that, in the Russian case, President Putin has defined the country's foreign policy agenda from a realistic perspective regardless of the options he has from international factors, domestic institutions, or political bureaucracy, whose pressures can help formulate but do not determine individual decisions and actions. Putin chose a unique trajectory for Russian foreign policy based on a particular set of ideas he developed about Russia, the United States, and international relations in a broader context, the so-called "Putinis." Contrary to the argument of autocracy, putting Putin's Russia in a broader transnational ideological context, "Putinism" refers to the conservative and illiberal nationalism propagated by Putin along with what he considers to be national interests, and develops in parallel to the theory that American foreign policy is not only hostile to these interests but also unethical in respect to the Russian Orthodox Church's values. Finally, Putin's ideas, beliefs, and perceptions play a key role in the conduct of Russian foreign policy, and if he had gone through a different ideological framework or another leader was governing Russia, the country's international behavior would certainly be different (MacFaul, 2020).

Given the domestic determinants of Russian foreign policy proposed and to better understand Russia's international behavior given the specificity of the Russian regime, in addition to the material power capacities and its relationship with other states, the relevance of policymakers and their ideas—as well as the institutions that advise and support them—should be considered in the process of formulating and implementing Russian foreign policy (MacFaul, 2020). In an autocratic governance system whose official narrative exudes the defense of regime stability and territorial integrity, national sovereignty, economic interests, the projection of a major global power, the defense of *Russkiy Mir* (Russian's World) in parallel with conservative ideological motivations of civilizational and religious scope and with a recently reformed normative framework through the package of constitutional changes approved this year, it seems correct to configure the predictability of Putin's Russia (Slobodchikoff, 2014) with the preservation of the current goverment and the main lines, internal and external, of its governing action.

THE CONCEPTS OF HONOR AND NEO-IMPERIALISM IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The line of continuity of construction of the Russian ethos in the country's foreign policy, through the concepts of honor and national pride, largely capitalized mainly by the Russian leadership with a view not only to the legitimacy of the political regime but also as a way of justifying actions and external positions adopted, seems to be verified.

In international terms, honor is associated with the preservation of dignity and the assumption of fulfilling the commitments made, endorsing moral considerations and obligations inherent in this agreement (Tsygankov, 2012). More than the aspects that refer to the internal honor of the individual, related to integrity, truth, and character, in external terms, honor refers to the accession of the reputation and the good name of the country. If reputation is called into question, it can lead to a relationship of greater competition and eventually destructive behavior. To this extent, honor at the international level underlies the competition of great power and even imperial rivalry, assuming that there is truth in the word of honor given, also serving to justify the right to defend the country in the face of possible threats (Tsygankov, 2012).

This notion of honor, in its classical sense—encompassing fears, interests, and honor—emerges as the determining factor for the behavior of the state. The rationality attributed to the behavior of the state is thus understood more in terms of capacity than of prestige or reputation (Tsygankov, 2012). In the specific case of the formulation of foreign policy, and for its understanding,

both the local and international influences that inform the concept of honor still appear to be relevant in state-to-state interactions.

Allied with the national memory of past interactions with its external context, international influences also contribute to the creation and shape of foreign policy and establish a purpose or system with meaning by which to act. Although it is a complex process, the foreign policy appears here understood as the moment of transcendence of the dichotomy of internal and external pressures for the development of strategies to respond to global challenges in conjunction with the concept of national honor. In fact, there seem to be economic and political imperatives that move states externally based on internal national trust as a way of meeting existing social claims and objectives, which can be interpreted as opportunities or threats to national development. When external pressures are seen as opportunities, they generate positive feelings of hope, strengthening the aspects of honor in international cooperation. On the other hand, when seen as threats, they tend to arouse fear, resentment, or even greater reactivity, exacerbating the concept of honor for a greater appeal to nationalism and more competitive and even conflicting international behavior.

In general, a vision of predominant honor can be seen as dependent on the moment and leadership in functions that can be worked through various existing mechanisms in order to influence public opinion as well as the elite in their favor. This view can thus be adopted as a national interest and, to this extent, the foreign policy itself is based on this image of national pride and honor. According to Tsygankov's approach, the influences in foreign policy from the perspective based on national honor refers to the relevant role of political leadership in the appropriation of material resources and ideas, implementing this view through existing institutions and using historical practices to influence public opinion and elites in particular.

The presence of the concept of national honor in the formulation of Russian foreign policy—still according to the same proposal of approach and from the fact that there is always a counterpoint to the **"**Other"—seems to present the motivation to permanently show that Russia has and intends to preserve national honor, especially at times when it considers that its honor or what it considers to be its national interests may be called into question, particularly in times of confrontation.

As Tsygankov advances, being a Russian cultural and historical phenomenon, the expression of honor is assumed by a need to demonstrate it by the country that possesses it and derives from a need to recognize the "Other" that exists (Tsygankov, 2012). We realize that it is through the "Other" that Russia claims to have national honor, often referring to the concept as motivation for its external positions and actions. Let us take, as an example, the three Russian military interventions in the post-Cold War period, the motivations of

which refer to the concept of Russian honor being put to the test. The events in Georgia (2008) and Crimea (2014) both point to the defense of Russian honor by the challenge posed by extending the Western sphere of influence in these countries from the Russian area of vital interest from the post-Soviet space and, therefore, along the borders of Russia. This is something that would call into question the country by the proximity of the presence of the Western "threat" as well as the status it claims of global power, relevant regional and international influence, and respect from its peers. The military intervention in support of the Syrian regime in 2015 also seems to exemplify the Russian defense of its honor, demonstrating that it is a global power with the capacity to project its power outside its territory and to defend allies and stabilize existing regimes and leaders.

Understanding this "Other" as the West—be it only the United States, the European Union (EU), or both together, depending on the cycles of Russian foreign policy—the Russian international motivations emerge from the projection of power capable of defending Russia's prestige in international terms. Its international journey has aroused an oscillating appreciation among those who regard its international behavior as nonthreatening to the West and those who perceive it as expansionist and disrespectful to existing international rules.

To that extent, Tsygankov (2012) points out three patterns of Russia in its relationship with the West. The first is the pattern of cooperation. Examples can be found throughout Russian history and the period under study during the leadership of former President Dmitry Medvedev, whose efforts to approach the West were an attempt to build a policy of "modernising alliances" with Western countries. The second is the pattern of defensiveness—especially in periods when the Russian leadership failed to achieve the external objectives desired and didn't receive support from the West for its efforts retreating into relative isolation to regain domestic strength, as well as the example of Russian management between the West and China since the end of the Soviet Union. Finally, there is assertiveness, or acting in the name of a force designed and seeking assertively and unilaterally to defend its interests even without the support of the West. The concept of honor thus is also referred to by the same author as something good and virtuous, operationalized not only at the individual level of leadership but also at the societal level of the country as a whole. And to that extent, the patterns identified may justify Russian international behavior, in terms of Russia's established meaning of the concept of honor.

Finally, Tsygankov argues that as a concept present throughout the history of Russia, always in a logic of affirmation in its relationship of singularity versus similarity to the West, the concept of honor has been built by the Kremlin and connected to the notion of Russian civilization, revitalization of

state strength, and support for Russian and pro-Russian communities in the world. Russia presents itself as a sovereign democracy with important obligations domestically and internationally.

Therefore, it does not seem innocent that at the inauguration ceremony of the Russian president, an act endowed with enormous solemnity and symbolism, the presidential emblem, in which "Value, Honor and Glory" can be read, appears alongside the Russian constitution. Another illustrative example of the importance of the concept for Russian leadership occurred during the Russian president's New Year's Eve speech, in which he made a point of praising the way the Russians dealt with the effects of the pandemic caused by COVID-19 by stating that they demonstrated "dignity, natural to a united people, who honor the traditions of their ancestors" (Putin's New Year's Eve speech, 2020) Whenever possible, the official Russian narrative uses the concept of honor, either domestically or internationally, to praise the people and the country. However, if the reflection of the use of the concept at the internal level is the search for legitimacy and not contestation to political leadership and its device, at the external level, the Kremlin seeks to project the image of Russia that defends what it considers to be its interests in the framework of deepening partnerships alongside historical allies as a counterpoint to its relationship with the West.

Another concept that seems to be transversal and emanates from the theoretical approach proposed by Grigas (2016) to examine Russia's international behavior, especially after the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, is that of neo-imperialism, referring to an approach that characterizes the Russian external action with Putin aiming to build a new type of empire. Grigas points out that before the annexation of Crimea, the real and consistent threat in the post-Soviet space seemed implausible even after the Russian military intervention in Georgia in 2008. This change in borders on the European continent enforced since the end of the Cold War, Grigas said, demonstrates that Russian politics is intrinsically intertwined with its expansionist ambitions and neo-imperial objectives. Grigas also points out that, above all, the Russian policy of defending its compatriots, Russian-speaking exchanges, and the Russian world abroad seems to contribute to an integrative function of unification of the Russian people, combining it with the potential for the unification of Russia with the territories where these Russian citizens reside or descendants of Russian citizens who because of the events caused by the disintegration of the Soviet Union resided in another country.

According to President Putin, "We must recognise that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a huge geopolitical disaster of the century . . . and although many thought that our young democracy would not be a continuation of the Russian state but rather its collapse, the prolonged agony of the Soviet system was wrong" (2005).

For Grigas, in addition to neo-imperialism being a prominent trend in Putin's era, it emerges as a concept rooted in the country's history since the Russian Empire. For the author, the legacy of Russian imperial projects and especially tsarist and Stalinist ethnic policies created the means, causes, and conditions for the revival of Russian imperialism. Especially with the coming to power of Putin in 2000, it seems clear that Russia had not become a democratic state nor was its aspirations for the empire destroyed by the end of the Cold War, even though it emerged more as a marginal idea in the broader context of Russian foreign policy at the beginning of the millennium and found space punctually in the political rhetoric of some members of the political elite to praise national pride before the domestic audience.

The argument from Grigas's theoretical perspective is that, particularly since 2000, there seems to be a growing trend in Russian foreign policy of neo-imperialism vis-à-vis the post-Soviet space, hence being considered the most relevant vector, especially in the territories where compatriots reside. Especially with Putin's leadership, Gringas says, the Kremlin's policies have shown a huge orchestrated effort to use Russian citizens residing in neighboring countries to rebuild their imperial project of Greater Russia whenever domestic and international conditions are favorable. A policy materialized, Grigas writes, in the influence that Moscow intends to have on the Russian diaspora by offering citizenship through the easier distribution of passports and manifesting military and legal protection. Grigas points out that as more than a mere cultural and soft power effort, this action of the Putin regime with compatriots must be understood with a consistent political trajectory that seeks to obtain territorial gains in the former Soviet republics, especially when the following three factors are present: a large concentration of Russian-speakers and ethnic Russians; a population residing in territories near Russia's borders, and a population receptive to Russian influence.

For Grigas, Russian history has determined its presence since the idea of empire, and tsarist-style leadership has contributed to today's Russia and its foreign policy. According to the author, the culture of strong leadership (tsarist style) under a wide mass of population continues to influence Russian society and culture and justifies the Kremlin's top-down policy toward its compatriots abroad. Compatriots have become, Grigas said, a pretext and motivation in the broader mission of empire to obtain more economic resources and a larger population as well as a greater sense of security and even distraction from problems at home. Internal public opinion has been in favor of the external objective of claiming the great power status of Russia, and Grigas said that Russian civilization and its compatriots are part of the historical and cultural rationale aimed at neo-imperialism—to some extent, this expansionist motivation seems to be relevant in the context of the domestic electoral factors of President Putin's leadership, endorsing it with a high

rate of popularity at relevant times, such as the war in Chechnya, intervention in Georgia, and the annexation of Crimea. Finally, according to Grigas, Russian ambitions seem to take on an inherent right to a privileged interest in the post-Soviet space, and although the implications of Putin's Russia's neo-imperialist trajectory differ from country to country, either bringing them into their sphere of influence or preventing them from leaving it, it seems unlikely that they will tend to disappear.

The very defense of the Russian language and compatriots abroad has been one of the main lines of external action under Putin's leadership. For the Russian president, "language is the basis for a spiritual and historical community of different cultures and peoples and clearly ensures the sovereignty, unity and identity of the Russian nation" (Grigas, 2016).

PUTIN'S FOREIGN POLICY CYCLES: THE PATH TO PREDICTABILITY

The so-called Russian "bicephalism," now pending for the West and sometimes the East, depending on the line followed, is more Europeanist or conservative, reflecting oscillations in the sources, mechanisms, and implications of Russia and allowing us to identify different cycles in its foreign policy. Between 2000 and 2007, Russia seemed to bet on a multivector and multipolar foreign policy, aiming at its international affirmation, in an attempt to engage in a renewed dialogue of rapprochement with the West, the so-called "European cycle." It is at this stage that Russia made its aid to the United States available for the fight against international terrorism following the terrorist attacks on US soil on September 11, 2001. One of the main motivations of this approach, or if we prefer gesture of goodwill, may well lie in the fresh reminder of the violent conflict in Chechnya that has been going on since the late 1990s and the fear above all of the new actions by Chechen separatism of the radical Islamic matrix. And time would eventually give rise to these fears about the attacks of "black widows" on the Moscow metro in 2003 or, more recently, the St. Petersburg metro bombing in 2017. In particular, the Chechen issue reflects the phase of proximity between Russia and the West well.

At a time when the conflict was entering its bloodiest moment, and international criticism weighed in, the unofficial visit in March 2000 to St. Petersburg by then British Prime Minister Tony Blair was decisive in removing skepticism from this rapprochement. The visit was endowed with enormous political symbolism not only because Vladimir Putin was preparing to be elected but also because an important message was conveyed to his constituents and especially to Western public opinion that the spirit surrounding the relationship with the West was conciliatory. The most significant message

of this meeting was not only to give Vladimir Putin international credibility for the acceptance of Western leaders but to shift to a softer tone of criticism from the international community in the face of the Chechen issue, positioning it as an internal Russian issue in a kind of invisible war. The fight against international terrorism appeared as a new common issue on which world leaders could agree, thereby increasing the margin of Russian leadership maneuvers by establishing a direct link between domestic and foreign policy. The conflict in Chechenia would be justified by Putin as an integral part of his commitment to the fight against international terrorism and presented as moral equivalence to justify escalating retaliation and avoid criticism (Jack, 2004). Cooperation with the United States was strengthened and extended to a broader commitment to support the attempted union of forces to resolve issues such as nuclear nonproliferation through joint action on the nuclear programs of countries such as North Korea and Iran (Tsygankov, 2010).

In the new foreign policy context, Russia said it had to respect the same values as other European countries. The values of freedom, human rights, justice, and democracy were enunciated by President Putin in his speech in 2005 before the Federation Council, pointing out that this is the path Russia would take. At the same time, the economic dimension emerged as essential in the relationship with European countries.

The main Russian focus was greater integration with the European economy, and several agreements were made, mainly on energy, resulting in the supply of gas and oil from European partners, such as Germany, by the construction of pipelines, such as the well-known Nord Stream project. Economic progress has paved the way for an improvement in political relations with European countries on issues where there seemed to be a willingness to present solutions to address relevant international policy issues, such as the conflict in the Middle East and the Iranian nuclear issue, communing some European voices on the Kremlin's approach to multilateralism and negotiation to the detriment of the use of sanctions and force (Tsygankov, 2010).

Following the formula of the defense of multiple poles allied through the diversification of alliances as well as the attempt to preserve influence in the post-Soviet space through the projection of power and pursuit of what Russia considers to be its national interests, Russia began a path to stabilize the internal order and economic growth along with a more pragmatic and assertive foreign policy. According to Trenin, Russia left the West, setting aside both its "integration" in the West and its "strategic partnership" with the United States (2006).

Growing Russian discontent is beginning to emerge in the face of sensitive issues such as the encroaching of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU on its borders. It is seen by Russia as a derivation of its main security role and an export mechanism of a certain type of democracy in

the region (Tsygankov, 2010). Concerning the first, there was acknowledged Russian mistrust and opposition, widely replicated by the fact that it remains active even after the end of the Cold War. It is at this stage that the military intervention took place in Georgia in 2008 and that the Ukrainian issue that would lead to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 began to move toward the Ukrainian issue that would lead to the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia does not accept losing influence in the post-Soviet space to the West.

In parallel, the official Russian narrative begins to challenge Western external action and to announce the end of the liberal international order of American hegemony, especially after President Putin's famous speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007. Demonstrating against the U.S. military intervention in Iraq in 2003 that culminated in the end of Saddam Hussein's regime and the U.S. military intervention in Libya in 2011 that toppled Qaddafi's leadership, generating a shock wave with consequent unrest in the region through the Arab Spring generated great instability in the Middle East and Maghreb region, composing part of the so-called "arc of crises," remains widely contested by Russia to this day.

In this new cycle, between 2007 and 2014, the so-called "Asian cycle," Putin's Russia begins to turn its policy toward a strategic partnership with China and seeks to deepen the relationship with countries outside the West, giving new breath to the economic issue through a greater commitment to organizations such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Eurasian Economic Union, especially after its suspension from the G8 after the annexation of Crimea. In this stage, Russia's alignment with China is mainly aimed at containing the United States' influence (Freire, 2020).

But the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 would mark the beginning of a new cycle of great tension in Russia's relationship with the West that persists to this day, the Russian cycle, in the so-called "new normal," trying to avoid international isolation. It is the period of an exchange of accusations, in which Russia claims to be the target of "Russophobia" by the West in all its positions and external actions. At this stage, the climate of tension with the West reaches its peak with a series of events that include Russian military intervention in the Syrian civil war; the accusation of alleged Russian interference in the electoral processes of several countries, including the United States; the economic sanctions adopted by the West against Russia; the expulsion of Russian diplomats from some Western countries; the Skripal case; and the poisoning of Alexei Navalny, Putin's political opponent.

In the current foreign policy cycle, according to Kolesa (2018), with the Western vector declining and unlikely to form a bloc with China to contain the West, Russia seems to aspire to be one of the independent poles of power in a multipolar world. Kolesa argues that Russia will seek to follow an

independent path, globally hostile to the West seeking to increase its power of attraction, especially economic, paving the way for other strategic options by diversifying alliances (2018). In parallel, Lain advances, knowing that his place in the international arena is closely linked to his position vis-à-vis the West, should maintain a relationship of strategic mutual adversity to the detriment of cooperation (2018).

Finally, as far as the "strategic rivalry" between Russia and the United States is concerned, Timofeev argues that Biden's victory will not alter the structure of relations with Russia (2020). According to Timofeev, Russia is still one of the United States' as most dangerous rivals, and even though it is a fragile economy, it is a significant military power that makes decisions on its own and is willing to defend itself (2020).

CONCLUSION

Under Putin's leadership, Russia seeks to create a new multipolar international order in opposition to the liberal international order of American hegemony, defending the rule of international law and restraining the importance of the United Nations and multilateralism. During the last 20 years, the Russian international path has been aimed at a greater distancing from the West and an affirmation of its domestic and international uniqueness. Projecting an image of global power, Putin claims the importance of his role in the world and the defense of his strategic interests. More than integration into the Western system, Russia wants to be respected by its peers and considered in its foreign policy agenda. At a time when its relationship with the West is one of increased tension, distrust, and mutual accusations, Russia feels the need to find a new dynamic of alliances and partnerships in the non-Western space. With a pragmatic and increasingly assertive foreign policy, it seeks the path of cooperation, strengthens ties, and initiates partnerships that allow it to avoid international isolation.

Since Russian foreign policy is formulated in relation to the "Other," by the widening of Western influence in its sphere of influence of the post-Soviet space, considered vital, by the weakening of its economy due to economic sanctions it is under, or even by the anti-Russian Western political narrative, it seems natural that a new breath will be given to other regional areas. Being a centralized and vertical leadership regime, Russia's foreign policy reflects the projection of the image of great global power at the international level and is legitimized at home. International action is intrinsically linked to these two dimensions and derives from the political agenda determined internally under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin based on his vision for the country. The uniqueness of Russian politics and governance refers to a geographically

vast country with varied ethnic specificities and latitudes, whose historical heritage is one of strong, centralized, and personalized leadership. Therefore, at present, it would be expected that Russia's predictability was already well understood and serves as the ground to pave the way for how to deal with Putin's Russia. The "burden of predictability" **(**Koleniskov, 2018) at the present moment seems to go both ways.

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NOTES

1. Eurasianism emerged in the 1920s among Russian émigrés who believed that Russia belongs neither to the East nor to the West but is a civilization in its own right.

Chapter Five

How Eurasian Integration of China's Belt and Road Initiative Defends a Multipolar World Order

Andrew K.P. Leung

In the face of "America First" hegemony, China advances its Belt and Road Initiative (B&R), integrated with Russia's Eurasian Economic Union in defense of a multipolar world order, which China has benefited from immensely during past decades. The B&R is designed as a key strategy to realize the Chinese dream of a historic renaissance, purging the national demon of the *century of humiliation* at the hands of foreign aggressors. The B&R is reinforced by China's multifaceted footprints in western Europe, central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, South America, and the Arctic. This is happening as the world's tectonic plates are shifting. Without forming a rigid geopolitical bloc reminiscent of the Cold War, China and Russia, as *continental powers*, are forming a marriage of convenience to rival a loose coalition of US-led Western *maritime powers*. In this "Game of Thrones," the broader developing world, representing the "Rise of the Rest," plays an important part. Rising from being a laggard, it now accounts for 60 percent of the world economy and is becoming a key contributor to global growth. As the largest developing country (in terms of per capita GDP and other measures), China is *practitioner par excellence* in cementing an intertwined, interconnected, interdependent, and digitized global production and value chain, encompassing many developed and developing countries. The world can no longer be easily bifurcated as the United States would like in order to isolate, exclude, and contain a rising China, which is now firmly branded as America's overarching strategic rival. On the other hand, notwithstanding its rising clout, China struggles with worsening perceptions of its economic and

geopolitical ambitions. The B&R faces accusations of a *debt trap* and a *road* leading only to China. Perceived authoritarianism and lack of tolerance for dissent continue to tarnish China's global image. An all-out American "China Scare" is raging across the aisle on Capitol Hill, pushing back against China in trade, technology, military, and ideology, encompassing Xinjiang, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Geopolitically, many countries do not wish to choose a side and increasingly adopt a hedging strategy. At the same time, the Trump administration withdrew from the Paris Agreement on climate change, tore apart a hard-won multilateral nuclear deal with Iran, and began to abrogate commitments in multilateral institutions, including the United States and the World Trade Organization (WTO). How China and the rest of the world navigate these turbulent waters will affect the stability and shape of the multilateral world order for decades to come.

WHYS AND WHEREFORES OF AMERICA'S "CHINA SCARE"

During the Cold War with the former Soviet Union, the Nixon administration saw fit to woo Maoist China to the American camp. Thereafter, the collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in an era of unchallenged American global hegemony. The American military, economic, financial, technological, cultural, and institutional powers, not to mention the dollar, reigned supreme. Many developing countries became "democratized" following the so-called "Washington Consensus"[1] of liberal and free-market socioeconomic policies. Few disputed the arrival of a unipolar world order built by the United States. This sentiment was exemplified by Francis Fukuyama's (1992) epic tome.

American and other Western multinationals opened up many parts of the world, linking them into global production and value chains facilitated by such institutions as the WTO. China was admitted as a member in the hope that, by opening up further, it would help expand globalization and become a *responsible stakeholder* of the extant world order, in a way, more like *us*.

The global financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 exposed the irresponsibility of untrammeled liberal financial policies, while eminent scholars, like Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz (2002) laid bare. Less developed nations blindly followed the Washington Consensus with disastrous results. Domestic industries failed to develop when stifled by foreign competition. Multinationals took resource-rich, poverty-stricken countries to the cleaners, leaving them with ecological degradation. Some pharmaceutical conglomerates surreptitiously cut corners with people's well-being in host countries.

Russian President Vladimir Putin never forgets how the former Soviet Union fell apart by following the so-called "Harvard Formula" of hastened economic liberalization (*perestroika*) and political reform (*glasnost*), all within 500 days.

Meanwhile, after joining the WTO, China has been developing in leaps and bounds, benefiting hugely from worldwide production and value chains, of which China has entrenched itself as a global hub. Across the world, shopping malls and department stores are replete with a vast array of competitively-priced "Made in China," Western-branded products, including products of very high quality. Most of the world's trade converges toward China's ports and business centers. China is now home to seven of the world's top ten container ports, including Hong Kong (occupying the first, third, fourth, fifth, seventh, eighth, and ninth positions) (World Shipping Council, 2020).

China has become the world's largest manufacturer, trader, and exporter as well as the second-largest economy. While China was one of the poorest countries barely a few decades back, in January 2020, China's per capita GDP exceeded USD$10,000 for the first time, according to the National Bureau of Statistics of China (*The Economic Times*, 2020).

President Xi Jinping champions a "China Dream," mostly referring to a national renaissance expressed in terms of the "Two Centenary Goals."[2] However, rather than being viewed as a stakeholder of the America-led world order, China's resurgence is perceived as challenging the established liberal world order defined by American leadership. China's ambitious "Made in China 2025"[3] plan to lead in twenty-first-century technologies—including artificial intelligence, robotics, and 5G—threatens to eat America's lunch. China's assertive posture in the South China Sea, with sandbanks rapidly changing into fortified islands, threatens to turn it into a Chinese lake. Moreover, notwithstanding WTO membership, China is considered to be gaming the system with forced intellectual property transfer, commercial espionage, and rapacious trading practices.

At home, President Xi's apparent authoritarian tilt is at odds with cherished Western values. There is now a bipartisan "China Scare" reaching a crescendo, pushing back against China on all fronts. Not confined to a trade war, flashpoints extend to cutting-edge technologies, like 5G (of which Huawei is the poster child), the South China Sea, Xingjian, Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Across the aisle on Capitol Hill, in the eyes of American hawks, China has become unspoken public enemy number one.

AMERICA FIRST UNDERMINING MULTILATERALISM

Notwithstanding dilution of its dominance, the United States power elite, exemplified by former-President Trump, remains convinced of *American exceptionalism*. America's historical trajectory and global power are derived from founding values and institutions. This renders the United States a *city upon a hill*, a beacon of hope for the world. Trump thus felt righteously entitled to do whatever it took to safeguard American interests and the liberal world order America has helped shape. A rapidly-rising China has now been firmly identified as America's predominant rival and the ideologically different challenger that needs to be pushed back on all fronts.

Separately, "America First" imperatives have not shied away from abandoning commitments originally designed to uphold global higher values and standards, such as the Paris Agreement on climate change and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) on international trade. Even American allies are not exempt from these rigors. Long-established trade relations, such as the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), are upended, and possible trade sanctions are threatened against Germany and France.

There is also a perceptible American reluctance to honor past commitments to multilateral organizations, like the United Nations (e.g., financial contribution) and the WTO (e.g., supplying trade dispute resolution judges). Moreover, there is greater readiness to ignore international norms. A hard-won multilateral 2015 Iran nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which involved a number of Western allies, has been unilaterally torn up. Recently, one of Iran's top generals was openly assassinated using a military drone by order of President Trump.

With "America First" on the rampage, allies are cajoled into falling in line. However, while remaining dependent on American global power, many are unwilling or can ill-afford to take sides in a deeply interdependent and interconnected world. More are hedging against American unpredictability. For example, Japan still harbors deep-seated anxiety about a rising China and is actively playing the role of a key member of the US-inspired anti-China Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). Nevertheless, Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is starting to mend fences with President Xi.

What's more, with heavy doses of "America First," the world is beginning to wonder what American global leadership stands for.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CHINA'S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE (B&R)

For nearly two millennia, up to the late eighteenth century, the Middle Kingdom, as the name implies, remained the center of the Eastern world. According to Angus Maddison (2007), emeritus professor of economics at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands, the Han Dynasty (206 BC to 220 AD) accounted for an estimated 26 percent of global GDP. This rose to high watermarks of about 58 percent during the Tang Dynasty (618 to 907 AD), some 80 percent during the Song Dynasty (960 to 1270 AD), 30 to 35 percent during the Yuan Dynasty (1271 to 1368 AD), 45 to 55 percent during the Ming Dynasty (1368 to 1644 AD) and about 35 percent during the heydays of the Qing Dynasty (1644 to 1922 AD) (Maddison, 2007).

Similar to other Asian powers, the Middle Kingdom's former status as a preeminent Eastern empire was largely by virtue of its status as a continental power, backed by land-based military might. Founding the Yuan Dynasty by 1300 AD, the Mongol Empire extended to large tracks of the Eurasian continent. Overland, China's ancient trading Silk Road started in the early Han Dynasty with an imperial envoy Zhang Qian. From China's ancient capital of Chang On (now Xi'an), its two westward routes skirted the Taklamakan Desert to converge at Kashgar in Xinjiang. It connected Tashkent and Bukhara in Uzbekistan, where one branch split southward across Afghanistan to the Indian subcontinent. Another route went westward through Merv in Turkmenistan, embracing Baghdad in modern-day Iraq. It extended to Antioch (Turkey) and Tyre (Lebanon) and proceeded along the eastern Mediterranean coast, linking outward to the sea with ancient Rome.

A parallel maritime trading route opened in the first century AD, linking Canton (Guangzhou) across the Strait of Malacca and Bay of Bengal through the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea to the Roman east Mediterranean.

The emergence of the Middle Kingdom's global sea power occurred during the Ming Dynasty. The exploits of Admiral Zheng extended the kingdom's tributary power system through seven distant sea voyages (1405 to 1433 AD), covering the bulk of Southeast Asia and as far as India, the Arabian Peninsula, and eastern Africa. These massive maritime expeditions were driven by the most advanced ocean-going ships and naval technologies of the time.

The first-voyage armada boasted 317 ships with twenty-eight thousand crewmen. A four-decked "mother ship," *Baoshan*, was estimated to measure between 440 and 538 feet long and 210 feet wide, with a displacement of some twenty thousand to thirty thousand tons, roughly a third to half of a modern American aircraft carrier. Each of these "mother ships" had nine masts with individually navigable square sails. The Yongle Emperor ordered

sixty-two or sixty-three such ships for Zheng He's first voyage. Another forty-eight were ordered in 1408, plus forty-one more in 1419, along with 185 smaller ships throughout these expeditions (Szczepanski, 2019).

However, during the reign of Emperor Hongxi (1378 to 1425 AD), a palace plot hatched by opposing mandarins reduced the Middle Kingdom's maritime power ambitions into a mere historical flash in the pan. All ocean-going vessels were grounded or destroyed, along with related shipmaking and navigational technologies and infrastructure. This ill-judged historical self-destruction was followed by centuries of naval-gazing self-aggrandizement, blind to the Industrial Revolution, which propelled the transcendence of global Western maritime powers, including Portugal, Spain, and Great Britain.

A CENTURY OF HUMILIATION AND THE CHINA DREAM

China's world status rapidly declined toward the latter periods of the corrupt Qing Dynasty, leading to subsequent partition and spoils exacted by Western invaders along its eastern seaboard.

At the inauguration of Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam on July 1, 2017, to contrast how weak and backward the motherland used to be, President Xi said, "In the early 1840s, Britain sent an expeditionary force of a mere ten thousand troops to invade China and got its way in forcing the Qing government, which had an eight hundred thousand-strong army, to pay reparations and cede the island of Hong Kong." He did not elaborate on China's subsequent conquest by Japanese imperialists, followed by decades of civil war, internal strife, famine, and abject poverty, including the early years after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949.

The demon of the *Century of Humiliation* remains deeply etched in the hearts and minds of generations of Chinese people. That is why, despite warts and all, the Communist Party's stewardship of China's remarkable rise in recent decades continues to enjoy extremely high popular support by international standards. According to an Edelman survey on public trust in government, China has the world's highest rating, at 88 percent, compared with 42 percent in Britain, and 40 percent in the United States (Edelman Trust Barometer Global Report, 2019: 42).

BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE (B&R)

Apart from realizing the China Dream, the B&R is designed to cement China's key strength of *global connectivity*. The initiative encompasses such

areas as infrastructure, trade, finance, policy, and people-to-people interaction. Other considerations include the internationalization of the *renminbi* (RMB), the Chinese currency, better utilization of China's *excess production capacity*, and *redressing China's regional disparities*.

The B&R is expected to cover 126 countries, representing 65 percent of the world population and more than 40 percent of global GDP. Potential investment is estimated at USD$5 trillion. Not only is it many times larger than America's Marshall Plan (some USD$120 billion in today's money), but it is also totally dissimilar in scope, depth, and *modus operandi*.

A map titled *The Belt and Road Initiative: Maritime Silk Road and Overland Economic Belt*[4] serves to illustrate the two-pronged global connectivity of the B&R: a maritime "*silk road*" through Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, the eastern shore of Africa, through the Mediterranean onto Venice, and an overland transcontinental "*economic belt*" from Venice to connect Europe, across Eurasia to terminate at China's ancient capital of Xi'an, where the ancient Silk Road began.

According to the McKinsey Global Institute (Woetzel, 2016), to keep pace with projected growth, the world needs USD$3.3 trillion worth of economic infrastructure annually through 2030. The B&R is thus a timely response.

Nowhere illustrates the dire need for transport infrastructure better than the land-locked, resource-rich, developing countries in central Asia: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan (Leung, 2017). They would stand to benefit hugely if they could more easily export their cornucopia of natural resources and other products with modern transport and other logistical infrastructure.

These land-locked countries are core members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a Eurasian political, economic, and security alliance founded by China and Russia. It now includes India and Pakistan as members, while Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, and Mongolia are admitted as the Observer States. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Turkey are granted "Dialogue Partner" status while ASEAN, CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), Turkmenistan, and the United Nations are accorded rights of "Guest Attendance." Many of these countries host the B&R. As the SCO excludes Western powers, per se, its growing influence in the Eurasian region represents a dynamic power center in a multipolar world.

Another B&R objective is to break free from the United States' containment strategy, exemplified by the Obama administration's *Pivot to Asia*, which purported to move 60 percent of America's naval assets to the region. The bulk of China's economic lifeblood of goods, oil, and raw materials passes through the Malacca Strait (outside Singapore), which is controlled by the United States Seventh Fleet. Much of China's oil is transported from the Middle East through the Strait of Hormuz outside Iran. These strategic

"choke points" are beyond China's control. The B&R creates alternative, safer supply routes and economic linkages in the form of seaports, gas-and-oil pipelines, and trade and investment flow running through friendlier countries. It's China's *pivot to the West*.

China's influence on the Middle East is well-timed. With the discovery and extraction of abundant domestic shale gas and oil resources, the United States is now a net energy exporter. Its relations with the Middle East (save Israel), including relations with Saudi Arabia, have become less paramount. Additionally, major Arab oil-producing countries are aware of global trends toward renewable energy and sustainable development. They are attempting to diversify their economies for the sake of long-term economic viability. As the world's largest energy customer, the biggest trader, and a massive investor in foreign assets, China, with its B&R connectivity, is an alluring partner for the Middle East.

The Middle East dimension of the B&R is reinforced at the eighth Ministerial Meeting of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) in July 2018, bringing together foreign ministers of twenty-two Arab League member states. A "China-Arab League" of strategic partnership in comprehensive cooperation and common development was announced. Also introduced was a plan for Chinese-developed industrial parks in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), connecting with regional ports in Djibouti, the UAE, and Egypt. The plan uses the term "Two Wheels" to refer to cooperation in oil-and-gas and low-carbon energy and the term "Two Wings" for enhanced cooperation in science and technology as well as finance (Fulton, 2018).

MAJOR HEADWINDS AGAINST THE BELT AND ROAD

From initial indifference, the United States is now pushing back against the B&R, which is seen as part of *The Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as The Global Superpower* (Pillsbury, 2015).

At a November 2018 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting, former Vice President Mike Pence referred to B&R as a "constricting belt" and a "one-way road" (Guardian, 2018). The Washington-based Peterson Institute for International Economics reported that the United States is branding B&R loans as "predatory lending" creating a "debt trap" and that it may veto any International Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue for B&R borrowers.

On October 5, 2018, the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act was passed in Congress. A US International Development Finance Corporation (USDFC) was established, combining the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and USAID's

Development Credit Authority. With USD$200 million in program funds, the US initiative is designed to bring better-managed, private-sector funding to the developing world.

On "debt trap" accusations, the Washington-based Center for Global Development headed by Lawrence Summers has found only eight out of sixty-eight B&R borrowers to be debt-distressed. During the period from 2000 to 2017, there were one thousand Chinese loans in Africa, totaling USD$143 billion. According to Deborah Bräutigam (2015), a renowned expert on Africa at Johns Hopkins University, China's lending in Sub-Saharan Africa is minuscule compared with private and other official sources excluding China, particularly from Western lenders. According to the Boston University Global Development Policy Center, Chinese loans to Latin America and the Caribbean since 2005 revealed no evidence of "predatory lending" (Ching, 2021).

The poster child of alleged Chinese debt-entrapment is Sri Lanka's Hambantota International Port. In December 2017, USD$1.1 billion in debt was written off in exchange for a ninety-nine-year lease to a Chinese state-owned company on the deep-water port. While corporate governance of B&R lending, such as accountability, transparency, debt-sustainability, environmental standards, fair competition, and more, leaves a lot to be desired, of Sri Lanka's accumulated foreign debt estimated at USD$55 billion, Chinese lenders accounted for only 10 percent in comparison with Japan's 12 percent, the Asian Development Bank's 14 percent and the World Bank's 11 percent.

RECENT BELL AND ROAD DEVELOPMENTS

Amid suspicions of divide-and-rule in the European Union, China has embarked on a broad-based economic and infrastructural cooperation initiative with sixteen central and east European (CEE) countries, the so-called 16+1 Framework, as a bridgehead for B&R projects throughout Europe. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, in December 2014, pushed for a multiparty agreement with Macedonia, Serbia, and Hungary to set up a "*China-Europe Land-Sea Express*" to facilitate the shipping of goods from Greece to Hungary onto western Europe. Amounting to 10 billion euros, the China-CEE Fund, incorporated in Luxembourg, is sponsored by the Export-Import Bank of China with the Hungarian Export-Import Bank to provide B&R funding for CEE host countries.

While a great deal of concern and skepticism remains in western European countries, Italy, for one, has jumped on to the B&R bandwagon. Capitalizing on Venice as the end-point of the Maritime Silk Road, Italy sees great

potential in itself as a hub for a 500 billion euro plan—the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T).[5]

Additionally, resulting from global warming and the gradual melting of Arctic ice, a new dimension is added by incorporating a "Polar Silk Road."[6]

Shipping time between China and Europe via the Arctic would be shorter than with the existing routes through the Indian Ocean and Suez Canal. In addition to China's official "Observer" status in the Arctic Council, this new B&R extension would help support China's claimed status as a "Near-Arctic State." Not to mention that China's interest in the massive potential of helping to utilize and manage the Arctic's wealth of natural resources as the region becomes more hospitable.

China's Arctic extension could not have come about without Russia's support. A "*Power of Siberia*" three thousand-kilometer pipeline is to connect to China in a USD$55 billion deal between Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). This is a manifestation of a deepening marriage of convenience as both Russia and China need each other ever more to ward off growing aggression from an "America First" hegemon (*Financial Times*, 2019).

In Asia, viewing China as a rival, India remains resistant to the B&R, which is seen as a Chinese plot to marginalize India. However, as mentioned earlier, while still distrustful of China, Japan has seemed to be changing tack, if only to hedge against the capricious Trump administration's emphasis on "America First." Despite a deep geopolitical and historical divide with China, Prime Minister Abe's recent attempts at rapprochement with President Xi speak volumes. Among the Japanese overtures is a more cooperative attitude toward B&R. If anything, the likely calculation is that it's better for Japan to stay in rather if some of B&R's massive opportunities are not to be missed.

A report by China's National Development and Reform Commission (2019) estimated that China's cumulative trade with B&R host countries surpassed USD$7 trillion in 2018, with an investment of more than USD$30 billion, creating nearly three hundred thousand jobs in host countries. The B&R has also helped build much-needed "soft" infrastructure in these countries, such as education, health care, and other services.

In Europe, China-Europe freight trains connect Chinese cities to forty-nine cities in fifteen European countries, speeding up connectivity on a broad front. The World Bank estimates that shipping times have been reduced by up to 3.2 percent and trade costs by up to 2.8 percent.

As of 2018, China had signed 171 cooperation documents with more than 150 countries and international organizations. A Belt and Road international science alliance was established in 2018, building technology transfer platforms and science parks with Southeast and South Asia, the Middle East, central Asia, central and eastern Europe.

Greater involvement of the World Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank will help address accusations of "debt traps," adverse ecological impact, lack of transparency, and inadequate benefits for local communities.

Wang Huiyao, founder of Beijing-based Center for China and Globalization, a nongovernment Beijing-based think tank, suggested that B&R should be internationalized to engage actively with other lenders and stakeholders. According to him, it should join the Paris Club, an informal grouping of creditor nations to find solutions to debtor nations' problems. It should be rebranded as the "Belt and Road International Development Plan" as much more than commercial returns is at stake (Wang, 2019).

SURVIVAL OF GLOBALIZED PRODUCTION AND VALUE CHAINS

A McKinsey Global Institute report titled China and the World: Inside the Dynamics of a Changing Relationship dated June 2019 contains the following insights:

a. China's exposure to the world in trade, technology, and capital has fallen. Conversely, the world's exposure to China has increased. This reflects the rebalancing of the Chinese economy towards domestic consumption**,** which contributed 76% of China's GDP growth in 2017–18, while net trade registered a negative contribution.
b. China's consumer markets are heavily integrated with the world. Penetration by multinational corporations is considerable. Across ten large consumer categories, average penetration was 40% in 2017, compared with 26% in the United States.
c. China's technology value chains are highly integrated globally. Chinese players have grown rapidly but struggled with cutting-edge core technologies dominated by advanced countries, especially the United States. Examples include high-end semiconductor chips, reduction gears (robotics), and power electronics (electric vehicles).

Intensifying the US-Chinese trade war has pushed many manufacturing operations in China to the rest of Asia and other parts of the world. However, many of these operations remain dependent on medium-technology intermediates from China*,* such as specialized parts, components, and support services.

On the other hand, China is doubling down on technological self-reliance, accelerating its own vertical integration.

