HISTORICAL DICTIONARY *of*

KIERKEGAARD'S PHILOSOPHY

CHRISTOPHER B. BARNETT

SECOND EDITION

Copyright 2022. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via
AN: 3323449 ; Christopher B. Barnett.; Historical Dictionary of Kierkegaard's Philosophy
Account: ns335141

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY

The historical dictionaries present essential information on a broad range of subjects, including American and world history, art, business, cities, countries, cultures, customs, film, global conflicts, international relations, literature, music, philosophy, religion, sports, and theater. Written by experts, all contain highly informative introductory essays on the topic and detailed chronologies that, in some cases, cover vast historical time periods but still manage to heavily feature more recent events.

Brief A–Z entries describe the main people, events, politics, social issues, institutions, and policies that make the topic unique, and entries are cross-referenced for ease of browsing. Extensive bibliographies are divided into several general subject areas, providing excellent access points for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more. Additionally, maps, photographs, and appendixes of supplemental information aid high school and college students doing term papers or introductory research projects. In short, the historical dictionaries are the perfect starting point for anyone looking to research in these fields.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

HISTORICAL DICTIONARIES OF RELIGIONS, PHILOSOPHIES, AND MOVEMENTS
Jon Woronoff, Series Editor

Orthodox Church, by Michael Prokurat, Alexander Golitzin, and Michael D. Peterson, 1996
Civil Rights Movement, by Ralph E. Luker, 1997
North American Environmentalism, by Edward R. Wells and Alan M. Schwartz, 1997
Taoism, by Julian F. Pas in cooperation with Man Kam Leung, 1998
Gay Liberation Movement, by Ronald J. Hunt, 1999
Islamic Fundamentalist Movements in the Arab World, Iran, and Turkey, by Ahmad S. Moussalli, 1999
Cooperative Movement, by Jack Shaffer, 1999
Prophets in Islam and Judaism, by Scott B. Noegel and Brannon M. Wheeler, 2002
Lesbian Liberation Movement: Still the Rage, by JoAnne Myers, 2003
New Age Movements, by Michael York, 2004
Feminism, Second Edition, by Janet K. Boles and Diane Long Hoeveler, 2004
Jainism, by Kristi L. Wiley, 2004
Methodism, Second Edition, by Charles Yrigoyen Jr. and Susan E. Warrick, 2005
Olympic Movement, Third Edition, by Bill Mallon with Ian Buchanan, 2006
Feminist Philosophy, by Catherine Villanueva Gardner, 2006
Logic, by Harry J. Gensler, 2006
Leibniz's Philosophy, by Stuart Brown and Nicholas J. Fox, 2006
Non-Aligned Movement and Third World, by Guy Arnold, 2006
Epistemology, by Ralph Baergen, 2006
Bahá'í Faith, Second Edition, by Hugh C. Adamson, 2006
Aesthetics, by Dabney Townsend, 2006
Puritans, by Charles Pastoor and Galen K. Johnson, 2007
Existentialism, by Stephen Michelman, 2008
Zionism, Second Edition, by Rafael Medoff and Chaim I. Waxman, 2008
Coptic Church, by Gawdat Gabra, 2008
Hegelian Philosophy, Second Edition, by John W. Burbidge, 2008
Ethics, by Harry J. Gensler and Earl W. Spurgin, 2008
Bertrand Russell's Philosophy, by Rosalind Carey and John Ongley, 2009
Holiness Movement, Second Edition, edited by William Kostlevy, 2009
Reformed Churches, Second Edition, by Robert Benedetto and Donald K. McKim, 2010
The Reformation and Counter-Reformation, by Michael Mullett, 2010

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Jesus, by Daniel J. Harrington, S.J., 2010
Metaphysics, by Gary Rosenkrantz and Joshua Hoffman, 2011
Shinto, Second Edition, by Stuart D. B. Picken, 2011
The Friends (Quakers), Second Edition, by Margery Post Abbott, Mary Ellen Chijioke, Pink Dandelion, and John William Oliver Jr., 2011
Lutheranism, Second Edition, by Günther Gassmann with Duane H. Larson, and Mark W. Oldenburg, 2011
Calvinism, by Stuart D. B. Picken, 2012
Hobbes's Philosophy, by Juhana Lemetti, 2012
Chinese Communist Party, by Lawrence R. Sullivan, 2012
New Religious Movements, Second Edition, by George D. Chryssides, 2012
Radical Christianity, by William H. Brackney, 2012
Organized Labor, Third Edition, by James C. Docherty and Sjaak van der Velden, 2012
Witchcraft, Second Edition, by Jonathan Durrant and Michael D. Bailey, 2013
Lesbian and Gay Liberation Movements, by JoAnne Myers, 2013
Nietzscheanism, Third Edition, by Carol Diethe, 2014
Welfare State, Third Edition, by Bent Greve, 2014
Wittgenstein's Philosophy, Second Edition, by Duncan Richter, 2014
Civil Rights Movement, Second Edition, by Christopher M. Richardson and Ralph E. Luker, 2014
Sikhism, Third Edition, by Louis E. Fenech and W. H. McLeod, 2014
Marxism, Second Edition, by Elliott Johnson, David Walker, and Daniel Gray, 2014
Slavery and Abolition, Second Edition, by Martin A. Klein, 2014
Seventh-Day Adventists, Second Edition, by Gary Land, 2015
Judaism, Third Edition, by Norman Solomon, 2015
Ancient Greek Philosophy, Second Edition, by Anthony Preus, 2015
Descartes and Cartesian Philosophy, Second Edition, by Roger Ariew, Dennis Des Chene, Douglas M. Jesseph, Tad M. Schmaltz, and Theo Verbeek, 2015
Anglicanism, Second Edition, by Colin Buchanan, 2015
Sufism, Second Edition, by John Renard, 2016
Shamanism, Second Edition, by Graham Harvey and Robert Wallis, 2016
Socialism, Third Edition, by Peter Lamb, 2016
Schopenhauer's Philosophy, by David E. Cartwright, 2016
Native American Movements, Second Edition, by Todd Leahy and Nathan Wilson, 2016
Environmentalism, Second Edition, by Peter Dauvergne, 2016
Islam, Third Edition, by Ludwig W. Adamec, 2017
Shakers, Second Edition, by Stephen J. Paterwic, 2017