A report by Natixis, a French corporate and investment bank, shows that China's vertical integration leads to less dependence on Asia's regional value chains (2019). A Natixis podcast reiterates the same trend as regards the European Union:

> EU Member states are generally becoming more integrated with China's value chain. The problem with this development, though, is that such integration with China is increasingly asymmetric. Meaning, China imports fewer intermediate goods from the EU increasingly, but it exports increasingly more intermediates to EU member states for their reexport. The EU depends more on Chinese inputs for exports while China relies less on EU goods for its exports. (Nguyen, 2019)

A Natixis report from November 4, 2019 confirms the same situation with the United States:

> Our analysis shows that the US declining participation in the global value chain is driven by both its reduction in exporting of intermediates used for inputs in others' exports, an area where it generally excels and its reliance on foreign inputs for its production. At the same time, the US is increasingly dependent on Chinese intermediates for exports while China is reducing its vulnerability to US imports of inputs for exports.
>
> Like Europe, the US is not only losing ground to China in terms of its integration with China's value chain but also reducing its participation with other regions in the world, such as Latin America, Europe and the rest of Asia. (2019b)

Meanwhile, B&R meets a global thirst for infrastructural links with the world's dynamic markets and economies. As it manages to overcome international headwinds about debt and ecological sustainability, its reenergized momentum is likely to entrench dependence on China's economy. This begs the question of how successful a containment strategy to decouple China from the global supply and value chain is likely to be.

In *Connectography*, Paraq Khanna (2016) argues that the future is shaped less by national borders than by global supply chains and that the most connected powers—and peoples—through trade, investment, infrastructure, and other linkages, are likely to win the day. Given time, this may well be true, especially when China's economy, already the world's second-largest, becomes the largest, which is likely to materialize within the coming decades.

In light of America's deep-seated "China Scare," a degree of decoupling is inevitable, at least for the near future. However, global supply chains are not mechanical, involving a complex web of inputs of raw materials, parts, components, distributed technologies, assembly, logistics, subcontracting networks, customer relationships, integrated markets, the economy of scale, and market potentials, which are not all amenable to the bifurcation.

DESPITE HEADWINDS, THE DEVELOPING WORLD IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT

Thanks to a slagging world economy, surge of protectionism, trade conflicts, rising indebtedness, and stagnating productivity growth, emerging markets, especially the so-called emerging and growth-leading economies (EAGLES) (BBAV Research, 2012), which used to lead in contributions to global growth, are losing their shine (Wheatney, 2019).

In its January 2020 report, the IMF cuts global GDP forecast for 2020 from 3.4 percent to 3.3 percent, with the lion's share of downward revision attributed to weaker growth in India (Carter, 2020). A slowing China's prospects are slightly upgraded from 5.8 percent to 6 percent due to a temporary truce in the US-Chinese trade war but are expected to slide back to 5.8 percent in 2021, owing to the ongoing conflict between the world's two largest economies (Carter, 2020).

Nevertheless, while China's growth is the slowest it has been in thirty years, anything over 5 percent annual growth is still a highly respected growth rate for the second-largest economy in the world. To use an analogy, it is one thing to make 10 percent on a capital of $10. It is a totally different ball game to make 10 percent on the capital of a trillion dollars.

In any case, while the whole world is going through a slower patch, dependence by Western and developing economies alike on China's upgraded production and value chain largely remains, as pointed out earlier. This is being reinforced by the B&R.

At the same time, the world's pendulum has been swinging toward the East, as pointed out in *Easternization: Asia's Rise and America's Decline From Obama to Trump and Beyond* (Rachman, 2016) and *The Future is Asian: Global Order in the Twenty-First Century* (Khanna, 2019). As the world tilts toward the East, China's global connectivity matters even more.

In terms of a multipolar world, a dynamic hotspot to watch is Africa. Albeit trapped by inadequate soft and physical infrastructures and poor governance, Africa remains a dynamic continent with the largest untapped economic and geopolitical potential. Thanks to its massive demographic dividend, growth in education, and better governance, six of the top ten fastest-growing economies are now in Africa, according to the World Economic Forum (Signé and Gurib-Fakim, 2019). It is also destined to be home to the largest population in the world. By the end of the twenty-first century, there is a strong chance that 30 percent of the world's population will be African (Pison, 2017).

More African countries are looking at China as their biggest trading partner and a source of funds for much-needed infrastructure. Some are trying to emulate part of China's model of governance. China operates fifty-four

Confucius Institutes in Africa, as many as the number of African nations (King, 2018). China is committed to providing fifty thousand training opportunities to African countries for government officials, opinion leaders, scholars, journalists, and technical experts (Sun, 2018). While China may not be the biggest investor (as distinct from infrastructural project financing) in Africa (Garcia-Herrero and Xu, 2019), China's presence in Africa is ubiquitous. In a way, it is almost "China's Second Continent," according to Howard French (2015). It is no wonder that China can often count on African nations' support for its stand in the United Nations General Assembly.

THE DOMINANCE OF AMERICA'S MILITARY, TECHNOLOGY, AND EVEN THE DOLLAR BECOMING UNCERTAIN

A key consideration regarding reliance on American protection is its unmatched military superiority. While no other country comes close to having the United States' overall military sophistication, technological advance, readiness, and global reach, the gaps are narrowing in several critical areas as far as China and Russia are concerned.

China has been rapidly developing a blue-war navy, including multiple aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. It has built fortified islands out of sandbanks in the South China Sea. Equipped with hordes of mobile mid-range high-precision anti-ship missiles, modern submarines, and underwater military devices, China has effectively developed capabilities to deny access to critical sea lanes of communication in a potential military conflict in the South China Sea, America's nuclear aircraft-carrier battle groups and Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP) notwithstanding. A report in the *South China Morning Post* dated January 18, 2020, poses the question on whether the United States has already lost the battle for the South China Sea (Power, 2020).

An exposé dated December 18, 2019, in *The National Interest* refers to a new "Missile Gap," begging the question about whether America is losing to Russian and Chinese state-of-the-art hypersonic weaponry (Goure, 2019).

Technologically, as a new era of digitization unfolds, China is threatening America's lead in the global artificial intelligence race, according to former President Donald Trump's head of technology policy (Jing, 2019). In regards to 5G, another cutting-edge technology, the agony of Western allies over Huawei, China's global tech giant with much 5G infrastructure already embedded in Western countries, speaks volumes.

Additionally, the Trump administration's aggressive use of tariffs and sanctions had begun to undermine global trust in the greenback. Recourse

is sought by using alternative currencies, currency swaps, direct trade settlements, and even state-backed digital currencies, according to a leading article in *The Economist* (2020). China, for one, is expected to launch the world's first digital currency (Elegant, 2019). With the B&R and backed by strong reserves, China's renminbi, while in no way displacing the mighty dollar, is set to gain ascendancy.

CONCLUSION

America's apparent retreat from global responsibilities coincides with China's ascendance in economic, financial, technological, military, and geopolitical clout. Unlike in the early Maoist days during the Cold War, China has not been exporting Communism nor can China's model of development be readily replicated by other countries. In any case, given a mountain of domestic and external challenges, including the so-called "Middle Income Trap,"[7] China remains unable and unwilling to shoulder the responsibilities of the United States as a global leader and hegemon anytime soon. The mantra of a "China Scare" thus appears to be overhyped.

China has been embedded in a multilateral world order from which it has benefited massively. When it overtook the United States as the world's largest trading nation in 2013 (in terms of purchasing power parity), China was the largest trading partner to 124 nations, far more than any other country on the planet (compared with seventy-six nations for the United States).[8] While not necessarily China's allies, these and other strategic partners, including Russia and the bulk of the developing world, add wind to China's sails in upholding a multipolar world order, countering American unipolar tendencies.

"America First" imperatives are upending global institutions, like the WTO, and tearing up multilateral agreements, like the Paris Agreement on climate change and the nuclear deal with Iran. An unprecedented trade war with China has disrupted global supply and value chains. More of such wars loom on the horizon with slant exemption for American allies, such as the European Union. This has already resulted in some pushback by America's traditional allies, including Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. In any case, unless without recourse, powers act in their considered best self-interest. In fact, they were among the first to intend to join the China-led Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

A new era is unfolding with China's epochal renaissance. The pendulum is swinging toward a new Asian century or an "*Easternization*" and an awakening Africa. These dynamics are driven by deepening globalization and multipolar connectivity, where China, with the B&R linking the Eurasian continent, plays a pivotal part.

Critical global issues, like climate change, water scarcity, ecological degradation, nuclear proliferation, cybersecurity, terrorism, and regional conflicts, cannot be resolved by any single country, no matter how powerful. This reality lends support to China's espousal of a "Community of Common Destiny" for humanity (Zhang, 2018), allowing for shared interests, mutual respect, and inclusive diversity.

While China is facing many headwinds pushing back against its "authoritarian" model, its "unfair" trade practices, and perceived drawbacks of the B&R, given wide support for multilateralism by many developed and developing countries, a super-globally-connected China is well paced to deepen and help improve the function of a multipolar world order against attempts to break it with a unipolar wrecking ball.

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NOTES

1. The Washington Consensus includes ten broad sets of relatively specific policy recommendations, including fiscal discipline, tax reform, market-based interest rates and exchange rates, trade and market access liberalization, privatization, deregulation, and protection of property rights.

2. Two Centenaries: (1) to become a relatively well-off country by 2021, the centenary of the Communist Party of China and (2) to become a "*strong, democratic, civilized, harmonious, and modern socialist country*" by 2049, the centenary of the People's Republic of China.

3. "Made in China 2025" is a national plan announced in 2015 to upgrade China's technology capabilities in order to lead in ten cutting-edge technologies by 2025—information technology, robotics, green energy, green vehicles, aerospace equipment, ocean engineering and high-tech ships, railway equipment, power equipment, new materials, medicine and medical devices, and agricultural machinery.

4. To view this map, please visit https://www.chinadailyhk.com/articles/156/162/90/1535691275209.html.

5. For maps on the TEN-T, see the following: "Connection of NAPA ports to the TEN-T and Pan-European corridors," https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Connection-of-NAPA-ports-to-the-TEN-T-and-Pan-European-corridors_fig1_347462105, as

well as "Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T)," https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/ten-t_en).

6. For a map of existing and developing routes included in the Polar Silk Road, please visit https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Map-of-existing-and-developing-routes-included-in-Polar-Silk-Road-36_fig4_330643092).

7. The World Bank defines it as within the "middle-income range" countries with GDP per capita between $10,000 to $12,000 at constant (2011) prices. According to historical data, only a handful of developing countries managed to escape from getting stuck in this middle-income range.

8. RT Questions More, *China overtakes US as world's largest trading country*, (February 11, 2013). reference is made to the number of countries having China as their largest trading partner, compared with the position of the United States. Information is available at https://www.rt.com/business/china-us-largest-trading-country-908/ (accessed on January 26, 2020).

Chapter Six

Whither Global Governance? An Approach to the World Politics

Özgür Tüfekçi and Rahman Dağ

The world has increasingly become more complex, more globalized, and more vulnerable in the twenty-first century. In this new global order, one should comprehend and explore political, economic, social, environmental, institutional, and cultural processes and changes globally. On the one hand, the international community has witnessed the gloomiest and darkest hours in recent world history because the existing global governance structures have deepened many political, structural, and moral crises. The absence of a strong international order has resulted in the 9/11 attacks, the 2003 war in Iraq, the 2007 global financial crisis, and the failure of the climate change negotiations in Copenhagen. On the other hand, world wealth has increased, and the social and economic well-being of many nations has improved. In this process, the roles of the nation-state and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become more intertwined. One can observe the critical role of international and transnational organizations in every issue area of international politics.

International organizations (IOs) and global governance are important global instruments to make the world a more peaceful and better place, protect human lives, and improve the environment. In this sense, global governance has emerged as a "purposive system of rules that operate at the global level" (Biersteker, 2015: 158). In the meantime, globalization has become a subsidiary tool used to set a trend of intensification in economic, political, institutional, cultural, social, and digital relations among countries since the late twentieth century. It has been marked by increasing economic, environmental, and institutional interdependence and deepening economic integration between countries worldwide. The main trends of increasing economic integration are as follows: the internationalization of production, trade, and

financial activities, the increase of foreign trade and economic openness, reducing the role of the state, and the growing role of multinational corporations (MNCs). Globalization is a historical process that was championed by miscellaneous IOs and a community of experts worldwide.

The term "global governance" is not synonymous with "world government." Whereas domestic governments have legitimate power and possess the absolute monopoly to use force, global governance means the political, economic, and social interaction that aims to solve transboundary problems without a world governing body. Toward this objective, the toolbox of global governance includes rules, norms, codes of behavior, institutional practices, and functions that help to solve collective action problems and manage global commons. Members of international institutions and their expert epistemic communities are other important tools to set up a system of governance and develop high standards in the international system (Carayannis et al., 2012: 1–2).

Whereas a web of international or transnational intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) connect people in all countries, the rapid growth of this network and the increasingly intense communications cause international interdependency. As a result, global governance has become a more fanciful idea and a need for world politics. Global governance encompasses the multitude of formal and informal structures of political coordination amongst governments, IGOs, NGOs, and MNCs—one of the most significant nonstate actors in international politics. Despite the fact that ever since the Peace of Westphalia, scholars have been concerned with governance, the interest in global governance has intensified after the Cold War since international institutions have started to play a central role in world politics.

Rosenau (1992: 10) points out that "global governance is a concept, refers to the absence of overarching political authority in the international system." He (1992: 3) also emphasizes that global governance is "governance without government," which indicates a shift from statism to integration. Robert Cox approaches the concept as powerful corporate actors are united to protect the interests of global capitalism through the concept of globalization (Sutch and Elias, 2007: 105). The notion of global governance is a contentious political topic. While some believe that it undermines national sovereignty, others worry that global governance would represent the values and interests of the system's wealthy and powerful members at the expense of the poor and weak ones. As a result, global governance is a highly politicized notion that raises basic concerns regarding the rightful site of authority in international affairs, global institution accountability, and international justice's character (Griffiths and O'Callaghan, 2002: 126).

The Commission on Global Governance (1995) defines the concept of "global governance" as follows:

> Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated, and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest. Examples of governance at the local level include a neighbourhood cooperative formed to install and maintain a standing water pipe, a town council operating a waste recycling scheme, a multi-urban body developing an integrated transport plan together with user groups, a stock exchange regulating itself with national government oversight, and a regional initiative of state agencies, industrial groups, and residents to control deforestation. Governance has been viewed primarily as intergovernmental relationships globally, but it must now be understood as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), citizens' movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital market. Interacting with these are global mass media of dramatically enlarged influence.

Global governance, according to Clive Archer (2001: 108), encompasses activities that cross borders and are generally outside the authority of particular governments, such as international crime, drug smuggling, cross-border environmental issues, the internet, tourism, human migration, and disease transmission. To manage these activities requires a system that is called an *international regime*. A well-accepted definition for the international regime is that "a regime is a set of principles, procedures, norms or rules that govern the interactions of states and non-state actors in particular issue areas within international politics" (Heywood, 2011: 67).

Regimes are formal or informal social institutions that have a formal or informal nature. Treaties, conventions, international agreements, and international organizations are all examples of regimes. These functions are used in various sectors, including economics, human rights, the environment, transportation, security, policing, and communications. The rising relevance of regimes reflects the growing interconnectivity of the world and the recognition that cooperation and coordination may benefit all parties equally. Regimes could potentially provide a web of regulatory frameworks (Heywood, 2011: 67).

International regimes are tool kits for individuals and institutions to manage their common affairs worldwide, which is called global governance (Archer, 2001). International organizations are in the tool kit to underpin global governance as well. Furthermore, these international organizations' role in international regimes is associated with their functionality. In this view, that role is split into two parts: To begin with, they can be tools of regime creation, energizing the institutional bargaining processes that result in constitutional contracts and the establishment of regimes. Then, the

provisions of the governance systems they develop can then be implemented and administered (Young, 1994: 164).

THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES

Realist Perspective

Realism is seen as one of the dominant theories of international relations since it provides one of the most powerful explanations for the state of war. That explanation is based upon the power politics of the classical world. In particular, in the chronicler of the Peloponnesian wars, Thucydides argues that the cause of war between the Athenians and the Spartans (around 420 BC) was an increase in Athenian military power the insecurity that it created among the Spartans. Thucydides' approach toward the nature of international politics has inspired E. H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau to use the term *realism* to explain state behavior. Furthermore, Morgenthau put forward that the concept of power was the focal point of international politics:

> The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible. On the side of the actor, it provides for rational discipline in action and creates that astounding continuity in foreign policy which makes American, British or Russian appear as in intelligible, rational continuum, by and large consistent within itself, regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of successive statesmen." (Morgenthau, 2005: 5)

Thucydides and Morgenthau had shared the belief that the origins of international power politics were to be sought in human nature. They claimed that since there was no natural harmony of interests among states, the struggle for power among states could not be tamed by international law, democratization, and international commerce. Because of the suspicion between states in an anarchic environment, harmony among states (particularly powerful ones) has been rare. Cooperation occurs when states face a common threat or common interest. However, the increase in institutional and economic interdependence and the increase in cooperation among states has left (classical) realists no choice but to modify the approach. Kenneth Waltz (2001: 181), *a* structural realist, took the stage and argued that anarchy is a crucial structural feature of the international system. Wars occur due to this structure rather than from particular defects in human nature (Griffiths and O'Callaghan, 2002: 263).

It is accepted that the contemporary international system is identified with extensive cooperation and peace among the great powers despite prevalent interstate violence and conflict. The answers to how and why the contemporary international system has undergone a significant change from the past are the fundamental role of democracy, economic interdependence, and international organizations (see Milner and Moravcsik, 2009; Russett and Oneal, 2001).

The role of international organizations is highly related to the concept of "global governance" since it is seen as the sum of all global actors, their interests, and their practices. Herein, one of the main problematic issues comes to the fore regarding the functioning of global governance, since the term global governance misdirects attention from deeper structures of power that shape patterns of global management by implying that these activities occur independently of states. From a realist perspective, states remain the primary actors in international relations (Weiss and Wilkinson, 2014: 93–94).

Realism deals with the impact of power in world politics since states are viewed as the main actors in international relations. In fact, the distribution of capabilities among these actors determines the stage for patterns of global authority, control, and legitimacy. States should not be analyzed as first among equals concerning nonstate actors, such as IGOs, NGOs, transnational corporations, activists, and transnational civil society. No realist scholar would deny that these actors exist and are currently engaged in the governance of some sort or can make a difference to the quality of some people's daily lives. However, their existence does not grant them status as a primary driver of world order. Rather, this web of formal and informal actors, institutions, and arrangements is contingent on the authority and legitimacy of the state (Weiss and Wilkinson, 2014: 99; Reimann, 2006: 50; Stavrianakis, 2012: 227–28; Stone, 2011).

In sum, realists are skeptical about international organizations, which are viewed as ineffective. According to them, international organizations are meant to be weaker since it is believed that international politics is built upon a quest for power over all states. Unless world politics provides a harmony of interests, levels of cooperation, and trust among the actors, international organizations will not develop into significant bodies. In addition, the growth of international organizations is usually deemed to be undesirable because of its implications for sovereignty. Any form of a global organization, therefore, keeps challenging the authority of the nation-state. However, unlike realists, neorealists have a moderate approach toward international organizations. The link between international organizations and hegemony is brought to the forefront by neorealists. Because hegemonic nations wield so much power, they are the only ones who can accept relative gains from other states as long as they are gaining absolute advantages (Heywood, 2011: 437).

NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVE

Neoliberal institutionalism focuses on the anarchical environment of world politics and aims to describe relations between state and nonstate actors. Neoliberal institutionalists challenge realism and its assumptions. The main assumption is that neoliberalism is driven by complex interdependence. Through complex interdependence, actors other than states may participate directly in world politics, hierarchical issues do not exist, and force is an ineffective policy instrument (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 24; Hohenstedt, 2017: 3).

Each assumption is significant. The first assumption argues that the role of international organizations, such as MNCs, international governmental organizations, and international NGOs, as well as established norms and networks, are effective to determine outcomes in world affairs. The second assumption claims that neo-liberal institutionalism concerns itself with low politics (economic and social issues) and so-called high politics (security issues). The final assumption argues that, given complex interdependence, it is obvious that military force is not of decisive relevance to all aspects of international relations (Sutch and Elias, 2007: 73).

The neoliberal institutionalist approach has more in common with neorealism than traditional liberalism (Keohane, 1989; Jervis, 1999). The basic principles that underpin neorealism are accepted by neoliberal institutionalists. They support the anarchical perspective of international relations. They agree that the sovereign state is the most powerful player. They also embrace neo-epistemological realism's assumptions and its approach (Sutch and Elias, 2007: 73).

WHEN IT COMES TO THE DIFFERENCES:

> Some of this difference reflects the issues that the schools of thought analyse. Neo-liberal institutionalists concentrate on issues of international political economy (IPE) and the environment; realists are more prone to study international security and the causes, conduct, and consequences of wars. Thus, although it would be correct to say that one sees more conflict in the world analysed by realist scholars than in the world analysed by neo-liberals, this is at least in part because they study different worlds." (Jervis, 1999: 45)

The neoliberal institutionalists and neorealists share a similar perspective toward international relations. However, since they deal with the different aspects of world politics, it has other impacts. The realists looked to be oblivious to the relevance of international organizations in limiting or altering state behavior because they made certain assumptions (the state as the only

significant actor and the priority of high over low politics) (Sutch and Elias, 2007: 75).

International organisations have significant importance for global governance. Unlike the realist perspective, these organizations do not eliminate the role of states and related concepts. Sometimes the organizations reflect the power and narrow interests of states-concerns that are stressed in traditional approaches to IR like neorealism. As neoliberal institutionalists claim, international organizations might sometimes have an important and beneficial impact on international relations, but sometimes not (Forsythe, 2014: 128).

In sum, neoliberal institutionalists are devoted supporters of international organizations since they deeply believe that states cooperate because cooperation might generate a great deal of interest. That is why international organizations are viewed as a reflection of the complex interdependence in world politics. Nevertheless, according to neoliberal institutionalists, having complex interdependence among states does not cause the rise of international organizations. Cooperation is tough to sustain if states do not trust each other (Heywood, 2011: 437).

CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE

According to the constructivist approach, international relations are more than just rational activity and interaction under material and institutional restrictions at the international and national levels. Constructivists define state interaction as a pattern of behavior that is determined by identities throughout time. Constructivists concentrate their efforts on institutions at the foundation of international society, such as international law, diplomacy, and sovereignty. Regimes, on the other hand, are crucial. As a theoretical approach, constructivism is difficult to employ. Constructivism, for example, does not assume that any certain social structure would control state behavior. Rather, it necessitates examining, expressing, and, eventually, comprehending a certain social connection. It may therefore be feasible to anticipate state behavior inside that structure once this has been accomplished (Griffiths et al., 2008: 50–52).

In this sense, Ruggie (2004: 504) focuses on the concept of the "global public domain," which is constructed by the proliferation of global civil society organizations. In addition, Jens Steffek and Maria Paola Ferretti (2009: 40) put forward that public participation through the inclusion of global civil society organizations can lead to new democratizing functions within the global governance arena, correcting the purported democratic deficit. In doing so, civil society organizations would enhance the democratic

accountability of intergovernmental organizations and regimes and increase the epistemic quality of rules and decisions (Steffek and Feretti, 2009: 42).

Constructivist analysis of the international organization and global governance focuses on the importance of intersubjectively shared social understandings in political communication and action and the importance of the fusion of power and social purpose in the analyses of international institutions, both public, such as the Bretton Woods institutions, and private, such as the contribution of civil society organizations in generating a global public domain for transnational discursive debate (Weiss and Wilkinson, 2014: 152).

In this sense, Heywood summarizes the constructive perspective toward the international organizations as follows:

> Constructivists challenge both neorealist and neoliberal accounts of an international organisation on the grounds that, despite their differences, they assume that states are rational actors guided by objective interests. This discounts the role of ideas and perceptions. The state-system is an arena of inter-subjective interaction. Levels of cooperation within the international system, therefore, depend on how states construe their own identities and interests as well as the identities and interests of other states. These, moreover, change due to membership of, and interactions that take place within, international organizations, meaning that international organisations themselves are essentially ideational constructs. (2011: 437)

CLASSICAL MARXIST PERSPECTIVE

When Karl Marx (1818–1883) started to criticize capitalism, he was forming Marxism. Marx's theoretical approach is dialectical in nature. It is based on the cognitive and material struggle to overcome the social contradictions of wealth accumulation (Griffiths et al., 2008: 196). In classical Marxism, imperialism is the basic dynamic of the international system. In addition, according to the classical theorists—Marx, Rosa Luxemburg, Rudolf Hilferding, Nikolai Bukharin, and Vladimir Lenin—the nature of the international organization is determined by economic relations. Therefore, relations between states in the nineteenth century would reflect contemporary capitalist relations. Furthermore, in the postcolonial era, Marxist theorizing on international organization was directed to the power of economic institutions, particularly MNCs (Emadi-Coffin, 2002: 11–15).

The classical Marxist perspective identifies a "grand strategy" or project for command and control at the heart of the institutional system of global authority, centered precisely on the dissemination of the forms of

competitiveness that enhance the power of global capital to discipline global labor. It shows how regional and national systems intersect, in particular by unveiling the logic of country ownership and partnership in the political economy of reform; it identifies the crucial role of international organizations in developing the ideas and discourses that establish, maintain, and perpetuate the hegemony of global capital, this being the only means, in the long run, by which local capital can sustain hegemony over local labor; and it illuminates the structural power of capital at the heart of the system, and depicts states as driven to embrace its logic in a world market increasingly characterized by a politics of global competitiveness (Weiss and Wilkinson, 2014: 178).

CONCLUSION: THE UN SYSTEM AND GENERAL DEFICIENCIES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

As an attractive field, international relations deals with peoples and cultures all over the world. The scope and level of the interactions among these groups reflect the world's complexity. Scholars in the field of international relations use many theories and concepts to understand and explain that complexity. International organization and global governance are complex concepts that need to be comprehended since international organizations' rise has increased the level of complexity in international relations. In this new complex environment, IGOs, regional organizations, NGOs, and MNCs are perceived as actors different from nation-states. Furthermore, international organizations are basically described as international social institutions that are collective or corporate actors and can cover several issues of international relations (Rittberger et al., 2011: 6).

In this sense, the world of international relations has been dealing with these organizations since they have been part of world politics. Debates on the role of international organizations derive from the early twentieth-century international relations theory, idealism. Nonetheless, following the Napoleonic Wars,[1] the first embryonic international organizations were formed (Heywood, 2011: 433). The Congress of Vienna (1814–1815), for example, founded the Concert of Europe, which lasted until the First World War. Following the First World War, US President Woodrow Wilson led the formation of the League of Nations to foster political stability. Wilson felt that a global organization representing all governments' interests would legitimize a commitment to collective security (Sutch and Elias, 2007: 84). The League of Nations was the first genuinely multinational organization to be in charge of maintaining world peace. Its primary goal was to find and promote shared interests, with the primary goal of avoiding conflict (Weiss and Wilkinson, 2014: 210). The League of Nations was a failure because of its impotency in facing the rise of

fascism in the 1930s. Besides, the ultimate failure of the league to maintain international peace and security was a product of its limited membership, its preservation of a territorial settlement that humiliated Germany, and its faith in the willingness of great powers to subordinate their short-term national interests to the protection of international peace (Griffiths et al. 2008: 185).

As a successor international organization to the League of Nations, the United Nations (UN) has strengthened its commitment to multilateralism. The UN was established following the Second World War to maintain international peace, foster friendly relations among states, and cooperate internationally in the resolution of global economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems as well as the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms (Griffiths et al. 2008: 322).

Multilateralism, like idealism, is a means of bringing together international players to encourage cooperation and generalized institutional frameworks. It was one of the major motives for both the League of Nations and the UN to be founded. The UN and other international organizations have both strengths and weaknesses since multilateral approaches limit state freedom of action. That is why, on the one hand, state sovereignty creates a real need for international organizations since any government cannot coordinate the activities of states for mutual benefit, while, on the other hand, state sovereignty also limits the power of the UN and other international organizations since governments reserve power to themselves (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2014: 234).

The important role of nonstate actors in international affairs during the post-Cold War era has received a great deal of attention. In particular, Keohane puts forward the significance of international institutions and cooperation as follows:

> I believe that international institutions are worth studying because they are pervasive and important in world politics and because their operation and evolution are difficult to understand. However, I also urge attention to them on normative grounds. International institutions have the *potential* to facilitate cooperation, and without international cooperation, I believe that the prospects for our species will be very poor indeed. Cooperation is not always benign, but without cooperation, we will be lost. Without institutions, there will be little cooperation. And without knowledge of how institutions work—and what makes them work well—there are likely to be fewer, and worse, institutions than if such knowledge is widespread." (1989: 174)

International organizations come to the fore to sustain accountability and international justice to hold together the world order. At the center of these organizations stands the most important international organization today, the UN. Regarding the global governance perspective, the UN is the closest thing

to a world government. It is not, however, a world government. Its members are sovereign states that have not given the UN the authority to impose its will within their borders unless their governments agree. As a result, while the UN enhances world order, its design recognizes the realities of international anarchy and governments' refusal to relinquish sovereignty. Within these bounds, the UN's primary goal is to establish a global institutional framework through which governments can occasionally resolve problems without resorting to force (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2014: 236).

Along with the end of the Cold War, the concept of governance became related to international organizations despite the lack of knowledge about what was meant by this concept. Somehow, the concept was initially seen by the aforementioned organizations, and the UN had gained certain legal government responsibilities by becoming involved with specific tasks, such as economic development, public health, and more.

> Governance is not just the province of the state. Rather it is a function that can be performed by a wide variety of public and private, state and non-state, national and international institutions and practices . . . However, the governing powers, international, national, and regional, need to be 'sutured' together into a relatively well-integrated system" (Hirst and Thompson, 1996: 183–84).

Despite the state playing a key role in that process, the UN has increased its importance. In three key ways, the UN grew concerned with the issue of international order. First, it became more concerned, not merely with the promotion of internal standards inside nations but also with the development of international standards. It is increasingly dealing with human rights violations and administrative and economic collapse as well as assisting with elections and humanitarian aid. Second, it was concerned with what had historically been the primary concept of international order, as well as the mission of the UN and the league before it, namely the promotion of international peace and security via the prevention of state aggression. Third, the UN became involved in promoting order when sovereignty was challenged by opposing citizen groups, typically in the form of a civil war (Taylor, 2001: 339–40).

Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that regarding the functioning of global governance, there are several deficiencies. First, there have been problems with the coordination and planning of the economic and social activities of the UN. Second, coping with sovereignty and the need for neutrality have been some of the problematic issues. Third, the UN system has had a serious financial shortfall. Fourth, since a number of states became unhappy about the restricted membership of the Security Council, there have been issues with executive competence and legitimacy. Besides, along with the lacking mechanisms for judicial review and supervision, the capacity of the

UN to collect and interpret information needed further enhancement (Taylor, 2001: 349–50).

It is unequivocal that the UN system needs improvements to provide well-functioning global governance. Nevertheless, improving the governance of the society of states could be carried out by the UN itself. Finding ways for the better governance of international society could take a long time, but surely states need to accept that their sovereignty has been altered.

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NOTES

1. The Napoleonic Wars were conflicts fought between France and a number of European nations between 1799 and 1815.

PART II

Chapter Seven

Trends and Transformation in World Politics through the Eyes of the Leading IR Scholars

Rahman Dağ and Özgür Tüfekçi

CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR ANDREW LINKLATER[1]

Question: We would like to start asking about your view of the contemporary international community. In *The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era*, you argued that "Sovereign nation-states have been deeply exclusionary in their dealings with minority cultures and alien outsiders. And through globalization, the pacification of core areas of the world economy, and ethnic revolt, new forms of political community and citizenship have become possible."

Considering the lack of solidarity in the international community manifesting in, for instance, the cases of different political preferences between developed and developing countries, economic and political cracks among the developed countries, the refugee crisis, and the recent COVID-19 outbreak, do you still believe that such community is possible?

Andrew Linklater: The argument was that the triple transformation of political community (more universalist, more sensitive to cultural differences, and more committed to the reduction of material inequalities) is an immanent possibility in modern societies. The emphasis was on normative ideals that are already anticipated by the development of modern conceptions of citizenship. The point was to highlight the positive qualities of those

societies and their moral-cultural resources. I have not moved away from that normative standpoint but would now focus much more on changing balances of power between political groups and the ideals they espouse. Here, I follow the line of argument that was developed by Norbert Elias in his analysis of the European civilizing process. Elias had an acute awareness of competing tendencies in societies and fluctuating balances of power between different forces. A central argument was that many groups in modern societies have deep commitments to global political projects but the drag effect of national loyalties remains strong. Those particularistic attachments have become more powerful in recent times. National-populist movements have mounted a strong challenge to globalism—to what is portrayed as a global establishment that has been indifferent to the material interests and cultural preferences of outsider groups. But national-populism arouses a counter-response that is internationalist or cosmopolitan in orientation. The COVID-19 health and economic crises may alter the balance of power between those competing forces. Support for globalism may increase. It is too early to tell.

Question: Considering the developing countries' playing a more active role in regional and international relations (IR) for quite a while now, what would the "liberal world order" stand for in the post-COVID-19 context?

Andrew Linklater: What stands out at the present time is the fact that people turn to the state when they fear for their security. The state remains the key survival unit, to use Elias's terminology. Its monopoly powers—its controls over the instruments of force and taxation—have been expressed in unexpected ways including enforced national lockdowns and the closure of borders.

Not so long ago, analysts argued that the state was being hollowed out by economic globalization. It is clear that many states have acquired new powers of public surveillance and regulation that will not be relinquished. Serious concerns about personal freedoms have been raised in liberal societies.

The upshot is a tilt against the liberal world order that may be hard to reverse. Of course, the critique of that order has been central to Chinese and Russian foreign policy. Economic globalization may be restored quickly when the current crisis comes to an end. One must wonder whether its revival will seem so urgent that global environmental problems are sidelined or those who propose linking economic reconstruction with major changes in fossil fuel-dependent economies will make headway. Perhaps we should expect major power struggles over short-term and long-term directions of change.

Question: In your book *The Problem of Harm in World Politics: Theoretical Investigations*, you analyze the problem of harm in world politics that stems from the fact that societies require the power to harm in order to defend themselves from internal and external threats but must also control the capacity to harm so that people cannot kill, injure, humiliate, or exploit others

as they please. Regarding the normative aspects of the nonhuman "world," how would you deal with harm caused by the COVID-19 type of pandemics considering the human effect of its emergence?

Andrew Linklater: It is useful to recall that thinkers such as Karl Marx believed that a great transformation was taking place, in which unintended harm to people in distant places was rising relative to the age-old, deliberate harm that societies inflicted on each other through war and conquest. Rephrasing the point, transnational harm was on the increase with lengthening and deepening interconnections between peoples. The COVID-19 health and economic crisis is the product of global linkages that are more imprinted on the minds of people everywhere than ever before. It could not have occurred in the absence of relatively peaceful relations between relatively stable major powers. Citizens of those states are free from the danger of dying in war but exposed to economic and environmental risks and the danger of pandemics.

Rising levels of transnational harm create major problems for forms of political community held together by national loyalties that were forged in warfare. Modern states and peoples are not geared toward dealing effectively in international or cosmopolitan ways with the negative effects of lengthening global interconnections. Many people think the nation-state can shield them from external dangers. Others look beyond the nation-state but there is no image of a post-national or post-Westphalian world order that commands significant support. People have yet to become attuned to thinking in such ways.

Question: If you allow me, we would like to continue with the "harm" concept. The world is witnessing the highest levels of displacement on record. Millions of people around the world have been forced from home by conflict and persecution. Bearing this in mind, what is your approach to the Responsibility to Protect as a cosmopolitan harm principle?

Andrew Linklater: The idea of the responsibility to protect has been a core feature of liberal endeavors to reform the global order (although, analysts have stressed that many different cultures and civilizations find common ground in opposition to serious abuses of human rights or human dignity). From an English School perspective, the doctrine represents a shift from the pluralist standpoint that highlights the problem of order in international politics to the solidarist position, which focuses on the fundamental rights of individuals.

Collective action to prevent human rights atrocities remains elusive for familiar reasons. The idea of humanitarian intervention does not command much support in the society of states. Many populations have become weary of overseas commitments; many people oppose them in principle. Critics of the responsibility to protect rightly focus on the highly selective nature of Western responses to human rights violations. There is no reason to think that

much will change on those fronts in the foreseeable future, not least because of current national challenges.

I have long admired John Vincent's position on human rights, which stressed the resident emergency of starvation in the modern world. Vincent was acutely aware of the fact that Western liberal conceptions of human rights do not resonate with large sections of the world's population. The upshot of his argument is that it is problematic to care about human rights and to do little to eradicate starvation. Many would argue that a similar point can be made about the right to a decent environment or to basic health care in the poorest societies. One must wonder whether the COVID-19 crisis will result in stronger international support for a broadened conception of human rights to protect the vulnerable from disease and to deal with the predicted rise in the number of people who will be on the verge of starvation given the current crisis.

Question: In "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon," Marx states that "men make their history but not under of their own choosing." You discussed that statement as follows in one of your speeches: "It is an astonishing statement because, at one and the same time, it captures the point that human beings are initiators, individually and collectively, of history, and yet we have lost control of many of our creations; history is a human product but it has been made in ways that people do not really understand and do not control."

In that discussion, can we take out "human beings" and put "the nation-states" instead? Furthermore, from that point, can we similarly deal with the Brexit process and claim that the United Kingdom opted out of the European Union (EU) to make or to resume its own history? How do you understand Brexit?

Andrew Linklater: But what are nation-states if not people making their own history but not under conditions of their choosing? They consist of diverse groups pulling in different directions and constraining each other's possibilities. What Marx's statement raised more crisply than ever before was the question of how people can reduce the tyranny of unnecessary constraints and expand their freedoms, collectively and individually.

Your question rightly stresses that Marx's statement was too vague. Of course, he believed that people were divided into social classes within particular modes of production and largely ignored social stratification along the lines of gender and race. Nationalism, geopolitics, and war were missing from the main line of argument.

Rephrasing the point, Marx combined the deep awareness of growing interconnections between human societies with too little emphasis on the effects of intersocietal dynamics on the long-term development of humanity. Elias used the term "survival unit" to overcome the failure of classical sociology to investigate that domain. He referred to the drag effect of national

loyalties to stress the resistance of many groups to any attempt to transfer powers to international organizations.

The point has significance for understanding Brexit and the national-populist surge more generally with its focus on exercising greater power over events through the reassertion of state power and national loyalties. But hopes will be dashed. States will remain at the mercy of forces they cannot control without major advances in international cooperation. Many groups understand that, of course, but the problem of balancing national and international responsibilities and attachments remains unsolved.

Question: Since you are one of the leading critical IR theorists, what do you think about the place of critical theory and the role of critical theorists in the world today?

Andrew Linklater: Frankfurt School critical theory was an important influence on the normative position outlined earlier, but it has had little impact on the sociological perspective I have worked on over the last fifteen or so years. I have found richer resources in Eliasian process sociology.

The relationship between critical theory and process sociology is enormously complicated. Elias was opposed to partisan investigation. He was a powerful advocate of what he called the "detour of detachment"—of research that was not driven by taking sides in contemporary social and political struggles.

Not that Elias was indifferent to human conditions. It has been argued that a form of secular humanism underpins his perspective and that he was highly critical of nation-centered academic approaches and public policies given the problems affecting humanity as a whole. For Elias, detachment was integral to that humanism. Only by understanding more about uncontrolled social processes could people discover ways of alleviating misery and insecurity.

Critical theory and process sociology are at odds in many respects, but they converge in important ways as argued in my forthcoming book on civilization and world order. All I will add is that process sociology provides means of analyzing the social world that go beyond critical theory and other approaches with which I am familiar.

Thank you for your time and sincere answers.

CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR ANDREW MORAVCSIK

Question: Your research shows that you have quite an interest in liberal intergovernmentalism and liberal theories of IR. Many of your recent publications are associated with the EU. We would like to start our questions with what has

directed you to research on these subjects. Could you please share a couple of memories or events that led you to this path?

Andrew Moravcsik: Three things. First, my father was a Hungarian immigrant to the United States from an intellectual family—so I have always had a cultural and social affinity with Europe, as my writing on opera also suggests. Second, when I went to Europe in the late 1980s, intending to research a dissertation on high-technology cooperation in the aircraft and weapons industry, I had the good fortune to notice that the EU was renewing itself with the single market program—and I found this much more interesting than aircraft. Scholarly life is about following your passions, and I jumped to this topic and had the good fortune to be in at the beginning of the EU's renaissance. Third, I believe the EU is the most successful example of the most important global trend of the past century, namely the spread of economic interdependence, democracy, and national self-determination, which means that most international politics is now about managing non-military instruments of statecraft. This is the distinctly liberal type of politics, in which preferences and interdependence matter most.

Question: "The World today is bipolar. There are, and will remain for the foreseeable future, two global superpowers: the United States and Europe." These are two sentences from your article, "Europe, The Second Superpower" (2010). There are plenty of arguments that there is a transition from unipolar to the multipolar world system, but by relying on several qualitative and quantitative evidence, you oppose this so-called transition. Why do you think so? Do not you think that a multipolar world system is pushing ahead and seeking to form itself as new world order?

Andrew Moravcsik: I define a superpower as a state that can project military, economic, and soft power transcontinentally with some probability of success. Only three political entities can claim to do that: the United States, Europe, and, maybe, China. And, of those, China is the weakest. All that might be different in 2050. But that's a long time from now. I do believe, however, following my friend and former colleague Fareed Zakaria, that being a superpower is not what it is cracked up to be. The United States is in the process of losing a war in Afghanistan, as Russia did before it, and Britain before that. Power, particularly coercive power, is overrated.

Question: You and your colleagues have emphasized three elements of legalization of actions in world politics: obligations, precision, and delegation. Although the fact that the level of legalization might vary from none to strong, world politics in the millennium years does not come close to strong legalization levels since the American-led global fights against terror. In the light of this discussion, we kindly would like to ask you about whether or not an unembedded world system also has something to do with it as world

powers are much more focused on their own interests rather than possible cooperation.

Andrew Moravcsik: Two questions here, and neither makes sense.

First, the question about legalization "in the millennium years" implies that what matters is that some international body like the UN tells states when to go to war. That has never been true. Nonetheless, war and civil war are declining, and there has not been a war between great powers since 1953. Moreover, in every other respect, the world is *far* more legalized than it was twenty or fifty years ago. Just about everything states and their citizens do internationally is now legally embedded: trade, invest, travel, pollute, send data, disarm, even impose sanctions, migrate, and wage war. And just about every state, including China, accepts these rules 99 percent of the time.

Second, one cannot ask why states "focus on their own interests" *instead* of "possible cooperation." An elementary error in IR theory, fifty years out of date, because it implies cooperation is altruistic or idealistic. That dichotomy was misleading when E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau introduced it in the 1930s and 1940s, and it is even more misleading now. For fifty years, since at least the seminar work of Cooper, Keohane, and Nye, we agree that cooperation takes place *because* it is a cost-effective way to promote the interests of states. How many convergent and conflictual interests states have changes—that is what liberal theory (as opposed to institutionalist or realist theory) explains.

Question: As you are aware, populist movements and dominant identities in almost all nations are politically getting stronger. Would you agree with the argument that there is a domestic identity-centered conflict that will prevail in the near future? Will the integrated governance of the EU be able to survive from these internal political dynamics?

Andrew Moravcsik: First Question: No, I do not. Populism is "more bark than bite," as I have written in recent papers. The optimal policy for the political interests of someone like Viktor Orbán in Hungary is to talk loudly and do almost nothing internationally or anti-European—which is exactly what he does. And in most countries, populists are way too weak to ever have a serious impact on any policy except migration (a policy on which, quietly, most populists and nonpopulists agree). Brexit is the only serious threat. And, four years after the vote, we still do not see real change. In any case, it was an unlikely fluke—and thus an exception that proves the rule. The rest of Europe is more united than ever, which allows it to do things like stand up to Russia in Ukraine.

Question: Since the concept of the international regime (liberal international order) emerged and prevailed in the IR discipline, economic and democratic developments have gone too far to substantiate liberal international order. With being a democratizing force, the West has played an important

role in the transformation from autocracies to democracies in the Balkans, central and east Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. However, recent developments indicate a reverse in that mission as Europe wants to keep Iran in line about nuclear issues and America seems to be ready to make a deal with the Taliban in Afghanistan and North Korea and has good relations with Saudis. Do you think that the Western powers are happy with autocratic regimes at the national level as long as they serve security and stability rather than liberty?

Andrew Moravcsik: The Western powers are not "happy" with autocratic regimes, but they are not going to go on a crusade to democratize the world. To think they will/would be to misunderstand liberal IR theory. The core liberal goal is, as Woodrow Wilson said, "to make the world safe for democracy," not to promote democracy. Democracy mostly arises where peoples themselves are ready for it and want it.

Question: Since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the EU as an international institution has been severely criticized for not having a foreign policy. In recent issues, the EU could not find a solution to the Iranian nuclear deal, failed to have an influential policy in Ukraine, Syrian, and Libyan crises, refuge crisis, and the most recent global pandemic crisis. As a scholar working the most on the EU as an institution, what would you say to these critics? Are these critics right or just extremely exaggerated?

Andrew Moravcsik: The negative judgment underlying your question is exaggerated and inconsistent with basic political science and policy analysis, which tells us that is the wrong way to judge the "success" or "strength" of EU policy. Most importantly, one must not judge policy according to whether it achieves some ideal outcome, but whether it achieves the most that could reasonably be expected.

Take the example of Ukraine, which you mention. This is probably the most important security conflict of the last decade, and it has been resolved largely on Western terms due mostly to the projection of European civilian power. By any standards, the overall result of the Ukraine crisis is an extraordinary success for Europe and the West—and it takes place in an area of traditional territorial conflict.

Three points. First, Ukraine is the country in the world closest—militarily, economically, socially, politically, and culturally. The result of the crisis, five years later, is that (93 percent of) Ukraine appears to be permanently part of the West. This is as extraordinarily positive an outcome as one could expect. It was always totally unrealistic to expect Europe and the West to triumph 100 percent over Russia in this area, particularly given that no Western country had enough at stake direct to justify direct military confrontation with Russia. Second, Western non-military assistance was essential. The West provided some of the initial ideological inspiration for Ukrainians to create

a pro-Western government for which they would fight. It has subsequently provided tens of billions in foreign aid, signed major trade agreements, provided opportunity for migration (and remittances), adjusted energy policy, engaged in active diplomacy, enacted sanctions on Russia to support Ukraine, and provided support for democracy and the rule of law, which has now born fruit. Without these things, the country would long since have collapsed. In addition, the West has provided some military assistance, but this started some years after the transition and is smaller and less essential. Third, this Western support—with the exception of the military component—has come almost entirely from Europe. A recent study by the German Marshall Fund, in which I was involved, shows that about 90 percent of the aid, trade, sanctions, diplomacy, energy policy, and the rule of law activity—not to mention the initial inspiration—comes from Europe.

Question: Global pandemic over coronavirus has shaken the liberal international order because most of the states are turning to their self-interests, and we have heard that third parties have confiscated several medical cargos. Could you please give us your insights about the future of the EU and the world after the pandemic?

Andrew Moravcsik: Again, this question entirely misses the point. Self-interest is not the opposite of liberal international order, but its basis. Obviously, in the crisis, every state has (rightly) looked after its own medical interest. And perhaps here and there states made short-sighted decisions. Why not? After all, no international organization—even the EU—has jurisdiction over medical care. Underneath the surface, however, massive cooperation is going on among government officials, corporations, researchers and universities, and civil society groups.

Question: We know that we cannot cover all your research and ideas, as they are too much to grasp within such a short interview. Could you please tell us about any issues that we might have missed but are quite important to you?

Andrew Moravcsik: I work on many topics, including the need for rigorous qualitative and historical work using digital means, EU foreign policy, liberal theory, human rights policy, and even the sociology of classical music. All my work is on the web, and I would be pleased to answer questions on any topic.

We would like to thank you for your sincere answers and time.

CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR ANSSI PAASI

Question: While we were going over your studies and research, it was impossible not to realize that you have been working at the same university since 1989. If you do not mind, could you please tell us what is the reason for

working for such a long time at the University of Oulu despite having such a reputation in the discipline?

Anssi Paasi: Of course, many events, choices, and conditions have their impact on the careers of academics: conventions, coincidences, decisions, timing, social contexts, etc. As to my own career, yes, I have been a professor at the University of Oulu for more than three decades. Before that, I worked ten years at the University of Joensuu, today known as the University of Eastern Finland. I was pretty young, thirty-one years, when I applied for the post in Oulu and only thirty-three years when I started at this chair. Since this was a full professorship, it provided for me a good motive to move to the other side of Finland to Oulu University. During my time in Oulu, I have spent some periods in the United States, United Kingdom, and elsewhere. I also had a chance to move to the University of Helsinki in 1999, but I turned down that offer. One more feature is that I have had several leaves of absence and worked for more than thirteen and a half years as a full-time researcher in the Academy of Finland, including a five-year period as an Academy professor. Generally speaking, I think that the key impetus to stay in Oulu has been a commitment to develop and internationalize Finnish geography.

Work at a Finnish university has also motivated me to cope with and to publish on some more specific themes, such as academic capitalism. As all social scientists know, problems related to the perpetual anglophone hegemony in global linguistic markets, in theory production, and in the publishing business is today an increasingly acute issue everywhere outside of the English-speaking world when assessment cultures are the order of the day at universities.

Question: In some of your research, you have emphasized four stages in the emergence of new regions; territorial shaping, symbolic shaping, institutional shaping, and a region becoming established in the regional system and social consciousness. We would like to ask to what degree these stages have to be completed. For instance, there is a Turkic world, Arab League, African Union, and similar loose regional concepts, which are used in regional and international relations, but their effectiveness cannot even come close to that of the EU. What really differentiates them from the EU? Is it about handing over sovereignty to some degree?

Anssi Paasi: Perhaps I can mention as a background that I did my PhD work on the institutionalization of regions, developing the conceptual approach that you quote in your question. After finishing the thesis in 1986, I started immediately a study on the institutionalization of the Finnish territory and its nation-building process, exploring this issue across various scales, from local to regional and national to international. I focused on the political and symbolic roles of the Finnish-Soviet border-region in this process because the Soviet Union and Russia have been so critical in Finnish history, IR, and

images of threat. This work culminated in the book *Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian border* (1996).

The four stages of the institutionalization theory are abstractions that are conceptualized in relation to each other. I tend to call them conceptual invariances since they appear to be core fundaments of concrete regions, as the use of this framework in various national contexts has shown. In practice, their order and significance can vary. They are not following neatly in any specific order, but the stage of establishment is, of course, a temporary apex in the process—but regions can also become deinstitutionalized. An established region often obscures its origin because institutional practices and discourses are regimented across diverging tracks and timescales. Respectively, institutionalization is characterized by wide-ranging institutional complexity and subprocesses. Outlining territorial, symbolic, and formal and informal institutional processes/practices and how they are related and mobilized in the making of regional entities inescapably requires a geo-historical approach in research. This can expose the significance of each stage in the making of specific regions.

Now, when thinking about Europe, we have to remember that there are several overlapping Europes. Geographer Roger Lee distinguished between three. First, there is a structural Europe: the traditional geographical Europe that is familiar from school books and atlases. It ranges to the Urals. Second, there is an institutional Europe that is now most efficiently represented by the EU. The territorial shape of this entity has been changing gradually, and Brexit is, of course, the latest change in this shape. The third is an experienced Europe. This varies a lot, depending on the position and viewpoint from which people are looking at it. It is surely a contested idea. Of course, one of the political aims of the EU is to make this experience and the EU area overlapping so that the European identity would mean the same as the EU. Some researchers argue that the EU has actually hijacked or abducted Europe, i.e., the EU has become a new norm in understanding what Europe does mean. The ambiguous role of the EU in consciousness can be seen in Eurobarometer studies where opinions on the EU are somewhat divided and the national level tends to dominate over European experience. This divide can also be seen in the current tendency in the central European states Hungary and Poland to take distance to the rules of the EU while benefiting from its funding instruments. This behavior has raised questions about following the rule of law principle and understanding the nature of democracy, which has aroused serious worries in the EU.

Yet, the EU is clearly more deeply institutionalized than other regional entities that you mention in your question. One part of this institutionalization

is the fact that the sovereignty of the EU states is partly given to Brussels and legislation comes to a large extent from above. I think that the complexity of the idea of Europe I tried to illustrate above shows the difference compared with the other cases that you mention that is the Turkic world, Arab League, African Union, and so on. These are used in regional and international relations and have certainly some shared, regionally understood cultural, religious, and linguistic elements and narratives, at times also visible organizations but they have not been systematized (or become institutionalized) as sets of political, economic, and cultural practices and discourses that are effectively and firmly embedded in the daily life of states and citizens like in the case of the EU.

Question: As you have extensively stressed that the concepts of the region can vary in accordance with identities, culture, economy, climate, sub-and transnational, and so on. You have also used a considerable amount of time and ink to show that a region has to be institutionalized to be operational or acceptable. We would like to ask you about so-called power diffusion from the West to the East. It may not be possible to cover the meaning of the West and the East if they are used in the context of the economic, political, or cultural, but still, there has to be something in this conceptualization of power flow or diffusion from the West to the East. What would be your thoughts about this argument?

Anssi Paasi: Of course, the first question is how to understand the West and East in socio-spatial, cultural, or economic terms, or how do we regionalize these ideas. Lewis and Wigen have spoken usefully about metageographic imaginaries, sets of largely taken-for-granted spatial structures through which we tend to organize our knowledge about the world. Such imaginaries are certainly not innocent and do not rise *in vacuo* but are powerful ideological tools in the making and manipulation of spatial worldviews. It is easy to understand how such metageographies, especially those related to bounded spaces (especially states) and related dividing lines (borders) have been important in geopolitics and IR and how they are becoming critical in geo-economics and changing power-relations. Metageographies related to the West-East divide transformed rapidly after the Cold War period. If the East referred during the Cold War predominantly to the socialist world led and dominated by the Soviet Union, since during the Cold War a number of states from the former Eastern Europe and Soviet sphere struggled to change their imaginary global position to the West or at least to central Europe, and many had the EU as their goal. Of course, Asia has had its eastern position, but we have to remember that in geographical terms, Europe is often seen as a peninsula of Eurasia! In the contemporary geographical imaginary, the Eastern world refers to nations in east Asia and the Middle East, the western world to an old

culturally established west and former central European states. It is useful to recognize that such imaginations change perpetually and are contested.

Many kinds of shifts are undoubtedly taking place that shake the "liberal international order," however theorists define this. Political scientists like Joseph Nye have argued that the twenty-first century is undergoing two main transformations in global power relations. He talks about power transition that is a shift of power among states. The direction in this shift is from the West to the East and in economic terms it is related to the strengthening of the Asian states, China as the main example but others will follow. The other shift is from governments to nongovernmental actors, the diffusion of power away from states. These tendencies are related to geopolitics but increasingly also to geo-economics and partly related to the revolutionary development in information technology. Respectively, besides states there are more actors on the international field and governments may be looking more inward than before, jeopardizing the key elements of liberal internationalism, such as openness, security cooperation, and the rule of law, for example. We have seen that President Trump is vigorously abandoning international agreements and organizations, for example, the INF Agreement, Paris Climate Agreement, TPP Free Trade Agreement, United Nations Human Rights Council, or Iran Nuclear Deal and is unhappy with the division of the costs of NATO and actions of the WHO. In the UK, Brexit is a major example that was largely a populist dive into unfamiliar. In many states like Poland, and Turkey, various forms of new authoritarianism have emerged. Further, across the world, populism and nationalism with a xenophobic emphasis have emerged. One more element is the extreme right-wing movements that have an ethnonationalist emphasis.

Question: Based on your massive contribution to the literature, we would like to ask you whether or not you ever think of the relations between subnational movements at the national level and regionalism at the transnational level. In the initial case, the political pressure is coming from the below but in the latter case, coming from the above. What would you say about a state/nation's reactions to these cases?

Anssi Paasi: Social life of individuals and collectives is, of course, organized in and across complex spatial relations which covers not only horizontal forms of regionality but also scalar relations that manifest themselves in some vertical form. Regionalism as a term was initially associated with sub-state regional cultural, political, and economic activities and movements, often supported by states, but currently, supra-state regionalism initiated by states is increasingly important. Yet, around the world we have regionalist movements with diverging political aims that start from local and regional contexts, some of them have ethnic tuning and are separatist, search for their

own state, and are often firmly opposed and even attacked by the existing governments by historical, economic, and political grounds.

Different academic fields also tend to have their own vocabularies when they talk about regionalism. For example, in economic geography, the term new regionalism sees regions as key contexts for economic processes and emphasizes substate regional scale in wider economic, cultural, and political processes, interactions, economic innovativeness, learning, and competitiveness. IR scholars and political scientists refer by new regionalism habitually to supra-state regional organizations (like the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR) and related region-building efforts that have typically motives related to economic integration but like in the case of Europe, political integration lurks in the background. For IR scholars the spatial referents are typically macro-regional but some IR scholars, like Fredrik Söderbaum, make a distinction between micro-, meso-and macro-regions. Micro-regions are for him substate or cross-border regions (crossing the line between domestic and international), meso-regions are midrange state or nonstate arrangements, or processes and macro-regions are wider world regions. These kinds of regionalisms/regions are tools of governments and often remain distant from the daily lives of citizens even if they may have an impact on important spheres of individual and social life through legislation. Perhaps I can refer here to a forthcoming book, edited by political scientists, *The Multidimensionality of Regions in World Politics* (2020), which aims to bring together the views on region in geography and political science and IR studies.

Question: Your approach to banal nationalism and how it relates to spatial and human geography is quite impressive. Reading your papers led us to think about the current rise in leftist and rightist nationalist sentiments all over the world. In general, how do you think the nature of banal nationalism at the domestic level would change? Will it cause a tendency to vivid reactivation of banal nationalist symbols and practices? In specific terms, we would like to know about your ideas on the election motto of the Trump presidential campaign, "Make America Great Again." Can it be considered as an example of changing nature of banal nationalism?

Anssi Paasi: Since the invention of the term by social psychologist Michael Billig, banal nationalism has been related to mundane micro-issues and everyday "flagging" where a nation is reproduced: weather forecast maps in TV news, various forms of national symbols that we meet in daily lives, school atlases and textbooks, educational practices, etc. While the practice of such nationalism may be banal and related to everyday life, it is important to remember that also banal nationalism is an expression of power relations that may dominate national symbolic landscapes and at times political struggles intended for social equality and national self-determination or independence, for instance. Banal nationalism often includes elements of hot nationalism,

such as military symbols and war memorials, and often celebrates certain events, such as independence or national days, which are mobilized as fuel in banal nationalism. I have been interested in banal nationalism especially in the context of producing and reproducing the practices and discourses related to independence.

Nationalism is strengthening around the world, and what is particularly worrying today is the rise of ethnonationalism where the ideas of a nation are constructed ever more often in relation to the Other and enemy images. This is often related to anti-immigration attitudes, as we can see today in many European states but also elsewhere. Similarly, President Trump is a fitting illustration of the mobilization of nationalist feelings in relation to Others, typically South American immigrants, but he seems to be so unpredictable that his attitudes and agendas seem to vary rapidly. Of course, he is not dealing merely with symbols but is well known for his very politicized efforts to build a border wall between the United States and Mexico, perhaps a new symbol of banal American nationalism, especially in the minds of Trump's supporters. This is a violent border that has claimed thousands of victims among immigrants. But again, seen in a wider constellation, this project is only one of countless such efforts that have been emerging globally. While there were seven walls/fences after the Second World War, fifteen after Berlin Wall collapsed in 1989, there were already seventy-seven walls in 2018. COVID-19 pandemic lockdowns also raised borders and bordering on the agenda, and it is important that this state of exceptionalism and forms of policing will not remain permanent when the pandemic is over. Also, in the case of COVID-19, such terms have been used as protectionism, medicine nationalism, and geopolitics. This is, of course, related to the competitive and very protective world market of Big Pharma. Similarly, warnings about the nationalist use of pandemics have been discussed, perhaps again Trump's comments on a "Chinese virus" as the most obvious example.

Question: In many of your studies, you and your coauthors claim that neoliberalism has increased regionalism at national and international levels. At the national level, administrative regions are shined up due to economic, tourist, and cultural reasons, and at the international level, regions are considered economic and developmental foci. Please correct us if we've misunderstood, but if not, then we would like to ask you about the possible reversal in regionalism caused by neoliberalism, as there is an ongoing and fierce discussion on liberal international order that has been shaken up. Could you please share your ideas on that matter with us?

Anssi Paasi: Globalization, the neoliberalization of the world economy, and changing forms of governance have challenged the idea of fixed borders and scales that have been deeply rooted in socio-spatial practices and the social consciousness of states. Since the end of the Cold War and the

acceleration of market-driven globalization, the ostensibly "slow geography," with its associated fixity of borders, has been undermined by an ever more "rapid geography" related to flows (ideas, capital, cross-border workers, tourists, immigrants), interactions, and networks. The conditions and consequences for this have encompassed, for instance, the transnationalization of finance capital, the expansion of mobile/digital technologies, novel forms of information management and governance, new direct and intermediated sociocultural relations, rescaling of the state, relaxing of borders, and the explosion of cross-border activities around the world.

Respectively, the Western liberal international order supporting these tendencies that emerged after the Second World War was characterized by economic openness, the rise of multilateral institutions, security cooperation, certain international solidarity, and so on. Gradually, states have faced growing economic competition, the escalation of the knowledge-based economy, and increasing demand for policies focusing on a regional scale. Simultaneously, separatist tendencies have engendered a widespread search for regional identities and encouraged demands for political autonomy in many regions. Concurrently, social and regional interests have turned out to be fragmented and extend across spatial scales. Around the world, neoliberal tendencies to save money and develop, for instance, services more "effective" have led to amalgamations of regional entities at local and regional scales. Networks of city-regions have been recognized as significant in regional development policies and competition, and systems of global cities were seen as major features unfolding the changing spatiality of the globalizing world. One more element has been cross-border regions that have been identified as key apparatuses in the lowering of obstructions between states.

Yes, today, many scholars think that this order is in crisis. John Ikenberry has argued that across the western liberal democratic world, liberal internationalism looks more like neoliberalism. We have President Trump, who is antagonistic to liberal internationalism and international organizations; Brexit in the UK; widespread political populism; the rise of authoritarian thinking even in some states of the EU and candidates that curtail press and academic freedom, economic recession, and austerity; and the concentration of property into fewer hands. These are features that both express and support populism and have enfeebled the international liberal order. Perhaps, what we have left is internationalism impregnated with neoliberalism. It is interesting to see whether the post-COVID-19 world will slow pace or will the mantra of eternal economic growth also characterize the future.

Question: To you, elites play a crucial role in the institutionalization of a region, and in this way, major identity or identities of a region are articulated by elites at the discursive level and then shared in parallel. If you do not mind, we would like to hear your point of view regarding the international level

and ask you about "Eurasia." Do you think that this concept represents an institutionalized region or is still employed in political statements in seeking to be institutionalized?

Anssi Paasi: I have suggested that we can distinguish analytically between two kinds of actors or agents who are important in institutionalization as well as the wider institutions and organizations that they may represent (yet this always occurs as part of the rise of wider spatial divisions of labor). On the one hand, there are activists, and on the other, there are advocates. Activists are persons (or social groupings) that may take part in the politics of the region and struggle over certain meanings that they either represent as regional or are created in a specific regional context. The former is common in the case of regionalist movements that are characteristically led by visible, charismatic actors. Such actors often manage publicity well and are eager to join public political debates. Through the last few decades, ethnic consciousness has ever more arisen from minorities themselves, which has highlighted the role of activists and, of course, the media in how these groupings can make their voices heard. The idea of a definite culturally, ethnically, or politically bounded "region," and a supposed regional identity may be significant in motivating the activities of such social groups.

Advocates, for their part, are actors working in a certain institutionalized subject position with endurance, which means that if the actors as such change, their advocacy will continue by those who replace them in the division of labor. Hence, their power stems from their institutionalized positions, which have endurance. Obviously, they can be simultaneously also activists, but I think that much of their power in the production and reproduction of identity discourses and regional ideologies emerge from their specific "institutional position." Respectively, contrary to often very visible activists, advocates are examples of the "nameless authority" that manifests itself in regional public opinion or certain structures of expectations, as linguists would say.

The analytical distinction between activists and advocates simply shows how various social positions may be critical in the production and reproduction of social institutions, spatial images, and symbolism that may eventually become structured along with the upsurge of institutions and organizations that are associated with a region by means of their function and/or sphere of influence.

In principle, this idea works at various spatial scales, even if in the case of substate region regionalism is most obvious. Supra-state regions also have similar but often contested logic. Think, for example, about the vision of Europe promoted by the EU. There are very strong advocates, if not activists, of this idea as well as opponents. In general, regions and regionalisms are frequently contested, and some scholars. like Michael Keating, advise

that region must always be seen as a result of political contestation over the definition and meanings of the spatial entity in question.

Respectively, Eurasia as well as other spatial ideas have a geo-history and have contested meanings. I edited recently with British scholars John Harrison and Martin Jones a major *Handbook on the Geographies of Regions and Territories* (2018). Among the eleven entries on various regionalisms, there was a profound entry on Eurasia. Authors (Herrera et al.) of this entry show that Eurasia has been a disputed idea. It emerged originally in the nineteenth century as an adjective, Eurasian, and did not receive political meaning until the twentieth century, when empires collapsed and new nations started to be emerged on the world map. Since then, the authors argue, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, post-Soviet Eurasia, and Eastern Europe have witnessed a range of sovereignty claims, settlement, and movements, as well as a wide arrangement of institutions corresponding to different levels of sovereignty and administration. They also emphasize the imagined, moral geographies that divide space according to civilizational lines (Europe versus Asia, West versus East, civilization versus barbarianism, etc.) and conclude that the evolution of Eurasian institutions, norms, rules, and laws remains a work in progress. Of course, the passage on democracy versus autocracy also comes into play in many states, similarly to religious powers, and the roles of ethnic and religious groupings and nationalisms.

Question: Your point that people are making regions in terms of identities and human involvement with the territory paves the ways for more complicated issues. One of them is that a place, person, or thing can have multiple identities at once, so several countries might be part of multiple regions. For example, Turkey has territories laying in Asia and Europe, but is mostly known as the Middle Eastern country, yet it is a candidate for EU membership. It also sometimes implies that Ottoman territories are natural hinterlands, in which Turkey could get in and out or called itself the Mediterranean or the Black Sea country. What we try to ask is that in case of multigeographical or geopolitical identities at play, how do you think regionalism can react to this?

Anssi Paasi: As to the general labeling of regional entities in different ways and their mobilization in political or cultural terms, I refer to my reply above where I discussed meta-geographies that are always contested. The major institutional arrangements used to look at this issue are the international law regarding the role of sovereignty of the state (while this is a contested idea, again) and the inviolability of borders that are important in international security order. These principles were violated by Russia in its annexation of Crimea in 2014, but there are also other ongoing processes, like the Chinese island construction in the South China Sea. For some commentators, these imply that authoritarian states tend to challenge the liberal international order, but military interventions in Serbia in 1999, the US invasion of Iraq,

and current events in Syria imply that violations of international law are the unfortunate order of the day for some Western states.

As to your question, if we go back to the framework of the institutionalization of regions, there are overlapping processes of institutionalization occurring at the same time as well as diverging identity narratives that cross borders—for example, cultural terms—but any political regionalist that claims to move state borders or claims to focus on external territories are, as argued above, tricky. It is not made easier by the fact that we have about two hundred states in the world but, depending on used criteria, maybe five hundred to six hundred nations with sort of identities. We also have stateless nations. A real "nation-state" (one state, one ethnic nation) is a very rare phenomenon.

When we think of this issue in terms of the institutionalization of territories, identity should be understood more widely and may be analytically associated with the stage of establishment, when a territory has a recognized position in the wider national or international regional/territorial system and a place in social consciousness. This implies that territory has become a part of the historical process. Identity, for its part, has two regional dimensions. We may distinguish analytically the identity of people, that is, how do they identify themselves with territory and feel belonging with the various grounds (cultural, ethnic, political, etc.) and the identity of the region/territory that is those features in nature, culture, religion, and society that give rise to regions in a socio-spatial division of labor (normally, these dimensions are deeply intertwined). The institutionalization process also typically gives rise to a set of symbols for identity that are again often contested. Respectively, there is always a material and symbolic layer in the region/territory building processes. As to the actors that are critical in region-building processes, I refer to my answer above regarding the roles of various agents (activists and advocates) who may be regionalists or nationalists. Yet, it is important to note that people's regional/territorial identity is only one of the many identities that people may have. They have also gender-, generation-, ethnicity-, and class-based identities, for example, that may ceaselessly transform, rather than being fixed. In the current world, with an increasing number of immigrants and refugees, transnational, diasporic identities stretching across borders are, of course, becoming more and more common.

Question: "In the contemporary world territories increasingly 'leak' or 'stretch' in space across borders" (Paasi, 125). This quotation is taken from your 2009 article "The Resurgence of the 'Region' and 'Regional Identity': Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Observations on Regional Dynamics in Europe." A phrase written a decade ago still stands, and to prevent such leaking or stretch, states are building walls and are resuming strict border controls. What would you say if you were asked about the impossibility

of border controls by a state without it being supported or legitimated by regional order, regardless of being on the subnational or transnational levels?

Anssi Paasi: Perhaps it is useful to look first briefly at the genealogy of border studies. The whole idea of a (state) border has changed rather dramatically since the early 1990s. At this time, business gurus, like Kenichi Ohmae, were ready to argue that we are moving to a borderless world that will witness the end of the nation-state. He was, of course, thinking in terms of business life and economy but also wanted politicians to accept this fact and stop cheating citizens in states to believe in strong states. Until this period, borders were mostly seen as fixed and neutral lines separating power containers and states.

Of course, it was due to major social transformations such as globalization, the development of information/communication technologies, the expansion of cyberspace, the breakdown of Yugoslavia and related wars, and the displacement of migrants and refugees that forced us to rethink what borders are and what they do. Similarly, rapid changes in academic thinking, such as the rise of poststructuralist/postmodern thinking that saw knowledge and truths as relational and space and identities as socially constructed and contested phenomena influenced scholars' border-imagination. Due to the EU's policies, more resources were invested in lowering the borders inside the Union to promote a seamless space for activities, which gave a new boost to often practically oriented border research. At the turn of the millennium, the 9/11 terrorist attacks also impacted how borders were seen.

Along with these tendencies, borders were increasingly often understood as contested social processes and discourses, rather than stable lines. Security issues and sophisticated technological solutions on bordering emerged on the agenda. In spite of the fact that a number of states are building walls around themselves today, the contemporary world characterized by the sort of liberal international order is fundamentally open, even if certainly not borderless. I have suggested that we have two kinds of overlapping borders and forms of bordering; at first, borders are part of the discursive-symbolic landscapes of social power that become institutionalized along with the rise of the state territory and nation-building process, and they often exploit national collective memory and identity narratives. Such landscapes include national(ized) sites, place-specific or universal memorials (for instance, the tombs of the "Unknown Soldier"), national commemorations, and national events, such as flag and independence days. In cultural terms, national literature and media are significant. Military memorials and landscapes are particularly emotional elements. They characteristically reproduce images of us and the Other, or the enemy, and imply sacrifice in the name of the nation, thus bringing together hot and banal forms of nationalism. Previous landscapes transformed borders as part of national heritage and the production and reproduction of collective

identities. Another important form of bordering is the fact that borders have also become parts of the "technical" landscapes of social control that operate in the name of the often-abstract security discourses and draw on images of threat. Mobile people are in focus in these landscapes, particularly immigrants and refugees. They also cover the material border landscapes (e.g., watchtowers, customs houses, and technical equipment) as well as the gendered practices and acts of border guards themselves. For example, passports and the act of examining them are significant apparatuses of bordering.

Question: The spreading of COVID-19 is not totally dependent on being contagious but also on massive flows of people, goods, and capital through political borders all around the world. We are not sure you would agree with us on that, but still, we want to take our chances to ask you about your projections on the post-COVID-19 world?

Anssi Paasi: For sure, the world has undeniably become increasingly mobile, as capital, goods, and people move. To take but a few examples, in 2019, more than four billion air passengers were traveling across borders, one and a half billion tourists crossed international borders, and immigration statistics tell us that more than 270 million migrants were living in states other than those where they had been born, that is about 3.5 percent of their population. In Europe, this share is 11 percent. Almost 11 percent of immigrants, twenty-nine million, are refugees. Now, when you think of the fast spread of the pandemic, it is impossible to understand this phenomenon without this intensified mobility. I was in a border conference in Japan in late November when the virus seemingly started its destructive travel from the wet market in Wuhan. A couple of months later, I was supposed to be at another border conference in Oregon, which was canceled because of COVID-19, similar to a number of other events around the globe. In the following lockdown, 144 states closed at least some of their borders, some also part of their internal borders.

Respectively, COVID-19 forces us to pay attention to a number of political issues, perhaps much more than earlier pandemics. The primary issue for future global security is related in general to pandemics, since COVID-19 is not the last pandemic. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, several pandemics have appeared on earth. Several scholars agree that political and ecological issues and our care of natural environments are at least partly behind this pandemic. The loss of biodiversity and demolition of ecosystems, motivated by shortsighted economic capitalist interests, narrowed the distance between wildlife and humans and may help viruses, pathogens, and zoonosis to spread. If the destruction of nature continues, we will very likely have new mass-pandemics in the future that hit both developed and developing states, and as always, some vulnerable social classes and regions are hit more seriously. Another issue is related to the relations of social communities.

Medical doctors reminded readers in *The Lancet* in February that in a world characterized by intensive mobility, misinformation, racism, and xenophobia do not prevent the spread of viruses. Yet in many states, (extreme) right-wing politicians, in particular, have used the terrifying COVID-19 situation in promoting anti-immigration attitudes. While it is definitely not fruitful to label viruses with a national label like Trump has done by labeling COVID-19 the "Chinese virus," this can, of course, be used politically in IR. Just now, more than 100 states claim that an examination of the origin of the virus and its spreading routes to human beings should be carried out.

Some analysts think that the presence of the state will be stronger after pandemics: during the period of crisis citizens and enterprises hunt for support from the state, governments may start to look inward in terms of protective materials, masks etc., as well as medicines. I have already seen some comments on "corona nationalism" and "corona geopolitics." Also, the influence of the state as a symbolic source of security, identity, and communal thinking may increase. I have my doubts that right-wing movements will use this lockdown as an opportunity to claim permanently closing borders.

It is important in global governance that states are committed to following to rule of law and international laws, and this will doubtless be even more important in the post-COVID-19 world. Also, in this respect, we need shared responsibility and international order.

Question: Reading all your studies within a short time seems impossible, as there is a massive pile of original research. Therefore, we would like for you to speak on any issue we might forgotten to ask about but you think it is important. If there is an issue you want to speak to, please enlighten us.

Anssi Paasi: Thank you for the conversation. Indeed, it has been inspiring to reflect on matters that I have been working with for a long time, especially as you formulated your questions from a somewhat different angle than I have been used to thinking about these issues in my own political geographic work. As you can see from my responses, I have been largely moving in a conceptual triangle with border, region/territory, and identity as the three keywords. By turning this triangle and by reflecting on the other concepts from a different perspective, they've opened new conceptual and empirical horizons in the rapidly changing world. My approach has been relational and cross-disciplinary, but regional and political geography have always been the major cornerstones in my research.

We would like to thank you for your sincere answers and time.

CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR IRA WILLIAM ZARTMAN

Question: Having looked at your teaching background, it is impossible not to realize that you have been at the center of conflicts in the world before or after these crises erupted. For instance, you worked and went around all Middle Eastern and North African countries. You've experienced these conflictual areas, breathed their air, and drunk their waters. Please, let me start with a personal question. What do you think is the most vital feature of the Middle East as a source of conflict eruption? If you do not mind, it is better for us if you could share some of your significant memories regarding the most vital feature of the Middle East as a source of conflicts in the region.

William Zartman: The Middle East is people by one large family, riven with its component tribalism, a traditional segmentary system as the anthropologists write about, more prone to rivalry than to unity. What if they had united against a common enemy (another Semitic tribe)? Israel would be in the sea, like the crusaders, and they would have been free to fight among themselves, which they would have done with gusto.

Question: To continue with the general question, in the Cold War era, almost every conflict had two sides in parallel with the international system. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, or Eastern Bloc, it is claimed that the multipolar world system has begun. Does it mean that, since the 1990s, national or regional conflicts have multiple parties naturally and that is why current conflicts are not easy to solve or cool down?

William Zartman: It means that the Cold War contenders are unable to keep things simmering but not boiling, that the field is open for them to look for power vacua to occupy preemptively, and that middle powers can then pick their local parties (states and nonstates). It's a fisherman's holiday with no game warden.

Question: This next question may complement the previous question. In your chapter titled "The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments" in *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes* (Darby and Mac Ginty, 2003), you basically argue that peace negotiations or processes can be commenced only when the warring parties feel that they do not get any result in this conflict. So there become two options, either the stalemate position continues or there is consent to form a negotiation table. In a multipolar world system, each warring party can easily replace their financially and politically supporting power with another one because there are alternatives to align with. The only thing warring parties do is to act accordingly. Thus, as long as there is a possibility of finding international support, how do you think that a stalemate would be possible?

William Zartman: Always possible among sensible people, but much more difficult.

Question: Almost all international and regional powers have agreed to fight against ISIS. Nevertheless, they could not reach an agreement to end the crisis. On the one hand, Israel is fighting with Iran in Syria and Turkey is fighting the PKK's Syrian branch (the PYD/YPG/YPJ) in Syria using Syrian opposition forces. On the other hand, while Russia is backing the Assad regime, the United States is using PYD/YPG as ground forces against ISIS. Would you consider the Syrian crisis to be a case similar to the one above? Furthermore, how do you think all parties in the crisis reach a ripeness point (Zartman, 2008) that will lead to a solution?

William Zartman: As long as some will help you when you get in a stalemate, you don't feel one and so it doesn't hurt. Assad was heading straight for a corner when Russia (coincidentally, curiously) edged in to help him, not to win completely but to stay in the fight and consolidate his position. Who feels an MH (mutual hurt) in the stalemate in Yemen? In Western Sahara? In South Sudan?

Question: In your 2019 article "Fragmented Conflict: Handling the Current World Disorder," you touched upon how difficult it is to solve national and regional conflicts in the current world [dis]order and come up with several methods to meet the challenge, ranging from state-building efforts to heightened attention. We wonder, to what extent you are hopeful these methods can be realized, especially building *ad hoc* international problem-solving practices.

William Zartman: The ideas, not original, that I put forward in my article—emphasize state-building, build *ad hoc* international problem-solving coalitions, give authority to mediation, gather coalitions of the willing, engage teams of rivals over a conflict, develop regional security communities, revive historical peace-making methods, pay attention to status dynamics, and encourage local traditional peace-building mechanisms—are stopgap measures while the system of world disorder is still untamed. They will have enduring value, but the longer-term challenge is rebuilding a system of order. Each of these has its challenges, but they are preliminary building blocks for a more lasting structure. International problem-solving measures? How about landmines or Somali coast pirates for starters?

Question: My next question is about terrorism and conflict resolution. There has been a general acceptance that states do not negotiate with terrorists. The concepts of terrorist and terrorism have been relatively defined, and someone's terrorist is another's freedom fighter, so to speak. For example, in the Libyan Civil War, there was an internationally recognized national unity coalition on the one hand and General Khalifa Haftar's militias on the other.

Several European states invited General Haftar to their capitals to talk about the Libyan crisis, providing him legitimacy. Still, to some, he was head of the insurgent group armed against the Libyan government. In sum, how do you think conceptual differences are used in negotiation tables, and do you think that it is working?

William Zartman: It is good to keep one's terms as sharp as possible. An insurgent is not *ipso facto* a terrorist, and even vice versa. I do wish we would stick to the United Nations'/United States' definition of terrorist as one who harms civilian victims in order to sway government policy. Terrorists can be someone's freedom fighters and vice versa. Haftar is another matter, probably not a terrorist but an insurgent. Middle states' strategies toward him versus Fayez al-Sarraj go back to a previous answer and have more to do with France's troubles with Italy and Turkey than with the goodness of the candidate. Talking to Hafter (he is there after all), although best not in one's own capital, can be a way of influencing him. I do think that supporting him militarily is disruptive of consolidating policy for outside advantage (see above).

Question: Our last question is about the structure of the latest social movements that are suddenly erupting and causing political changes. However, they are so easily losing momentum and do not stay alive to check whether or not the result is what they wanted. Additionally, such movements do not have a strict hierarchical administrative structure, and that is why sometimes governments cannot find a legitimate representative to negotiate. If you agree with this idea coming from new social movement theories, how do you think this issue affects the conflict resolution process and negotiation process?

William Zartman: Read my book *Arab Spring: Negotiating in the Shadow of the Intifadat* (2015). Preferably, buy it.

The problem of finding valid interlocutors in a hybrid war is a major issue, as is the absence of the movement's understanding of what it wants and how to negotiate. Unfortunately, it often requires on-the-job training.

Question: It seems that the COVID-19 global pandemic is one of the most significant challenges for the world in the twenty-first century. What is your future projection on the post-COVID-19 world?

William Zartman: My Goodness! When is the Second Coming? We will fall back into old habits and invent a few new ones: back to the fragmented conflict question. One heritage of COVID-19 is that China, whose statistics are never credible, will have used the pandemic year that it produced to strengthen its position mightily. I hope we come out of our own quadrennial fever attack to rise to the occasion.

Question: Thank you for your time and sincere answers. It is not possible to cover all issues in this interview. Please add any significant points or topics that you think we have missed.

William Zartman: I would emphasize, as a continuation of the previous answer, that it is crucial and urgent for the Atlantic Alliance to restore its purpose and cooperation, and I am addressing not only the new US administration but also the herding cats of Europe. And it is equally crucial for the Pacific Rim to do the same, here addressing the US in the first place. That would be a great step toward dealing with the fragment conflicts problem and the world disorder.

CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR GERARD TOAL

Question: Your educational background shows that you have experienced a remarkable journey via combining history and geography with a geopolitical approach toward post-Communist conflicts. Could you please share your experience of that journey with us? What is your primary motive to study these territories, and how did you end up combining the geographical study of nationalism with geopolitics?

Gerard Toal: Thank you for the opportunity. As those who have read my work will know, or struggled to pronounce the Gaelic version of my name, I come from a borderland county in the Republic of Ireland. I grew up at the height of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. Without really thinking about it, I gravitated toward the study of conflict regions, to borders and nationalism, and to the imperialist attitudes one often finds in such situations. It is, I suppose, an accident that the university where I started my academic life did not have a politics department. Unconsciously, my geographically shaped perspective found expression within the disciplines of geography and history. My primary motivation, to the extent that one can ever identify such a thing consciously, is to question the seemingly innate desire of people to claim territories for their own group to the exclusion of others. So much conflict is tragic in its impacts and consequences. There is injustice, and this should be brought to light, but I've always been wary of the allure of nationalism, or at least, I came to that position pretty quickly in university when new horizons of thinking were made available to me.

Question: In one of your publications, you claim that the concept of the "Russian World" is controversial. How much credit do you give to the idea that Russian cultural, historical, and linguistic influence is quite influential in attracting people of the states that once were under the Soviet Union or Russian Empire?