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Utopianism, Second Edition, by Toby Widdicombe, James M. Morris, and Andrea L. Kross, 2017
Chan Buddhism, by Youru Wang, 2017
Islamic Fundamentalism, Second Edition, by Mathieu Guidère, 2017
Salvation Army, Second Edition, by John G. Merritt and Allen Satterlee, 2017
Medical Ethics, by Laurence B. McCullough, 2018
Unitarian Universalism, Second Edition, by Mark W. Harris, 2018
Medieval Philosophy and Theology, by Stephen F. Brown and Juan Carlos Flores, 2018
Hume's Philosophy, by Angela Coventry and Kenneth R. Merrill, 2019
Jehovah's Witnesses, Second Edition, by George D. Chryssides, 2019
Democracy, by Norman Abjorensen, 2019
Latter-day Saints (formally Mormonism), Fourth Edition, by Thomas G. Alexander, 2019
Green Movement, Second Edition, by Miranda Schreurs and Elim Papadakis, 2019
Heidegger's Philosophy, Third Edition, by Frank Schalo, 2019
Daoism, by Ronnie L. Littlejohn, 2019
Hinduism, Second Edition, by Jeffery D. Long, 2020
Kant and Kantianism, by Vilem Mudroch and Helmut Holzhey, 2020
Human Rights, Second Edition, by Jacques Fomerand, 2020
Baptists, Third Edition, by William H. Brackney, 2020
Buddhism, Second Edition, by Carl Olson, 2021
Catholicism, Third Edition, by William J. Collinge, 2021
Husserl's Philosophy, Second Edition, by John J. Drummond, 2022
Homosexuality, by Brent L. Pickett, 2022
Kierkegaard's Philosophy, Second Edition, by Christopher B. Barnett, 2022

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Historical Dictionary of Kierkegaard's Philosophy

Second Edition

Christopher B. Barnett

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD
Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Published by Rowman & Littlefield
An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706
www.rowman.com

86-90 Paul Street, London EC2A 4NE, United Kingdom

Copyright © 2022 by Christopher B. Barnett

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Available

ISBN 978-1-5381-2261-7 (cloth : alk. paper)
ISBN 978-1-5381-2262-4 (electronic)


™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

To all who know the labor of love.

“In your patience possess ye your souls.” (Luke 21:19)

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Contents

Editor's Foreword xi
Preface xiii
Chronology xvii
Introduction 1
THE DICTIONARY 11
Appendix A: Kierkegaard's Writings 273
Appendix B: Kierkegaard's Pseudonyms 281
Bibliography 293
About the Author 311

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Editor's Foreword

Philosophies and philosophers come and go, and, alas, most of those we are familiar with have come a long time ago and not been replaced by younger, fresher voices of note, with some few exceptions. One of the most notable philosophies is existentialism, along with one of the philosophers most closely connected with it, Søren Kierkegaard. The need for a volume on him in this series was already noted two decades ago, when the first historical dictionary on Kierkegaard was published. But two decades is a long time for such a rich and vibrant vein, and it is certainly time for a new edition, which is also by a new author.

Søren Kierkegaard lived in Denmark from 1813 to 1855, which is not that far back in the long history of philosophy, and existentialism still appeals to many professors and students even as most systems of thought have faded with time. That is partly because it deals with relatively "modern" topics: Who am I? Why do I live? And what should I do? But these topics are not only modern; they are perennial and have been around as long as there have been philosophers and should keep exercising our minds and souls as long as the human race exists. This book gives us the views of one of the foremost modern philosophers as well as of others who revolve around existentialism. It is extensive, and it has a bibliography that includes the many works of Kierkegaard himself, to say nothing of those who have written about him and can take readers much further.

This new edition was written by Christopher B. Barnett, professor of theology at Villanova University, just outside Philadelphia. He not only teaches about Kierkegaard but has written extensively on him, including three monographs, a translation of Kierkegaard's spiritual writings, and many shorter works. Thus the present book is a very good starting place to learn about Kierkegaard and existentialism; it is also a jumping-off point for further studies, thanks to its bibliography, both on the philosopher and on recent secondary literature. Its structure, consisting of an introduction, chronology, and bibliography surrounding a core of short entries on the man and his thought, make it an excellent work to support further studies.

Jon Woronoff
Series Editor

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Preface

In December 2017, Jon Woronoff contacted me and asked if I would be interested in writing a new edition of the *Historical Dictionary of Kierkegaard's Philosophy*. While I greatly appreciated his offer, my first thought was to politely decline. After all, I reasoned, there have never been more resources available to the student of Kierkegaard. In addition to an ever growing catalog of monographs and anthologies dedicated to the Dane's thinking, the last few decades have witnessed a number of groundbreaking developments in Kierkegaardiana. Not only have *all* of Kierkegaard's extant writings been digitalized and published online (at www.sks.dk) by the Søren Kierkegaard Research Center (Søren Kierkegaard Forskningscenteret) in Copenhagen, but two seminal series on Kierkegaard's work have appeared—the multivolume International Kierkegaard Commentary, edited by Robert L. Perkins (1930–2018) and issued by Mercer University Press, as well as the monumental series Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, edited by Jon Stewart and put out by Routledge. Moreover, the esteemed Julia Watkin (1944–2006) had already published a *Historical Dictionary of Kierkegaard's Philosophy* in 2001. Watkin's volume had long been in my own library, and it had proven useful on numerous occasions.

Still, something gnawed at me. In this day and age, it is always tempting to overcommit to projects, given the amount of weight that universities accord to academic publishing. But that was not a factor in this case. On the contrary, I could not shake the feeling that, in spite (or even because) of the excellent material now available to the Kierkegaard scholar, an updated one-volume resource might actually be *valuable*. I spoke with a number of students at Villanova University, where I have taught for the last decade, and they all painted a similar picture. Down a dim, narrow stairwell in Villanova's Falvey Memorial Library, one can access the basement floor on which Kierkegaard's books are held. Amid the dusty and haunted shelves, accompanied only by the strobing effect of the building's motion-detector lights, there emerges an extensive section devoted to Kierkegaard, including more than two dozen volumes belonging solely to the efforts of Perkins and Stewart. It is hard to know where to start, even if one is not scared off by the spectral ambiance!

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

All kidding aside, my hunch was that people new to or enthusiastic about Kierkegaard research might truly benefit from a handy reference guide. Such a work would serve a few key purposes: (1) to synopsize the pivotal ideas of Kierkegaard's varied and complex oeuvre, (2) to situate Kierkegaard's writings in their sociohistorical context, and (3) to consolidate a number of indispensable resources for Kierkegaard study. Equipped with these materials—a thorough chronology, a biographical introduction, a new dictionary, and an essential bibliography—the reader of Kierkegaard might find the field (and university libraries!) a little less intimidating. Besides, I concluded, I myself would find the work upbuilding: it would give me a chance to gain clarity about Kierkegaard's oeuvre, both with regard to particular concepts and with regard to its overarching significance. Even if Kierkegaard would dismiss the idea of a compendium to his thought, as if he were capable of being efficiently summarized, he may have managed a nod of approval for the individual who has taken on the challenge of trying to understand him in earnest.

As noted, I hope this book will find a broad audience—scholars and students, to be sure, but also nonspecialist readers. Thus the dictionary itself does not have a critical apparatus, lest it be overburdened with footnotes. That said, quotations from Kierkegaard's published work have been taken from the current standard English translations of his work, *Kierkegaard's Writings*, issued by Princeton University Press under the direction of Howard and Edna Hong. Similarly, quotations from Kierkegaard's *Nachlaß* have been taken from two places: either *Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers*, the seven-volume set arranged by the Hongs, or the newer *Kierkegaard's Journals and Notebooks*, which is under the general editorship of Bruce H. Kirmmse. Throughout the text I have provided corresponding Danish terminology when needed or useful; it has been taken from the standard Danish edition of Kierkegaard's works, *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter*. Complete documentary information can be accessed in the bibliography.

This project has been an immense undertaking, and I could not have done it alone. On a professional level, I am grateful for Jon Woronoff's invitation to write this volume as well as for April Snider's generosity and patience as I experienced delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic, including my own bout with the virus in November 2020. On a personal basis, my wife, Stacy, has put up with far too many late dinners over the course of this endeavor: I have a penchant, apparently incorrigible, for writing when I should be eating! Also essential to the work in this volume were a number of PhD students in Villanova's Department of Theology and Religious Studies who helped me with subtle but important tasks, such as organizing the bibliography. Jake Given, Sister Dung Trang, Céire Kealty, and Trevor B. Williams—not only am I thankful for your respective efforts in bringing this project to fruition,

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

but your sincerity in doing so was as humbling as it was treasured. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the various Kierkegaard scholars, those from previous eras and those working today, whose labors and insights have made this book possible.

Christopher B. Barnett
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
New Year's Eve 2021

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Chronology

1756 12 December: Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard born at Sædding Church in Skjern, a town in western Jutland.

1766 14 January: Christian VII becomes king of Denmark-Norway.

1768 18 June: Ane Sørensdatter Lund born in Brandlund, a town in central Jutland.

c. 1768 M. P. Kierkegaard leaves his Jutland home to apprentice with his maternal uncle Niels Andersen Seding in Copenhagen.

1776 4 July: The United States Declaration of Independence is adopted by the Second Continental Congress in Philadelphia.

1777 M. P. Kierkegaard is released from serfdom.

1780 December: M. P. Kierkegaard takes out a trade license as a hosier in Copenhagen.

1784 14 April: Prince Frederik, son of Christian VII, becomes Crown Prince Regent of Denmark-Norway, taking control of the government on account of his father's mental illness.

1788 20 June: Governmental reforms in agriculture initiate the process of eliminating serfdom in Denmark.

1789 14 July: Parisian revolutionaries storm the fortress and prison known as the Bastille, signifying the escalation of the French Revolution.

1794 2 May: M. P. Kierkegaard, now a prosperous merchant, marries Kirstine Nielsdatter Røyen, sister of his business partner Mads Nielsen Røyen.

1795 5 July: A devastating fire starts in Copenhagen, eventually destroying buildings in the city center and leaving thousands homeless; M. P. Kierkegaard's property escapes noteworthy damage.

1796 23 March: M. P. Kierkegaard's wife Kirstine dies of pneumonia; the couple had no children.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

1797 **26 April:** M. P. Kierkegaard marries Ane Sørensdatter Lund, formerly a servant in his home. **7 September:** Maren Kirstine Kierkegaard is born to M. P. Kierkegaard and Anne Lund, less than five months after the couple's marriage.

1799 **27 September:** Governmental ordinance limits press freedom in Denmark. **25 October:** Nicoline Christine Kierkegaard is born to M. P. Kierkegaard and Anne Lund. **24 December:** Liberal author Peter Andreas Heiberg is exiled for life for violating press restrictions.