Gerard Toal: The collapse of the Soviet Union was a traumatic event for millions of people, liberating to be sure for many but also deeply disorienting for others. I remember attending a conference entitled "Eastern Europe,

Central Europe, Europe in Prague" at the time of the coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991. There, I met the Soviet-Russian geographer Vladimir Kolossov, later to become a close research colleague and friend. Vladimir was very surprised, as we all were, with the cascade of independent declarations in its wake. This was a "shock event." Over the subsequent years of research across the post-Soviet space, much in collaboration with Dr. John O'Loughlin and Vladimir Kolossov, we saw first-hand the divergent attitudes toward the Soviet collapse. In many instances, we were doing research in places, like Abkhazia and Transnistria, that were once relatively prosperous but were subsequently devastated by conflict because the power vertical was gone. In our survey research, we always had a question: Was the Soviet Union's collapse a positive step or a negative step? The split in attitudes on that question predicted a lot of other attitudes. The Russian Federation, especially under Vladimir Putin, was able to appeal to those who lost status after the Soviet collapse. Russia's so-called soft power wasn't simply due to Russian cultural, historical, and linguistic influence. It was due to the fact that Russia was the cultural heart of the Soviet Union and that retained powerful appeal to both ethnic Russians and other nationalities across post-Soviet space.

Question: We understand that you have written a pile of literature, like an encyclopedia, on conflicts in post-Soviet territories. We would like to ask a question that we wonder about. Russia has been using military power when it feels its border of security hinterland is threatened. Does Russia have a significant number of local supporters in those conflictual lands, such as Ukraine and Georgia, or is military presence enough to motivate some people to fight against their established state?

Gerard Toal: Well, Russia lost its potential appeal to Georgians and Ukrainians because of its military interventions in both states. The Georgian case is complex because Soviet Georgia was a product of Bolshevism, and therefore a questionable entity when democracy arrived (just like Yugoslavia). Ukraine is more surprising because Russia completely blew up its innate soft power after taking Crimea and fermenting war in the Donbas. Sure, it still has significant influence, but relations are highly antagonistic when they need not have been. Objectively, you can't say Russia's leaders played their cards very well. But I'm sure they'd disagree!

Question: You asked, "Why Does Russia Invade Its Neighbors?" in your book *Near Abroad: Putin, the West and the Contest over Ukraine and the Caucasus* (2017). Could you summarize your answer to this question, please?

Gerard Toal: Because the Russian government, under Putin, determined that it was in Russia's national interest to intervene militarily in both states. In both cases, the background fear was that both states were decisively tilting away from Russia and toward joining an anti-Russian military alliance. But,

in both cases, the triggers for the intervention were local factors. Grasping both these factors is what the book tries to show. It's about "thickening" geopolitics with an appreciation of the central importance of the already entangled local and regional geopolitical fields. Too often, these are overlooked. Geopolitics is flattened into great power competition categories only.

Question: You often use the term *de facto* states in your publications. We would like to ask about your general evaluation on whether these Russian-made *de facto* states are deemed to fail.

Gerard Toal: Well, *de facto* state is the consensus term in the academic literature, replacing other phrases like quasi-states and pseudo-states. To say they are Russian-made is an example of thin geopolitics. Nagorno-Karabakh is not "Russian-made." Neither was South Ossetia, Transnistria, or Abkhazia if you look at the details of their creation. It is true that they got crucial aid from particular factions in Moscow at certain times, but the picture is a lot more complex. None of these entities, for example, was recognized by the Russian state. Abkhazia suffered under a boycott for years before Putin came to power. The new *de facto* states in the Donbas are, I think, much closer to what you describe. Deemed to fail? Well, all are unsustainable economically. Moscow provides critical aid. All are territorial levers for Moscow today, giving it a permanent stake in shaping the future of these states.

Question: On the one hand, it is a clear fact that there is tension between Russia and the United States and Europe because of several moves, such as Russian military interventions and NATO enlargement. On the other hand, the Trump administration's disagreement with Europe on NATO's economic burdens, trade wars, etc., is another reality. In this sense, it seems that a storm is brewing in transatlantic relations. Please forgive me if this question is too bold to ask, but we would like to ask about possible conciliation between Europe and Russia against the United States.

Gerard Toal: The storm is already with us. Typhoon Trump! An egregious parade of egocentrism and narrow nationalist chauvinism! Forgive us, Europe! As you know, with the COVD-19 crisis, we are now in a new environment. There are multiple moves to try to forge a degree or reconciliation between the major powers. The United Nations secretary-general, António Guterres, called for an immediate end to fighting involving governments and armed groups in all conflict areas almost one month ago. "The fury of the virus illustrates the folly of war." You will recall the ending of my book *Near Abroad*, which, after citing threats to common security, like global pandemics, ends with this line: "Like it or not, we are all in this together."

Question: Vladimir Putin has amended the constitution, which allows him to stay in power for two more terms. Do you consider it as a part of the geopolitical feature of Russia as in the time of the Russian Empire?

Gerard Toal: Well, there are certainly many who argue that Russia needs a strong state, just as there are many who argue that, as the central power in on the Eurasian landmass, it has an eternal geopolitics. I take both of these claims seriously as forms of discourse but don't believe they are analytically correct. The constitution that Russia has is a result of choices that the political elite is making.

Question: In one of the interviews you gave in 2012, you mentioned a global pandemic as one of the most significant geopolitical challenges for the world in the twenty-first century. Nowadays, we are experiencing such a challenge. What is your geopolitical projection on the post-COVID-19 world?

Gerard Toal: Aye, one easy geopolitical question after another! Where to begin? I do think that COVID-19 is a profound structural shock to the system of global geopolitical competition. I am also convinced that this is a "critical juncture" in US-Chinese relations and that China is seeking to take advantage of the crisis to project power and influence across the world. The United States, by contrast, is in a terrible state, saddled with a disastrous president and manifestly failing state institutions. To many across the world, the United States is not a model world, the vanguard of modernity, but the system to avoid. There are two immediately crucial questions going forward: Who will develop the COVID-19 vaccine and garner credit for its distribution across the planet, thus saving millions of lives? And, will the United States renew itself in November 2020, presuming we get to have an election and Trump, seeing he is likely to lose, cancels it or overly cheats? I am biased in that I want the United States to rally and renew itself. Perhaps an emergent China will be a catalyst to it doing so in a positive constructive manner. But that may be wishful thinking, unfortunately.

Question: Thank you for your time and sincere answers. It is not possible to cover all issues in an interview. Please add here any significant points or topics you think we have missed.

Gerard Toal: Thank you for the opportunity. I hope Turkey is able to play a positive and constructive role in the collective security challenges we face across the planet.

CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR JOSEPH NYE

Question: It is an honor to have a chance to conduct an interview with you. Looking at your academic career from undergraduate to now, it is apparent that you have gathered amply significant memories and experiences. Could you please share some of them with us that are quite determining to your career?

Joseph Nye: I have always been interested in the boundaries where subjects intersect, particularly politics, economics, and morals. That has meant a career studying common markets in Africa and Central America; transnational issues, interdependence, nuclear proliferation, power transitions, and my book *Do Morals Matter?* In other words, I have been what Isaiah Berlin calls a fox rather than a hedgehog who focuses deeply on one thing. Perhaps I could have learned more as a hedgehog, but at least I have never been bored as a fox.

Question: You once claimed that "Europe retains impressive power resources."[2] However, with an ongoing refugee crisis, Russia's occupation of eastern Ukraine and illegal annexation of Crimea, the British withdrawal from the EU, and now criticisms against disorganized and slow response in the COVID-19 outbreak, it seems that the EU is losing its own power resources. Do you agree with this criticism? Would you evaluate the situation from the concept of soft power?

Joseph Nye: Europe has gained soft power by setting an example for the world, but soft power alone is not enough. Europe has not invested enough in its hard power to accompany the soft power. And disunity in the face of the challenges you mention further weakens European power.

Question: Your concept of soft power has been a key development with which to understand the last decade of the twentieth century and so forth. However, *Is the American Century is Over?* suggests that you have to restate your opinion because of changes in world politics. Furthermore, you sum up the short answer as follows: "The short answer to our question is that we are not entering a post-American world . . . The American century is not over, but because of transnational and non-state forces, it is definitely changing in important ways."

If you do not mind, we would like to ask which transnational and nonstate forces you are referencing, and do you believe that they are still relevant or will be relevant in the post-pandemic world order?

Joseph Nye: Many transnational issues cross borders outside the control of government. They include financial flows, terrorist groups, climate change, and of course, pandemics. The United States cannot solve these problems acting alone. We must learn to think of power with others as well as over others. This will be increasingly true in a post-pandemic world. Environmental globalization obeys the laws of science, not politics.

Question: Since the Obama administration, America seems to be trying to reduce the number of soldiers deployed all over the world. Moreover, they are now reducing the number of soldiers in Syria, emptying the military base in Northern Iraq, and cutting a deal with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

What would you say if somebody were to claim that the bringing democracy mission, which is backed by military operations, is coming to an end?

Joseph Nye: The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to disillusion with the idea that military occupation of poor countries can produce democratization. Even Ronald Reagan said bayonets were not the way to implant democracy. It should be done slowly by soft power or not at all. But that does not mean the withdrawal of military forces from democratic Europe or Japan where they play an important role in deterring authoritarian states, like Russia and China.

Question: As soon as Trump took over the presidency, he started focusing on trade relations with other countries and seeking more profitable economic regulations for the United States. He thinks that other countries have more advantages with the trade agreements that the Obama administration signed, and it has to be the other way around. Please correct me if get it wrong, but what would be your comments on this tax war that Trump triggered? Do you agree with me that it is degenerating American soft power in economic terms as it has been the founding state of the international liberal economic order?

Joseph Nye: Trump has a very narrow conception of the national interest that focuses on transactions rather than institutions and long-term relations. Moreover, few economists agree with his focus on bilateral trade balances as a measure of merit. His withdrawal from Obama's Transpacific Partnership undercut American soft power in the Asia-Pacific region.

Question: In the fifth chapter of *The Paradox of American Power* (2002), you discussed which way America should go, multilateralism or unilateralism. Two decades have passed since the Bush administration. Could you please reevaluate your primary argument in the book under the most current world affairs? Do you still side with multilateralism? If so, do you think that the Trump administration is on the same page as you?

Joseph Nye: I still believe in multilateral approaches for the reasons stated above, and developed at length in my new book *Do Morals Matter?* Unfortunately, Trump is not only not on the same page, he does not open the book.

Question: In 2017, you tracked the development of the soft power concept with the article "Soft Power: The Origins and Political Progress of a Concept." It, as you imply, has grown and cannot be held at a constant time and place. To what extent is the concept explanatory in a world taking a path to illiberal tendencies?

Joseph Nye: Soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment. Attraction depends on the mind of the target. Some people are attracted to authoritarians, which means they have soft power. If liberal ideas of freedom become less attractive in other countries, the soft power of democracies will be diminished.

Question: Thank you for your time and sincere answers. We do not want to miss what is essential to you if the previous questions do not cover it. Could you please elaborate on an issue by yourself as a closing question?

Joseph Nye: Trump is famous for his slogan "America First." All leaders have a responsibility to put their own country's interests first, and Trump is not unique in that. The important moral choice is how broadly or narrowly a leader chooses to define those interests. But the United States responded to COVID-19 with an inclination toward short-term, zero-sum, competitive interpretations, with too little attention to institutions and cooperation. As I show in my new book, *Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump*, this administration has interpreted "America First" narrowly, stepping back from the long-term, enlightened self-interest that marked the American approach designed by FDR, Truman, and Eisenhower after 1945. The Marshall Plan is a good example of using a broad definition of the national interest. It was good for the United States' interest in preventing the Soviet takeover of western Europe, but it was also good for Europe struggling to recover from the devastation of the Second World War.

We can apply that model to the current COVID-19 crisis. Attacks by new viruses may come in waves. In 1918, an influenza epidemic killed more people than died in the horrors of the First World War. Many people thought it had ended when it abated in the summer, but the second wave in the fall of 1918 was more lethal than the first. There is much we still do not know about this new coronavirus, but we must be prepared for a multiyear battle. That will require sharing information; developing and producing therapies and vaccines; and preparing, manufacturing, and distributing medical supplies and equipment. It is quite possible that there will be seasonal surges of the virus between the Northern and Southern hemispheres. When the North thinks it has a respite, the virus (or a mutation) may fill a Southern reservoir only to spill northward with the change of seasons. We should have a COVID-19 Marshall plan for poor countries.

CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR KATHARYNE MITCHELL

Question: Before moving on to substantive questions, we would like to ask you a personal question. It might seem to be a cliché, but we still wonder what made you want to study spatiality, multiculturalism, and neo-liberal citizenship? If possible, could you please share a couple of moments with us regarding your academic journey?

Katharyne Mitchell: My first independent work as a scholar was on the movement of people and capital in the Pacific Rim. For my dissertation, I looked at Hong Kong migration and capital flows to Vancouver, British Columbia, in the 1980s, following Thatcher's decision to return control of Hong Kong to China in the year 1997. At the time, I was studying geography at the University of California, Berkeley, and most of my reading was in urban Marxist geography. I intended to investigate the impact of rapid capital flows into Vancouver from Hong Kong and some of the ramifications of that capital influx for urbanization, gentrification, and increasing uneven development in the city. While those processes were important and central to the story of Vancouver's transformation at the time, I discovered that there were other equally critical stories that needed to be examined and analyzed. These included struggles over the aesthetics of landscape change that were connected not just to economic processes but also to questions of nation and race. The capital that was moving into the city and impacting its look and feel as well as its economic development was clearly being racialized by many residents because of the connection with the Hong Kong Chinese migrants who were arriving and establishing citizenship in the city at the same time. This led me to start looking at the ways that economics and culture intersect and impact each other in any spatial encounter. From there, I became interested in multiculturalism and citizenship, specifically the ways that these processes are always in formation rather than static, and always about more than just "culture" or "nation" alone; they are also about the specific economic context in which they are being conceptualized or promoted at any given time and place.

Question: Rising populism all over the world has a component of resurfacing historical periods that were powerful in national (majoritarian or authoritarian democracies) or international politics (hegemonic or superpower status). In that sense, would you say these populist movements have historical roots that might label them as fundamentalist?

Katharyne Mitchell: There is no question in my mind that contemporary populist movements draw on historical periods to assert their legitimacy and dominance. This can be seen in movements, such as Pegida and the AfD in Germany, as well as in Trump's call to "Make America Great Again." In the latter, it is never actually pinpointed *when* was the historical period during which America was supposedly so great, but the inference is that it was a moment in the history of white male strength and authority—one that must be firmly reasserted, with violence if necessary, by strong white male leaders today. Authoritarian populism is on the rise worldwide, in part because of the economic anxiety of those who have been "left behind" by neoliberal globalization and anger at the liberal-cosmopolitan elite who seem to be

profiting from it. In part, it is also coupled with the fear of "the other," who can be racialized to take many forms but who is always located by populist leaders as outside of the "real" spaces of the nation and its mythic past. A critical component of this anxiety and fear, I would argue, is the angst associated with dislocation—a dislocation that is emotional and symbolic, but also quite literal—a dislocation from the meanings and securities of an established (historical, rooted) place in the world. What has interested me as a political and urban geographer is the way in which these populist movements and associated ideologies are thus often asserted and resisted in and through the sedimented spaces of the landscape. I have written about this with my colleague Key MacFarlane in a recent paper in the *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, where we examine struggles over memory, nation, and place that are quite literally "surfaced" in the urban fabric of the city. See "Hamburg's Spaces of Danger: Race, Violence and Memory in a Contemporary Global City" (2009).

Question: Regarding previous questions, refugees have been considered a new international menace to political and social stability in developed countries, and that is why several European countries have already declared the failure of multiculturalism. Together with rising nationalist sentiments, this may lead to nations replacing liberal multiculturalism with something else. We would like to connect these dramatic developments to the international scale and ask you whether or not rising populist and nationalist movements have the potential to change the liberal international system or order.

Katharyne Mitchell: The world is definitely in an anti-globalist moment. Migrants and refugees are often perceived and represented as a menace and a drain on resources. This has led to harsher policies and more negative rhetoric at the national scale, including the declaration by some that multiculturalism has been a failure. I think these negative sentiments are already scaling up to the international level. We can see that supranational organizations like the EU are also pursuing more rejectionist, anti-immigrant positions in an effort to appease the far-right parties in a number of member states. We can also see the breakdown of the US-dominated liberal order as Trump shreds old alliances and the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) articulate their own brands of national belonging and identity. In a different world moment, this might be the opportunity for a new, more genuine conversation about global multiculturalism and a more progressive, less western-dominated international system. But I fear that what we're seeing with China, Brazil, India, and Russia are equally, if not more regressive, attitudes toward immigrants and refugees, paired with rising nationalism and authoritarianism.

Question: In terms of neoliberal models of governance, about which you have many reservations, national political regimes trying to model Western

political, economic, and social structures and ways of life have begun to raise their voices, emphasizing their uniqueness from the West. Would you consider these political developments as indications that the multilateral international system is breaking down?

Katharyne Mitchell: Yes, in many respects the post-Cold War order is collapsing, and the western dominated multilateralism of the Bretton Woods era is at an end. The current attacks on the World Health Organization are the most evident example of this trend. Unfortunately, neoliberal practices, such as the privatization of industry and commonly held property and the dispossession of the lands and resources of the indigenous and other minority groups, continue apace. Thus, while the Washington consensus may be over, many nations emphasizing their "uniqueness" are still operating with the same destructive model of free-market capitalism. Authoritarian populists worldwide make a strong rhetorical show of breaking free of Western dominance and developing their own national path of development. But in terms of their core policies and practices, they remain wedded to neoliberal strategies of capitalist accumulation, with all of its attendant ills.

Question: As you have researched the relations between space and identity, we would like to ask you another question on this issue. Identities and values are quite influential in shaping spaces, especially predominantly immigrant urban areas and the major squares of cities. How do you think majoritarian parties and nationalist politicians understand and react to the multicultural nature of these parts of the cities? Is it possible that future interventions in these urban areas might affect the relations between host societies and the home countries of immigrants?

Katharyne Mitchell: In France in 2005, there was great civil unrest that spread across the country in the wake of the death of two teenagers who had been electrocuted after hiding from the police. I had just returned from a year working in Marseille, and I will never forget an expression used by the president at the time, Nicolas Sarkozy, to talk about an immigrant suburb (*banlieue*) near where the electrocution of the young people occurred. He said, "*Vous en avez assez de cette bande de racaille? Eh bien, on va vous en débarrasser*," (You've had enough of this band of scum? Well, we're going to get rid of them for you). The word "*racaille*" has a connotation in French of something subhuman—so the phrase evokes the disposal of human beings as trash—as waste products. In a similar situation, he spoke of the usefulness of using a *Kårcher* (French power-washer) to clear out misbehaving youth in primarily immigrant neighborhoods. I don't think these semantic choices are accidental. They are deliberate and clear signals sent out to white supremacist followers that the leader understands and will deliver on the unspoken promise of (re)building—or making great again—a white nation. This kind of language and symbolic referencing can be seen in the statements, body

language, choice of backgrounds, positioning, and photo locations chosen by authoritarian leaders worldwide—with variations on who is racialized as white in different nationalist settings. As a geographer by training, I am always interested in the way that these semantic codings of inside/outside the national body politic are often linked to physical space. It is the immigrant *neighborhood* that is dirty and corrupt and in need of deep cleansing; it is the urban *square* where the population must be kept in check. These places provide a useful foil for populists, with clear signaling to followers of their supremacist ideologies, yet without having to actually name the outsider with overtly racist language (at least not yet). As to the second part of your question, will the multiple and ongoing attacks on these spaces and the populations who reside in them affect IR? Unfortunately, in most of these cases, the home countries do not hold the same degree of geopolitical power as the host societies, so the repercussions are minimal. In those cases where there are significant remittances associated with a diasporic migrant population, home countries might offer muted critiques of the treatment of their citizens. But these are generally ignored.

Question: There is another distinctive discussion on returning religion into national and international politics. You mentioned on the university website that you are currently working on the sanctuary and other forms of humanitarian protection provided by religious communities to refugees and other vulnerable migrants. Could you please share your thoughts about the potential influence of sanctuary practices and other forms of migrant aid offered by religious organizations on national and international politics?

Katharyne Mitchell: This is a question that has preoccupied me for the past few years. The offer of the religious sanctuary as a form of protection in Europe goes back to at least 600 AD. It occurred in the context where people accused of certain kinds of crimes could be offered sanctuary in a church and thus protected from arrest. This concept was actually recognized in English law up until the seventeenth century. Even after Enlightenment rationalities of the importance of the rule of law and systems of good governance began to override these types of practices, there remained factions that held onto sanctuary ideals. It was seen as an *alternate form of justice*, one that side-stepped and to some extent overruled sovereign (monarch or nation-state) forms of hegemonic authority. Because of this interesting history, I believe that sanctuary possesses the capacity to contest the existing "order" of things, including at the scale of national and international politics. I have been working on the ways that the practice of sanctuary and other faith-based "refusal" movements present challenges to liberalism and normative systems of governance. Faith-based organizations have the potential to rework democracy as we know it precisely because they don't "follow the rules"; they may respond to what they perceive to be a "higher" level of authority as the arbiter of

justice and human dignity, and thus be willing to protect asylum-seekers and vulnerable migrants even when it is against the law. They might also hold nonsovereign, nonliberal concepts such as "sacred space" (such as a church) and "sacred time" (such as God's time) and associated cultural meanings and traditions, which collectively can give them quite a lot of power, even in primarily secular societies. Of course, these nonliberal movements can be either regressive or progressive, but in the humanitarian actions I was interested in, they were quite progressive, serving to challenge increasingly xenophobic attitudes and narrow interpretations toward asylum and refugee status in a growing number of European countries over the past five years. In my empirical research in Germany, for example, certain church networks offered sanctuary to asylum-seekers and were extremely effective in using the related scuffles and struggles with police and the judicial system to make wider political statements about the (in)justice of the asylum process. They thus directly influenced national policy and politics with their faith-inspired humanitarian actions and beliefs.

Question: We would like to touch upon another issue relating to refugee issues all over the world. Most humanitarian aid provided to refugees is not conditional—it is universally provided regardless of a person's background or identity. But there is also some humanitarian aid that *is* conditional; it is given selectively on the basis of ethnic, religious, ideological, or even sectarian identities. Would you make a connection between conditional humanitarian understandings and the current multicultural backlash?

Katharyne Mitchell: I haven't really seen this in my own research, so I am just hypothesizing here. I imagine that in some contexts there could be anger that the liberal-universal promise that all be treated equally is not being followed in these types of cases. Even though this liberal promise is founded on various forms of historical violence and never completely realized, it is a touchstone for many governments and people. If, for example, some aid organizations are only providing humanitarian assistance to Muslim refugees, that might provoke anger and a backlash to liberal mantras such as multiculturalism. But this is not something I have witnessed myself. All of the faith-based organizations I worked with in Europe are deeply committed to nonpartisan humanitarian aid, i.e., support that is not conditional on identity or background. Of course, this fear (the fear that others are getting something unfairly because of their identities) can be stoked by populist politicians for their own purposes, just as with anything else.

Question: You have argued that civic education will shape the next generation's understanding of space, politics, and identities, and is especially important in the education of children. There is not yet involvement in the national curriculum to change it in favor of nationalist or populist education, but still, at the spatial, social, political, and economic level, there are tendencies to

reshape young minds in favor of dominant views. Please forgive us for bringing this issue into the broader context of IR, but do you agree that these tendencies might change the root codes of liberal understandings and politics?

Katharyne Mitchell: Unfortunately, I think this *is* already happening. There are currently very bitter and ongoing struggles over how both history and civic education are portrayed and promoted in children's textbooks in the United States, India, Japan, France, and Zimbabwe—indeed, many nations. This is because all leaders know that how the past is memorialized and how it becomes part of the archive of collective memory is absolutely critical for how the present can be manipulated and the future imagined and directed. So too with civic education and how the role of government and the rights and responsibilities of citizenship are depicted. Many classic books on nation-building and nationalism have emphasized the importance of schooling in these topical areas, i.e., what is our system of government, who are we as citizens, and how should we *act* as citizens—citizens of a particular nation and/or citizens of the world? The struggle over children's minds and ways of thinking about history, government, democracy, and democratic participation is absolutely critical for our future. It will affect both national politics and IR. Indeed, it affects everything—from our collective ability to listen, engage and contribute constructively to our ability to imagine and plan for a progressive planetary future that is inclusive and just for all.

Question: We know it might have nothing to do with your area of expertise, but there is a popular debate on post-COVID-19 world projections. If you do not mind, could you please share your precious thoughts about it with us?

Katharyne Mitchell: I don't really feel comfortable making predictions about this yet. It's still too early to see where we're headed, I think!

Question: Before ending the interview, we would like to take a chance to have you ask a question to yourself. Because an interview cannot cover all the areas of the life of an academic like yourself, we would kindly ask you whether there is an issue that you consider quite significant but that we didn't ask about. If yes, would you tell us about it?

Katharyne Mitchell: Thank you—I think we have covered a lot of territories already!

We would like to thank you for your sincere answers and time.

Katharyne Mitchell: Thank you for your questions and for giving me the opportunity to address them in this venue.

Best Regards.

CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR KNUD ERIK JØRGENSEN

Question: We would like to start the interview with a general and common question. Could you please tell us about what has led you to study the EU from a constructivist perspective? It would be perfect if you could just share some of the moments and events in your academic career.

Knud Erik Jørgensen: After a brief career detour, working in a municipality administration, I returned to Aarhus University in 1988 to do a PhD. I had secured external funding from the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) to analyze Western Europe's policies toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Having prepared, during the early 1980s, a somewhat long graduate thesis on the Polish opposition (KOR, Solidarnosc, etc.) within the framework of perspectives on social movements, I was new to the discipline of IR.

I entered the discipline at a time when the keyword in world politics was CHANGE. The polish social movement *Solidarnosc* made a comeback, and other dissident groupings made it from dissidence to government offices. During the autumn of 1989, I prepared part of my thesis at Chatham House in London, listening to excellent speakers and their situation reports during the daytime, then taking the tube to my flat in Shepard's Bush and finding out, upon arrival, that the situation in the meantime had changed. Gorbachev had launched the *Perestroika* and *Glasnost* renewal of the Soviet Union and in 1991, having jumped on a tank, Boris Yeltsin addressed the masses, announcing the end of the Soviet Union and the birth of Russia. Helmuth Kohn announced the reunification of Germany, and the European Commission launched the ambitious 1992 project aimed at creating what we know as the EU.

Within the world of the discipline of IR, things were predominantly different, less change-oriented.

When navigating the theoretical landscape at the time and selecting my theoretical framework, I took guidance from COPRI, specifically Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, who flirted with combinations of (reconstructed) neorealism and post-positivist approaches, including speech act theory. Hence, I pragmatically included a reconstructed neorealist framework in the thesis and continued to explore the post-positivist perspectives on the side. Not so much the poststructuralist approaches Wæver (and subsequently Lene Hansen) was attracted to, but the social constructivist middle ground, occupied at the time by Emanuel Adler, John Ruggie, Friedrich Kratochwil, and Alexander Wendt. They represented a sophisticated understanding of the relationship between ontology and epistemology, and while it was developed with a view to IR,

it seemed highly applicable to studies of processes of European integration, including the EU's foreign relations. Concerning the foreign affairs dimension, I also drew on Walter Carlnaes's important advances within foreign policy analysis. Finally, a guest lecture by John Searle at the EUI suggested that his understanding of social reality could serve as philosophical underpinning and combined, I was equipped with a solid platform for analytical interventions in the EU's foreign relations. Such a platform seemed much more attractive than the stale conventional political science templates that at the time were about to make inroads in European Studies but almost always without much attention to international affairs and also more suitable than the liberal intergovernmentalist framework, Andrew Moravcsik was building with rationalist underpinnings.

In short, all these developments in the world and my exploration of theoretical perspectives prompted me to adopt constructivist perspectives.

Question: In your 2001 book with Karin Fierke, *Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation*, you state, "This book is an attempt to look more broadly at the place of constructivism in IR theory, raising critical questions about the meaning that constructivism has acquired in IR debates and the various philosophical traditions from which it emerged" (3). Since then, almost two decades, there have been ample developments in both practical and theoretical realms of IR. Thus, we would like to ask about your evaluation of the evolution of constructivism in IR. Do you believe that both practically and theoretically constructivism has been able to prove itself to the world as a separate IR theory?

Knud Erik Jørgensen: The main aim of the book was to identify the varieties of constructivism that exist beyond the middle ground and explore their potential in research on global affairs. Concerning your question, I have to answer both yes and no. The "yes" part of my response is due to the fact that constructivism at both theoretical and empirical levels generated an avalanche of studies without which we would know considerably less about all sorts of aspects of social reality. Within the decade after Robert Keohane's presidential address in 1988, a string of important contributions emerged (Katzenstein, 1996; Ruggie, 1998; and Wendt, 1999), not to speak about Martha Finnemore and Katryn Sikkink's (2001) stock-taking overview of constructivism-informed empirical research or Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner's (1998) certification of constructivism. I can perfectly understand that the rich branching out to multiple research agendas and theoretical orientations might leave the impression of fading constructivism, but, paradoxically, it is the fate of an orientation that goes mainstream. As some are fond of saying about a given restaurant: It is so popular that nobody goes there anymore.

The "no" part of my response is not less significant for our understanding of the evolution of constructivism in IR. I firmly believe that constructivism has been unable to prove itself as a separate theory, not least because it was never the aspiration. Social constructivism offers an idea about what social reality is, how it is different from material reality, and how we can do research on social reality. In this sense, it functions as a steering system in studies of social reality or, more often, aspects of social reality. As such, constructivism should be and has been able to spin off multiple separate substantive theories about IR. Examples of social reality include norms (and accompanying theories of norms), practices (and accompanying theories of practices), and Foucauldian genealogies (and accompanying theories of genealogies). In other words, constructivism is able to shape substantive theoretical IR traditions and, in a sense, to reconstruct them. Hence, I am not surprised that we have not only constructivist liberal theories but also constructivist realism and constructivist English School perspectives. Nonetheless, scholars who park their professional identity in one of the three theoretical traditions tend to consider constructivism a competitor to their tradition. Such misperceptions are bad, but what is worse is that some textbooks present constructivism as a separate substantive theoretical orientation, thereby socializing students into a misperception.

Question: "From a long-term perspective, negotiations will be among the key factors determining economic, political, and legal developments in Turkey—and the EU—during the next twenty-five years. During this time span, not only Turkey but also the EU is likely to change significantly" (Jørgensen and LaGro, 2007: 12–13). We want to use this quotation taken from *Turkey and the EU: Prospects for a Difficult Encounter*, edited with Esra LaGro, as a basis of these questions. Along with adjustment difficulties in the negotiation process between Turkey and the EU, they seem to turn into regional rivals because of PKK's Syrian branch in the Syrian conflict, gas and oil resources in the eastern Mediterranean and Libyan crisis. Do you think that their foreign policy perspectives are totally different? If so, then how would you evaluate the current negotiation process?

Knud Erik Jørgensen: Fifteen years after publication, the subtitle, *Prospects for a Difficult Encounter*, has proved even more accurate than Esra LaGro and I imagined when we prepared the book for publication. As I think about my response to your question, I notice that the EU adopted limited sanctions on individuals and companies in Turkey, stating that "Regrettably, Turkey has engaged in unilateral actions and provocations and escalated its rhetoric against the EU, EU member states and European leaders," while keeping an option of expanding the scope of sanctions, should Turkey's behavior not change. The decision demonstrates that the conclusion of a comparative study

of Turkish and EU foreign policy (Jørgensen, 2015) remains valid. In other words, trends are diverging, not converging.

While the widening gap situates prospects for enlargement in dire straits, does it also allow for any shared or at least overlapping foreign policy perspectives? I think it does. Previously, Turkey and EU member states shared the aspiration for regime change in Syria and a critical stance concerning political developments in Egypt. Currently, both the EU and Turkey are seriously concerned about Russia and neither frequent headlines about EU-Russia energy relations nor S-400 missiles are capable of erasing these deep concerns. Moreover, both the EU and Turkey have a problem with their main ally, the United States. Given that the problem also existed during the George W. Bush and Obama administrations, it is unlikely that the end of the Trump administration will remove the problem. In this context, it should be remembered that former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's (2009) first programmatic foreign policy statement included five pages on Asia and only five lines about Europe. During the Cold War, Josef Joffe (1984) talked about Europe's American pacifier, and it is widely known that the retraction of pacifiers can be felt traumatic.

Question: In another edited book of yours with Oriol Costa, titled *The Influence of International Institutions on the EU: When Multilateralism Hits Brussels* (2012), you claimed that international institutions are quite influential over the EU policies and sometimes it plays an amplifier role. You ground your approach to multilateralism and present several cases of how multilateralism works in these interactions. We would like to ask you about totally different policies between the EU and the United States since the Trump administration got the power, such as financial burdens of NATO, WHO, the Iranian nuclear deal, tax regulations, and so on. What would you say about these separate policy differences? Are they just routine international issues multilateralism usually solves, or might they entirely change the nature of multilateralism in the world?

Knud Erik Jørgensen: First of all, it takes more than a Trump administration to take down the multilateral system and the international institutions and norms it embodies. In contemporary international society, disdain of its multiple institutions is widespread. There are more demands than contributions and more criticism than solutions. States might be loyal in the sense of not exiting the institutions, but their voice tends to be scapegoating, not a voice of commitment and leadership. During the last 100 years, the multilateral system, consisting of international institutions, has experienced a range of ups and downs. While expanding in scope during the Cold War, the Cold War did not exactly make the United Nations system it was designed to be.

The multilateral system has always been globally unbalanced, with a much denser network of institutions across the Atlantic than across the Pacific

Ocean. Thus, no OSCE and no NATO in East Asia but bilateral defense relations between the US and Japan and South Korea, respectively.

Concerning transatlantic relations, the EU seems overall to enjoy more smooth relations with US presidents of the Democratic Party even if also the Clinton and Obama years had their problematic moments. The Biden administration's policies toward Europe will probably not produce smooth sailing, but just not viewing the EU as an enemy would be a significant step away from the four years with Trump.

Question: Leading countries of the EU are actually quite influential in international institutions because their memberships mostly intercept those of NATO, the United Nations including the Security Council, and what you call the GX systems (G2, G5, G7, G20, etc.) and are signatories of necessary international agreements. What are your insights about the power of the EU as an international institution in world affairs? It would be great if you could answer the question with your four core elements of the EU's performance: effectiveness (goal achievement); relevance (for its priority stakeholders); efficiency (ratio between outputs accomplished and costs incurred); and financial/resource viability.

Knud Erik Jørgensen: Perhaps a suitable starting point is to acknowledge that influence in international institutions and power in world affairs are two very different issues. Concerning the former, it seems to me that those who claim something general about the EU's power in international institutions are bound to have a serious problem with their trustworthiness. The simple answer to the question is that it varies, not least across time and issue area. Hence, a differentiated analysis is mandatory, and the analysis should also take into consideration the two-way street of influence Oriol Costa and I analyzed in *When Multilateralism hits Brussels* (2012). If we bracket the important outside-in influence, then how would I summarize the EU's influence in international institutions, using the performance parameters of effectiveness (goal achievement); efficiency (ratio between outputs accomplished and costs incurred compared to other actors); relevance (of the EU for its priority stakeholders); and financial/resource viability. The four parameters promise a more nuanced analysis than a focus on just performance, but they remain somewhat crude instruments, and in order to avoid some of the well-known problems that mar performance studies, conclusions should take this into account.

Concerning effectiveness, it would be easy to prepare a list of global governance goals the EU has been unable to achieve (for inspiration, read a handful of articles critical of the EU). However, it is also possible to prepare a list of goals (partly) achieved, arguing that the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement would not have existed without its engagement. The same applies to the World Trade Organization, the International Criminal Court, and the Iranian

nuclear deal. At some point, the organization was called the United Nations' best friend and concerning achievements, and one should not forget why the EU was given the Nobel Peace Prize. Obviously, both the pro and the con list can be extended, so how does the balance sheet look? Has it changed over time? How does the EU compare to other members of international society?

The comparative aspect leads us "efficiency." At this point, it is important to keep in mind that we focus on the EU as an international institution, not the EU as a union of states. Stated in simple terms, the costs incurred of cultivating its multilateral relations are considerably lower than the combined costs of running the EU-27 multilateral relations. While the former compares well to the performance of other major actors in global governance, the latter shows the financial downside of running separate foreign services (the pros of this kept out of the calculation).

Concerning relevance, we should keep in mind that the category of "stakeholders" is a wide category. It comprises member states but depending on distinct issue areas might also include, for instance, political parties, influential NGOs, business sectors, media, and segments within academia. They all have views about the "relevance" of the EU, either in distinct policy areas or general views. Concerning international health policy, member states have a tradition of not finding the EU that relevant, hence the relatively limited competencies that were displayed during the COVID-19 pandemic, including the lack of emergency procedures for the EMA. A similar lack of perceived relevance is on display in, for instance, the IMF.

Finally, concerning financial viability, we can see all sorts of combinations. In the field of development policy, there is a tradition of underfunded performing institutions. If the EEAS is adequately funded, taking the long list of tasks into consideration, remains a highly contested issue. The simple point I am trying to make is that also the performance parameter "financial viability" requires rigorous analysis and, moreover, that the same applies to a general analysis of "performance." What's in this context is interesting is twofold. First, there is a highly uneven ratio between, on the one hand, performance studies that merit the name and, on the other hand, comments in the passing on the EU's failure or success. Second, I have come across surprisingly many scholars who find it almost offensive to ask about the EU's objectives in a given policy area and if those objectives have been achieved.

Question: With your permission, we want to look at your articles on "continental IR theories" and "the relations between hegemony/hegemonic power and IR" to ask another question. We understand that, from the sequence of your research, you have concerns about the future of IR because of the changing dynamics of world affairs. Furthermore, you believe that it might be an advantage for new conceptualization and also that it might be an issue leading to miscommunications. Could you please tell us whether or not we correctly

understand you? If you confirm, we would like to ask you whether there is a coming epistemological crisis along with the systemic changes in the world. Moreover, if we do not understand you correctly, could you please correct us and then share your thoughts about the above question?

Knud Erik Jørgensen: It's complicated and has both time and space dimensions, so let me explain why I think you understand me correctly. Given the dynamics of its subject matter, the discipline of IR always needs to find an adequate balance between continuity and change. If continuity is overemphasized, we end up in a situation in which Sun Tzu, Kautilya, Thucydides, and other BC thinkers (and practitioners) said it all and even Ibn Khaldoun is a hopeless late-comer. Subscribers to "the timeless wisdom of realism" seemingly drift into the unscientific abyss of timelessness. If, on the other hand, change is overemphasized, our conceptualizations and theories have to change every decade or every year. Taking the position into the absurd, last Tuesday is different from this Tuesday, so . . . An additional problem with this position is that the Zeitgeist will be the Queen (or King) and it will forever be our fate to be followers. When W.T.R. Fox in 1949 reviewed the American experience with the discipline during the interwar years, he stated the following upfront, "Much of what seemed important in 1929 seems irrelevant, and some of it even trivial, in 1949. Another twenty years may perhaps bring a similar judgment on work now being done. But we ought at least to be aware of the direction in which we have been moving if we are to control the future development of the field" (Fox, 1949, 67). I read Fox's statement also as a warning against those who spend their time practicing chrono(ego-)centrism and find it worthwhile to lecture past generations about what they did wrong, what they ought to have been doing, and why contemporary norms are perpetually supreme.

The dimension of space (or geo) is not less important. In the Fox quote above, he explicitly delineates the examined space. His article is about the *American* experience, not about the interwar discipline in general. However, the issue is considerably more complex than just a matter of delineating scope. It branches out to include, "innocent" universalism, the inapplicability of concepts and theories across space as well as mixing up normative preference with rigorous analysis.

With "innocent" universalism I have in mind studies in which it is taken for granted that concepts, theories, and perspectives apply worldwide. It is seen as so self-evident that scholars simply neglect the issue. The second issue, the inapplicability of concepts and theories across space, is obviously the opposite perspective. In the camp of stigmatized concept, scholars argue that a concept or theory that comes out of one region does not apply beyond the *terroir* (territory) in which it was built. During the 1980s, Arab intellectuals and segments of Middle East scholars began to argue that Western concepts

were of no use in studies of the Middle East. Thereby, they practiced what al-Azr (1980) calls orientalism in reverse. Yet this is just one example of the inapplicability axiom. Finally, it is a widespread practice to mix up normative preferences with rigorous analysis.

Hence, the epistemological crisis, if that is a suitable term, concerns both the time and the space dimension.

Question: Regarding your research on the relations between multilateralism and multipolarity of the world system, we would like to ask you about where you see the EU in the emerging world order. Do you think that it would be able to be at the core, in terms of the functioning mechanism, of a so-called emerging new order?

Knud Erik Jørgensen: That's a very tricky but also a most relevant question. It is tricky because the notion of "the emerging world order" is very slippery. On the one hand, its ambiguousness explains why it is popular. People like to use it, and, seemingly, they say something about something very important, yet they do so without saying that much. In this sense, the virtue of the concept is its lack of precision. On the other hand, even in IR, with its more elaborate language, international order connotes a range of different things. Scholars of a realist orientation tend to equate international order with configurations of polarity within the international system. English School scholar Hedley Bull examined international order in international society and pointed to the key significance of the sociological institutions he called "fundamental." Scholars of a liberal orientation tend to differentiate between configurations of power within distinct issue areas, thereby operating with multiple international orders.

It seems to me that answers to the question about the EU's position in the emerging international order foremost tell you something about how the analyst conceive the international environment in which the EU is situated.

Question: Since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the EU as an international institution has been severely criticized for not having a foreign policy. In recent issues, the EU could not find a solution to the Iranian Nuclear deal, failed to have an influential policy in Ukraine, in the Syrian and Libyan crises, refugee crisis, and the most recent global pandemic crisis. As a scholar working the most on the EU as an institution and the EU's foreign policy, what would you say to these critics? Are these critics right or just extremely exaggerated?

Knud Erik Jørgensen: Perhaps I should softly approach an answer by saying that different fields of study are attractive for different reasons. The study of EU foreign policy is highly attractive because, on the one hand, you have the critics you refer to and, on the other hand, you have scholars who have coined concepts for more than two dozen different ways in which the EU is a power (civilian, military, normative, imperial, you name it). Such a situation

is intellectually stimulating and guarantees that widely shared orthodoxies have a hard time. At the same time, the situation is frustrating, especially because it is difficult to achieve accumulated knowledge about the EU's foreign relations.