1800 Conrad Malte-Brun, geographer and liberal pamphleteer, is also exiled for his outspoken advocacy for a free press.

1801 **2 April:** The Battle of Copenhagen takes place, as a fleet of British ships engage the Dano-Norwegian navy in Copenhagen harbor. **7 September:** Petrea Severine Kierkegaard is born to M. P. Kierkegaard and Anne Lund.

1805 **6 July:** Peter Christian Kierkegaard is born to M. P. Kierkegaard and Anne Lund, the couple's first son.

1807 **23 March:** Søren Michael Kierkegaard is born to M. P. Kierkegaard and Anne Lund. **16 August:** The Second Battle of Copenhagen begins, eventually culminating in the British bombardment of Copenhagen and the confiscation or destruction of ships that belong to the Dano-Norwegian navy. In turn, Denmark allies itself with Napoléon Bonaparte's French Empire.

1808 **14 March:** Denmark declares war against Sweden, which had joined the side of the United Kingdom against France.

1809 **30 April:** Niels Andreas Kierkegaard is born to M. P. Kierkegaard and Anne Lund.

1813 **5 January:** Denmark declares national bankruptcy. **5 May:** Søren Aabye Kierkegaard (hereafter SAK) is born to M. P. Kierkegaard and Anne Lund. **3 June:** SAK is baptized at the Church of the Holy Spirit in Copenhagen.

1814 **14 January:** The Treaty of Kiel ends hostilities between Denmark and the British-Swedish alliance. However, as part of the pact, Denmark cedes Norway. **11 April:** The Treaty of Fontainebleau is signed, ending Napoléon's reign.

1819 **14 September:** Søren Michael Kierkegaard dies of a brain hemorrhage in connection with a playground accident.

1821 SAK is sent to the School of Civic Virtue in Copenhagen.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

1822 15 March: Maren Kierkegaard dies of an illness called "cramp," possibly tetanus.

1828 20 April: SAK is confirmed by Rev. Jakob Peter Mynster at Trinitatis Church in Copenhagen.

1830 The July Revolution or Second French Revolution marks the end of the post-Napoleonic Bourbon Restoration. **30 October:** SAK enrolls at the University of Copenhagen. **1 November:** SAK is drafted into the Royal Guards, Company 7. **4 November:** SAK is discharged from the Royal Guards as unfit for service.

1831 25 April: SAK completes the first part of his *philologico-philosophicum* examination, receiving *laudabilis* in Latin, Greek, Hebrew, and history and *laudabilis præ ceteris* in elementary mathematics. **27 October:** SAK completes the second part of his *philologico-philosophicum* examination, receiving *laudabilis præ ceteris* in philosophy (theoretical and practical), physics, and higher mathematics.

1832 10 September: Nicoline Christine Kierkegaard dies in connection with childbirth.

1833 21 September: Niels Kierkegaard dies of typhus in Paterson, New Jersey, where he was hoping to find mercantile success.

1834 31 July: Anne Lund Kierkegaard dies after a lengthy illness. **17 December:** SAK publishes "Another Defense of Woman's Great Abilities" in the newspaper *Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post*. **29 December:** Petrea Kierkegaard Lund dies in connection with childbirth.

1835 21 February: Petition against press censorship is proposed. **6 March:** The Society for the Proper Use of Freedom of the Press is founded. **17 July:** SAK travels to North Zealand, taking up lodgings at an inn in the fishing village of Gilleleje. **27–28 July:** SAK makes his only trip to Sweden, sightseeing around the Kullaberg peninsula. **1 August:** SAK records the famous Gilleleje journal entry, in which he declares that he is searching for "the idea for which I am willing to live and die." **24 August:** SAK returns to Copenhagen. **28 November:** SAK delivers the paper "Our Journalistic Literature" to the University Student Union.

1836 18 February: SAK publishes "The Morning Observations in Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post No. 43" in *Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post*. **12 March:** SAK publishes "On the Polemic of *Fædrelandet*" in *Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post*. **15 March:** SAK publishes the second part of "On the Polemic of *Fædrelandet*" in *Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post*. **10 April:** SAK publishes "To Mr. Orla

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Lehmann" in *Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post*. **October 21:** P. C. Kierkegaard marries Elise Marie Boisen.

1837 **May:** SAK, while visiting the theologian Peter Rørdam in Frederiksberg, meets Regine Olsen for the first time. **18 July:** Elise Marie Boisen dies at the age of 31; she and P. C. Kierkegaard had no children. **September:** SAK leaves his childhood home of Nytorv 2 (now 27) and moves to Løvstræde 7; around the same time, he takes a position teaching Latin at his alma mater, the School of Civic Virtue.

1838 **13 March:** SAK's beloved philosophy professor, Poul Martin Møller, dies of a form of cancer. **April:** SAK moves back to Nytorv 2. **9 August:** M. P. Kierkegaard dies after a sudden bout of illness. **14 August:** M. P. Kierkegaard is buried in the family plot in Copenhagen's Assistens Cemetery. **7 September:** SAK publishes his lengthy book review *From the Papers of One Still Living: Published Against His Will*.

1839 SAK moves to Kultorvet 132 (now 11).

1840 SAK moves to Nørregade 230A (now 38). **3 July:** SAK completes the examination for his theological degree, receiving the distinction of *laudabilis*. **17 July:** At the invitation of his aunt Else Kierkegaard, SAK departs Copenhagen for his father's home in western Jutland. **8 August:** SAK returns to Copenhagen. **8 September:** SAK asks Regine Olsen to marry him; she accepts two days later. **17 November:** SAK enters the Royal Pastoral Seminary for practical training as a pastor.