Hence, it seems to me that, on the one hand, the critics have a strong argument. In short, there is an EU foreign policy on a given issue when member states agree there should be one and when they do not, there is not. On the other hand, I am inclined to feel sorry for the critics you refer to because they seem to have missed at least 50 years of EU foreign policy. Of course, they can return the compliment and say that I (and the colleagues who share my research interests) clearly do research on a topic that does not exist. In order to understand the contrast better, let me unpack some of the main pillars on which it rests. In other words, I suggest that we move from a general assessment to differentiated analytical tasks and then turn back to the level of the general assessment.

The first issue is temporal and concerns scope and periodization. Which timeframe do we have in mind? You refer to the time after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, but given that the critique has existed as long as there has been an EU foreign policy, we can easily add 30 years more. I encountered the critique for the first time when I prepared my PhD thesis in the late 1980s and told a senior diplomat about my topic being EU foreign policy, he dryly commented, "I didn't know we had one." A decade later, Jan Zielonka prompted me to prepare what is published as "The European Union's Performance in World Politics: How Do We Measure Success?" (Zielonka, 1998). At this point, a hint to anti-EU folks is in place: my point is not that I observe only success and ask how we can measure it. My point is that terms like success and failure often are employed rather casually so the challenge is, at least for agnostic scholars, how we can turn these concepts into analytical concepts. In this context, it is telling that very few, if any who deem EU foreign policy to be a failure, take their point of departure in the literature on policy failures and fiascos (e.g., various publications since 1990 by Maarten t' Hart and his colleagues). Finally, do we detect any development over time, or has the EU foreign policy never existed? Did it have an unspecified golden age after which it went into decay?

The second issue is conceptual prompting me to ask seemingly banal questions: How do we understand "the EU" and "foreign policy"? In more specific terms, and concerning the policymaking process, which institutional branches do we include in our assessment: the European External Action Service (including 130-plus delegations), the Council, EU member states, the European parliament, DG Trade or the European Commission? Concerning "foreign policy," it is important to notice that it is one of these easy-to-use yet notoriously slippery terms that can mean everything and nothing. Should we,

concerning the umbrella term "foreign policy," include development policy, foreign economic relations (e.g., trade agreements), aspects of environmental and climate policy, aspects of migration policy (e.g., agreements with countries of migration origin and transit), aspects of exchange rate policy? Enlargement policy? The inclusion or exclusion of various aspects shapes the "foreign policy" we observe and scrutinize.

The distinction between ontology (does it exist) and influence (is it of consequence) is important, of course, because a "yes" to the ontological question does not imply that the really existing foreign policy is of consequence, is influential, that it rocks the world. Moreover, assessments of EU foreign policy often include a comparator, another international actor to which the EU is compared. The comparator is usually implicit though easy to detect. For some reason, the EU is conventionally compared to the United States and when the EU does not reach the benchmark of US foreign policy, then it is deemed to not exist or have no impact. True, the EU does not have aircraft carriers plowing the waters of the South China Sea, the Persian Gulf, or the Mediterranean, the EU does not command nuclear forces and the EU does not have an NSA (and other agencies) monitoring events around the world. In terms of staff numbers, the EEAS is far from being on par with the US State Department or the UK Foreign Office or the Quai d'Orsay. The EEAS and the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs are at similar levels, so perhaps the EU's comparator by default should not be the US but the Netherlands.

In the cases of Ukraine, Syria, and Libya, which EU member states have a proper foreign policy? The number of such states is very limited. If so, why then expect the EU to have a policy and even an influential one. The critics you mention observe what they see, namely an absence of EU foreign policy, and they deploy the observation for different purposes. While some have a preference for an EU that is capable of shaping the world in the image of the EU, others use the observation to confirm what they concluded a long time ago, namely that they do not subscribe to the existence of the EU or the EU's international aspirations. This illustrates how timeless wisdom is the enemy of academic knowledge. Another example is the idea that EU policymaking always reflects the lowest common denominator, an idea some analysts turn into timeless wisdom, whereas practitioners in the field tend to think that processes of policymaking end along the median line.

The lack of engagement in a given international crisis leads us to an issue that is worthwhile exploring. What I have in mind is that the lack of engagement at times is equated with the absence of a policy. In this case, analysts run the risk of overlooking the possibility of non-engagement being the result of a very conscious policy to stay away from the crisis. At the beginning of the dissolution of the Yugoslavia crisis, the US Secretary of State declared, "we do not have a dog in this fight" whereas a European minister of foreign

affairs declared, "this is the hour of Europe." Both approaches proved to have short-term rhetorical qualities but were unsustainable in even the mid-term. David Owen's *Balkan Odyssey* and Richard Holbrooke's *How to Win a War* explain why this is the case and they provide fascinating insights into the worldviews and approaches of the special envoys of the EU and the US, respectively.

The series of possible disaggregation of general assessments into specific analytical tasks is obviously much longer than the few examples above, but I hope they are sufficient to illustrate my argument that the critics are partly right and partly wrong. In itself, an empty statement but with the qualifications above, I hope it is a bit more than that.

Question: Refugees in general and Syrian refugees in specific recently threaten the core establishments of the EU; free movement of labor, capital, goods, and services. Before spreading the coronavirus all over Europe, refugees have been the main reason for border closing among the EU member states. What would you think if someone claims that the EU is in an ontological crisis?

Knud Erik Jørgensen: Let me answer the question in two steps: first at a general level and subsequently turn to the specifics about refugees and the EU's four freedoms.

At the general level, well, it is far from an unusual claim, hence all the talk about the EU's perpetual ontological anxiety disorder. The analysis of this disorder constitutes a veritable cottage industry, producing a very broad range of products: articles, books, special issues, blogs, editorials, documentaries, policy briefs, etc., Indeed, Europeans are masters in comparing their own weaknesses to the strengths of others and when Europeans, occasionally fail to deliver enough, others are eager to step in and keep the flame of anxiety alive. In this context, I think that anti-Europeanism is as widespread as chauvinist Eurocentrism.

Hence, when someone claims that the EU is in an ontological crisis, the first thing to do is to ask if it is an ideology-informed diagnosis, a theory-informed diagnosis, or an evidence-based diagnosis. It seems to me that while Walter Laqueur's *After the Fall: The End of the European Dream and the Decline of a Continent* (2012) is a good example of the first diagnosis type, Stephen Walt's blog *The coming erosion of the EU* (2011) is a good example of a theory-informed diagnosis. Given the limited contents of their analytical toolbox, realists are bound to produce limited understandings of the EU and the long tradition of doing so proves the point, but this does not imply that they are bound to get everything wrong. Thus, Walt points to the decline in the EU's capability to be a strategic actor (as if the EU ever was) and he does point to an increase of disunity. He predicted this before British voters opted for a Brexit of sorts and before Polish and Hungarian voters began insisting

on voting for illiberal governments, thereby creating contending perspectives on European values.

Whereas the conclusions of ideology-and theory-informed studies are somewhat predictable, there is an important difference between them. While the former is conclusion-determined, the latter type of analysis can be but need not be over-determined by theory. By means of characterizing Andrew Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism as AM-Tracking through Europe, Thomas Diez once pointed to the problem of over-determination. William Wallace also pointed to a similar unhealthy imbalance between knowledge of the substance matter and theory-determined analysis.

Concerning your specific question about the impact of refugees and migrants on the core of the European project, i.e., the four fundamental freedoms of the EU (the free movement of labor, capital, goods, and the freedom to establish and provide services), there are no good reasons to invoke the image of an ontological crisis. Whereas the arrivals of Syrian refugees did prompt a gradual and temporary closing of borders, thereby having an impact on the Schengen regime, the four freedoms remained intact. A Danish carpenter, for instance, could still travel to Italy and begin working for a construction company. While the four fundamental freedoms essentially are freedoms *within* the EU, there are no equivalents beyond Europe. Whereas processes of globalization have produced some freedoms when it comes to the free movement of capital and goods, the freedom to provide services has never made it from the negotiation table to decision-making and worldwide freedom of movement of labor remains a normative preference only among a few NGOs.

Question: Since the coronavirus threat has closed down the world for a dozen months or more, it will inevitably cause paramount changes afterward. Could you please tell us more about your thoughts on post-COVID-19 world politics?

Knud Erik Jørgensen: My first thought is that it is too early to tell. We do not know how many waves the COVID-19 pandemic will have, we also do not know the impact of the ongoing vaccination campaigns and we do not know the derived political, social, and economic impact of the pandemic. We know even less about the impact on world politics and analyzing the impact of pandemics has never been high up on the IR discipline's changing research agendas. In order to assess the ramifications of the current COVID-19 pandemic, it might be useful to look back at the Spanish flu pandemic that in several waves terrified the world community during the years of 1918 to 1920.

To the best of my knowledge, describing the worldwide impact has been left to a journalist, Laura Spinney, who, in 2017, published *Pale Rider: The Spanish Flu of 1918 and How It Changed the World*. If one wants to understand the wider impact of pandemics, it is a great book, wonderfully written, and a suitable starting point for those in the community of IR scholars who

might want to take on the challenge of understanding the specific impact on world politics. Spinney argues, for instance, that the Spanish flu had an impact on the dynamics of the First World War (soldiers dying of flu in the trenches) and triggered India's independence movement. Concerning impact, I also notice how the global ability to forget pandemics puzzles Spinney, for instance, the 1957 Asian flu and the 1968 Hong Kong flu, killing two million and four million, respectively.[3] COVID-19 has currently not reached two million deaths.

It is puzzling that we have been unable to offer comprehensive studies of the IR of pandemics and it is of limited comfort that we generally have difficulties in theorizing relations between humans and nature. In a textbook chapter on the Human-Nature tradition, I tried to reconstruct what I call the Human-Nature tradition using fragments of research to synthesize a tradition. However, it will be an uphill battle and for three reasons. First, and paradoxically, the significant advances during the last three decades in our understanding of social reality have reduced attention to research on the impact of material reality on IR. Second, the poststructuralist insistence on denying the distinction between material and social reality contributes to the problem. Third, the Cultural Studies hegemony within Gender Studies rules out the factor of biology and thus an entire branch of research on the nexus between gender and IR.

The international politics of naming the virus is easy to detect and a *I* of sorts of the Spanish flu, which was not at all Spanish in origin. Whereas the real origin of it is unknown, the origin of its reconstruction can be traced to Melvin Bay in Alaska and to the lab in Atlanta that reconstructed the "Spanish" string of the H1N1 virus.

Unlike the Asian flu and the 1968 Hong Kong flu, it is likely that we, in a post-COVID-19 era, will see the institutional design of WHO being critically reviewed. What also seems likely is that the pandemic seems to cause uneven economic impacts, some countries coping better than other countries. The vaccines race reveals patterns of cooperation (or alignments). Whereas parts of the world opt for the vaccine developed in China, other parts opt for American or European developed vaccines and other parts go for the Russian Sputnik.

However, and somewhat ironically, it might not be COVID-19 that has a significant impact on international politics but "vira" proliferating in cyberspace, weaponized and challenging cyber security.

Question: We might not be able to cover all the issues which are important to you, so by asking this question, we will not miss a critical question. As a closing question, we would like to learn your prime concern about world politics?

Knud Erik Jørgensen: In my mind, there is fierce competition among several strong candidates. Should my prime concern be the combined effect on world politics of media conglomerates, bot farms, social media giants and companies such as Cambridge Analytica? Should it be resource scarcity and the multiple and seemingly successful exercises inland and ocean grabbing? Or should it be the irresponsible and seemingly unchecked international behavior of autocrats? I think my prime concern is the combined effect on world politics of these three factors.

Thanks a lot for your time and sincere answers.

CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR MICHAEL C. WILLIAMS

Question: In your book *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations* (2005), you have examined three leading realist figures and come up with the concept of "wilful realism." As you know, these three prominent thinkers had been influenced by their political and social surroundings. Thomas Hobbes lived in a conflictual environment where wars were all around, Rousseau experienced the eve of social upheaves leading to political transformations all over Europe and Morgenthau witnessed two world wars. We have to admit that the book is emphasizing a distinctive deal of realism, but we would like to ask about your personal experiences that led you to reexamine the core realist thinkers, at least mostly accepted ones. Have you had this thought in your mind since your college years or has something else triggered you to think in this way?

Michael Williams: I suppose the first thing to say, which may help explain my views on realism, is that I did not begin life as a realist. On the contrary, I first encountered IR as a student of the renowned "critical" theorist RBJ Walker, and throughout my university studies, I was (and in many ways still am) critically inclined or oriented in my thinking about much of what passes as, or claims to be realism in politics. Politically, most of this period also corresponded with the so-called "second Cold War" and the Reagan administration's foreign policy agenda, particularly its assertive nuclear strategy. In this context, certain kinds of realism—such as those associated with the strategist Colin Gray and his assertion that in nuclear conflicts, "victory is possible"—seemed to me part of the problem, not the solution. But one of the principles of critical thinking I admire is to try to understand the positions you disagree with as well as (or even better than) they understand themselves. So, I began to dig into "classical" realism as a means of assessing its followers, and the more I did so, the more I found a perspective whose depth seemed

misunderstood and under-appreciated by both its detractors and by those who claimed to follow in its footsteps—and the more I wanted to try to recover it.

And so began my long journey into realism and its "traditions," a body of thought I think still has much to teach us, however reluctant we often seem to be to learn. After the Cold War ended, it seemed to me that this wider realist vision had much more to contribute to thinking about the transformation and the world that was (and still is) emerging than the narrower, "structuralist' variants associated with thinkers like Kenneth Waltz that began to dominate in the late 1970s. The need to think about world politics politically, rather than to try to calculate or model it "scientifically," seems to me to be as relevant as ever—and to be one of the main reasons behind the resurgence in interest in classical realism in recent decades.

Question: "Whether this [European Union] will be a successful one remains, however, to be seen." That is the last sentence of one of the articles that you coauthored with Lene Hansen in 1999, "The Myths of Europe: Legitimacy, Community and the 'Crisis' of the EU." It has been now more than two decades, and the EU has tremendously evolved, but critics of how it works or how it does not work are still in place. How do you see the last two decades of the EU, and do you have any future projections to its existence, especially after Brexit, the refugee crisis, and the most recently, the COVID-19 pandemic?

Michael Williams: The EU is undoubtedly one of the most significant political enterprises of our time. In historical terms, it is fascinating to see that way that classical realists like Hans Morgenthau were strong proponents of European unity, in stark contrast to the skepticism of later thinkers such as John Mearsheimer. But classical realists warned consistently of the limits of legalism, the limits of "rational" institutions, and the perils of overly optimistic, progressive liberalism in the face of competing for political values, identities, emotions, and interests.

Both these legacies continue to be insightful for thinking about the EU today. In the article you mention, Lene Hansen and I tried to show how the myth of the EU as an apolitical, technocratic institution relied on two foundational myths. First: that increasing rationalization was an unstoppable, neutral, transhistorical process—a powerful view traceable back to Max Weber, but in its later guises lacked his crucial insights that rationalization can in a dialectical fashion generate profound opposition, counter-movements, and even irrationality. The second myth was a tendency to historical amnesia where the view of the EU as an apolitical project elided its origins in the profound fear of conflict and irrationality emerging from the Second World War. Too often, especially in the 1990s during the period of its expansion, these myths entwined in debates over the EU, at least at the level of public, justificatory rhetoric. In its rationalistic liberal guises, accepting the myth of

liberal rationalization at face value has meant that its darker dimensions have too often been ignored, to the EU's peril—as I think some of the controversies with the "new" central European member states shows quite clearly.

Question: In several articles of yours about the constitution of the concept of security and politics in realist approach, you seem to stress the fact that even in realism ideas are quite essential to define and to determine what security and politics are, especially through the ideas of Morgenthau. Why are you doing that? Do you try to challenge the rationalist core of realism? Or just seek to emphasize possible commonalities between realism and constructivism?

Michael Williams: To some degree, the answer here follows from the previous question. I think classical realists understood the premises of what we now call constructivism quite clearly—and that they would have found many of them unobjectionable or even obvious. But realism rebels against the often-discussed tendency of constructivists to see their theoretical stance as intrinsically politically progressive. I do not think that this was necessarily the case with some of its most important early proponents, such as Alex Wendt, Nick Onuf, or Fritz Kratochwil but there was a distinct tendency to equate the social construction of action and the possibility of change with the idea that such possibilities were likely to be progressive or peaceful. Here, I think classical realists' engagement with figures such as Carl Schmitt or Max Weber, gave them a very different and deeper sense of the issues involved. Those ideas mattered made questions of which ideas, to what ends, and with what consequences, both inescapable and vital. Classical realists' core concepts of power, interest, and prudence, as well as its ethics, reflect this awareness. It was an attempt to construct a form of political conduct, one that contrary to common belief actually stood in quite close connection to a certain kind of liberalism, not in opposition to it.

These are issues that scholars in the field of IR gradually lost sight of. The opposition between liberalism and realism became a cliché rather than a point of serious engagement. Equally destructive was dominance, starting in the 1960s, of the commitment to a rather naïve form of objectivity. The questions of ethical judgment and action central to classical realism are questions that "scientific" constructivism simply cannot answer. They are also questions that in its most extreme forms rationalist social science cannot even sensibly ask. To answer them requires a different philosophic and political sensibility, as well as a wider sense of action and ethical conduct. Fritz Kratochwil has often pointed out that rationalism is not reason—a point that I find particularly well-formulated in the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu's observation that "the logic of practice is not the practice of logic." So, while realism and constructivism certainly have commonalities, realism tends to

ask harder-edged political questions—and forces constructivist theories to ask questions that prevailing methodological orthodoxies too often foreclose.

Question: You and your colleague, Rita Abrahmansen, have a distinctive approach to security studies with an examination of globalization of security, especially private security companies working at national and international levels. Your works reminded me of Nicholas Machiavelli, who touched upon the voluntary military structure and has been considered as one of the initial points of the nation-building process. Since then, security has become an outstanding service that has to be served by the states. However, your research indicates that there is a reverse development on that matter. Do you think that liberal national and international understanding changed the idea of dying for the country into dying for money? This question might seem too bold, but we know that the United States, Russia, and several European countries nowadays prefer using private mercenaries in international conflict.

Michael Williams: I think this a wonderful question—bold in the best sense! Your mention of Machiavelli is a great place to start. Although he is often claimed as one of the patron saints of realists, this has far too often been done without paying serious attention to his thinking about war and republics—particularly the uses of war in producing and sustaining republican virtue—and thus to the survival of republics as a whole. As Nicholas Guilhot has shown, this made Machiavelli a source of intense interest for post-war thinkers like Felix Gilbert, whose concerns often intersected with those of classical realists of the time for reasons that went far beyond his simple reputation as a proponent of cynical realpolitik.

The impact of security privatization on issues like this was, in fact, one of the questions that Rita Abrahamsen and I discussed during our work on security privatization. However, one of the most interesting things we discovered in that research was just how tightly the state was entwined with security privatization. Many of the areas of commercial (as opposed to private military) security that we looked at, for instance, are connected to public security institutions in myriad ways—with the state deeply concerned to exercise control oversight over legitimate violence. A similar process seems to be at work in military privatization, where the increasing role of private actors has generally strengthened state actors rather than weakening them. While combat-active private military firms do seem to be playing renewed roles in important settings—witness the activities of the Russian Wagner Group in parts of Africa today—they need to be understood as parts of complex public-private assemblages, not simply as undermining the state.

Bringing these two issues together highlights a different and, I think, a crucial issue in contemporary civil-military relations: Citizen participation and republican virtue are increasingly not required directly of citizens in most advanced states. Professionalization, privatization, and technological

intensification have placed previously unheard-of amounts of military power in the hands of fewer and fewer hands, and lessened the republican controls on that power that mass citizen participation demanded. Yet Machiavelli may still have been right that war is a particularly potent means of creating social solidarity. How to square the circle? The answer, I think, lies crucially in the realms of modern culture and media, where citizen virtue is performed by a relatively small number of professionals for an audience of citizen-spectators. The remarkable cultural power of modern militaries seems to me to be at least in part a result of this process—with private actors ranging from commercial security firms to technology providers, to media organizations all playing key roles.

Question: Since the Trump administration got the power in the US, there is a fierce discussion on the financial burden of NATO to the US, and Europe has not put a fair contribution to it. Even President Trump implies that Europe should pay for its security during the Cold War to the US. The more Trump suggests this issue, the more the idea of the European army is articulated, as President Macron emphasized several times. We would like to relate these developments with your studies on European security both in domestic and foreign realms. How would you react if somebody claims that the North Atlantic Alliance is shaking up and security concept is always going to be military-origin at the end?

Michael Williams: Is security always "at the end" a military concept? Here, at the risk of sounding a little too much like an academic, I think we need to ask what we mean by security. At one level, the answer clearly seems to be "no"—at least if we equate security with safety in some broad sense. COVID-19 alone show this: during the past year, economies have been extensively dislocated, civil liberties constrained, previously sacrosanct budgetary principles cast aside in the name of public security. Security as what Ole Waever and Barry Buzan influentially analyzed as "securitization" seems tailor-made for explaining such a situation. Conversely, is there something special about military security? I think the answer is yes, and that it is connected to existential fear which war evokes in ways that no other human activity does—though, the issues discussed at the end of my previous answer has important implications here, and as the case of COVID-19 illustrates, this is not the exclusive domain of military affairs.

Question: As you are one of the leading experts on security studies, we would like to add a general and practical question to the list. Since 9/11, terrorism has been a new threat to national and international security. When a terrorist attack happens anywhere in the world, most anti-terrorist/terrorism speeches emphasize that it is an attack on our way of life (as President Bush said in his historical speech just after 9/11). In this sense, do you agree or not

on if said that security has always been considered as a whole package including military, social, individual, political, and so on?

Michael Williams: Here, too, I think a little conceptual clarity can be helpful. I agree that security is and always has been part of a "whole package" ranging across social orders in different ways in different times and places. What is equally important, I think, is the relationship between security and risk. Risk as a general characteristic of social life relies on individuals doing numerous things that are dangerous such as driving in a car (road accidents which kill 1.3 million people globally each year) but that fall under the category of "acceptable risks," even if they are more likely to be deadly threats to the average individual than activities that are treated in extreme "security" terms, such as terrorism, risks evoke a different set of emotions, calculation, and political responses, though in absolute terms this may outweigh the mortal or existential threat of security politics.

One of the most important and interesting dimensions of contemporary politics is thus the way that risk and security are related, sometimes staying separate (as in driving a car needing to be seen as an acceptable risk for social and economic life to continue) or becoming part of a continuum where risk and security are linked in a process of intensification and de-intensification, moving as an object of political contestation and policy between risk and security. Responses to terrorism illustrate this clearly. It also seems one of the most fascinating aspects of the COVID-19 situation, where different governments have had to try to modulate policy responses and public perceptions by constantly (and with no small difficulty) moving back and forth between logics and rhetoric of risk and security across the whole package of society, including daily activities they would not previously have considered intervening in. This will become an important issue in global politics in the future. If pandemics as cross-border issues requiring global responses become recurrent issues, the form and effectiveness of those responses will depend on how the politics of this risk-security nexus play out within and, crucially, across countries. As we discussed above, given the tight connections that exist between security, fear, and sovereignty, they are unlikely to be issues that can be handled at a technocratic level alone—however much governments may repeat the mantra of "trusting the science." If pandemics (or, equally importantly, fear of pandemics) become an ongoing feature of global politics, one can expect highly contentious debates within and across this domain of security politics, with potentially important implications for patterns of cooperation and conflict in inter-state relations in a wider sense.

Question: International human rights norms are quite influential in the domestic and foreign policies of most countries. Moreover, being a source of these norms has been giving a symbolic power to Europe and the West in general, which is working in internal and external security. However,

the ineffectiveness of the EU in international crisis (the refugee crisis, etc.) increases the doubts about Europe's commitments to human rights. Do you think that Europe has been losing the symbolic power and that also causing or would cause internal and external security issues?

Michael Williams: This is a remarkably complicated question. We can point to certain obvious factors, including shifting geopolitics, the rise of Asia in general and China in particular, and the lack of unity and will in the EU. However, I think there are other dynamics going on that are important to recognize. In historical terms, these ideas and values were not just normative values—they were forms of symbolic power. We shouldn't confuse this with them being narrowly instrumental or crudely manipulative. This doesn't capture how symbolic power works, which is through a process of shaping appropriate or legitimate forms of identity and conduct within a wider configuration of economic, military, cultural, and economic forces—forces that at the end of the Cold War aligned to give so-called "normative power Europe" a good deal of attraction and impact both within the EU and in the wider world. In this complex, "victory" in the Cold War, the idea of the democratic peace, and visions of the "end of history" were entwined with the dominance of the Atlantic alliance and the allure of joining its institutions, preeminently NATO and the EU.

To some degree, in Europe, the EU and NATO have been the victims of their own success in maintaining (contrary to some "realist" predictions) the unity of the continent and successfully enlarging their memberships over the past three decades. However, this has not been accompanied by the normative or cultural convergence the EU in particular had desired, foreseen, or (even worse) sometimes assumed. The challenges presented by "illiberal" members inside the institutions are the most obvious evidence of this failure. However, this should not be seen as simply a failure of will on behalf of the EU. It also reflects the rise and influence of significant counter-movements that have drawn on the economic and cultural dislocations associated with attempts to globalize liberal ideas and institutions, and that have developed increasingly sophisticated and effective attacks on them. My current research, for instance, is on the rise and impact of various forms of radical conservative ideas, movements, and policies that systematically attempt to counter the forms of liberal power operating in the EU and try to build alternatives to it. There are a wide variety of such movements across the world—including in the United States, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Brazil, and even in Turkey. Sometimes linked in loose networks, they received an important boost from the election of President Trump but go well beyond it. These movements are important, I think, because they represent explicit, systematic challenges to the liberal international order, its institutions, and its forms of power. This reflects more than just a lack of will or unity on the part of the EU or the Atlantic powers:

it represents a reaction against them and is connected to wider geopolitical shifts. The ways in which these dynamics play out over the next decade will be an important part of determining the shape of the emerging world order.

Question: As you know, as a stage of securitization theory, you have reconsidered the concept of "extraordinary" in one of your latest articles in 2015, titled "Securitization as political theory: The politics of the extraordinary." Your paper has a theoretical feature, but we would like to ask you a question regarding practice. Could you please tell us what you would say if somebody claimed that the increased number of conflicts all over the world is proving that extraordinary politics is already in place?

Michael Williams: Security as the politics of the extraordinary has always been with us. Although it can seem that this kind of politics is on the increase, we also have to balance this perception against the fact that global awareness of extraordinary politics has never been higher. The sheer volume of information, often connected to the "spectacular" dynamics of modern media, means that it is necessary to be cautious about seeing an explosion of extraordinary politics, though this does not mean that its prevalence is not a matter of concern. Also, of course, we need to remember that extraordinary politics is not always negative: the breaking of existing norms that it implies can be a source of progress, even if its potential for violence needs always to be kept in mind.

It seems to me that the greater explosion of extraordinary politics in a negative sense may lie in the risk-security domain, where we see a proliferation of exceptional measures that are less spectacular, more subtle, and un-coordinated, but that result in the increasing intrusion of marginally exceptional, unspectacular, and thus less visible and legally and democratically accountable, political practices across the globe.

Question: We really do not want to lose an opportunity to get as many insights as from you, and before ending the interview, we would like to ask you if there is an issue we missed asking about but you think it is paramount. If there is, could you please tell us about it as closing comments?

Michael Williams: I think I have probably said enough! Thanks for your excellent questions—and your remarkable patience.

CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR NICHOLAS ONUF

Question: Before starting the interview, would you allow me to ask about your career adventure. You are known as one of the founding fathers of constructivism in IR. We wonder how and when did you decide to work on it? Any memories would be appreciated.

Nicholas Onuf: Early in my scholarly career, I had focused on theoretical issues in International Law, including the time-honored question,

Is international law truly law? I paid particular attention to the sources of international law, and thus to the underlying criteria of the effectiveness and validity of sources as legal rules themselves. By the late 1970s, I had distilled my understanding of the relevant processes into this formula: Law is what lawyers say it is, and that goes most conspicuously for international law and international lawyers. Looking back, one can see this sociological stance as inchoately constructivist.

While I worked on theoretical issues in International Law, I also devoted a great deal of attention to theory in the field of IR, then dominated by political realists, who had little or no respect for international law and international institutions, despite the conceptually sophisticated work of younger liberal scholars, such as Stanley Hoffman, Ernst Haas, Joseph Nye, Robert Keohane, John Ruggie, and Oran Young. Although I counted myself in this camp, by the 1970s, I had become disenchanted with liberal ideas about institutional progress, integration, and reform, not to mention disciplinary parochialism, and I seriously explored Western Marxist social theory. In particular, I came to appreciate the pervasiveness of domination in human affairs. I also sought to reconcile the evident materiality of the human condition with the equally evident subjectivity of human experience—a philosophical issue Marxism brings to the fore, but realism misconstrues, and liberalism wrongly writes off. I realized that society is the necessary middle-term in this equation and then that language is indispensable means by which society mediates material existence and human experience, in the process making society what it is.

In the 1980s, I immersed myself in the postmodern movement, with an emphasis on the so-called "linguistic turn." Wittgenstein, Foucault, and Habermas variously stimulated my conceptual awareness. At the same time, my feminist doctoral students pushed me to think about the social content of taken-for-granted concepts like gender. Drawing on my earlier work on rules (norms by another name), I gradually worked out a system of relations between kinds of performative speech (assertions, orders, promises), kinds of rules (instruction-rules, directive-rules, commitment-rules), and conditions of rule (domination reconceptualized as hegemony, hierarchy, heteronomy) applicable to every society, including international society.

A decade of work came to fruition in 1989 with the publication of *World of Our Making*, in which I used the term *constructivism* to characterize what was distinctive and important about the undertaking. The book's subtitle, *Rules and Rules in Social Theory and International Relations*, points to the joint emphasis on rules grounded in language and rule operationalized through rules. Most readers then and since have picked up on the importance of rules for social construction, but not on the importance of rule, even in an allegedly anarchic international society. This response hardly surprised me, since many younger scholars, especially in the US, were looking for ways

to reconceptualize liberal institutionalism after the Cold War ended. By the time scholars elsewhere began to explore constructivism grounded in language, Western Marxism had faded away, poststructuralists were fetishizing Carl Schmitt, and my emphasis on conditions of rule failed to resonate. I am happy to report that there is now a renewed interest in rule—hierarchy, most of all—but it is little influenced by what I had to say more than thirty years ago. Not that I was surprised.

Question: In one of your book chapters, "Constructivism: A User's Manual," you state that "All the ways in which people deal with rules—whether we follow the rules or break them, whether we make the rules, change them, or get rid of them—may be called practices." Based on this making and developing rules, could you please evaluate the process works, from people to IR?

Nicholas Onuf: People cannot be dissociated, practically or conceptually, from the social arrangements that enable them to act in, and upon, the world. Everyone is an agent, however limited in degree; everyone's world, however confined, is replete with institutions, manifest in rules instructing them in what to expect, directing them what to do, and securing their complicity in what is going to happen. Agency itself is a function of rules conferring specific statuses, offices, and roles on designated human persons, thereby authorizing, or empowering, such persons to act on behalf of some agent or institution—including oneself. By metaphorical extension, an institution, on behalf of which designated agents are authorized to act, is itself an agent or person. In this respect, a state (such as Turkey) is an institution and has personality in international law; the state's agents act on behalf of the state acting on behalf of the state's constituent population—including those agents of the state; such agents themselves constitute an institutional complex routinely called a government.

Let me use myself as an example of how to put this frame of reference to use. I am an elderly male scholar. These three statuses (among many others) assure that many other agents listen to me and secure me considerable respect. I am a citizen of the United States who pays taxes and votes. These duties derive from a state-authorized office and give me a small place at the bottom of a so-called chain of command. I hold legal rights and duties equally held by other agents (for example, the right to sign a valid contract under municipal law combined with a duty to carry out the terms of that contract, the right to speak freely under the US Constitution, the "right to life, liberty and security of person" stipulated in article three of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). Because my rights constitute others' duties, and their rights my duties, we all have comparable roles in relation to each other. This is the case at every level of social relations, as most scholars would put it; I would prefer to say, in every substantive domain of social relations. Formalized in

the principle of sovereign equality, the same logic of rights and duties holds for such states as Turkey and the United States in their relations.

In the case of states like Turkey and the US, their formal relations as equals *constitute* what I have been calling international society. For the most part, government agents organized into chains of command conduct these relations; scholars in the field of IR give most of their attention to these agents and their relations. There are, however, other domains of relations to bear in mind. Obviously, states' authorized agents often fail to treat each other as equals in their substantive relations, and they call on a wide variety of resources (materialized through rules), including other kinds of agents, to achieve their goals. To the (considerable) extent that states benefit disproportionately from their access to other domains over lengthy periods of time, and this access is effectuated through a mighty assemblage of rules, the result is a condition of rule *within* international society.

It follows then that *some* of my statuses, offices, and roles fall into the substantive domain we conventionally call IR because they bear on how states act (and agents function) in relation to other states (and their agents). Thus, my status as a scholar means that when I give an interview, what I am saying may reach the ears of agents more directly empowered to act on behalf of states; those agents may even treat me as a resource. That I am a theorist works against my relevance to what goes on in the name of IR, because most people in government think theory is too abstract to help them in their day-to-day conduct. Consider this interview a case in point.

Before I retired as a professor and thus as an academic officer with the power to assign grades and determine futures, I had some direct impact on students who were themselves state agents or would become state agents. Since then, *most* of the statuses, offices, and roles making me a person, a social being, do not fall into the substantive domain of IR, at least most of the time. This is obviously true for *most* people. By contrast, some offices—for example, the presidency of Turkey or the United States—guarantee that the acts of incumbent officers and many of their designated subordinates fall within the substantive domain of IR most of the time.

I should also point out that the boundaries between domains are porous. Metaphorically speaking, dams always leak; floods occasionally spill over them. To illustrate the point, a merchant in Wuhan's wet market rightfully selling meat is performing a role, and the customer whose duty it is to pay for the meat at an agreed price is performing a complementary role. We can safely say that this transaction has no relevance to IR. Yet billions of routine transactions like this make China's economy what it is, and China's economy is a resource that agents of the Chinese state use in their relations with agents of other states. Once in a great while, a routine transaction in one domain unexpectedly overwhelms other domains. Recently an utterly routine

transaction in Wuhan's wet market unleashed a virus that has had devastating repercussions all over the world, many of them obviously relevant to IR.

It should be clear that, theoretically speaking, a rule-oriented frame of reference applies to *all* social relations. It is not, however, a theory. It does not make substantive generalizations about *any* domain of social relations. Nor does it indicate how, or when, domains affect each other substantively or come to be seen as separate and autonomous.

Question: States are also what people have made throughout history, but sometimes they could go for a domestic or a foreign policy that people do not agree with. Could you please explain two ways of construction either in domestic or foreign policies?

Nicholas Onuf: Implicit in this question is what I would call a methodological concern. To use a familiar formula, constructivists have long insisted that agents and structures are co-constitutive. In this context, *Agents* are usually construed as human individuals (despite what I say above*); structure* is a notional property of systems (hence I prefer *institution*, which, like agents, are rule-defined). The standard language of agents and structures reproduces the so-called level of analysis problem—an ontological issue with methodological implications. Does one start an inquiry at the unit level or the aggregate? With the state or the system of states? With agents' choices or the system's constraints? Does one add things up and break them down, piece by piece, or does one embrace the whole? The first way leads to descriptively rich case studies favored by students of foreign policy, while the second way leads to abstract generalizations, or theories, about the ways that structurally differentiated kinds of systems work.

Constructivists say there is a third way. The co-constitution of agents and structures is a *process*; constitution is also a *condition*, a snapshot of the state of social relations, at any given moment; social reality is never fixed or constant. Thus, we can start with process, which would seem to imply that we seek to identify ever-changing causal sequences. Methodologically, this is tricky business, all the more because the causal sequences run in both directions: agents make structures what they are; structures make agents what they are. And it is here that many constructivists are defeated by the conceptual complexity of their constructions, to the point of claiming that constitutive processes cannot be broken down into their causal constituents (Alexander Wendt is an example).

In my view, this stance is simply wrong. Even if causal sequences demarcate change by definition (a change in X causes a change in Y), converging causal sequence can offset rather than reinforce changes in both sequences, and they frequently do; sites of multiple convergences appear to be stable from an observer's perspective; the sand on a beach change constantly even as the beach looks pretty much the same day after day. If we talk about *function*

(processes oriented toward some end), then complexity is even greater, along with stable patterns of causal relations. And we must talk about function if we are going to talk about social relations. We do just this whenever we use the language of doing, using, making, or working.

Rules encapsulate, actualize, effectuate this kind of language—language that fulfills the potential of modal auxiliaries. Rules say: This is where (when, how) we (you, they) *can* (*should*, *must*) do (use, make) such and so; this is what may (*can*, *would*) happen if you do not. All the ways in which people deal with rules—'whether we follow the rules or break them, whether we make the rules, change them, or get rid of them'—are constitutive processes, mediating human choice and institutional constraints. Every time an agent follows a rule (or breaks it), the rule itself is strengthened (or weakened) for the next agent who chooses to follow that rule (or not); the rule is never simply there, despite appearances. To summarize, rules harness causation; they do not replace it. Co-constitutive processes turn *ought* into *is*, and *is* into *ought*, if only for a time. As rules, institutionalized *oughts* carry the weight of rule.

Please note: I haven't dealt with the best way to conceptualize *policy* in this response. But see *Making Sense, Making Worlds*, chapter seven. As for my take on "oughtness" and normativity, see my *International Legal Theory*, chapter 28.

Question: From a constructivist perspective, the anarchic nature of IR is also constructed, and it is distinctive from chaos. Defining states as sovereign means they do not have to abide by someone else's rules, but post-structuralists, neorealists, and neoliberals emphasize the international order, political and economic conditions and claim that they do not leave options but abiding specific rules. Could you please elaborate on the difference between the international conditionality and construction of these certain conditions? Thus, what makes constructivism a separate IR theory might be revealed.

Nicholas Onuf: I have dealt with the question of the force of rules (the extent to which agents feel compelled to do what rules say) in my response to the previous question—though briefly. The normative force of rules is such that we follow them most of the time *ceteris paribus*. We, as agents, choose to do so because we benefit materially and subjectively. (Not actively choosing is a choice; the term *follow* allows for this ambiguity.) We internalize rules and follow them reflexively; we even follow rules we learned as children instructing us to follow the rules. Agents can always choose not to follow any given rule in any given circumstance, try to change the rule, and so on, always in anticipation of the consequences stipulated by rules complementing the rule in question. Sovereign states routinely abide by most of the rules they have collectively constructed for themselves—not just the formal

rules they call international law, but also a large variety of informal rules that "work" for them.

Realists like to emphasize the occasions in which states' agents choose not to abide by this or that rule, typically offering what they call compelling reasons for doing so. Who would deny that there are such occasions and that they matter a great deal? Liberal institutionalists emphasize the ordered pattern of social relations that emerge when agents follow thick blankets of rules that favor their joint needs and interests. Who would deny the extent of such ordered patterns in the social relations of every domain, including IR? Honoring a Marxist legacy, many poststructuralist and postcolonial scholars emphasize resistance to conditions of rule, given the asymmetric consequences of following rules-in-place. While the beneficiaries of standing social arrangements tend to resist resistance and counter violence with violence, who can deny that resistance results in new patterns of rules and altered conditions of rule? Constructivists can accommodate all such emphases, and their normative underpinnings, because the kind of rule-oriented constructivism I have endorsed in this interview is not a theory (as I pointed out above), and it does not require any particular normative stance to justify its use as a frame of reference.

Question: Following your footsteps in constructivism, there have been many studies working on constructivist agents ranging from individuals, social movements, and elites to international organizations. Do you think that these studies are in favor of constructivism or just going around the core assumption that value-centered people are making our world? I am asking this because most of them imply and try to prove that constructivism is a separate IR theory.

Nicholas Onuf: As I suggested earlier, many self-styled constructivists are liberal institutionalists in disguise. They are disposed to valorize the individuality and autonomy of every human being, operationalized as freedom of choice. I have already pointed out that this so-called "right" is simultaneously a duty; right and duties together limit choice and foster the condition of rule I call heteronomy. Some relatively few, materially well-endowed societies are liberal in this sense, but they are also institutionalized as, and protected by, territorially demarcated chains of offices (states). By virtue of comparable rules (stipulating sovereign equality), states themselves constitute a heteronomous society; by implication, realists share with liberals a common perspective on "anarchic" international society; they differ in the degree to which they believe that anarchy/heteronomy in international society meets planetary needs.

As deep-down liberal institutionalists, many self-styled constructivists do not think that heteronomy should operate unhindered, and they often favor functionally delimited offices ('international regimes') to assure a modicum

of cooperation in providing public goods. They also advocate rules generalizing human rights, again supported by offices. There is little consistency in these initiatives, which liberals justify in the name of pluralism and constructivists implicitly acknowledge by shifting emphasis from legal rules to informal norms. If there is any theory to this brand of constructivism, it's the old liberal argument that peace and prosperity are co-constitutive.

Question: I know that you have been looking at constructivism from a theoretical perspective, but would you please allow me to ask a question that might contain a practical perspective. It is about the discussion of shaking pillars of liberal international order. States' intervention in the market, the refugee crisis, lack of cooperation for global issues, etc., all these are believed to be menacing the order. If you agree with this discussion, how would you respond to it through constructivism prism? If you do not, why?