1841 **12 January:** SAK preaches at the Church of Holmen in central Copenhagen, his first sermon as a seminarian. **16 July:** SAK's magister thesis *On the Concept of Irony, with Continual Reference to Socrates* is declared worthy of being defended by the philosophy faculty of the University of Copenhagen. **29 July:** King Christian VIII grants permission to SAK to receive the magister degree with a thesis written in Danish, albeit under the conditions that the oral defense be conducted in Latin (as was customary) and that the dissertation's principal points be delineated in a series of Latin theses. **11 August:** SAK returns Regine Olsen's engagement ring. **16 September:** SAK's dissertation is printed and made available to the public. **29 September:** SAK defends *On the Concept of Irony* in Latin before a public audience; the defense begins at 10:00 a.m. and ends at 7:30 p.m., with a two-hour intermission in the middle of the day. **11 October:** SAK conclusively breaks off his engagement with Regine Olsen. **25 October:** SAK departs Copenhagen for Berlin. **26 October:** University officials confer the degree of magister in philosophy upon SAK.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

1842 **6 March:** SAK arrives back in Copenhagen. **12 June:** SAK publishes "Open Confession" in *Fædrelandet*. **11 November:** P. C. Kierkegaard receives pastoral ordination in the Danish state church.

1843 **20 February:** SAK publishes *Either/Or: A Fragment of Life, Part I* and *Either/Or: A Fragment of Life, Part II*. **27 February:** SAK publishes "Who Is the Author of Either/Or" in *Fædrelandet*. **5 March:** SAK publishes "A Word of Thanks to Professor Heiberg" in *Fædrelandet*. **8 May:** SAK travels to Berlin for the second time. **16 May:** SAK publishes *Two Upbuilding Discourses*; he also publishes "A Little Explanation" in *Fædrelandet*. **28 August:** Regine Olsen becomes engaged to Friedrich (Fritz) Schlegel, a civil servant and future governor of the Danish West Indies. **16 October:** SAK publishes three texts on the same day: *Fear and Trembling: Dialectical Lyric*, *Repetition: A Venture in Experimenting Psychology*, and *Three Upbuilding Discourses*. **6 December:** SAK publishes *Four Upbuilding Discourses*.

1844 **24 February:** SAK takes his qualifying examination in homiletics, preaching a sermon at Trinitatis Church and receiving the grade of *laudabilis*. **5 March:** SAK publishes *Two Upbuilding Discourses*. **8 June:** SAK publishes *Three Upbuilding Discourses*. **13 June:** SAK publishes *Philosophical Fragments, or A Fragment of Philosophy*. **17 June:** SAK publishes *The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin* and *Prefaces: Light Reading for People in Various Estates According to Time and Opportunity*. **31 August:** SAK publishes *Four Upbuilding Discourses*. **16 October:** SAK moves back to Nytorv 2.

1845 **29 April:** SAK publishes *Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions*. **30 April:** SAK publishes *Stage's on Life's Way: Studies by Various Persons*. **9 May:** SAK publishes "An Explanation and a Little More" in *Fædrelandet*. **13 May:** SAK departs Copenhagen for the Prussian city of Stettin (now Szczecin, Poland), where he would connect to Berlin for a brief stay. **19–20 May:** SAK consecutively publishes the first and second parts of "A Cursory Observation Concerning a Detail in *Don Giovanni*" in *Fædrelandet*. **24 May:** Kierkegaard arrives back in Copenhagen. **29 May:** SAK publishes a collection of his upbuilding writings from 1843 to 1844, giving it the name *Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses*. **27 December:** SAK publishes "The Activity of a Traveling Esthetician and How He Still Happened to Pay for the Dinner" in *Fædrelandet*, in which he criticizes *Corsaren* (*The Corsair*), a satirical newspaper.

1846 **2 January:** *Corsaren* publishes the first of a series of articles and cartoons that mock SAK. **10 January:** SAK publishes "The Dialectical

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Result of a Literary Police Investigation" in *Fædrelandet*, condemning *Corsaren* and encouraging the paper to abuse him. **7 February:** SAK writes in a journal passage that he intends to stop being an author and to take a pastoral appointment. **28 February:** SAK publishes what was to be his last major work *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments: A Mimical-Pathetical-Dialectical-Compilation, an Existential Contribution*. **30 March:** SAK publishes *A Literary Review: Two Ages, a Novel by the Author of "A Story of Everyday Life."* **2 May:** SAK visits Berlin for the fourth and final time. **17 May:** SAK returns to Copenhagen. **17 July:** *Corsaren* ridicules Kierkegaard for the last time.

1847 **13 March:** SAK publishes *Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits*. **29 September:** SAK publishes *Works of Love: Some Christian Deliberations in the Form of Discourses*. **3 November:** Regine Olsen marries Fritz Schlegel at Vor Frelsers Kirke in Copenhagen. **29 December:** SAK contracts to sell the family home at Nytorv 2.

1848 **March:** First Schleswig War breaks out in the Jutland Peninsula; there is increased pressure for Denmark to adopt a democratic constitution. **April:** SAK vacates Nytorv 2 and moves to Rosenborggade 9. **26 April:** SAK publishes *Christian Discourses*. **24–27 July:** SAK serially publishes *The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress* in *Fædrelandet*. **October:** SAK moves to Rosenborggade 7, possibly due to a bad odor in Rosenborggade 9.

1849 **14 May:** SAK reissues *Either/Or* and publishes *The Lily of the Field and the Bird of the Air: Three Devotional Discourses*. **19 May:** SAK publishes *Two Ethical-Religious Minor Essays*. **5 June:** Frederick VII signs a new Danish constitution, establishing a bicameral parliament and safeguarding religious freedom. **30 July:** SAK publishes *The Sickness unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening*. **14 November:** SAK publishes *"The High Priest"—"The Tax Collector"—"The Woman Who Was a Sinner": Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays*. **19 November:** SAK contacts Friedrich Schlegel in writing, asking him to consider passing on a letter to Regine Olsen; Schlegel declines.

1850 **April:** Søren Kierkegaard moves to Nørregade 43 (now 35). **25 September:** SAK publishes *Practice in Christianity: No. I. II. III*. **20 December:** SAK publishes *An Upbuilding Discourse*.