Nicholas Onuf: I have already addressed the character of the so-called international order and its liberal premises (your pillars, I think) from a constructivist perspective. To address the challenges now "shaking" that order, it is necessary to comment on capitalism as a system for accumulating wealth, building physical plants, extracting resources, marshaling technical skills, producing valued goods, encouraging the consumption of those same goods, and disposing of the waste from all of these activities. Capitalism is social construction on a colossal scale; its (re)generative properties are unprecedented in human history; its concentration of wealth in ever-fewer hands terrifying; its dependence on unfettered liberalism and the support of states made wealthy through capitalism is all too obvious. Capital has made the modern world what it is; its agents, its uses, its imperatives have eventuated in a materially integrated, socially (functionally and territorially) differentiated, utterly vulnerable system of social relations from which none of us can escape.

Constructivism encourages us to think about social relations first by reference to processes accounting for relatedness and then by reference to differentiated densities of relations—and *their* relations. We often use the language of systems (and their structures, functions, processes, and boundaries) when we do so, but we should always remember that systems are observers' constructs that take on the properties of social constructions (rules, agents, institutions, resources) when observers, as agents, act on, and thereby actualize, what they think they see. I think it is conceptually useful to think of capitalism as a system that is sufficiently autonomous (from an observer's point of view) that large changes in it have cascading effects on the totality of social relations making up the modern world.

In my view, capitalism has run its course. Its generative power, manifest in centuries of exponential material growth, has finally exceeded the carrying capacity of the planet. We have run out of cheap technological fixes. We have

already begun to a trajectory of exponential downgrowth. Social unrest will increase dramatically. Desperate state agents will join forces with functional experts to authorize digital surveillance, mind-numbing entertainments, and the pharmaceutical pacification of noisy, unhappy publics.

Dystopian novels have pointed to this eventuality for decades. Climate change is so widely seen as the large cause for this systemic crisis and impending collapse that any additional "theorizing" would seem to be superfluous. A constructivist perspective encourages observers to think of themselves as agents capable of bringing about major changes, but that perspective also makes it clear how difficult it will be to carry off such changes. Because the liberal international order was constructed by innumerably many agents to foster and then manage growth, not decline, that order is now part of the problem, and not one easily remedied.

Question: Leading norms or as you prefer to call it "rules" in the world has had western origins. Relying on your answer to the previous question, do you believe that any alternative leading norms or rules are being constructed anywhere in the world?

Nicholas Onuf: My answer to the previous question drew attention to the scale and exigencies of "the modern world." Thanks to relentless capital-driven globalization, the characteristic rules of modern social life have permeated every society on the planet; No village-dotted countryside is exempt; Turkish society is an obvious case in point. Yet traditional ways have not disappeared, even in self-styled modern societies. In my view, the hallmark of any traditional society is the importance of status in the conferral of agency, instruction-rules emphasizing appearances, decorum, and honor, and institutionalized status-ordering as the primary modality of rule. We, the beneficiaries of modernity (I, my interviewers, many readers) think we have put tradition behind us. We are deceiving ourselves.

A stagnant economy and increasingly concentrated wealth in my own society seem to have prompted the revival or invention of tradition; "Make America Great Again" is a revealing slogan. Yet, in my view, even more important is the rise of institutions assigned specialized tasks, the proliferation of expertise, and status-ordering of experts by reference to credentials, specialties, employers, and honors, all allegedly keyed to achievement rather than ascription. This is modernist hegemony. Because it appears to be socially progressive, problem-oriented, and relatively blind to traditional ascription by way of race, gender, and family ties, it is much favored by those who seek an alternative to the remnants of tradition now erupting everywhere. I would suggest that functional administration may well suit a world in decline, but it is hardly free of status preoccupations. Achievement becomes indistinguishable from traditional modes of ascription—anywhere, everywhere.

Question: I hope you forgive me because of one more question about the practical world. Based on your life experience and theoretical expertise, could you give us a particular example that constructivism provides a better and meaningful explanation but other mainstream theories do not or fall short?

Nicholas Onuf: There is a division of labor, so to speak, in the field of IR. Realists own "high politics," liberal internationalists own "low politics." Poststructuralists have assumed ownership of critique from Marxists. Feminists, environmentalists, public health specialists, and scholars focusing on refugees, immigration, terrorism, cyberwarfare, and intelligence: All these and more have carved out substantive domains for themselves, as did regional specialists at an earlier time. There is no real estate not accounted for—no turf to which constructivists could assert a compelling ownership claim. This state of affairs does not trouble me at all, because the kind of constructivism I have outlined here finds purchase anywhere in the field and enhances any and all theoretical orientations. It does the most clearly by reminding scholars that change is constant in social relations everywhere, but that rates and patterns of change are not. Scholars in the field failed to anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union, but this event sparked some young scholars to take an interest in constructivism, which was just then undergoing its early, important development in the field.

Question: Decolonization waves, nationalist independence movements, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have caused the emergence of new states. Most of them became the center of national, regional, and then international conflicts, such as Latin American, African, Middle Eastern, and Balkan states. Do you think that it is because of that they do not have their own historical and indigenous rules and systemic values? Your focus on agents creating rules and rules, creating new rules, and social institutions or constitutions being created might bring an explanation to this question.

Nicholas Onuf: One might think an emphasis on rules and rule would preclude any sustained consideration of conflict. It should be clear by now that I do not share this sentiment. Conflict is a ruled activity; rules often collide; violence is rarely random. In this interview, I have elaborated on the many ways in which rules impede change, foster change, and change themselves in the process. Often rules seem not to change at all, but, as I have argued, this is an illusion. Often, in aggregate, rules seem to change slowly or at regularized intervals, and this is what liberal democrats want to see. Less often, rules meet with sustained, massive resistance. Newly empowered agents replace rules with new ones, and therefore new conditions of rule, on such a scale that observers speak of revolutions.

After the Second World War, the collapse of the old imperial order combined with globalization has been just such a revolution (or sequence

of overlapping revolutions). One especially useful way to sketch out this revolution is to map shifting sites of agency, and their relation to surviving patterns of rules (and conditions of rule). I have always been interested in the interpenetration of global and local elites—this is an interest brought on by dependency theory many decades ago. As a constructivist, I would now formulate the process of reciprocal value-penetration as co-constitutive. It has eventuated in what I regard as a revolutionary constitutive development. The global elite now consists of mobile, globalized local elites, all of whom share in a condition of rule (modernist hegemony effectuated locally and globally through functional administrative apparatuses) alienating them from local norms and resurgent localized agency. I am talking about *us*, our values, our nostalgia for lost worlds, as we rule this world to suit ourselves.

Question: The last question is going to be about the recent coronavirus crisis in the world? There are already opinion pieces about the post-COVID-19 world in economic and political terms. What would you think about it? Does this global pandemic construct a new way of protectionist thinking and practices in IR?

Nicholas Onuf: I have already suggested that the capitalist world economy has reached its apex and begun a downward trajectory that may turn into a collapse. The pandemic is certain to trigger a deep economic depression on a global scale, from which recovery may not be possible. At the same time, large numbers of adversely affected people will blame state agents and functional elites in every domain for mismanaging the pandemic and its socio-economic consequences. This is a recipe for a downward spiral: co-constituted publics become ever more battered and enraged; agents empowered to solve worsening problems on every scale fail again and again to turn things around.

At worst: Rules will be subject to rapid change and may lose some of the normative force we take for granted; conditions of rule will be unstable; material welfare will decline drastically; domains of social relations will lose the institutional-functional properties by which we identify them; territorially defined states will crash and burn; IR will disappear into a chaos of increasingly localized social relations; warlords will fight it out over large swaths of the earth, as they have so often in the past.

At best: Climate change will have been arrested; material scarcity will dominate daily lives; fewer people will live fewer years; democracies will break down, but modest republics may take shape here and there; modernity will be forgotten, never to be repeated.

Question: We would like to thank you for the sincere answers and would like to have your closing comments since it is not possible to cover everything in a short interview.

Nicholas Onuf: I am grateful for the opportunity, the privilege, of responding to your thoughtful questions in a way that, I hope, honors the intelligence

of your readers. In my answers, I have not indulged my ongoing interest in providing constructivism with suitably robust philosophical foundations. Instead, I have tried to link constructivism to another longstanding interest of mine, which is the unfolding of the modern world over five centuries. My most recent book treats these two interests as converging projects, although the book says relatively about constructivism as an explicit frame of reference. In this interview, I have tried to remedy this oversight, at least with respect to the world situation as I see it today. As I wind down my scholarly career, this interview may indeed be my last stab at making sense of the world we have made for ourselves—the modern world.

CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR PETER M. HAAS

Question: Before getting into the questions, if you do not mind, could you please share some of your memories that shaped your academic career and approach to IR?

Peter M. Haas: I grew up in an academic household. My father raised me with an appreciation of history. My salient memory from college and graduate school was receiving the advice that the environment was not a major element of IR. I hope I've proven them wrong.

The most significant eureka moment was when I was conducting my dissertation fieldwork around the Mediterranean. I had pretty much been trained as a historical materialist and expected to find that country's concerns mirrored their exposure to marine pollution. My initial interviews, luckily, turned me into a constructivist when the response from environment ministers to my questions about their understandings of the environmental problems facing their country was "I don't know, what do you think?" So, I realized that problems had to be framed and interpreted, they weren't obvious.

Question: Your research history shows that your focus on the concept of "epistemic communities" is extremely high, and also your case studies on how epistemic communities can construct internationally common policies either on environmental issues or potential conflicts. Based on your theoretical approach with the concept of the international order, how would you evaluate the US's reluctance to be a part of global environmental issues in the last couple of years?

Peter M. Haas: While top-level US pronouncements—particularly withdrawing from Paris and the current WHO shaming—run in the face of expert consensus, lower-level decision making in the United States remains informed by ecological norms and understandings. Midlevel scientists in the EPA and Commerce Departments continue to try to issue evidence-based assessments of global warming.

The analytic crux shaping adherence to global norms and expectations rests on domestic level professional recruitment. The most worrisome element of current US politics is the hollowing out of the professional bureaucracy.

Question: This question might be too recent to have an answer, but we are still eager to ask. As you know, Italy and Spain have been complaining about the deficiency of medical assistance from the EU in their severe fight against the coronavirus. Moreover, this issue has been turned into a question of the EU's dedications to its member states in case of an emergency. How would you think that global and regional (in the European sense) affect the EU's commitments to become a political unity, especially after the Brexit process?

Peter M. Haas: We have two things going on here. Brexit is an ideologically driven reaction to European Integration. Concerns about the EU's administrative performance in responding to COVID-19 has the effect of undermining the legitimacy of the institution's ability to help EU members, and citizens. Both make the future of the EU more difficult, although we do know that the history of European Integration is halting, path-dependent, and rests on public support for its consolidation.

Question: Your understanding of international order has more or less constructivist perspectives, but you mostly focus on issues, which have a feature of transcending the national borders. That might enforce states to comply with international institutions. In one of your articles, you seem to solve this issue with the existence of the hegemonic powers. If they are doing this thanks to the epistemic community, the rest of them will follow their paths. What do you think if somebody claims that your perspective might work in a bipolar world system or under a hegemonic power but might not work under multi-hegemonic power structure in the world, as in the case of China and the US? This question stands if you agree that China is a hegemonic power.

Peter M. Haas: This is a mistaken realist reading of my work. Hegemonic powers may be instrumental in distributing epistemic understandings, but all powers require guidance as to how to recognize and pursue their interest under conditions of complexity and uncertainty. With the spread of interdependence, such conditions are now widespread and widely recognized.

China and the United States are now major powers who enjoy some degree of parity. Neither is hegemonic in the classic sense of being able to unilaterally exercise primacy across issue areas. We simply don't yet know what motivates Chinese foreign policy and whether they will serve as a revolutionary or status-quo major power.

Question: In "Rules to Goals: Emergence of New Governance Strategies for Sustainable Development," you claim that there is a transformation from rule-based international governance to governance [global, if I may] through goals. Could you please reevaluate what lead all of you to come up with the argument?

Peter M. Haas: This piece focuses on the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. The interesting thing about them, for our perspective, is that these goals are purely aspirational with no means of enforcement beyond a tote board associated with the extent to which governments and IOs reach those goals. Thus, we focused on the reasons for establishing goals rather than rules, and the possible consequences of new holistic norms for global governance.

Question: In one of the book chapters you wrote in 2017, you remind the people of IR that epistemic communities do not and do not have to always agree on specific issues but sometimes get different propositions to the international issues. You have summarized this with the concepts of contestation and consensus, but they both can get popularly support, and that is a part of the policymaking process on which epistemic communities are influential. In either way, if it is bad or good, manipulated or straightforward, would you consider this process ending with a policy as a part of the construction of a policy?

Peter M. Haas: Consensus always masks some degree of agreement and contestation. But epistemic communities tend to agree about what their consensus and disagreements, as well as most importantly the process by which contestation operates. Outside the expect communities any degree of contestation is seen to undermine consensus claims, rather than merely establishing some parameters for the consensus.

I have looked at some of the institutional features which allow epistemic communities to reliably deliver their advice to decision-makers. More recently I have been working on the narratives which are used to critique and justify the use of expert advice at the UN, in particular how to elevate discussions about consensus formation and contestation so that decision-makers may better understand knowledge cumulation.

Question: There has already been a tremendous number of comments on post-COVID-19 world order or affairs, but we believe you are one of them whose answers might be seen as the most reliable. Would you please share your thoughts on post-COVID-19 world politics? Would it cause more cooperation or devastation as several countries are preparing legal complaints against China?

Peter M. Haas: Clearly, there are lots of deaths due to bungled responses to COVID-19. There will surely be some interesting comparative work relating domestic politics to COVID-19 responses. China and the WHO are currently being targeted by the United States for contributing to the rapid spread of the virus, but those chickens will surely come home to roost when the international community looks back at the US experience.

Because we simply don't know the trajectory of the virus, it is pointless to speculate deeply at this point about the future of the world order. As we know from responses to systemic shocks, the international community can either drop the ball (the 1930s) or respond collectively and effectively (the post-Second World War liberal world order). I would imagine that the WHO's reputation will suffer, although Chinese behavior is consistent with prior behavior. A deeper concern is about the wider spread loss of support for multilateral institutions, including the WHO, UN, and WTO. There may well be a large transfer of responsibility for health care delivery to NGOs.

We would like to thank you for your sincere answers.

CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR RICHARD SAKWA

Question: Let me start with introductory questions. Could you please tell us about your personal background, where you grew up and went to high school, your degrees and how you ended up being a student of IR, and what were the cornerstone events or times that directed you to this end? Furthermore, what was the academic climate during your student years? Who were the intellectual influences on your thinking during those years?

Richard Sakwa: I was born in Norfolk, England, in rather interesting circumstances. My father was a reservist officer in the Polish Army before the war, and in the end, after the defeat escaped to Palestine and joined General Anders' Second Corp, which fought with the British Eighth Army in El Alamein, Tobruk, Sicily, Monte Casino and all the way up Italy to Bologna. At that point, as the war came to an end the whole mass of soldiers expected to take a train over the Alps back to Poland. However, that was not to be. Stories filtered back about what was going on. For example, my uncle Tadeusz (which is my middle name) served with the Home Army, and their unit leader managed to survive five years of German occupation, but he surfaced near Lublin in late 1944 and was promptly shot by the NKVD. In the end, my father, who by then had married my mother who was part of the French community in Alexandria, ended up as a refugee in England. They had planned to emigrate to Argentina and had even bought a plot of land in Santa Rosa on the River Plate, but the night before they were due to sail a mine bobbed into Alexandria harbor and damaged the ship. After living briefly in the shabby and war-damaged London the family took up a small farm in Norfolk. Hence my early years were shaped by war, an inadequate post-war settlement, displacement, and contingency. What if the mine had not damaged the ship? I would have ended up speaking Spanish and defending Las Malvinas, instead of supporting the rights of the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands.

After Vladislav Gomulka was installed as Polish leader after 1956, contacts were reestablished with the family. It was my job to cut the pages of the magazines that came from Poznan, and I remember the distinctive smell of the paper and pictures of the rebuilding of Warsaw. My cultural milieu was Polish and French, and only marginally English. My father told various stories of the war, including a meeting with the Pope on his way up Italy.

The family moved to London in the mid-1960s, a time of rapid cultural and political change. My abiding memory of those times was the anti-Vietnam War movement, including the demonstrations outside the US embassy in Grosvenor Square. This certainly helped to consolidate my view that US hegemony is far from a peaceful endeavor, and hence later when it was rebranded as the "liberal international order" I came to it with a certain skepticism.

This was the period of the Harold Wilson Labour government, which raised fundamental questions about how social democracy could work. The harsh response to the dock workers' strike struck me at the time. There was also the program of establishing comprehensive schools, abolishing the exam at eleven, which determined the fate of generations of schoolchildren. While clearly laudable, I personally could not but regret the abolition of Ealing Grammar School for Boys. I caught the tail end of the Victorian ethos of prefects and the rest of it, but also the culture of learning and debate. I was elected, as part of the 1960s wave of social change, chair of the Sixth Form Common Room, and worked to "democratize" the school. I also spoke at the Old Ealonians association, crossing the generations and respecting traditions. It was a shame to see the old school go and with it some fine traditions.

When I entered the London School of Economics in 1972, the old protest and hippie generation dominated. I remember having to cut my way through the substance smoke in St Clements in my first weeks there. I soon learned, though, that the school was not as radical as its image suggests, but it was great to study History there.

On graduation, I had no idea what to do. To earn some money, I worked in the Renault plant in Park Royal. One evening after work in October 1975, I happened to reach out to my Teach Yourself Russian book, which I had happened to buy years earlier, and as it happened, in the book was the cutting from the Sunday Times advertising the Master's degree in Russian Studies at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Birmingham. I applied and was awarded not only a place but a full Social Science Research Council (as it was then called) scholarship. Contingency again, or was everything determined by all that came before?

My first trip to the Soviet Union in August 1977 was as part of an exchange agreement with the Maurice Thorez Institute of Foreign Languages in Moscow. The language teaching was poor, since the main teachers were

at their dachas, but the trip was enough to glimpse an alternative society made up of failed hopes and enduring aspirations. We stayed in the House of Students and Graduates (DAS), built in the 1950s as an experiment in communal living, but now thick with cockroaches and faded dreams.

This was the era of Eurocommunism. In that framework, in 1978, we organized the Communist University of London, to which we invited a representative of the CPSU Central Committee. One of our key speakers Oliver Macdonald (Peter Gowan) noted that this was the first time since 1926 that a Trotskyist debated with a representative of the Soviet system.

In 1979, I started what turned out to be nearly three years in Moscow, first as a graduate student at Moscow State University and then as a language editor at Mir Science and Technology Publishers. It's hard to believe today when a three-hour flight is considered excessive, but no one minded taking five days to get there by boat from Tilbury—the T. S. Baltika, which Khrushchev had sailed on to get to New York in October 1960 to bang his shoe in the UN.

The academic climate there was deeply frozen, but with an undercurrent of critique and innovation. The debate about alternatives was as live there, mostly in so-called dissident circles but also in some of the institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Back in the UK, the debate continued, precisely at the time when Mrs. Thatcher declared that there was no alternative. The peace movement mobilized against the deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles. This was followed by the excitement of perestroika and Gorbachev's reforms. The INF Treaty of 1987 put an end to the missile question for a generation, although now with the demise of INF it may well be back.

This, of course, is the larger pattern. The so-called revolutions of 1989 proved successful in terms of nation-building and the restoration of an order of independent states in central and eastern Europe, but they failed to transform the structures of the Cold War in which these state-building endeavors were located. This is why we are now facing elements of a Second Cold War, built out of the failure to transform the structures of the first.

Question: Let us make a comparison between the Ukraine and the Syrian crises. Is there any distinctiveness between Russian approaches to these conflicts areas in terms of ethnic involvement? I mean how does Russia conceptualize foreign ethnicities in far away and relative ethnicities close to the mainland at the national and international level?

Richard Sakwa: I am not sure that ethnicity is the key element in these crises. In his Crimean "reunification" speech about of March 18, 2014, Putin certainly spoke of the "Russian World" and the protection of threatened Russian communities, but the key dynamic was not ethnic but geostrategic, and this also applies to Syria.

Question: To be specific, how do Russian foreign policymakers locate Marxist-Leninist PKK/PYD in Syria and Muslim Tatars in Crimea?

Richard Sakwa: Russian state-building and foreign policy since 1991 has not been shaped by issues of ethnic determination, for good or all. Having faced the Chechen insurgency at home and as a matter of general principle, Russia is more concerned with legitimacy and state integrity than with questions of national self-determination. The intervention in Ukraine was determined by political issues and strategic concerns, and in my view was defensive. The Crimean Tatars are treated like any other national minority within Russia, with the Tatar language in Crimea one of the three official languages (along with Russian and Ukrainian). No doubt more could be done to promote Tatar cultural and economic development, but there have been certain achievements. However, as in the rest of the country, Putinite "soft authoritarianism" stifles independent political media and other forms of political expression, a situation exacerbated by the exiled Tatar leaders in Kiev. I personally very much regret the closure of the Tatar ATR television station. I was very impressed with the quality of their journalism and the responsibility of their correspondents when I visited Crimea a year or so after reunification.

A similar dynamic applies when it comes to the Kurds in Syria. Russian intervention in September 2015 prevented Islamic State from taking Damascus and averted what no doubt would have been the slaughter of the historical peoples and religions that have made Syria such a rich cosmopolitan country for over two thousand years. Moscow's concern is with keeping the legitimate state authorities in power in Damascus and the country together. For understandable reasons the PYD allied with the US, and together they defeated some of the Daesh strongholds. In the end, it was inevitable that the Kurds would be cast to their fate. As always, they are victims of larger geopolitical machinations.

Today, with Russia and Turkey aligned politically and economically, but strategically in conflict in Syria and Libya, the Kurdish question from Moscow's perspective is very much secondary, although for Ankara it is a matter of primary concern.

Question: We would like to ask you about the so-called power diffusion from the West to the East. It may not be possible to cover the meaning of "the West or the East," but still, there has to be something in this conceptualization of power flow or diffusion from the West to the East. What are your thoughts about this argument?

Richard Sakwa: Both the West and the East are contested and differentiated concepts. Concerning the former, the "political West" is a construct of the Cold War, although, of course, the historical West has a far longer provenance. I rather prefer the term "Atlantic power system" to describe the US-led geopolitical construct that took shape after the Second World War. This is a combination of normative power and what could be called "dominion," the

power system at the heart of the Atlantic order. There is also the particular type of US-style capitalism that has come to predominate, even in the EU, in recent years. It is this Atlantic power system, which is currently disintegrating, and this can be seen as an opportunity for its component parts to take responsibility for their own fate and development, with battles and political conflicts to free them from the incubus of Cold War structures and ideologies. Above all, the changes allow us to think of the West as a cultural rather than a power phenomenon.

So, there are profound changes taking place, but it is rather simplistic to see the underlying process as simply one of a power transition in favor of the East. Of course, Asia is taking an increasing share of the global economy, and countries such as China are gaining in military power.

At the same time, Russia and Eurasia represent a third force. The gravamen of Putin's strategy is to develop a type of "heartland" politics to ensure that Russia and Eurasia as a whole retain a distinctive voice in international affairs. Putin is trying to avoid the region becoming a new "fracture zone," forced to choose between East and West, Beijing of Brussels/Washington.

Question: In recent years, the US has been militarily investing in Poland under the name of NATO while the EU has been in doubt of American endowment to the European security against Russia. If these phrases or comments sound right to you, would you agree with the idea that two rivals are against the third one? Or, as the US and the EU countries are consisting of NATO, does not sound robust?

Richard Sakwa: The tragedy of the post-Cold War era is the failure of the EU to develop genuinely as a center of sovereignty in global affairs. Belatedly, there is now talk of "strategic autonomy," some of it latterly forced by Washington under Donald J. Trump itself withdrawing from the Atlantic power system. Most European countries and leaders are at a loss, and even Macron's comments on the issue lack focus or strategic direction. Although he echoes some Gaullist themes, he is not the de Gaulle of our day. I am not sure that he really has a pan-continental European vision.

As for countries like Poland, they are the most ardent defenders of the Atlantic power system, and for them, the EU is a subsidiary benefit to the security guarantees offered by Washington. I fear that, as in the 1930s, the Polish elite become the instruments for their own destruction.

Question: Let me ask you a direct question of why Russia invades its neighbors? Do you have any plausible response to that question an academic would give?

Richard Sakwa: Russia does not invade its neighbors. The term is loaded and misleading. As the best analysts of the Russo-Georgian war of August 2008 note, there was a long prehistory, which was exacerbated by Saakashvili's speculation with the Atlantic power system, prompting him to

attack South Ossetia on August 7. The Russian response was defensive and then became offensive as a salutary warning. If Russia really did want to invade Georgia, Tbilisi would have fallen in hours rather than days.

As for Ukraine, as mentioned earlier, the intervention was defensive. Again, if this had been a real invasion, Kiev would have fallen very quickly. Regular forces intervened in August 2014 at Ilovaisk and in February 2015 at Debaltseve for limited strategic reasons. As for Crimea, if Sevastopol had fallen to the Western powers this would have been Russia's greatest defeat in a thousand years. Putin basically could not but intervene. This was obvious to me, but still appears a mystery to strategic planners in the West.

Question: On the one hand, it is a clear fact that there is tension between Russia and the United States/Europe because of several moves both parties made such as Russian military interventions and NATO Enlargement. On the other hand, Trump administration's disagreement with Europe on NATO's economic burdens, trade wars, etc., is another fact. In this sense, it seems that a storm is brewing in transatlantic relations. Please forgive me if this question might be too bold to ask but we would like to ask about possible conciliation between Europe and Russia against the United States.

Richard Sakwa: The Atlantic power system has spent seventy years guarding against attempts to drive "wedges" between its two wings, and this is unlikely to change. However, it is obvious that Trump represents a fundamental challenge to the unity of the alliance.

Trump represents a form of hard-nosed mercantilism that is dismissive of the benefits that the US has gained from the multilateral normative order that it shaped and led. It is jealous of the achievements of others (notably Japan and then China) in that system. Trump's transactional approach to foreign policy has little respect for international institutions or multilateral processes, and instead advances a short-term profit-and-loss view. He has no time for the lessons of history, notably the way that America's reaction to the stock market crash of October 1929, through the adoption of the protectionist Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of June 1930, exacerbated the crisis and precipitated an unprecedented global economic depression. Trump gladly embraced trade wars and imposed various punitive tariffs on erstwhile partners. One of his first acts on assuming office was to abandon the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as part of his broader critique of regional trade blocs, which included a review of the NAFTA relationship with Canada and Mexico. Trump appeared to have a special animus against the EU, arguing that "the EU was formed to take advantage of us on trade." He offered blandishments to President Emmanuel Macron for France to leave the EU, one of the more quixotic and futile gestures in diplomatic history given that France has invested so much status and prestige in the project of European integration. Trump also on June 1, 2017, withdrew the US from the Paris climate agreement (COP21), arguing

that it undermined the US economy. On May 8, 2018, he withdrew the US from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Iran nuclear deal signed by the five permanent members of the UNSC plus Germany.

The EU has been powerless seriously to resist any of this. Talk of strategic autonomy has so far not been matched by substantive action. Any attempts by Macron or other EU leaders to seek rapprochement with Russia will be blocked by those who have invested so much into the Atlantic power system, in various Eastern European capitals, and in London and Washington.

Of course, it would make sense for a return to normal relations between Russia and the rest of Europe. After all, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968, but with less than a year Ostpolitik was well on track, followed soon after by a period of détente. However, in the current period the institutions and ideology of the Second Cold War are so deeply embedded that there is little chance of them changing any time soon. The impasse is set to endure for at least a generation.

Question: The power struggle in the realist approach is not only military and diplomatic ways but continues in economic spheres. Apart from the American and European economic sanctions, how do you evaluate the disagreement between Russia and Saudi Arabia on oil prices? Is that really a part of the American plan to destroy the Russian economy? Would you call it that?

Richard Sakwa: If anything, the oil crisis of spring 2020 was about Russia and Saudi Arabia trying to destroy the energy fracking industry in the US, whose cost base is much higher than in the two countries. The OPEC+ agreement swiftly restored stability to the oil market, although in the long-term the COVID-19 crisis will depress demand and oil prices will remain relatively low for some time.

Question: Vladimir Putin has amended the constitution, which allows him to stay in power for two more terms. Do you consider it as a part of the geopolitical feature of Russia as in the time of the Russian Empire?

Richard Sakwa: Russian domestic politics always develop in interaction with foreign policy and geostrategic concerns.

Question: The spreading speed of coronavirus cannot be totally dependent on being contagious but also massive flows of people, goods, and capitals through political borders all around the world. We are not sure you would agree with us on that, but still, we want to take our chances to ask you about your projections on the post-COVID-19 world?

Richard Sakwa: The crisis intensified the enduring dialectic between state action and multilateral coordination. On the systemic level, the crisis revalidated the role of the state. Globalization had earlier suggested that certain economic imperatives transcended state policies. However, when urgent action was required, it was the state that acted. The problems may well have been global in scale, but national responses were crucial. The importance of

national welfare and health provision was reinforced, which years of austerity since the economic crisis of 2008 and 2009 followed by the Eurozone crisis of 2011 had reduced to a parlous state in a number of European countries. The adequacy of responses to the Great Pandemic became a new proxy for measurement of the adequacy of government, with the US scoring not only badly, but "very badly," while China's early mismanagement of the growing health crisis amidst attempts to suppress information was offset by the timely sharing of the genetic structure of the novel virus and resolute action to suppress its spread. In Germany the combination of effective central policy, strong federal governance and high societal trust mitigated the crisis, throwing into stark light the absence in the US of an effective and accessible public health care system and social safety net. The pandemic challenged narratives of American exceptionalism and the changing character of its leadership. The crisis has acted as an accelerator of history and speeded up the relative decline in the moral status and prestige of both the United States and Europe.

The crisis put an end to a forty-year cycle of social life, the era of neo-liberal denial of state activism. This had already been apparent in the 2008 global financial crisis, but in the end, the banks were bailed out, and life continued as normal. Many had long argued that banks which are too big to exist, but after financial crisis the burden of recovery was placed on populations through the imposition of various austerity programs.

In the pandemic, the primacy of sovereign nation-states was reaffirmed. However, at the same time, the crucial role of multilateral agencies and problem sharing was once again demonstrated—and then repudiated!

This is an example of what was accelerating. The great powers had already failed to learn the lessons of earlier pandemics and global health challenges. Instead, the US under Donald Trump undermined the international trading system based on rules while resorting to an increasingly ramified range of sanctions and trade wars. The long-standing American ambivalence about global governance institutions was taken to a wholly new level, with the denigration of the United Nations, WHO and the World Trade Organization (WTO). At the height of the crisis, the US even withdrew funding from WHO.

Even though it was clear that no country, even one as powerful as the US, could deal with the crisis and its various economic, health, and social ramifications in isolation, this is precisely what occurred. This only exacerbated the crisis of self-confidence of the political West. At the same time, the military West has continued to expand, and despite calls for a lifting of sanctions and a period of calm during the crisis, a US flotilla entered the Barents Sea in a demonstratively provocative act, and 1,200 US troops arrived in Perth at the height of the quarantine period.

In short, all that the crisis has done is demonstrated once again the intellectual and political bankruptcy of the post-Cold War international system and highlighted its dangerously militaristic turn.

Question: Covering all your studies within a short time seems impossible, as there is a massive pile of original research. Therefore, we would like to leave the stage to you for any issue we might forget to ask, but you think it is important. If there is an issue you want to speak to, please enlighten us about it?

Richard Sakwa: There are plenty of other issues we could talk about, but one very much on my mind at present is the cultural roots of the Second Cold War. The problem is as much civilizational as it is geostrategic. One central factor is the "exceptionalist" ideology in the US, which after 1945 became embedded in what Michael Glennon calls Trumanite "deep state," a vast security apparatus that swallows up vast resources for no clear purpose other than the maintenance of US hegemony and leadership; while this very same "military-industrial complex," against which Eisenhower warned in his farewell address in 1960, diverts resources away from making the US not only a powerful country but also more socially just and rich in all senses of the word. The exhaustion of the political West encourages Russia and China to develop alternative models of international politics. This emerging, although relatively diffuse, bipolarity will shape international politics and globalization for the foreseeable future.

We would like to thank you for your sincere answers and time.

CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR ROBERT JERVIS

Question: Your conceptual and practical contribution to international politics is remarkable and inspiring. We wonder about your academic journey. To fill this wonder, could you please share some of your unforgettable moments or events that led you to the IR or motivate you to do more work?

Robert Jervis: It was a combination of what was happening in the "real" world, reading that I did on my own, a gifted instructor, and a friendship with a leading scholar that set me on this path. Being born into a politically aware family in 1940, my early memories are filled with politics, especially international politics and the start of the Cold War. I was gripped by the question of how to respond to what most of us saw as Soviet expansionism, and particularly how force and threats could be used to protest our interests without leading to war. Readers of chapter three of *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* know that this question has never left me. While attending Oberlin College from 1958 to 1962 debates about the "missile gap" raged (only later would we learn that there was a gap—but one that favored

the US) and while I was fascinated by this and the related larger subject of nuclear strategy, I lacked the conceptual tools to think about it productively. But then I stumbled on the newly published *Strategy of Conflict* by Thomas Schelling and *Deterrence and Defense* by Glenn Snyder that gave me what I'd been searching for. Readers of my other work, especially the books and articles on nuclear weapons, will know how much I took away from these volumes. It also turned out that Glenn Snyder was teaching at UC Berkeley the first two years I was there, and his theories of IR class not only clarified a great deal and excited me, but introduced me to Arnold Wolfers' marvelous collection of essays, *Discord and Collaboration,* which I still turn to. Finally, when Tom Schelling brought me to Harvard to finish my dissertation, luck brought Kenneth Waltz to the office next to mine for his sabbatical year, and he filled in the gaps in my education that were created by the absence of Snyder (Berkeley had decided he wasn't flashy enough to fit its desired profile and did not give him tenure).

Question: You are very critical about the Bush doctrine, which forced the nations to side with the US that were otherwise considered as against. The doctrine also required the military presence of American troops all over the world in case immediate intervention was needed. How would you consider the Obama and Trump administrations willingness to withdraw a number of soldiers deployed abroad? Do you think that the Bush doctrine has been reversed or that the instruments to achieve the same results have just been transformed from military to economic ways?

Robert Jervis: Ironically, I think the person who reversed the Bush Doctrine was George W. Bush. The failure in Iraq taught him a lesson, although, of course, at great cost to the US, Iraq, and the region. The real break in US foreign policy here came not with Obama's inauguration, but in the second half of Bush's second term when he lowered his aspirations, realized that American power was not limitless, and developed some understanding of the intractable nature of many of the problems he faced. Many Republicans (but not Donald Trump) criticized Obama for withdrawing all US troops from Iraq, leading (it is argued) to the development of ISIS, but, in fact, it was Bush who set the US on this path.

Although under both Bush and Obama (but not under Trump) the US sought to push countries to become more democratic and deployed a range of instruments including economic ones to this end, pressing domestic needs and the declining salience of foreign policy limited what the US could do here. Obama did put some faith in economic sanctions (here Trump has doubled down), but while these can harm countries and exert pressure, as we have seen in the cases of Iran and North Korea, by themselves they are unable to drastically alter adversaries' policies, let alone turn them into democracies.

Question: During the Cold War period, the nuclear powers were keeping in balance and deterring each other from the destruction of the world. What about the current international politics, which has evolved to operate in a multipolar world? Moreover, could you please share your ideas with us on the Iranian nuclear deal while the US has withdrawn its signature and imposed heavy economic sanctions, the EU still wants to keep the deal, and Russia supports Iran's quest for nuclear power status?

Robert Jervis: I don't think the world is fully multipolar. China is still a regional more than a world power and Europe unfortunately remains disunited (the response to COVID-19 shows just how disunited). This has played out in response to Trump's withdrawal from the Iran deal. I supported that agreement, publishing two articles about it and organizing an ad in the *New York Times* urging the Senate to support it (or at least not reject it). In retrospect, I see no reason to change my mind. While it didn't alter many aspects of Iran's policy, perhaps in part because the economic benefits Iran had expected were not fully forthcoming), it did keep Iran a safe distance from nuclear weapons.

When Trump withdrew (I think the reasons were mainly his desire to overturn anything Obama had put in place), I had expected that the Europeans would maintain some of their economic relations with Iran, especially since they had agreed to make many concessions to the US and were led to believe that these would be sufficient for Trump to stay in the agreement. I underestimated the importance of the US market and its control of the world financial system and overestimated the strength of the Europeans' desire to play an independent role in world politics. So, while the Europeans want Iran to uphold its side of the bargain, they have not been willing to pay the high price that would have been entailed by defying the US and offering Iran significant inducement to stay in.

Question: As mentioned above, there is an argument that the transformation from bipolar to unipolar and then to multipolar world systems is incomplete and still in process. How would you evaluate this change, if you agree, from the perspective of systemic effects?

Robert Jervis: It's hard to say. By most measures of power, the US is still unrivalled, and the rise of China, impressive as it is, still leaves it with a long way to go. Europe could be a peer of the US were it united and motivated to take active positions, but neither of these conditions is met now, and if anything, Europe is moving in the opposite direction. Britain's departure may eventually lead to a more cohesive Europe, but this is far from certain. Germany is undergoing a change of leaders and France always offends its fellow-Europeans by claiming too much and delivering too little. Unlike in the early years of European cooperation, there are no strong and valued non-governmental figures to step into the gap. Of course, the pandemic has

introduced a whole new layer of uncertainty on top of this, and over the entire world system. It is not clear whether any country will emerge with an enhanced reputation and, perhaps more importantly, whether elites and the public will react by turning inward, reducing globalization, blaming foreigners, and being less likely to cooperate or whether the lesson will be that threats that menace the entire planet can only be met by greater joint efforts and international institutions. The path chosen will have great influence on what is perhaps the greatest threat to the planet, which is climate change.

Question: As a practical version of the previous question, in your article "The Remaking of a unipolar world" published in 2006, you argue that the US is on a new mission to reestablish a unipolar world system via spreading democracy. Considering that the current administration of the US has in good relations with Saudis and several gulf countries, trying to make an agreement with North Korea, recently has come to an agreement with Taliban in Afghanistan and showing no interest in regime change in Syria, do you think that the US has chosen the way of living "in a mixed world if it were a safe one"?

Robert Jervis: Perhaps the only virtue of Trump's foreign policy has been its recognition of the need to live in a heterogeneous world and to realize that the American ability to remake it in our image is very limited. Consistent with this, he has recognized that while the US is exceptional in some respects, it has often behaved brutally at home and abroad and should not be self-righteous. Unfortunately, however, he has been neither consistent nor measured. It is one thing to have to accept brutal dictatorships but quite another to embrace them and imply that their sins are just like ours or to say that because a county buys a lot of American products it is free to murder and oppress. The stance is not moral—and it is not effective either. The reckless policies of MBS are likely to fail, and it is not entirely as an accident that a ruler (*de facto*) who commits the sort of crimes that he has fails to grasp the realities that his country faces both at home and abroad.

In parallel, Trump's personalization of foreign policy, most evident in his presentation of his relations with Xi and Kim, reflects his ego, not an understanding of world politics. Because other leaders are less susceptible to flattery than he is, Trump, far from being a master deal-maker, consistently gets taken advantage of.

So, while some of Trump's instincts about the limits of American power are good, his enormous personal flaws prevent him from building an effective policy on them.

Question: In your prominent book *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life*, you have emphasized that interactions of nations create a system of the world. If you are among those who are in favor of the idea that

the world system is changing to an unknown path, what, where and why do you think triggering interaction occurred in the changing process?

Robert Jervis: I'm glad that you mentioned this book because of all those I have written I think this is the most important, although difficult to summarize. I do believe that in a highly inter-connected world we see lots of unintended consequences, non-linearities, and complex feedbacks (including tipping points). But they are hard to trace even after the fact and even more difficult to predict, especially because we are theorizing about actors who have their own theories and who are trying to estimate how others will anticipate and react to what they are doing, knowing that others are usually also trying to anticipate and react to the actor.

One obvious question is whether COVID-19 will be a tipping point, and if so in what direction. As I noted in an earlier answer, the obvious reaction would be to increase nationalism, but it is at least possible that people will learn the opposite lesson and see the virtues of greater worldwide efforts.

Another tipping point could be the spread of nuclear weapons. Although proliferation has so far proceeded much more slowly than almost all political leaders and analysts predicted, if North Korea enlarges its arsenal and makes nuclear threats and if Iran gets nuclear weapons, the incentives for neighbors to follow them will be strong.

The use of nuclear weapons, a remote but ever-present possibility, would surely change world politics, although here too it is hard to predict exactly how. Herman Kahn, although renowned for being belligerent, said that if there were a small or limited nuclear use during the Cold War, the US and USSR might agree that world government, as terrible a prospect as that was, would be better than continuing on the current path.

Question: Within recent world politics, we have often been hearing several leaders' names, such as Vladimir Putin of Russia, Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, and Donald Trump of America. The first two have been ruling their countries for almost two decades. Moreover, the last one is mostly on the agenda of world news not only because of him being the President of the United States but also his unique statements and policies. Based on your article "Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know" in 2013, I would like to ask, if not long-term ruling or having a unique character, why the leaders matter? Could you please evaluate your arguments in the paper by taking these three leaders into account?

Robert Jervis: Soon after Trump's election, I wrote a piece saying that he would test IR theories dealing with structure (both domestic and international) versus agency. After more than three years, I think we can reach a mixed verdict. In the areas of trade and immigration Trump has put his stamp on policy, overriding the objections of not only must experts, but many

members of his own party and powerful economic interests. On Russia, he has sought a "reset" but been unable to carry it out because Putin has not been helpful and domestic opposition in Congress has been too strong. I believe he could have had even more impact were he consistent, had a normal attention span, and was competent enough to pick subordinates who shared his views.

I know less about the others. In the US academic community, there is a sharp debate on whether Putin is an aberration or represents forces and characteristics that are deeply rooted in Russia. But it does appear to me that at least some of Russian behavior needs to be explained by his personalistic rule, his KGB roots, and his preferred strategies of maintaining domestic power.

You would know more about Erdogan than I do, but from here it looks like some of his hostility toward the US grows out of his personal experiences and outlook. Ironically, his initial policy was to have no external enemies, but a combination of his internal policies and the difficult international environment has brought led to making more enemies than his predecessors faced.