1851 **3 January:** Full freedom of the press is established by law. **31 January:** SAK publishes "An Open Letter Prompted by a Reference to Me by Dr. Rudelbach" in *Fædrelandet*. **April:** SAK moves to **Østerbro** 108A (where Willemoesgade enters **Østerbrogade,** since demolished). **7 August:** SAK publishes *On My Work as an Author* and *Two Discourses at the Communion*

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

on Fridays. **10 September:** SAK publishes *For Self-Examination: Recommended to the Present Age*.

1852 April/October: Søren Kierkegaard moves to Klædeboderne 5–6 (now Skindergade 38/Dyrkøb 5), from which he had a view of the Church of Our Lady.

1854 30 January: J. P. Mynster, bishop of Zealand since 1834, dies in Copenhagen. **5 February:** Hans Lassen Martensen, formerly professor at the University of Copenhagen, eulogizes J. P. Mynster as a "witness to the truth" (*Sandhedsvidne*). **15 April:** H. L. Martensen is appointed bishop of Zealand by King Frederick VII. **18 December:** SAK publishes "Was Bishop Mynster a 'Truth-Witness,' One of 'the Authentic Truth-Witnesses'—Is *This the Truth*" in *Fædrelandet*, thus beginning his attack on the Danish state church via the press. **30 December:** SAK publishes "There the Matter Rests!" in *Fædrelandet*.

1855 12 January: SAK publishes "A Challenge to Me from Pastor Paludan-Müller" in *Fædrelandet*. **29 January:** SAK publishes "The Point at Issue with Bishop Martensen, as Christianly Decisive for the, Christianly Viewed, Dubiously Previously Established Ecclesiastical Order" and "Two New Truth-Witnesses" in *Fædrelandet*. **20 March:** SAK publishes "At Bishop Mynster's Death" in *Fædrelandet*. **21 May:** SAK publishes "Is This Christian Worship or Is It Making a Fool of God? (A Matter of Conscience [In Order to Relieve My Conscience])" in *Fædrelandet*. **22 March:** SAK publishes "What Must Be Done—It Will Happen Either through Me or through Someone Else" in *Fædrelandet*. **26 March:** SAK publishes "The Religious Situation" in *Fædrelandet*. **28 March:** SAK publishes "A Thesis—Just One Single One" in *Fædrelandet*. **30 March:** SAK publishes "'Salt'; Because 'Christendom' Is: the Decay of Christianity; 'a Christian World' Is: a Falling Away from Christianity" in *Fædrelandet*. **31 March:** SAK publishes "What Do I Want?" in *Fædrelandet*. **7 April:** SAK publishes "On the Occasion of an *Anonymous* Proposal to Me in No. 79 of This Newspaper" in *Fædrelandet*. **11 April:** SAK publishes "Would It Be Best Now to 'Stop Ringing the Alarm'?" in *Fædrelandet* and "Christianity with a Royal Certificate and Christianity without a Royal Certificate" in *Fædrelandet* (feuilleton). **27 April:** SAK publishes "What Cruel Punishment!" in *Fædrelandet*. **10 May:** SAK publishes "A Result" in *Fædrelandet* and "A Monologue" in *Fædrelandet* (feuilleton). **15 May:** SAK publishes "Concerning a Fatuous Pompousness in Regard to Me and the Conception of Christianity to Which I Am Calling Attention" in *Fædrelandet*. **16 May:** SAK publishes "For the New Edition of *Practice in Christianity*" in *Fædrelandet*. **24 May:** SAK publishes *This Must Be Said; So Let It Be Said* and *The Moment, No. 1*. **26 May:** SAK publishes "That

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Bishop Martensen's Silence Is (1) Christianly Indefensible; (2) Ludicrous; (3) Obtuse-Sagacious; (4) in More Than One Regard Contemptible" in *Fædrelandet*. **4 June:** SAK publishes *The Moment, No. 2*. **16 June:** SAK publishes *What Christ Judges of Official Christianity*. **27 June:** SAK publishes *The Moment, No. 3*. **7 July:** SAK publishes *The Moment, No. 4*. **27 July:** SAK publishes *The Moment, No. 5*. **23 August:** SAK publishes *The Moment, No. 6*. **30 August:** SAK publishes *The Moment, No. 7*. **3 September:** SAK publishes *The Changelessness of God: A Discourse*. **11 September:** SAK publishes *The Moment, No. 8*. **24 September:** SAK publishes *The Moment, No. 9*. **28 September:** SAK collapses in the street. **2 October:** SAK checks into Frederiks Hospital (now *Kunstindustrimuseet*), suffering from various ailments including loss of coordination and a bilious cough. **11 November:** SAK dies in Frederiks Hospital. **18 November:** Kierkegaard's funeral is held at the Church of Our Lady, and, with some controversy, he is buried by the Danish state church at Assistens Cemetery in the Nørrebro district of Copenhagen.

1856 **17 January:** SAK's nephew Henrik Lund concludes his classification of Kierkegaard's posthumous papers, ultimately storing them in various containers in the home of his paternal family.

1857 **May:** P. C. Kierkegaard, now bishop of Aalborg, takes possession of SAK's posthumous writings.

1859 SAK's *The Point of View for My Work as an Author* is published posthumously by P. C. Kierkegaard.

1861 The extant articles of SAK's *The Moment* were published by an anonymous translator as *Christentum und Kirche: "Die Gegenwart," Ein ernstes Wort an unsere Zeit, inbesondere an die evangelische Kirche*, the first rendering of Kierkegaard's writings into German.

1865 **February:** Hans Peter Barfod is appointed SAK's literary executor and develops a more extensive and comprehensive register of SAK's papers. **11 November:** Barfod completes his task, submitting a bound catalog to P. C. Kierkegaard.