Question: You have significantly contributed to the discipline of IR, and one of these contributions is about states' misperception of others, which is/was one of the reasons for waging wars. Since the Iraqi war, there has been no full-fledged war between at least two states but mostly multilateral conflicts. Taking the case of natural energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea as an example, how do you think your conception of misperception might work for this issue? As it has already turned into a multilateral issue with involvements of Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, Libya, the EU, France, and Italy, don't you give a chance of possible multilateral conflict there because of misperception?

Robert Jervis: I (and others) perhaps have not given multilateral conflicts the attention they deserve because they are so complicated. Although I am not a formal and conventional game theorist, I find Schelling's forms of interaction, especially strategic interaction, particularly intriguing, and while these can be applied to multiple players (see Schelling's brilliant set of essays collected in *Micromotives and Macrobehavior* and my own analysis in *System Effects)*, things can get intractable quite quickly. I and others have, of course, looked at the dynamics of alliances, but the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean doesn't readily fit those models in part because the configurations change from one issue area to another. I am not an expert in what is happening there, but what strikes me as particularly intriguing is the combination of common and conflicting interests involved in the energy resources and the interactions between the motives and strategies prevailing in this area and the general political conflicts among the countries. On the one hand, the latter can complicate the former, but on the other hand, the desire to exploit the natural resources and the costs of conflicts over them can perhaps lead

to tacit understandings among the relevant states, if not to broad changes in their political outlooks.

Question: We took the chance of the break caused by coronavirus and got a chance to ask you these questions. While the COVID-19 pandemic is still continuing, experts from various fields have already expressed their comments on the possible effects of it on the world. Could you please share yours on post-coronavirus world politics with us?

Robert Jervis: This is a crucial question and while, of course, I have given it thought (and have referred to it in some of my previous answers), I remain uncertain about how things will turn out. Indeed, I think the situation is uncertain, using that phrase not colloquially but in the technical sense developed by the economist Frank Knight who distinguished between a situation of risk, where the probabilities were known or could at least be estimated, and uncertainty, where they cannot be. The reasons they can't be are two-fold: 1) there are not many precedents and 2) we are dealing with actors who themselves are trying to estimate the outcomes (which in turn depend partly on what they will do, which is strongly influenced by what they think others will do—and they know that what at least some of the others will do depends on the others' estimates of what the actor will do). Events like the pandemic can also induce important changes in attitudes somewhat the same ways that large wars can. My fear is that the world will see more poverty, despair, refugee flows, and conflict. My hope is that leaders and mass opinion will see that while, of course, the pandemic raises significant conflicts such as over the distribution of needed equipment and medicines and may provide some opportunities for one state to gain at others' expense, these relative gains (or losses) are swamped by the potential absolute gains of working together, pooling resources and brain-power to deal with a menace that no one state can handle by itself and that spills over borders no matter how high the figurative and physical walls that are erected.

Question: You have more than a half-century-long academic career, and we cannot get a chance to ask you plenty of questions for benefiting from your wisdom and intellectual, but at least, could you tell more about any subject you think is significant but that we missed within the interview.

Robert Jervis: The interview has hit on so many interesting and important questions that I'll just raise one more (without being able to answer it). This is whether or not there is meaningful progress in IR (the world of IR, not IR theory). Two of my good friends who have taught me so much differ on this. Ken Waltz argued that although the structure of the international system might change from multipolarity to bipolarity (and after the Cold War to unipolarity), the continued pressures of anarchy lead to fundamental regularities that limit if not preclude progress. On the other hand, the brilliant historian Paul Schoeder argued that there has been progress over time and that this is

rooted less in changes in material factors like the costs of war (although these indeed are important) than in the development of better ideas and a grasp of the interdependencies in the international system that require due respect for other state's rights and interests and protection of the valuable weaker states and intermediary bodies. In my APSA presidential address, I took the middle ground that what I called the leading powers (the US, the states of western Europe, and Japan) formed what Karl Deutsch called a security community (a group of states that were not only at peace with each other, but among whom war was unthinkable) and that this was a real if limited form of progress. Let's work toward building on and expanding it.

CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR SIMON DALBY

Question: Taking this interview as an opportunity, we would like to hear, if you do not mind, about a moment or an event that has been paramount in your academic career.

Simon Dalby: Perhaps the moment that sticks in my memory most is the one and only time I made a presentation at the United Nations. It was part of a panel presentation on climate and security back in the months prior to the Copenhagen Climate summit in 2009. After all, five of us presenters were finished the session was opened to comments from the national delegates. One refused to accept that climate change had anything to do with security, a second said the whole topic was mind-boggling. In response to my comment that if policymakers thought that it was appropriate to build fences around their states to keep people from moving, they weren't thinking hard enough, another delegation got up and walked out. Their government was, in fact, building fences, although I had an entirely different fence in mind.

I learned once again that day just how hard it is to get clear messages concerning academic research across to even sometimes sympathetic policy audiences, and the importance of thinking ahead about what is coming regardless of the reluctance of policymakers to hear what you are trying to say. Alas, as the COVID-19 pandemic teaches us all once again this isn't a problem that has gone away since, and it remains a major difficulty in dealing with climate change and other environmental transformations.

Question: There has been a significant number of discussions on the path that the world is taking in terms of the world system or international order. Your prominent work of *Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics* reemerged with a reprint edition in 2016, and we do not think that it is a coincidence because the early 1990s were at the edge of systemic change and now the discussion has resurfaced among the academics and politicians.

What do you think triggered you or the publisher to think that the discourse of politics has to be reexamined in IR?

Simon Dalby: It is always flattering to have some of your old work revived because someone thinks it is worth recirculating. While I don't know exactly why Bloomsbury chose to add my text to the list of works that were out of print that they thought worthy of revival, clearly the fractiousness of international politics and the revival of xenophobic rhetoric and military posturing in recent years relates to my original theme. The revival of some of the worst aspects of the second Cold War in the hostility to Russia, and the fears of declining power on the part of some in the United States policy establishment in particular, makes my historical study of American geopolitical discourse in the 1970s more in tune with some political discussions in contemporary times than I would wish it were!

Question: While concluding your article "Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse" in 1992, you stated that "The phrase 'environmental security dilemma' is clumsy, and its meaning is not immediately self-evident." The concept nowadays, especially since the 1990s, has been paid a great deal of attention but as you argued in one of your latest articles on "Environmental (In)security" still none of the developed countries are taking environmental security quite seriously, at least not given importance as much as national security gets? Do you still agree with yourself or not that the phrase is self-evident?

Simon Dalby: The idea of a security dilemma suggests that when one state builds military forces to strengthen its defense capabilities it makes other states nervous of its intentions and they in term respond by arming too. The process sets an escalatory dynamic in motion that threatens all concerned and undercuts the ostensible purpose of increasing security. The idea of an environmental security dilemma is an extension of this. It suggests that in using modern industrial techniques to try to "secure" states and their peoples, without taking the environmental consequences of those actions into account, they will actually endanger their own security by damaging the conditions that make their society and its industrial economies possible in the first place.

Alas nearly three decades after I wrote that paper the situation is much worse and the need to recognize that the extension of ever more "firepower," both in terms of military capabilities and the use of combustion-based energy systems, is now endangering the whole planetary system. While this is most obviously about climate and the rapidly worsening extinction crisis, other things including oceanic acidification and pollution, plastics, and chemicals loose in all parts of the global ecosystem, and the overuse of numerous water resources are all causing grave concern among scholars who pay attention to the state of this planet. We can no longer take a relatively stable geographic context for granted for human civilization, and that means that we are

increasingly facing the unfortunate consequences of our attempts to secure fossil-fueled prosperity.

Question: Most of your research is, if we are correct, actually intercepting the relationship between human security, environmental security, and national security. Could you please rephrase the relationships among them?

Simon Dalby: Security is a key term in the contemporary political lexicon, and as such one that needs to be carefully and continually interrogated. If national security isn't rethought by the leading states in the current system it will continue to undermine both what humans need to live safely fairly directly, and indirectly by wrecking the environmental circumstances that have given rise to human civilization. The interconnected crises we face, the mutual vulnerabilities that pandemics and globalization have reminded us of all forcefully in early 2020, mean that security isn't a matter of ever more powerful states threatening each other with ever more sophisticated weaponry. The real threats are from an increasingly disrupted global ecosystem that we are polluting, heating, and denuding rapidly. Asking questions about what forms of security are being provided by whom, where, and with what consequences is key to any analysis of contemporary politics. But the twentieth-century intellectual tools in IR research are not much focused on the rapidly changing context for human life, and one way of repeatedly pointing this out is to unpack the implications of particular invocations of security in policymaking and academic analysis.

Question: The "Anthropocene" is another concept you have been using as a reference point in your studies. Do you think people in the world, not sovereign states but individuals, are digging their graves as most of them do not know how much they degraded the world they live in? Or that they unconsciously follow the recent developments in their way of life, so it is the states' fault that the world is deformed?

Simon Dalby: A bit of both! Peoples and states are frequently oblivious to the consequences of their actions, and that has to change if there is to be a livable future for all of us. The corporate model of contemporary economics which both commodifies practically everything and externalizes many of the consequences of production is premised on something called "growth," which supposedly increases welfare for all but is failing to deliver for the majority of humanity. The economic model we need is one that focuses on ensuring growth of living things, animals with two legs, four legs, and wings, as well as plants and fishy creatures too! An ecological mode of economic thinking that focuses on ecological flourishing rather than artificial measures of total throughput is key to thinking about the future.

This all matters because, as the earth system thinkers who use the term Anthropocene make clear human actions are now on such a scale that we are collectively remaking the earth so much that we now live in a new geological

era. How we shape that future is the political question of our times. Rapidly restoring ecosystems, ensuring that pollution of the oceans is curtailed, moving from fossil-fueled energy systems into electrical ones that power a much more efficient industrial, transportation and residential system is key to shaping the next stage of the Anthropocene. But, clearly, persisting with the modes of economy that we have inherited from the twentieth century is quite literally unsustainable. The key to the Anthropocene formulation, in so far as it is useful, is that it focuses on production, quite literally what we are making, and makes it clear that there is no environment "out there" external to the human enterprise.

Question: "Having taken our fate into our own hands, governance mechanisms have to grapple with novel matters of production and energy challenging modern assumptions about autonomous humanity playing out its political drama against a stable natural background."

The above sentence is another quotation from your article "Environmental Geopolitics in the Twenty-First Century" in 2014. We would like to turn our attention to "governance mechanisms." Do you think that global governance is possible for environmental issues, especially in the conflictual nature of the world system? If you agree with us that there is a process from which the new world system would come out as regional and superpowers are trying to position themselves in it, how do you think that would influence possible global governance or global cooperation for such vital environmental issues, such as climate change?

Simon Dalby: These are the really big questions of our time in terms of human institutions and what kind of future we are making. We have had some successes on this score over the last few decades, most obviously the series of protocols to ban chlorofluorocarbons and as a result the depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer has been limited, and partly reversed. But regional and global rivalries among states are a major obstacle to progress on numerous other matters, and this failure to update notions of national security to deal with common dangers is a notable problem in thinking about global governance. To put the matter bluntly, our task as scholars now is convince policymakers, publics, and corporate decision-makers that the tasks that matter now are about now to share a crowded world rather than dominating a divided one. Security comes from working on these common dangers, not spending cash on what are by now ridiculously expensive killing machines feeding into status competitions among national elites. The planetary predicament we all face requires transcending these hopelessly outdated rivalries and thinking through practical measures for confronting climate change, habitat destruction, pollution, ocean acidification, and other common threats.

Question: We would like to ask a question about the COVID-19 pandemic in relation to your argument that modern society and politics are sacrificing

their planet for their way of life and national security, respectively. Conspiracy theories are getting hits about whether or not the coronavirus was intentionally invented and spread to the world by someone or a state. That might stand as conspiracy, but we hope you would agree with us that the virus is a result of human beings' historical fight for power and security against each other. Based on your extensive research and experiences, how do you think the pandemic would influence urgent needs to cooperate in such a global biological hazard? Will sovereign states, especially developed ones, be ready for more global cooperation or just get back to where they were before the pandemic?

Simon Dalby: Whether this COVID-19 pandemic is caused by a species jumping virus, or one manipulated in some lab that has seriously misleading research priorities, is now beside the point. It is loose in the world and will kill lots of people in the next few months if not long after that. The necessity to cooperate on finding a vaccine or effective treatment to ensure that this disease doesn't last into the long-term future is now a high priority, and is beginning to be focused on by leaders who have recognized that American leadership on this will not be forthcoming. Recognizing that waiting for the Americans is folly in the present world order may encourage many other policymakers to think about how to do innovative things to tackle common dangers; in so far as this is successful this pandemic will be useful for global governance.

But if, once a vaccine is found, policymakers simply say, "OK, that was nasty but now we can go back to the way we used to do things" then an opportunity to tackle the other pressing issues will be lost. Avoiding that result is now key. I don't do predictions, but clearly, at least some policymakers have had their assumptions that we can have business as usual after the pandemic severely shaken in recent months. The parallels with climate change in particular are obvious; the warnings about looming peril are very clear and the need to act before the situation gets out of hand likewise. So too is the lesson about not waiting for American participation in present circumstances.

Question: We thank you for your time and sincere answers. As a prominent scholar, you might want to emphasize another issue that is not covered by the questions here. If so, would you mind sharing it/them with us as a closing section?

Simon Dalby: I am fortunate to have a job in an interdisciplinary school of international affairs, one that more or less ignores the scholarly strictures that limit so many researchers to narrow fields defined by disciplinary orthodoxy. What both the COVID-19 pandemic, and the burgeoning debate about the Anthropocene show clearly, is the necessity of tackling contemporary issues from multiple perspectives, always asking how thinking is confined by research methods and accepted procedures. Thinking outside disciplinary boxes is as necessary as thinking outside the strictures of national security

these days, and this is a task that needs to be taken up by scholars, and crucially by university administrations and granting agencies; the questions of the twenty-first century are frequently not amenable to research grounded in nineteenth-century disciplines.

Asking how questions are formulated, and what these formulations preclude is now an essential task for all scholarship that addresses the pressing issues of how the world is being dangerously transformed. But simply assuming that better research will provide the solution to complex problems isn't enough either; confronting the power structures that have perpetuated human problems, rather than ensuring human security for many, is also a necessary part of our academic task and critical interventions in the policy and political debates in the aftermath of COVID-19 are unavoidable now.

CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR STEPHAN HAGGARD

Question: The pile of your research shows that you have a quite interest in the political economy of Latin America and east Asia and seems that your recent publications are mostly associated with east Asia. We would like to start our questions with the following: What has directed you to research this region? Could you please share a couple of memories or events that led you to this path?

Stephan Haggard: When I wrote my dissertation and first book, *Pathways from the Periphery* (1990), I was interested in the comparison between Latin American and east Asian political economies. But I spent more time for that book researching the east Asian cases, perhaps because I felt less was known about them. The work on the developmental state was emerging from Chalmers Johnson, Robert Wade, and Alice Amsden, but, to me, none of them addressed the political aspects of rapid growth in a satisfactory way.

Since that time, however, I have not just worked on east Asia; I have also been interested in transitions to and from democratic rule (including in Turkey). My work with Robert Kaufman started by looking at the political economy of these questions (*The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*, 1995), before turning to the social policy consequences of democratization (in *Development, Democracy and Welfare States*, 2008). Most recently, Bob and I have returned to questions of democracy in two books with a more global focus: *Dictators and Democrats: Masses, Elites, and Regime Change* (2016), and a forthcoming short book on *Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World*.

I think my identification with east Asia also comes out of a very chance encounter with North Korea, that has developed into a prolonged fascination:

with the famine, refugees, and more recently with the political economy of the nuclear question.

Question: Since the 1990s, your emphasis on economic reforms in east Asian and Latin American countries, especially on having a democratic way of the national economy is still credible because they still do not have embedded political and economic structures. How would you describe their economic reform history? Is it getting better, or are they still in structural crisis?

Stephan Haggard: So much has transpired since the early debates about export-oriented and import-substituting development strategies, my initial preoccupation. A combination of factors made closed-economy approaches unsustainable, as Turkey also learned. These included financial crises, which hit regions at different times, pressure from the IFIs and advanced industrial states to liberalize, but also the growth of international production networks which forced a rethink; foreign direct investment posed challenges, but it was even more challenging to develop without it. We are now entering the post-global financial crisis world, though, in which the risks of openness are becoming more apparent. I am surprised that even in the United States, you are seeing a major rethink about the role of industrial policy, spurred in part by the tremendous challenges posed by China to the world political economy.

Question: Regarding economic growth, if we are not wrong, you are in favor of an institutional approach that claims that rules have to be first institutionalized and then economic growth will follow. As you know, there is a fierce debate on the new version of the world system, whether it is multipolar or not. Moreover, we witness that several states, such as Turkey, Brazil, India, Iran, and Nigeria, we can include China and Russia to the list, have performed a distinctive form of economic growth but are not yet affiliated with the developed countries. Do you think that lack of the rule of law is the main obstacle to that? If not, then what do you think it might be?

Stephan Haggard: I do believe that institutions matter, but I am somewhat more heterodox than you suggest. I have written on the rule of law, but I don't think the standard model of property and contracting rights is likely to be enough. One point I always reiterated was that the east Asian countries might have been outward-oriented, but they also had strong and capable states. This legacy persists; look at how relatively effective Korea and Taiwan were in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Liberal, market-oriented ideas do not help you confront challenges of that sort.

With respect to the performance of the developing world, it is clearly a very mixed group of countries that you mention. China, and perhaps India, are in classes by themselves because size has proven to be a striking advantage. Other countries on that list have not fared as well but I am not sure there is a common reason. Brazil and Russia face altogether different challenges, with Russia for example effectively a petro-state.

Question: Since the concept of the international regime (liberal international order) emerged and prevailed in the IR discipline, economic and democratic developments have gone too far to substantiate liberal international order. With being a democratizing force, the West has played an essential role in the transformation from autocracies to democracies in the Balkans, central and east Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. However, recent developments indicate a reverse in that mission, as Europe wants to keep Iran in line about nuclear issues, America seems ready to make a deal with the Taliban in Afghanistan, and North Korea has good relations with the Saudis. Do you think that the Western powers are happy with autocratic regimes at the national level as long as they serve security and stability rather than liberty?

Stephan Haggard: The concern about promoting democracy abroad varies depending on the party in power in the United States. Donald Trump, of course, was extreme in this regard. He behaved like an autocrat at home—or at least tried—and cared little about democracy and human rights abroad; thus, his penchant for dealing with dictators. That is going to change somewhat under a Biden administration. But note that it was Obama—and I suspect Biden as well—who reached out to try to resolve problems with important autocratic regimes such as Iran. Believing in the values of the liberal international order should not prohibit democracies from pragmatic diplomacy with authoritarian regimes. The US faces these challenges with a number of its allies at the moment, including I would argue with Thailand, the Philippines, and Turkey as well.

Question: Developing countries, as mentioned in the previous question, are seeking to be developed countries. In this process, they mostly take examples of the Western-developed states. Considering that these developed states had been undemocratic while they were in the process of developing, especially in the times of industrial revolution, do not you think that these developing states' undemocratic features are natural and they are just taking footsteps of the currently developed states? Or do you think that once an international order is established and working, the hierarchical structure of the international order prevents the other states from changing their status of developing countries for developed ones?

Stephan Haggard: There is a political as well as economic dimension to your question. I don't think any particular political form is necessarily "natural," and countries go through political cycles as Turkey has. I see no reason why developing countries can't be democratic, and the resurgence of democracy in Africa demonstrates that even economically challenged countries can prosper politically.

The economic part of your question is more challenging as it gets to the idea of a middle-income trap and what is required to push through once reaching a certain income plateau. Education clearly matters in this regard, but the return of industrial policy suggests that selective interventions in support of innovation matter too. We also still do not know how to think creatively about the crucial role of the service sector, which despite the importance of manufacturing is the largest source of employment in most advanced and middle-income countries. How do we make the service sector more competitive and dynamic?

Question: In your article "Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule" (2012), you examine the relationship between inequality in distribution and democratization. Two years later, in "The Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Settings: The Empirical Record," you emphasize the difficulties in returning to the rule of law after a conflict. This research indicates that the countries you are working on are in a deficit of social and economic requisites to be able to have political stability leading to economic growth. Could you please articulate any possible ways that might change their destiny?

Stephan Haggard: In the paper and later book on inequality, we were examining a particular theory that inequality might determine changes in regime, both to and from democratic rule. We were skeptical and thought that other factors mattered for democratization, such as the nature of authoritarian rule and the existence of strong civil society organizations.

The problem of countries torn by civil war is somewhat different since the challenges often focus on much more fundamental issues such as restoring order and developing the state capacity to deliver basic services and public goods. The somewhat discouraging finding of the rule of law paper you cite is that countries that have experienced civil war often had the weak rule of law to begin with, and thus coming out of civil war alone was not likely to lead to a permanent improvement in that regard. I think what we were trying to say is that building basic state institutions—not just democracy, but capable institutions—is hard.

Question: As one of the prominent experts on the political economy of east Asia, you believed that economic integration of North Korea with required engagement and infrastructure might cause a security and peace mechanism so that regional economic relations can change the conflictual nature of the region if the nuclear issue is solved. Since 2009 when you published your work of "A security and peace mechanism for northeast Asia: the economic dimension" do you still agree with your argument? Or are the developments in parallel with your argument?

Stephan Haggard: I think that the most the outside world can do at the moment with respect to North Korea is to reiterate the offers that are on

the table: that North Korea can achieve both traditional military security and human security by foregoing nuclear weapons and integrating with the region. If North Korea did not have nuclear weapons, we would just ignore it. But because of its threatening posture, we have been forced into a complex diplomatic game. That game involves not only offers of a security and peace mechanism, but the imposition of sanctions that will hopefully steer North Korea back to the bargaining table. North Korea is a hard target; sanctions may not work, but options of negotiating with the country have not succeeded either. I confess that studying North Korea is an exercise in frustration; there do not appear to be obvious options.

Question: In 2016, you and your colleague, Robert Kaufman argued that there have to be additional criteria for the democratization process during the third wave of democratization, namely the role of civil society and the capacity for collective action. How do you integrate these new criteria into the democratization process? Could you please summarize it with us? If you do not mind, we also want to add another perspective by asking whether or not these criteria are applicable to the post-Arab spring political structure?

Stephan Haggard: We observe that mass mobilization is an important route to democratization, and we certainly saw it during the Arab Spring. I still don't think we understood what went wrong in Egypt in particular. Was it simply that the state sector and military had grown so significant in the country's political economy that they could not be contained? Was it the nature of the new parties that emerged from the democratizing moment, that they appeared to pose threats of their own to democratic order? Or was it perhaps that the nature of the Middle Eastern autocracies did not permit the types of robust civil society organizations that could sustain resistance? Honestly, I don't have the answers. But I see the failure of the Arab Spring as one of the great tragedies of this young century.

Question: You have several publications on the rule of law and economic growth with the data on a significant number of developing countries. We would just take your argument to the global level, what do you think if somebody says that there might be relations between the violations of international law or undermining international institutions and global economic growth?

Stephan Haggard: In a way, I suggested this in my early work when I noted that some countries pursuing statist policies managed to succeed, and I still believe that to be the case. But one thing I do believe is that components of the liberal order ended up benefitting most developing countries in the post-war period; look at the pace of growth looked at over the longer run, with the corresponding decline in poverty. Were the rules biased? Yes. Could developing countries nonetheless profit from them? Also, yes. To me, the one major exception that we have learned is that financial openness is a possible exception; it can be highly risky in the absence of appropriate regulatory and

other policies. With the benefit of hindsight, the great growth tragedies of the post-war period—outside of extreme autocracies and civil war cases—came as a result of financial crises.

Question: This question might not seem to be related to your area of expertise, but as a prominent scholar in your field, you might have something to say about possible outcomes of the COVID-19 pandemic in terms of the global political economy?

Stephan Haggard: There are many obvious issues here, such as the need for better international cooperation around international public health. But the question is an embarrassing one because the American performance has been so scandalously bad. To me, this is actually a good way to wind up. The United States has exhibited many of the causal factors we associate with democratic backsliding over the last four years: an autocratic personality and a fawning party providing support. Yet deeper forces were also at work, including a deep polarization. The central debate in the United States at the moment is over the nature of that polarization. Was it economic, rooted in declining manufacturing and increasing inequality? Was it racial and ethnic, as I believe? And what role did social media technology play in making it all worse? It will take some time to rebuild the United States from four years of drift, and that includes with respect to the damage we inflicted on ourselves by mismanaging the pandemic.

Question: We would like to thank you for your answers to the questions, and we want to give you a moment to make comments on anything we may have missed but you consider important.

Stephan Haggard: I enjoyed our time together. Thanks for reaching out to me.

CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR TERRY NARDIN

Question: We would like to start the interview with a biographical question. Could you please tell us about what led you to work on international political theory and the philosophy of international law? It would be perfect if you could share some moments in your academic career.

Terry Nardin: I studied philosophy as an undergraduate at the University of Chicago and then at NYU but worries about nuclear war led me to become increasingly interested in international affairs. I had a charismatic teacher at NYU, Anthony Pearce, who introduced me to the field of IR via Thucydides, Machiavelli, Mackinder, Nehru, and other classics of international thought. As a graduate student, I learned about game theory and its application to IR by reading books like Thomas Schelling's *The Strategy of Conflict* and Anatol Rapoport's *Fights, Games, and Debates*. After I started teaching, I got

interested in moral questions arising from the war in Vietnam and then more generally in what later came to be called "international ethics." It seemed to me that international law was a place where one might look for principles guiding and judging international conduct and I decided to teach international law to learn more about it. The subject was popular with students, so I was stuck with teaching it for many years. In those years, I became increasingly interested in the history and theory of international law and eventually wrote a book about it. I learned along with my students, which may sound like professional malpractice but is now appreciated as a better way for students to learn than by their listening to an expert deliver information: "active learning" versus "the sage on the stage." My teaching for some years now has been mainly interactive.

So, my intellectual trajectory was from international affairs to international ethics and international law and from both to what is sometimes called international political theory. Like some others, like the philosopher Bernard Williams, I had the idea that politics was not just "applied ethics"—that it might have its own distinctive principles. The same is true of international politics. What distinguishes international political theory from international ethics is that it takes seriously the idea that political ethics is different from individual ethics. This does not mean, as many think, that political ethics is realist. It does mean that circumstances are important. Averting a famine is not the same as pulling a drowning child from a pond. Michael Walzer's book *Just and Unjust Wars* was important for many reasons, not least because he looked to the history of arguments about right and wrong in war rather than to textbook ethics to elucidate compelling principles. Walzer was too quick to dismiss international law as a repository of such principles. In my view, the history of international law is part of the discourse, neither better nor worse than the memoirs, poetry, works of history, and other sources Walzer drew upon. Much later, I made a different connection between morality and law: I came to see politics as deliberation about the principles that should inform the law. Since law is enforceable and therefore coercive, the challenge became one of identifying what I call principles of justifiable coercion. I think this idea has important implications for the global justice debate because it allows us to narrow a huge range of values parading under the label "justice" to a coherent core. In contrast to ethics, which concerns how people should behave, justice concerns how people can be compelled to behave. Politics is deliberation about just and unjust laws, and law is coercive. These points hold for international politics as well as politics within a state. Working out just how principles of international justice—principles that are properly part of international law—differ from those governing the relationships of private persons is itself part of the subject.

Question: In your 2017 article with William Bain, "International Relations and Intellectual History," you suggest that ideas about political regimes have shaped ideas about IR. We have always thought that the claim that democracy is the best regime might not be true at the international level, where imperial power has often been the guarantor of international order. Empires are not democratic. Based on this argument, we would like to ask about the relationship between international order and political regimes. Are the conditions of international order—in bipolar, unipolar, or multipolar world systems, for example—connected with the prevalence of certain kinds of political regimes?

Terry Nardin: There may be two questions here rather than one. The first is whether a democratic international order is likely to be more just or stable than an autocratic one. An autocratic international order would be a vast world empire or something close to it, a hegemony of some kind. Some would say that hegemony is not necessarily undemocratic, but the greater the hegemony the more autocratic it is likely to be. Athens exercised leadership over an alliance of states in and around the Ionian Sea in the period between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, but we find in Thucydides evidence that the Athenian alliance became increasingly autocratic. The hegemonic leader became a hegemonic tyrant.

The other question concerns the relationship between Internal regimes and patterns of international order. One of the ironies of Thucydides' history is that democratic Athens transformed its hegemonic alliance into a hegemonic tyranny whereas autocratic Sparta led an alliance that remained democratic because its members retained substantial independence. One line of argument we encounter in relation to the effect of political regimes on international order is the democratic peace hypothesis—the claim, attributed to Immanuel Kant, that democracies don't fight wars with one another. The Kantian connection is rather loose, however: Kant followed Aristotle in treating monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy as three kinds of autocracy, differing in the number of those in the autocratic faction—one, few, or many—but not in the degree to which they could be tyrannical. Others, like Montesquieu and Tocqueville, thought democracy was more likely to be tyrannical than monarchy—Montesquieu identified monarchy with the rule of law and Tocqueville worried about the tyranny of the majority in democratic America. Kant distinguished between democracies, which he thought could be despotic and warlike, and republics, which inclined toward peace and the rule of law in their relations with each other because they were peaceful and lawfully governed internally. If a state respects the rights of its citizens, Kant thought, it might be more inclined to respect the rights of other states.

These are regime-based arguments. The other line of argument concerns the distribution of power among states. The claim in this case is that there is no necessary correlation between polarity and regime type. A unipolar world system might be either imperial or republican: Kant, for example, suggested that a single world state would be "a fearful despotism." In this, he was repeating the view, common in eighteenth-century European international thought, that the states system (or as an international theorist might say today, multipolarity) provided a hedge against despotism. Edward Gibbon, for example, saw the Roman empire, which embraced all of what it thought of as the civilized world, as culturally stagnant because Rome's domination was uncontested. Its very success doomed Rome, Gibbon thought, to decline and fall.

Also complicating the picture is the existence of competing understandings of "order." An imperial order might look peaceful because it had succeeded in imposing what autocrats call "law and order"—an order in which states were not fighting one another but were nevertheless internally oppressive. In place of interstate violence, there might be violence in suppressing revolts or barbarian incursions, exterminating or enslaving indigenous peoples, or brutally policing subject populations. Within empires, wars between states become civil wars if the forces are evenly matched. Or they can take the form of grim oppression and silent genocide if not. One of the uses of history is to show how limited the abstractions of IR theory can be, whether they take the form of the democratic peace hypothesis or theories of international polarity.

Question: "The traditional understanding of state sovereignty on which the international legal order rests has been qualified but not discarded and its persistence confirms that the system it orders remains a system of states." This is the last sentence of the abstract of your 2019 article "The International Legal Order 1919–2019." Reading that sentence, we cannot avoid asking whether state-centric foreign policy preferences are better than cooperative actions that delegitimize state sovereignty. Especially, American foreign policies under Trump, such as withdrawing American participation in major international agreements, building a wall to prevent irregular migration, or refusing to cover its share of the costs of international organizations, are in effect efforts to destroy the liberal international order. Do you think that the system of states can support an alternative order or that it is just a way for powerful states to maintain their hegemony?

Terry Nardin: My article was about what is, not what should be. I'm not defending the states system, just observing that statements about its demise as a result of globalization are mistaken or at least premature. American foreign policy under Trump is stupid and immoral but I would not say that his government is supporting the system of states to advance American hegemony. That suggestion implies a degree of knowledge and rational intention that is manifestly lacking in the shambolic travesty of foreign policy emanating

from the Trump administration. One thing we can learn from the history of IR is that the states system has been defended recurrently against hegemony. One understanding of what used to be called "the balance of power" is that it was a policy states could pursue cooperatively to preserve their independence against subjugation by an ambitious imperial power. But the balance does not operate automatically, like the governor on a steam engine of a thermostat. Because it is a policy, it must be chosen. Sometimes there is "bandwagoning" instead of "balancing." Small states may align with a superior power, seeking the safety of being a client or vassal. This has been a recurrent pattern in east Asia, where Chinese hegemony has waxed and waned over the centuries but has seldom been successfully resisted, just as the balance of power—states combining to resist a potential hegemon, such as Spain under Philip II, France under Louis XIV and again under Napoleon, and Germany under Hitler—has been a recurrent pattern in Europe. International law tracks this history of European interstate relations. My point in the article was that despite globalization and talk of global problems and global constitutionalism, the world legal order today remains decentralized, an international rather than unified global order. It resembles the international legal order of the European past more than the confederal order imagined by Kant or the founders of the League of Nations or the United Nations.

Question: Your article "Humanitarian Intervention" in the *International Encyclopedia of Ethics* (2018) examines international interventions and the intentions that motivate them from a philosophical standpoint. You suggest that because "enforcement implies superiority, not equality," an intervening state cannot be said to "enforce" international law unless it is acting on the authority of the United Nations. Does this mean that unilateral humanitarian intervention can never be legitimate?

Terry Nardin: The problem lies in ambiguities of the words "enforce" and "legitimate." As a matter of law, enforcement means by those with authority to hold subjects to their legal obligations. If A wrongfully injures B, let's say by building a wall on B's land, B has the right to seek legal protection, perhaps by suing A for its removal and for damages. (I chose this example because landowners on the US border with Mexico have sued the federal government to prevent it from building sections of Trump's wall on their land.) B cannot retaliate by attacking A or damaging A's property. That would vigilantism, not enforcement. It would not be lawful and therefore not legitimate, if by legitimate we mean lawful.

In the case of humanitarian intervention—or, to use the currently favored expression, "the responsibility to protect"—authoritative enforcement does not address the problem when authority is contested or those with authority are unable to act. The United Nations could not act to prevent Serbian atrocities in Kosovo, which many think made it legitimate—morally justified—for

NATO to act. But NATO could not legally authorize itself or any of its members to intervene. Morally speaking, some think, it is wrong regardless of questions of legal authority to stand and watch while innocents are being slaughtered. There is a tension here between moral legitimacy and legal authority, between morality and law, that are obscured when we use an ambiguous word like "legitimate."

Question: Taking Syria as an example, though the Security Council has not authorized any state to intervene in that country, there is a broad international agreement on the importance of suppressing terrorism, and this seems to have legitimized American-supported military actions in Syria. Russia claims that it is the only state whose military presence is legitimate because it was invited by the Syrian government. Some claim that Assad's government is illegitimate because it is attacking its own people, and other neighboring states are assisting terrorists in Syria. However, it seems that a political solution is the only way to restore political stability. How, if that is the case, can American intervention be legitimate? Is this a case of might makes right?

Terry Nardin: To say that a government is illegitimate because it attacks its own people is to use the word legitimate in still another way. Here we are not describing its actions as illegitimate, either legally or morally, but the regime itself as illegitimate, which means that its authority is undeserved, that it has, in fact, no right to exist. On this view, an illegitimate government is no government at all. I don't want to come across as splitting hairs. Words are important and should be used to clarify distinctions, not obscure them. Talk about legitimacy is often political talk: disingenuous, designed to win arguments rather than state truths. It is important if we want to understand and explain, rather than merely to win political arguments, to be clear about what we are claiming and how we are using words to express those claims. What would it mean to "restore stability" in Syria? Supporting a murderous regime might end the civil war, but at what price? If repression continues, the stability or peace achieved might be, to quote Kant once again, the peace of the grave. Sometimes stability comes from stalemate, which may be the situation now in Syria with different parts of the country controlled by the government, Turkey, Kurdish insurgents, and others armed factions.

Question: It is sometimes argued that having either a bipolar or unipolar world system makes it easier to manage internal conflicts than a multipolar system such as ours that perpetuates national, regional, and international conflicts. Would you agree with the claim that respecting international law works best in a world system in which one or a few states are powerful enough to dictate the behavior of other states? Can you comment on the emerging multilateral world system that is replacing the bipolar and unipolar systems of the late twentieth century?

Terry Nardin: As I suggested earlier, polarity does not appear to explain much. There are several reasons for this.

First, conflicts (civil wars, terrorism, provincial revolts, labor strife, systematic police violence, and other kinds of oppression, etc.) can take many forms and are endemic in many societies.

Second, "polarity" is ill-defined. It's not clear that the international system was ever bipolar because a split between the Soviet Union and China started early and was obscured by ideologically driven perceptions of the Cold War as a war between communism and the "free world" (with quotation marks because the latter included many authoritarian regimes).

Third, we have reason to be skeptical about such generalizations because the polarity theories belong to a certain conception, now dominant, of the social sciences as an effort to explain historical contingencies in terms of empirical laws of human behavior. Nothing much has come of this scientific research program at the level of IR. Generalizations about the causes of war or about how the distribution of power internationally is related to internal conflicts, describe voluntary practices, not involuntary processes. They are not immutable; they are patterns of customary behavior that can and do change. The generalizations of social science are empirical in the sense that they are based on observation, but they are not natural laws: generalizations that are independent of time, place, and circumstances that represent the operation of invariant laws of human behavior. Such so-called scientific laws are more or less well-disguised descriptions of practices and institutions specific to particular historical situations. Perhaps the world has gotten more peaceful, as some argue. Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, in their book *The Internationalists*, argue that wars of territorial conquest have virtually disappeared since 1945. Others think that civil wars have increased in numbers and severity during this same period. There may well be patterns here. But the idea that these patterns, whatever they are, are necessary is illusory, as is the expectation that they can be counted on to persist into an indefinite future. This is pseudo-science, not science.

Question: The twenty-first century started with the 9/11 attacks on the world's superpower, followed by the global economic and refugee crises, and finally the coronavirus. All these abrupt and massive changes happened in just two decades. Based on these events, would you agree with us that states have failed to cooperate in managing core global security issues?

Terry Nardin: We should add global warming, a core global security issue that will become more urgent from year to year. States have cooperated more successfully on some issues than on others. Some might say that there have been successes in cooperatively managing terrorism and refugee problems but signal failures in managing the COVID-19 pandemic or many

aspects of climate change. But where is the source of the dysfunction? Is the international community to blame for failed American leadership or the success of authoritarian movements and regimes? Maybe their internal problems explain why states have been unable to cooperate more effectively. But something more profound and recalcitrant is at work here: our inability to put long-term above short-term goals, or a collective failure to prepare intelligently for events like a pandemic or catastrophic terrorist incident. For example, just-in-time logistics seems to make sense in "normal" times but in an epidemic can lead to catastrophic disruptions in supply chains relied upon to get personal protective equipment to hospitals. It seems pointless to wonder whether a different distribution of power in the international system could make any difference. Is a unified state more effective in solving big problems than a decentralized one? Sometimes yes, sometimes no. And there is a lot of wiggle room in what saying it means to solve a problem or even what counts as a problem. If someone would-be tyrant's strategy is to divide and conquer, sowing dissension and exacerbating problems is for them a solution, not a problem.

Question: In the US and EU, rising populism is seen as a menace to liberal democracies. From a constructivist perspective, populism must inevitably affect international politics. In these circumstances, how would you evaluate the future of world politics? Is it possible that the international world order is moving from hierarchical to anarchic order, reviving a realist perspective?

Terry Nardin: Populism is another name for, or another kind of, autocracy. Like other autocrats, populists have little respect for moral or legal limits. We could call that lack of respect political realism, but that would do a disservice to realists, not all of whom would be autocrats or defenders of autocracy. Political realism in one form or another emerged in the ancient world and never vanished. You can find it in ancient Chinese and Brahmanical texts, in Thucydides, in European doctrines of reason of state and emergency powers, and, of course, in contemporary international discourses. Realist arguments have been used to justify both hierarchy and resistance to hierarchy in the anarchical society of states. A hegemonic empire is just a big state that can rationalize its actions with realist arguments just as easily as individual states in a decentralized international system can rationalize theirs. Populism or other kinds of authoritarianism might invite realist justification, but even liberal democracies that adhere to the rule of law recognize exceptions to law in emergencies. So, again, there are no easy generalizations, no answers without qualifications, no laws of history or human behavior on which to base confident predictions.

Question: The coronavirus pandemic has shaken the liberal international order because most states are focused on their own interests, and we have heard that third parties have confiscated several medical cargos. Could you

give us your insights about the future of the EU and perhaps the world after the pandemic?

Terry Nardin: Sorry, no, that would be a prediction, which I've just said is futile. Sometimes disaster tears people apart and sometimes it brings them together. It is certainly one lesson of the pandemic that viruses do not respect national boundaries. We live in one world in relation to this and many other aspects of our increasingly unsustainable human order. It's not clear to me that IR theory has much to contribute to figuring out how humanity is going to deal with the grave and multiplying challenges it faces.

Question: We might not be able to cover all the issues which are important to you, so let us close by inviting you to share your biggest concern about world politics in our era.

Terry Nardin: I hope you will forgive me for challenging the premises that underlie some of your questions. I hope that you can agree that it makes for unexpected and perhaps interesting answers. I've been teaching and writing for many decades now and am not the specialist in IR or political theory that I once was. As one ages, one sometimes outgrows the preoccupations of one's discipline and even one's younger self. You might say that my approach has become more multidisciplinary, but that is increasingly common across the academic world. The changes we call globalization might have contributed to this. For solutions to problems of world order, we now look beyond the disciplines of IR or political science. But also need to understand, not simply to act. And to understand the world, we need to look beyond the practical disciplines to history and philosophy, to the sciences and arts. Sometimes our concern with solving practical problems leads us to a narrow focus on what is important, as if the desire for knowledge is driven by curiosity rather than practical need were unimportant. But we won't be better off if the liberal arts are dismissed as irrelevant in an age of existential challenges and are marginalized or even suppressed in the same economic advantage or political order. As for world politics, we must try to make it better, but we must also not give up on trying to make sense of it. We like to think we are actors, but often we are merely spectators, and it is hubris to think otherwise.

CONVERSATION WITH PROFESSOR THOMAS G. WEISS

Question: You have extensively contributed to global governance and United Nations literature. Your research is now among the must-read works for those who are studying IR. We would like to ask you what really triggered you to work on these issues and, importantly what really kept you working

on them so much. It would be great if you could just share your several moments with us.