1869 The collection and publication of SAK's unpublished writings begins in earnest with the first volume of *From the Posthumous Papers of Søren Kierkegaard*.

1872 SAK's *The Book on Adler: The Religious Confusion of the Present Age Illustrated by Magister Adler as a Phenomenon* is published posthumously.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

1876 SAK's *Judge for Yourself! For Self-Examination, Recommended to the Present Age: Second Series* is published posthumously by P. C. Kierkegaard.

1880 SAK's *Armed Neutrality: Or My Position as a Christian Author in Christendom* is published posthumously.

1881 SAK's *The Moment, No. 10* is published posthumously.

1886 Johannes Gøtzsche translates SAK's *Two Ethical-Religious Minor Essays* into French, the first such translation; the volume's preface was written by Danish theologian Hans-Peter Kofoed-Hansen, who would convert to Catholicism the following year citing SAK's influence.

1900 Edmund Husserl publishes the first volume of his *Logical Investigations*.

1901 The publication of the 14-volume *Søren Kierkegaard's Collected Works* commences.

1909 The publication of the 16-volume *Søren Kierkegaard's Papers* commences.

1918 Álvaro Armando Vasseur publishes the first Spanish translation of SAK's work, a selection of aphorisms and passages titled *Prosas de Søren Kierkegaard*.

1919 Karl Barth publishes the first edition of his landmark treatise *The Epistle to the Romans*.

1923 Lee M. Hollander of the University of Texas publishes *Selections from the Writings of Kierkegaard*, the first English translation of SAK's work.

1927 Martin Heidegger publishes *Being and Time*.

1943 Jean-Paul Sartre publishes *Being and Nothingness*.

1967 Howard and Edna Hong publish volume 1 of *Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers*, the first of six such volumes (along with a separate index and collation), thereby making an abundance of Kierkegaard's unpublished writings available to the English-speaking world.

1976 The Kierkegaard Library is established at St. Olaf College in Northfield, Minnesota.

1978 The Hongs issue the first volumes of *Kierkegaard's Writings*, the 26-volume series of Kierkegaard's work now considered standard in the field of Kierkegaard studies.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

1994 The Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre is founded at the University of Copenhagen; its principal task is to develop *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter*, the first unified edition of Kierkegaard's oeuvre, inclusive of his published and unpublished treatises, along with his journals, papers, letters, and so on.

1997 The first volume of *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter* is published.

2012 *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter* is brought to completion.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Introduction

The Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) once remarked to a friend, "Kierkegaard was by far the most profound thinker of the last century. Kierkegaard was a saint." Even if one brackets off Kierkegaard's standing among nineteenth-century philosophers—an undecidable question, though, by all accounts, the Dane was one of the great minds of his age—Wittgenstein's remark draws attention to two reasons for Kierkegaard's enduring appeal. On the one hand, Kierkegaard was indeed a "profound thinker." His work engages most of the central branches of Western thought, including (but hardly limited to) aesthetics, epistemology, ethics, ontology, psychology, rhetoric, and theology. In doing so, moreover, it addresses many of the major intellectual figures of previous historical eras (Socrates, Aristotle, Augustine, Descartes, and Hegel, among others), just as it anticipates many of the notable theorists of subsequent generations (including Nietzsche, Barth, Heidegger, Sartre, and Derrida).

At the same time, however, Kierkegaard was *more* than a "profound thinker." As he himself insisted, his writings were in service to personal edification, with particular emphasis on the question of how to live well. For him, this was a deeply felt problem, and he endeavored to learn *through* his own literary productivity. Thus Wittgenstein's claim that Kierkegaard "was a saint" has merit. After all, the word "saint" is derived from the Latin verb *sancire* ("to consecrate"), which connotes devotion to a sacred purpose. Whatever else may be said of Kierkegaard's life and authorship, it is clear that slowly but surely he understood his thinking and even his own life as set aside for a divine calling. The following short biography will demonstrate that Kierkegaard's philosophical significance cannot be fully grasped apart from this lived component. That he would later be dubbed the "father of existentialism" is, in fact, a consequence of his desire to uncover the very meaning of human existence—to find an idea, as he writes in an 1835 journal entry, for which to live and die.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

A SHORT BIOGRAPHY OF KIERKEGAARD

For all of its complexity, Kierkegaard's life loosely resembles the structure of a three-act play: (1) an early period in which his habits and interests were formed; (2) a middle stage during which his literary career began to thrive, even as he was slowly pressed into conflict with certain elements of Danish society; and (3) a dramatic final phase culminating in his so-called "attack upon Christendom" and his untimely death at 42 years of age.

KIERKEGAARD'S UPBRINGING

Though born into a well-heeled family in Copenhagen, Kierkegaard should not be confused with a typical member of the haute bourgeoisie. In fact, one could argue that Kierkegaard's authorship is an outgrowth of his inability to fit into polite Danish society. The primary source of this tension was Kierkegaard's father, Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard (1756–1838), a man whose combination of brooding melancholy and religious piety has become legendary in Kierkegaard studies.

The son of a peasant, whose surname was adopted from the small churchyard (*kirkegaard*) he managed, M. P. Kierkegaard grew up in the West Jutland parish of Sædding, an area of limited economic opportunity, known for its bucolic way of life and traditional values. Even as the Enlightenment compelled the Danish state church to exchange older catechetical and liturgical materials for works more compatible with modern rationalism, Jutlanders remained committed to the Christianity of previous generations. A nearby village served as a base for Pietist evangelization and, with it, the proclamation of what the great Pietist forefather Johann Arndt (1555–1621) called "true Christianity." For Arndt and his followers, the Christian life was not a matter of social propriety but of repentance for sin, faith in salvation, and constant growth in holiness.