Thomas G. Weiss: When I finished Harvard College, the Vietnam War was raging, and I was a conscientious objector. I worked at Riker's Island Prison as a Volunteer in Service to America (a domestic Peace Corps). That experience introduced me to the importance of systems—everything is related to everything else, from the local communities in the Bronx to the Department of Corrections, to the State of New York, to Washington, and, ultimately, to the planet's biosphere. By the time that I entered Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School to study domestic politics, I had altered my perspective; I simply had to use analytical lenses from the local to the global. So, my focus became IR and more specifically organized efforts to solve problems collectively through international organizations and law.

I like to write and have always found the time to do so—even when I was a United Nations official and not supposed to! I also have had the luxury of holding academic posts that had modest teaching requirements at both Brown University and the CUNY Graduate Center, which afforded me the time to pursue field research and ideas that interested me.

I also have had the good fortune to be able to collaborate with colleagues and friends—including mentors and former students. The academy does not reward enough social scientists who collaborate; supposedly only those who isolate themselves in stacks and struggle on their own with abstract theory are welcomed to the sacred ranks of tenured faculty. Of course, that is not what characterizes the best work in the natural sciences, and so social sciences too should acknowledge that two (or more) heads can be better than one.

Question: As you have mostly researched, the United Nations and its departments are mostly considered as an international mechanism for global governance, and we have to admit that it has been successfully operated in several international conflicts. In this century, a significant discussion on the viability of the United Nations began, and some criticize the United Nations and the structure of the Security Council and the general assembly over incompetence to lead the bilateral and multilateral disagreements among the states. What do you think about this discussion? Is it because nations of the world lose their trust in the UN, or is it the structure of the United Nations is not suitable for millennium dynamics among the states?

Thomas G. Weiss: Most criticism has focused on the obvious disconnect between the membership and operating principles of the Security Council—established in 1945 to reflect a different world and different set of major powers. We can all agree that 1945 is not 2020 and that the membership and procedures of the council should reflect today not seventy-five years ago. The devil, as always, is in the details, and all of the proposals for change cause as many problems as they solve. The United Nations emphasizes process more

than results. Somehow, if the process is right the outcome will be as well. In addition, there is the "small" problem that the five permanent members have a veto over any change, and neither their governments nor parliaments would agree to diminish their relative organizational status and power. In the lead-up to the sixtieth anniversary, I wrote an article that the Security Council would not change in my lifetime. I have been correct to date and given my advancing age . . . .

For the sixtieth anniversary, and given the German origins of my family name, Germany's permanent representative in New York was none too happy. I kept telling him that I was not justifying just explaining world politics, and that he should not shoot the messenger.

Question: The middle powers or developing states have proved that they are quite eager to take responsibility for international issues, and their numbers are increasing. Together with their involvements, there are now too many different perspectives for world affairs. When they feel disregarded or disqualified in terms of economic, diplomatic, and military power, they are not just raising their voices but also expressing their discomfort regarding the world order. Under these circumstances, what are your thoughts on the adjustment of developing countries or the middle powers into global governance?

Thomas G. Weiss: Middle powers have an important role and often punch above their weight. The Nordic countries, for instance, have played a disproportionate role in determining policies and priorities for development assistance. Canada led the way for the International Criminal Court and Land-mines Treaty, and also for the process leading to the Responsibility to Protect. And of course, the emerging powers from the Global South are playing a growing rhetorical and actual role in many arenas. That said, the reported death of the influence of major powers has been premature!

Question: The Arab Spring has brought significant hope for the people of the Middle East and also of the World that military-origin powers, dynasties, and lifetime rulers are no longer legitimate in national and international politics. However, most claim that the Arab Spring has turned to the Arab winter as people's demands have not been applied or sustained in power. Rather than delegitimate such rulers or powers in the Middle East, most of the leading countries in the West (Europe and the US) have been reluctant to support peoples' demands but willing to accept them. Do you agree that supporting oppositions demanding more democracy is a sort of humanitarian issue that the international community should respond to? If not, could you please specify why?

Thomas G. Weiss: The Pollyanna belief in a rapid worldwide transition to democracy that accompanied the end of the Cold War has been replaced by a more sober appreciation for the difficulties of moving in that direction. The backsliding in Hungary and Poland, for instance, illustrates that "winter"

is not a season only in the Middle East, but far more widely. Indeed, I am uneasy about the support for the language and tactics of Trump as well as his equivalents in Brazil, the Philippines, and right-wing cabals elsewhere. The new nationalisms are a dispiriting and dangerous development.

Question: As an extension of the previous question, could you please speak with us more about the dilemma on the right to protect and sovereignty of states in terms of humanitarian interventions? Is it really humanitarian or just a pursuit of national interests of world powers?

Thomas G. Weiss: Let me quote something from an oral history that I did with Sir Brian Urquhart: "My dear Tom, the central problem is that the United Nations is the last bastion of national sovereignty." He was lamenting the world organization's inability to rescue desperate human beings caught in the crosshairs of violence and violations of their human rights. The reason? Their presidents, princes, and prime ministers claimed what they did was exclusively their business. For decades, United Nations member states agreed.

In the last three decades, however, the international community of states occasionally, but not systematically or consistently, has applied the "responsibility to protect" and revoked the license for mass murder claimed by sovereign thugs. In addition, states have agreed to limit their prerogatives through international treaties, some 560 of which are deposited at the United Nations. Moreover, for financial transfers, technology, and information, states are powerless to halt some invasions.

In short, sovereignty is not quite what it used to be, and those of us who are preoccupied with normative developments point proudly to paragraphs 138 to 139 about R2P as the signature success story of the 2005 World Summit. On the one hand, that is true. Cosmopolitanism is compelling normatively, and R2P is an important step to try and remove mass atrocities as policy options for sovereign thugs.

However, the summit could do nothing to change the geopolitical reality that "never again" is an inaccurate description of the impact of the 1948 Genocide Convention—"here we go again" is closer to the truth in Sudan and Syria, just as it was in Rwanda. There are limits to analysis and advocacy when there is neither the political will nor the operational capacity among major powers to implement the new R2P norm.

Today, the main challenge for R2P is how to act, not how to build additional normative consensus. The shibboleth of western imperialism, of course, continues to have resonance and distract, overlooking the foundations across the Global South on which to build a case for robust humanitarian action. In this regard, the support for outside intervention in Libya from the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Islamic Conference, and eventually the African Union is noteworthy, as was the military participation of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Although some critics lament that R2P provides

a humanitarian veneer for powerful states to justify military intervention—a "Trojan Horse" is the usual image—the opposite has been the case. Countries with capabilities look for excuses to do nothing.

Libya should clarify for policy-and decision-makers that between 1999 and 2011 we hardly witnessed too much military intervention to protect human beings but, rather, nothing significant. The international action against Libya was not about bombing for democracy, sending messages to Iran, implementing regime change, keeping oil prices low, or pursuing narrow interests. These may have resulted, but the dominant motivation for using military force was to protect civilians. As a result, Muammar el-Qaddafi's "model" for repression can no longer automatically be interpreted as an acceptable approach for other autocratic regimes, although that precedent has been diminished by the lack of commitment to post-intervention peacebuilding.

Question: We would like to ask a question in practical terms. Taking the Syrian Crisis as a case, there is no Security Council decision to intervene, but the global fight on terror seems legitimized by international interventions led by the US. Moreover, Russia claims that it is the only state whose military presence is legitimate because of being called by the Syrian government. Also, several states claiming that the Assad Regime is illegitimate because it has been bombing its own people, whereas some others argue neighboring states are assisting terrorists in Syria. However, they all argue that a peaceful political solution is the only way to maintain political stability. What we are trying to picture is that, as you argued in your article, whether or not an intervention is legitimate in terms of international law, benefactors' decisions are the ultimate determinant. Under this circumstance, do not you think that international law is the law of powerful states as they only have the power to implement it?

Thomas G. Weiss: International politics, law, organization, development all reflect the reality that the decibel level of pronouncements by and impact of actions by major powers always dominate. Russia does what Russia can get away with doing in Syria, which is what the West did in Libyan and China does in the South China Sea. The biggest gap in global governance consists of the difference between rhetoric and reality; there is no mechanism to enforce norms or even international conventions without the political will to do so. Everyone agreed that 1994 Rwanda was a genocide in real time. Despite the 1948 Convention, nothing happened. Raphael Lemkin would be appalled but not surprised.

Question: We would like to direct your attention to the world system. It is claimed that during the bipolar and unipolar world system, to solve or at least cool down, the internal conflict has been easier than the multipolar world as we are now. That is why, recent national, regional, or international issues are prolonging without a solution. Would you argue that keeping international law

as the most effective world system, in which the leading powers are clear and powerful, is enough to make states act in a certain way? We also would like to have your comments on the emergence of the multilateral world system.

Thomas G. Weiss: There is no question that we are in a multipolar world. The somewhat reassuring, in retrospect, bipolarity of the Cold War lasted forty-five years, whereas the unipolar moment was just that—a decade, which is trivial in historical terms. The current "moment" is likely to last for a longer time with Chinese, US, and EU zones of influence along with more local control by other actors (e.g., Brazil, India, or Indonesia) exerting their leverage in more modest ways.

Question: The twenty-first century started with a challenge against the superpower of the world, 9/11 attacks in the US, experienced a massive global economic crisis, followed by discussions on the death of multiculturalism, and ISIS terror, refugee issues in the western world and finally coronavirus. All these rapid and effective changes happened in just two decades. Based on this course of events, would you agree with us if we boldly claim that international society is failed to cooperate in core global security issues?

Thomas G. Weiss: The fiction of the "international community" is just that—there is no community of "peace-loving states." However, the English School's notion of international society captures well the fact that there is a partial codification of norms and behavior that is an improvement on the law of the jungle. The weaknesses of that society, however, are very much in evidence worldwide, for global security certainly, but also for the global economy or global environment.

Question: Since the concept of international regime (liberal international order) emerged and prevailed in the IR discipline, economic and democratic developments have gone too far to substantiate liberal international order. With being a democratizing force, the West has played an important role in the transformation from autocracies to democracies in the Balkans, Central and east Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. However, recent developments indicate a reverse in that mission as Europe wants to keep Iran in line about nuclear issues and America seems to be ready to make a deal with the Taliban in Afghanistan and North Korea and has good relations with Saudis. Do you think that the western powers are happy with autocratic regimes at the national level as long as they serve security and stability rather than liberty? Do you think that a normative international law has expired and a new era of national interest, as realist terms, has started?

Thomas G. Weiss: Authoritarian regimes can be helpful, or viewed as such, by so-called democratic states of the West. Those states often purport to oppose authoritarian regimes, and sometimes they actually mean it! But not if vital interests get in the way. Realism typically trumps idealism, and this generalization applies to the Global South as well. This is hardly a new

era, but a continuation of politics as usual, or perhaps a return after a brief moment when a few of us actually thought that we were moving toward a more humane set of considerations to guide public policy.

Question: Current domestic politics in the US and the EU are mostly part of academic discussion about rising populism, and this is considered as a menace to liberal democracies. From the constructivist approach, it is imperative that national populist movements will affect international politics. Under these circumstances, how would you evaluate the future of world politics? Is it possible that the international world order is taking a path from hierarchical to anarchic order, especially from realist and structuralist perspectives?

Thomas G. Weiss: I certainly hope that we are not moving backward too quickly, but the new nationalisms and new populisms are a menace to democracies as well as autocracies, and to the planet as well. There is no need to espouse any particular theoretical perspective, just take a look at the newspaper.

Question: Since Trump came to power, the US has been withdrawing from major international agreements, which are components of the international liberal order. In this sense, America is cutting financial supports for international organizations in case they decided against US foreign policy preferences. It might be jumping to a conclusion, but still, we would like to ask whether or not these cases are degenerating the core nature of international order, which is not experiencing a transformation to something else.

Thomas G. Weiss: While the UN's performance leaves much to be desired, it has made substantial contributions to world order. Indeed, the world body has become so embedded in today's international system that it is taken for granted.

That danger has become ever more evident since the contested election of Donald Trump, a man intent on destroying the rules-based international order for which the United Nations is a keystone, an order that the United States, despite lapses and inconsistencies, has championed and sustained. His freezing of US funding for the World Health Organization (WHO) in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic was merely his most recent foray in his siege on multilateralism. Trump routinely sneers at international cooperation. In a zero-sum ideology, partners and allies are for dummies. Sustained collaboration for mutual benefit is not something he believes in or does. Ever.

Trump uttered the "S" word, "sovereignty," twenty-one times in his first General Assembly address. His mantra was well-received by such "champions" of human rights as Russia, China, Myanmar, Venezuela, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Cuba. They customarily emphasize sacrosanct sovereignty in order to ward off criticism. That is no longer necessary because the US has issued a permission slip to proceed as they wish.

There is no need to be a Barack Obama groupie to recognize the stark contrast. His first address to the General Assembly in 2009 referred to "sovereignty" once, which reaffirmed Washington's commitment to cooperation in the national interest. If Biden addresses the General Assembly in 2021, that more historically grounded US position will again emanate from the podium.

The administration's chauvinism, contempt for international cooperation, and assertion of the power of one to address global problems fly in the face of contemporary problem-solving. They also ignore that the United Nations has made a difference. The namesake of Trump's efforts was the America First Committee, which was the shortest-lived anti-war group ever, founded in 1940 by proto-fascists Charles Lindberg, Henry Ford, and Father Charles Coughlin to keep the United States out of the Second World War. It disappeared less than a year later in December 1941, and the United Nations Alliance emerged the next month. Trump's "America First" has not collapsed as yet. It will, although hopefully without the equivalent incentive of a Pearl Harbor.

The current US administration thus ignores the totally opposite approach to calculating Washington's national interest to counter the existential threat from 1942 to 1945. The signing of the Declaration by the United Nations on January 1, 1942, committed the Allies to multilateralism to crush Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in the short term, and to maintain international peace and prosperity over the longer term. That commitment was evident for the European, Asian, and African fronts as it was for the intergovernmental organizations of what would become the United Nations system.

As host for the San Francisco conference that led to the signing of the United Nations Charter and the first country to ratify it, the creation of the United Nations system was not peripheral but central to US decision-making about how best to pursue vital interests. One might have expected the fall-out from the failed League of Nations and the US refusal to participate to have produced Hobbes on steroids. Yet, those overseeing the Allied war machine—in Washington, Whitehall, and elsewhere—and contemplating the future were resolute: multilateralism and the rule of law, not going-it-alone and the law of the jungle, should underpin the post-war order. In fact, the bleakest contrast was with the Third Reich and the Japanese Empire, which epitomized the right of might and the pursuit of lawlessness.

The bottom line was straightforward. The solution was not 1914 minus—that is, before the First World War and without even a toothless League of Nations—but rather 1918 plus. Unfortunately, the Trump administration has forgotten this lesson—assuming that any of its members ever studied history.

Question: If you agree, such transformation is happening, then how do you place humanitarian, cultural, social, democratic, and international

nongovernmental organizations within this transformation? Do you think that they are powerful enough to reverse, prevent or slow it down?

Thomas G. Weiss: The field of global governance arose to reflect more accurately both growing interdependence and the growing proliferation of non-state actors. The growth in numbers of NGOs, as well as TNCs, and of their resources and influence is noteworthy. That said, we should be cognizant of the limitations of non-state actors. By themselves, they cannot eliminate poverty, fix global warming, or halt mass murder. Governments need to take their responsibilities seriously. NGOs can—as they have historically—play not only a significant but also a greater role in shaping international public policy and monitoring commitments.

Question: We would like to ask a question about COVID-19 in relation to your argument that modern society and politics are sacrificing their planet for their way of life and national security, respectively. Conspiracy theories are getting hits about whether or not the coronavirus is intentionally invented and spread to the world by someone or a state. That might stand as conspiracy, but we hope you would agree with us that the virus is a result of human beings' historical fight for power and security against each other. Based on your extensive research and experience, how do you think the virus influences urgent needs to cooperate during such a global biological hazard? Will sovereign states, especially developed ones, be ready to consent to more global cooperation or just get back to where they were after the virus is beaten?

Thomas G. Weiss: The COVID-19 pandemic etched in stark relief the extent of human interdependence and the urgent need for global cooperation at a moment when enthusiasm for it is in short supply amidst deteriorating Washington-Beijing relations, Brexit, and nationalist populisms. With a global depression brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic, the planet will remain hard-pressed to respond to current and future threats without greater collaboration across borders and more robust intergovernmental institutions. The growing US-China competition for global leadership and the rise of the digital age have ushered in paradigm shifts in how we work, communicate, and think in a complex, interconnected, and anxious world. Amidst the turmoil of 2020, people worldwide are suffering from what Alvin Toffler described a half-century ago in his blockbuster *Future Shock*—populations disoriented, dislocated, and stressed from rapid social, economic, and technological upheavals.

A lethal pandemic has fundamentally challenged both contemporary thinking about global governance—its constitutive elements, internal constitution, and outcomes—as well as how it can be improved. In the midst of an economic calamity and fears about additional waves of COVID-19, it is hard to imagine that one needs to make the case for urgently rethinking global problem-solving. But we do because current efforts, in both the scholarly and

policy worlds, are too tethered to the constraints of the contemporary international system—including the feeble United Nations system. The world has figuratively if not literally shut down. But the twenty-first century is not the nineteenth or twentieth; there will not be significantly less interdependence and globalization, and certainly not fewer pandemics. The most urgent task thus is to reinforce the United Nations system's crumbling foundations.

The next few decades are likely to bring unprecedented economic, political, social, health, and ecological upheavals; they will bring opportunities and complications. New evidence and new insights necessitate calling into question shibboleths about what works and what does not. We should recall one of my favorite quotes reportedly made by John Maynard Keynes. When asked about inconsistencies in his thinking, he replied "When I get new information, I change my views. What do you do, Sir?"

Question: We might not be able to cover all the issues that are important to you, but we do not want to miss a critical question. As a closing question, we would like to learn what your prime concern about world politics is.

Thomas G. Weiss: At the end of a long career devoted to researching and teaching the crucial importance and potential of cooperation across borders to solve global problems, it is disheartening to view the crumbling foundations of the institutional structures that grew out of the Second World War, the ones to which I have devoted my professional life to improving. Despite the COVID-19 disaster, multilateralism gets lost amidst mind-numbing national concerns. Multilateralism was totally absent in the November 2018 midterm elections as in the 2016 presidential campaign and in debates by Democratic aspirants. Its defense simply has to become a priority for the presumed Democratic candidate, Joe Biden.

The "Age of Trump" looms large. While the forty-fifth US president is an aberration, he is not unique. In addition to Brexit, other nativist "ages" abound: of Jair Bolsonaro, Vladimir Putin, Recep Erdoğan, Xi Jinping, Narendra Modi, Rodrigo Duterte, Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi, Nicolás Maduro, Viktor Orbán, and other populist cabals. There are more similarities than differences between Washington's stance and "Russia First" or "Brazil First" or "China First."

The UN's history of challenges leads us to conclude with the oft-cited remark attributed to Dag Hammarskjöld: "It has been said, that the United Nations was not created in order to bring us to heaven, but in order to save us from hell." The United Nations is one reason that we are not in the netherworld already. A world without it is, alas, not impossible if current political conditions continue or deteriorate.

We would like to thank you for your sincere answers and time.

NOTES

1. Some of the material in this interview is drawn from the book titled *The Idea of Civilization and the Making of the Global Order*, which was published by Bristol University Press and reproduced with the publisher's approval.

2. Nye, J., (2016), "The Danger of a Weak Europe," Project Syndicate, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/danger-of-a-week-europe-by-joseph-s--nye-2016-01?barrier=accesspaylog (accessed on April 6, 2020).

3. See https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/04/covid-19-how-spanish-flu-changed-world/.

Conclusion

Rahman Dağ and Özgür Tüfekçi

A quest for transformation has existed since the day human beings adopted a collective way of life and since the formation of civilizations. There have been conflicts between individuals, communities, and tribes and between states and nations from small-scale conflicts to larger wars.

As civilizations developed, science and technology progressed, and transportation and communication opportunities between countries increased, the world started to get smaller. The "interest" and "influence" areas of countries increased, so "aggressive" and "imperialist" ambitions grew. In addition, regional powers and countries formed defense and attack pacts among themselves against the common enemy. Countries that understood they could not mean anything "alone" no matter how strong they were tried to join their forces with other countries.

While approximately eighteen million people lost their lives in the First World War, the Second World War caused the death of more than thirty-five million people. Two successive all-out wars, millions of wounded widows and orphans, ruined cities and destroyed civilizations, declining prosperity, poverty, hunger, and misery, resulted in massive extinction and socioeconomic conditions that hit rock bottom. This sad picture has been a good lesson for humanity. For this reason, with the new process that started in the 1950s, countries can no longer risk war easily and, instead, prefer to resolve conflicts through reconciliation as much as possible. Therefore, with the end of the Second World War, large-scale wars seemed to have ended. However, the conflict of interest will continue to exist as in the past. Only the face and nature of the wars have changed. Since then, humanity has experienced several trends and transformations.

Terry Nardin's answers to our questions remind us to admit that the international relations (IR) discipline might not be adequate to fully grasp world politics, which contains people, individuals, systems, states, and various actors and requires a multidisciplinary approach. The conceptual map for

what is legitimate and lawful and what is not tricks us while interpreting and explaining singular events in world politics. The essence of our questions appears to us to connotate too many given ideas and focuses on getting something from these prominent scholars about whether there is a systemic earthquake in world politics, expecting them to agree with us. In general, his insights clearly indicate that even though there is a systemic relation (he does not approve of the polarity approach) in world politics, we cannot forget that states are also a systemic political unit. The prevailing impression on changing world politics stems from the internal political, economic, social, and cultural deviations in both leading and challenging states. In reality, specific and practical issues, such as irregular migration, climate change, terrorism, civil wars in Yemen and Syria, and Russia's interventions in the affairs of its neighbors are all internationally influential events that pull states' reactions to them and so eventually to world politics.

For this reason, as in the introductory chapter, we are going to deal with the main issues, concepts, and changes through the interviewees' approaches in this conclusion. Now we will summarize major points raised by these prominent IR scholars on these issues to see what they think of trends and transformation in world politics.

To start with, Thomas G. Weiss acknowledged the current world system is already multipolar and the power struggle to dominate is ongoing. In his words, "The fiction of the 'international community' is just that—there is no community of 'peace-loving states.' However, the English School's notion of international society captures well the fact that there is a partial codification of norms and behavior that is an improvement on the law of the jungle." Therefore, despite us already being in a multipolar world, new norms and basics have not yet been established and acknowledged by the members of the world system. The normative struggle among the possible poles at national and international levels has been in operation, though to reevaluate current international law (regardless of what it is), and this leads us to trends in redefining terms in the ways that suit national and international interests of possible leading actors best.

UNREST IN WORLD POLITICS: EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AT NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS

The systemic structure of world politics has a tremendous effect on the states' domestic and foreign policies. Once there is a power vacuum or the inadequacy of a leading power surfaces in world politics, it is inevitable that this would be seen by the others and they would initiate their own strategies

to fill the gaps in accordance with their own national interests. That is why= unrest in world politics has become a common feature. And an understanding has been widely accepted that there is a transformation to a multipolarity at the global and regional levels among equals and discrepancies.

In this sense, Nicholas Onuf approaches this understanding from another perspective and points out that capitalism has run its course. Its generative power, manifested in centuries of exponential material growth, has finally exceeded the planet's carrying capacity. We have run out of cheap technological fixes. We have already begun down a trajectory of exponential down growth. Social unrest will increase dramatically. Desperate state agents will join forces with functional experts to authorize digital surveillance, mind-numbing entertainment, and the pharmaceutical pacification of noisy, unhappy publics.

In contrast, Andrew Moravcsik devalued the rise of populist movements all over the world—most importantly in the European Union (EU) and the United States since he thinks that they are politically and socially too weak to determine the course of a state or a government. On the other hand, prominent political and urban geographer Katharyne Mitchell pays more attention to the rise of authoritarian populist movements that dignify their mighty positions in history. The reason we have brought these opposing arguments is not to just counter these two prominent thinkers. The actual reason is that mainstream political parties that are against populist ideas and policies have been influenced by populist movements and demands, as they have to keep their share of votes or at least not lose that share in favor of populist movements or oppositions. What this means is that even though populist movements and political parties do not have adequate electorate support to get the power but have much more influence on discourse and policies of ruling and main opposition parties. In sum, as Katharyne Mitchell suggests, the more people feel they are symbolically, emotionally, and actually dislocated, the more populist movements and demands influence mainstream politics. Additionally, the level of irregular migrations from Latin America to the United States, from the Middle East and North Africa region to Europe has been instrumentalized by populist movements and political parties that legitimize nationalist policies through international and multilateral policies. That is also challenging the core liberal ideals of the international order. Once, it was free movement of capital, labor, and services, which is considered the liberal motto of the West, but now it seems that labor and services are being removed from the motto.

DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

Andrew Linklater emphasizes the relation between normative domains and power in international politics in dichotomies of "national and international responsibilities," "nation-states and internationalism," and "global politics and national loyalties." This suggests that there have been a deviation and evolution in the consistency of norms and power starting within social groups in modern states. His argument of "when people fear something, they approach the state as a political unit for survival" is quite meaningful in explaining the rise of current leftist and rightist populist movements in the developed Western world. However, they might not be powerful enough to change the global international order, especially globalized economic, political, and social relations. This brings us to the dichotomy of, as Linklater suggests, national and international responsibilities.

In this sense, it can be argued that there is a deviation in the line of liberal social structure to the nation-state and then to international order. That is actually critical in determining the trends and transformation in world politics for developed and developing countries. In other words, the current liberal international order is, in fact, under threat that originates from social, political, and economic relations and changing roles in developed Western states, which have been responsible for founding and maintaining. Additionally, the alternative world order, represented by China, Russia, Turkey, and emerging, developing countries, is waiting for an opportunity to take over or to establish a brand new order.

Stephan Haggard focuses on the political economies in developing countries, and he advises that economic development requires stable and enduring institutions together with democratic initiatives. However, he does not believe that this is the only way and that there might be alternative paths toward economic development for developing countries, which are not totally fine with the existing international order. In this perspective, democratic and liberal Western states do not have to be absolutely idealistic on economic relations and can be pragmatists—also, developing states do not have to be totally democratic to get on the path to development. This dichotomy might weaken the robust idea of the relations between democracy (the rule of law) and economic development but could be carried to the scope of power politics through the representation of political systems.

These arguments might seem too bold to claim. Yet, to Richard Sakwa, China has a distinctive world view that seeks to integrate itself into the institutions founded by liberal ideas and goes for other developing countries. From these depictions, it is possible to see that there is an ongoing transformation in world politics that is heading toward an uncertain destination.

In parallel, taking Ira William Zartman's and Gerard Toal's answers into consideration, political disorder and conflicts in various locations—such as Georgia, the South China Sea, Ukraine, Syria, Yemen, and, most recently, Nagorno-Karabakh—are increasing in number. These areas are becoming instruments of great power politics with the involvement of regional, subnational, political, and armed groups. The participation of more and more actors in these conflicts has been making them more unsolvable as the gap in the power balance of involved parties has been gradually closing.

When it comes to the structure of the international system, Robert Jervis does not think that the world is fully multipolar. According to him, China is still a regional power more than a world power, and Europe, unfortunately, remains disunited. Robert Jervis's answers to our questions can be taken as supportive points with the context of the book, as there is a trend for transformation in world politics, but he has reservations regarding the idea that this transformation has already led to a multipolar world system. He thinks that China falls short when compared with the capabilities of the United States and that the EU could not continue its unitary position and follow certain foreign and even domestic policies. However, he actually presented his impression that the Trump presidency removed the dust layered on the crucial issues in transatlantic relations and in the world in general. To reset an embedded international order, he underlined a multilateralist approach to get over the issues in world politics. That requires a more inclusive multilateral approach that has to accommodate challenging powers in world politics and international institutions.

Touching upon multilateralism, Simon Dalby uses his decades-long academic experience to highlight to what extent people and states have degraded the world ecosystem. The more people and states close their borders and cease their cooperation, the more international environmental security is at stake. A trend seeking for great power status or regional and international power politics does not seem to bring us that multilateralism to deal with global environmental security. This is summarized by Simon Dalby in the following:

> But regional and global rivalries among states are a major obstacle to progress on numerous other matters, and this failure to update notions of national security to deal with common dangers is a notable problem in thinking about global governance. To put the matter bluntly, our task as scholars now is to convince policymakers and public and corporate decision-makers that the tasks that matter now are about to share a crowded world rather than dominating a divided one.

EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY

In association with the migration, changing identity formation, regional context, and loosened borders, Anssi Paasi mentions "a conceptual triangle with border, region/territory, and identity" that he works on. These concepts, as he suggests, enlarged the literature on national identities and regionalism in fast-changing world politics. These spearheading changes led to the redefinition of these concepts and, in practice, ideals of nation-states and regions. The common idea that there is a power and capital flow from the West to the East is reflecting that there is a trend causing a transformation in everything we know from the twentieth century. From a meso-geographic perspective, the subdivision of Asia into Eurasia, central Asia, and Southeast Asia in terms of economic, political, social, and cultural aspects suggests that there is an ongoing identity formation that will take its place in IR and political science literature. This process does not have to be planned and precisely implemented since changes in, as touched upon in the introductory chapter, the way of doing politics and the concept of sovereignty could naturally lead this process at elite and state levels.

Empirically, a range of sovereignty claims, settlements, and movements as well as a wide arrangement of institutions corresponding to different levels of sovereignty and administration have been witnessed in post-Soviet Eurasia and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Anssi Paasi claims that they also emphasize the imagined, moral geographies that divide space according to "civilizational" lines (Europe versus Asia, West versus East, civilization versus barbarianism, etc.) and concludes that the evolution of Eurasian institutions, norms, rules, and laws remains a work in progress. Of course, the passage between democracy and autocracy also comes into play in many states, similar to religious powers and the roles of ethnic and religious groupings and nationalisms.

When it comes to risk, security, and sovereignty relations, Michael Williams's perspective is that, given the tight connections that exist between security, fear, and sovereignty, they are unlikely to be issues that can be handled at a technocratic level alone—however, many governments may repeat the mantra of "trusting the science." According to Williams, one of the most important and interesting dimensions of contemporary politics is thus the way that risk and security are related, sometimes staying separate (as in driving a car needing to be seen as an acceptable risk for social and economic life to continue) or becoming part of a continuum where risk and security are linked in the process of intensification and deintensification, moving as an object of political contestation and policy between risk and security.

THE WAY OF INTERACTIONS WITH OTHERS

Andrew Moravcsik's answers to our questions suggest an opposite stance to the main context of the book, arguing that we missed the actual point. He rightly reminds us that there is no direct contradiction between national interest, economic interdependence, and global governmentality. The reason states prefer cooperation also stems from national interests—that is right. However, once the states envisage that their national interests are better served once they individually act rather than following the policy made by international organizations, then interdependency might not seem cost-efficient.

Giving the Ukraine crisis as an example, Andrew Moravcsik argues that the EU usefully managed the situation by keeping Ukraine in line with European ideals and did not allow it to be fully controlled by Russia. From this perspective, by using interdependency, European institutional sanctions against Russia, and foreign aids to Ukraine, he suggests that there is still an international liberal order run by Western values, institutions, and power in place and operating as usual.

In sum, by mentioning China as a third superpower, along with the EU and the United States, but the weakest one, he does not totally close the door for a transformation to multipolarity but evaluates it for further future. However, Joseph Nye thinks that the EU is not investing enough in its hard power and that its soft power over the conflicts in its near abroad has been reducing. Additionally, not in the far future but for quite some time, transnational issues such as "financial flows, terrorist groups, climate change, and of course, pandemics" require a multilateral approach that is definitely not limited to the EU and the United States. That is an idealist and a naive statement that everyone can agree on. The problem, as in the context of the book, is how this multilateralism would be organized via international institutions that are like the colosseum where great powers present their strength. That is why, regardless of who is to be in charge, a couple of adequately powerful states have to agree on certain issues leading them to act together, and the rest would follow. That might sound like an anarchic or hierarchic perception of world politics, but the more disagreements, the more international issues are turned to be unattended.

While Moravcsik and Nye explain interactions with others from an empirical viewpoint, Nicholas Onuf theorizes about social relations as follows: Realists like to emphasize the occasions in which states' agents choose not to abide by this or that rule, typically offering what they call compelling reasons for doing so. Who would deny that there are such occasions and that they matter a great deal? Liberal institutionalists emphasize the ordered pattern of social relations that emerge when agents follow thick blankets of

rules that favor their joint needs and interests. Who would deny the extent of such ordered patterns in the social relations of every domain, including international relations? Honoring a Marxist legacy, many post-structuralist and post-colonial scholars emphasize resistance to conditions of rule, given the asymmetric consequences of following rules in place. While the beneficiaries of standing social arrangements tend to resist resistance and counter-violence with violence, who can deny that resistance results in new patterns of rules and altered conditions of rule? Constructivists can accommodate all such emphases and their normative underpinnings because the kind of rule-oriented constructivism is not a theory, and it does not require any particular normative stance to justify its use as a frame of reference.

RISING NUMBER OF NUCLEAR POWERS

The number of nuclear powers is a significant issue for world politics. In this sense, the Iran deal is a quite contradictory issue. Robert Jervis asserts that he supported that agreement, published two articles about it, and organized an ad in *The New York Times* urging the Senate to support it (or at least not reject it). He mentions that while it didn't alter many aspects of Iran's policy, perhaps in part because the economic benefits Iran had expected were not fully forthcoming, it did keep Iran a safe distance from nuclear weapons.

Jervis also makes an assumption on how the Iran deal has divided Europeans and the United States regarding the way the international system works as follows:

> When Trump withdrew, I had expected that the Europeans would maintain some of their economic relations with Iran, especially since they had agreed to make many concessions to the United States and were led to believe that these would be sufficient for Trump to stay in the agreement. I underestimated the importance of the US market and its control of the world financial system and overestimated the strength of the Europeans' desire to play an independent role in world politics. So, while the Europeans want Iran to uphold its side of the bargain, they have not been willing to pay the high price that would have been entailed by defying the United States and offering Iran significant inducement to stay in.

Regarding the spread of nuclear weapons, Robert Jervis claims that although proliferation has so far proceeded much more slowly than almost all political leaders and analysts predicted, if North Korea enlarges its arsenal and makes nuclear threats and Iran gets nuclear weapons, the incentives for neighbors to follow them will be strong. On this issue, he assumes that the use of nuclear

weapons, a remote but ever-present possibility, would surely change world politics, although here too, it is hard to predict exactly how. In addition, he quotes Herman Kahn, although renowned for being belligerent, saying that if there were small or limited nuclear use during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union might agree that world government, as terrible a prospect as that was, would be better than continuing on that path.

For the sake of supporting the idea of having back North Korea at the negotiation table and creating engagement and infrastructure to cause a security and peace mechanism in the world politics, Stephan Haggard argues that

> the most the outside world can do at the moment with respect to North Korea is to reiterate the offers that are on the table: that North Korea can achieve both traditional military security and human security by foregoing nuclear weapons and integrating with the region. If North Korea did not have nuclear weapons, we would just ignore it. But because of its threatening posture, we have been forced into a complex diplomatic game. That game involves not only offers of a security and peace mechanism but the imposition of sanctions that will hopefully steer North Korea back to the bargaining table. North Korea is a hard target; sanctions may not work, but options of negotiating with the country have not succeeded either.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIETY IN WORLD POLITICS

Regarding institutions and societies, Onuf asserts that the characteristic rules of modern social life have permeated every society on the planet through capital-driven globalization. According to him, traditional ways have not disappeared, even in self-styled modern societies. In his view, the hallmark of any traditional society is the importance of status in the conferral of agency; instruction rules emphasizing appearances, decorum, and honor; and institutionalized status-ordering as the primary modality of rule. In addition, Onuf claims that the rise of institutions assigned specialized tasks, the proliferation of expertise, and status-ordering of experts by reference to credentials, specialties, employers, and honors are all allegedly keyed to achievement rather than ascription. And he accepts that this is a modernist hegemony.

When it comes to the international institutions and their impact on world politics, Knud Erik Jørgensen gives the EU's role in global governance as an example. According to him, the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement would not have existed without the EU's engagement. He carries on that the same applies to the World Trade Organization, the International Criminal Court,

and the Iranian nuclear deal. In the same token, Peter M. Haas rearticulates the significance of and operationality of epistemic communities as an indicator for the current world order, saying its institutions are still in function and that the EU is just one of them. At some point, the EU was called the UN's best friend concerning achievements.

In this regard, Knud Erik Jørgensen reminds us about the timeless, basic concepts employed in IR literature through the questions on the failure and success of the EU in international issues. His answers to our questions threw us a curve, as he has made us rethink what is meant by several concepts we used in the questions. For instance, the phrase "EU foreign policy" seems not to have a foundation due to its structure, and we take the United States as a comparator when we think and ask about the EU. Therefore, while thinking of the EU or Europe as polar in the so-called emerging world order, we and most of the academics do not have an accurate ontological stance approaching the EU. Despite the absence of a conventional foreign policymaking process, it does not change the reality that the EU has been signing bilateral and multilateral agreements in accordance with European interests (if that is meaningful).

Michael Williams's answers support this misconception of the EU, as he reminds us that the EU itself has been subjected to ideational struggle apart from liberalism and there are challenges aroused by illiberal members within the EU. While claiming the rise of Asia in general and China in particular, he stresses that

> these [radical conservative idea and policy] movements are important, I think, because they represent explicit, systematic challenges to the liberal international order, its institutions, and its forms of power. The ways in which these dynamics play out over the next decade will be an important part in determining the shape of the emerging world order.

To continue with Nicholas Onuf, one of the prominent constructivist scholars, people make rules and rules make institutions, and then people and institutions can obey the rules or violate them. In practical terms, there has been a rule-making mechanism at the international level originating from the power and perception of agents and structure. Now, as Nicholas Onuf repeatedly emphasized in his answers to our questions, the capitalist functioning of the world system is downgrading and people of the world within the institutions that they formed (states and international organizations regardless of being in the West and the East) are looking for an alternative way of rules to reset the mechanism.

In his closing remarks, Richard Sakwa also underlined the current position of the West against the East and ended his interview, saying, "The exhaustion

of the political West encourages Russia and China to develop alternative models of international politics. This emerging, although relatively diffuse, bipolarity will shape international politics and globalization for the foreseeable future." In this sense, Sakwa emphasizes how international institutions' impact on world politics might be undermined by leaders. Through focusing on Trump's approach toward international institutions, Richard Sakwa argues that Trump's transactional approach to foreign policy has little respect for international institutions or multilateral processes and instead advances a short-term profit-and-loss view.

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Richard Sakwa joined the University of Kent in 1987, was promoted to a professorship in 1996, and was head of the School of Politics and International Relations between 2001 and 2007. In 2010, he once again took over as head of school until 2014. While completing his doctorate on Moscow politics during the Russian Civil War (1918 to 1921), he spent a year on the British Council scholarship at Moscow State University (1979

to 1980) and then worked for two years in Moscow in the Mir Science and Technology Publishing House. Before moving to Kent, he lectured at the University of Essex and the University of California, Santa Cruz. Sakwa is an associate fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House; honorary senior research fellow at the Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies at the University of Birmingham; and since September 2002, a member of Academy of Learned Societies for the Social Sciences.

Luis Tomé is full professor at the Autonoma University of Lisbon in Portugal, where he is director of the International Relations Department and of the research unit Observatory of Foreign Relations (OBSERVARE). He has also been a visiting professor at the Portuguese Military University Institute, the National Defense University, and the Higher Institute of Police Sciences and Homeland Security, as well abroad at La Sapienza University of Rome, the Academy of Social Sciences and Technology in Angola, the East Timor National Defense Institute, and the Middle East Technical University in Turkey.

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Tomé earned a PhD in International Relations from the University of Coimbra, a master's degree in Strategy from the Technical University of Lisbon, and a bachelor's degree in International Relations from Autónoma University of Lisbon. His main areas of research and expertise are International Relations, Geopolitics, and Security Studies, with a particular focus on Euro-Atlantic, Asia-Pacific, and Eurasia regions.

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Andrew K. P. Leung is a prominent international and independent China strategist. Over forty years' experience in senior Hong Kong government positions; twice handed over to Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam as director-general of social welfare and director-general London; China Futures fellow, Massachusetts Berkshire Publishing Group; brain trust member, IMD Lausanne Evian Group; Gerson Lehrman Group council member; Thomas Reuters expert; senior analyst with Wikistrat; elected member of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs; advisory board member, European Centre for e-Commerce and Internet Law; think tank research fellow, Beijing Normal University, Zhuhai Campus; visiting professor, London Metropolitan University Business School; honorary president, China Hong Kong Economic and Trading International Association; formerly governing council member, King's College London; advisory board member, China Policy Institute of Nottingham University; and visiting professor, Sun Yat-sen University Business School (2005 to 2010). In the 1980s, he oversaw Hong Kong's industrial transmigration into mainland China and helped launch the Quality Campaign and Technology Centre. He was invited by the US government for a month-long visit in 1990 to brief Fortune 50 CEOs personally, including one-on-ones with Steve Forbes of *Forbes* magazine, on China post-1989. In 2002, he was invited by Prince Andrew for a private briefing leading to HRH's first official visit to China as UK's ambassador for trade and investment. He advised on cross-cultural management in Lenovo's take-over of IBM Computers, and he was invited as editor at large for an international consultancy on China's energies. He is a regular contributor, commentator, and speaker on China at international conferences and an interviewee on prominent international TV channels worldwide, including BBC, Sky, CNN, ABC, Aljazeera, RT, TRT, Times Now, Chanel News Asia, CGTN, National Geographic, etc. His topics include trade, finance, economics, geopolitics, international relations, science and technology, sustainable industrial development, and green cities. He has graduate qualifications from the University of London, postgraduate qualifications from Cambridge University, PMD from the Harvard Business School, and solicitors' qualifying examination certificate from the Law Society, London. He has been included in UK's Who since 2002 and was awarded Silver Bauhinia Star (SBS) in July 2005 on Hong Kong Honors List.

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