Driven by economic necessity, M. P. Kierkegaard would leave his home as a youth, but he sustained a connection with his West Jutland heritage. This was evident in the way that he ordered his family's religious affairs. Despite his rise as a successful businessman in Copenhagen, M. P. Kierkegaard almost exclusively associated with Pietist-minded clergy and organizations. The Kierkegaard family became involved in Copenhagen's Moravian Brødresocietet (Society of Brothers) and regularly attended its services, which combined homiletic stress on what was referred to as "upbuilding" (*opbyggelse*) with liturgical attention to the crucified Christ—themes that, notably, would come to dominate Søren Kierkegaard's own writings. Likewise, the Brødresocietet

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

nurtured the long-standing Moravian practice of spiritual reading. Books such as Thomas à Kempis's *The Imitation of Christ* and Arndt's *True Christianity*, both drawing from the complex legacy of Catholic mystics such as Meister Eckhart (c. 1260–1327) and Johannes Tauler (1300–1360), were staples in Moravian households. Kierkegaard himself kept volumes by Tauler, Thomas à Kempis, and Arndt, and he read and admired spiritual writers as diverse as Henry Suso, Angelus Silesius, Jakob Böhme, and Gerhard Tersteegen.

This lifelong interest in Pietist literature adds another layer of complexity to Kierkegaard's relationship with his father, whose religious piety was equaled only by an insidious sense of guilt and melancholy. The precise origin of this guilt is difficult to pin down, but, whatever the case, it seems that Søren too felt implicated in it. Precisely how or why Kierkegaard arrived at this conclusion has puzzled scholars for decades. Certainly, the fact that *five* of Søren's siblings died before his father was received as evidence of a curse. Yet, in the end, the lone certainty is that the Kierkegaard family sought to wrench theological meaning from personal sorrow.

Something similar could be said of the other major event in Kierkegaard's background, namely, his broken engagement to Regine Olsen in 1841. On the surface, their match seemed almost ideal. Both families were affluent. Both were pious: Regine's family, too, attended the Brødresocietet's meetings when she was a child. And yet, Regine and Søren did not respond to their backgrounds in the same way. Kierkegaard could not shake an ambivalence about wealth, even as he relied on it to support his literary career. Moreover, he struggled to reconcile Christian asceticism with conjugal life. Regine, on the other hand, had a jaunty personality. She did not see a conflict between earthly happiness and religious devotion. It is hardly surprising, then, that she fought to preserve the engagement.

But it was not to be. Kierkegaard ultimately decided that he was not suited for marriage. The obstacle may have involved his father's murky past or an altruistic desire to shield Regine from his own depression. It almost certainly had to do with Kierkegaard's sense of religious vocation, which, in his mind, placed him outside of "normal" cultural expectations. Ironically, Regine's resistance on the latter point persuaded him to play the rake. He even told her that the breakup was simply an occasion to have a fling—hardly a mature decision, but one he hoped would demonstrate that the relationship was untenable. At last, Regine relented.

The end of the affair was indelibly painful. Regine would go on to marry Frederik Schlegel, a finance minister who, in 1855, assumed the governorship of the Danish West Indies. Schlegel was a congenial, steady person, and, by all accounts, his marriage to Regine was a contented one. Still, Regine remained captivated by her first love, just as Kierkegaard never stopped loving Regine. Regardless, Kierkegaard's break with Regine catapulted him into

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

a new phase in life. He was a writer now, and it would not be long until he made his mark in Danish letters.

KIERKEGAARD'S LITERARY CAREER

Kierkegaard's literary output in the years following the breakup rivals that of anyone in Western intellectual history, though, in a sense, it started accidentally. Still distraught, Kierkegaard journeyed to Berlin in October 1841, citing a desire to hear the lectures of one of the day's leading philosophers, Friedrich Schelling. Kierkegaard was hardly the only burgeoning thinker to attend, but Schelling failed to retain the Dane's attention. Thus Kierkegaard elected to immerse himself in his own writing. By the time he returned to Copenhagen in 1842, he had drafted his own literary-cum-philosophical opus, *Either/Or*. The finished product, which numbers well over seven hundred pages, would be published in 1843.

So began a remarkable stretch of creative activity. From 1843 to 1846, Kierkegaard issued an assortment of works. On the one hand were his pseudonymous writings, whose prolix, lyrical élan belied philosophical and theological ruminations on all manner of topics—the origin of melancholy, the beauty of monogamous love, the challenge of faith, the anxiety of freedom, and the relation between faith and reason. A number of these works, including *Fear and Trembling* (1843) and *Philosophical Fragments* (1844), have since been reckoned among the most significant in Western thought. On the other hand were Kierkegaard's many upbuilding discourses, which bore his own name and were published more or less concurrently with his pseudonymous works. Kierkegaard considered them directly religious and thus a decisive counterbalance to the searching, even skeptical tone of their pseudonymous relatives. That, indeed, was why he deemed them "upbuilding" (*opbyggelige*), a term he encountered among Copenhagen's Moravians. They are intended to fill the reader who is receptive to spiritual wisdom.

Yet, despite his productivity, the life of an author did not sit easily with Kierkegaard. He periodically floated other pursuits—teaching, traveling, and, perhaps most seriously, pastoring. This vocational tension came to a head in 1846. In February of that year, he published *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments*, which would prove to be another pseudonymous masterwork. However, unlike its predecessors, the *Postscript* ends with a brief appendix, "A First and Last Explanation." In it, Kierkegaard discloses that *he* stands behind the series of pseudonymous writings that began with *Either/Or*. This admission afforded Kierkegaard the opportunity to stipulate how his authorship was to be read. In particular, he underscored

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

that the author himself was not to be identified with the pseudonyms, who are more like characters in a play than facsimiles of his own personality. It also reflected his desire to take leave of his literary pursuits and, according to a February 1846 journal entry, to become a parish priest.

Kierkegaard's interest in becoming a pastor was not new. He entered the Royal Pastoral Seminary in 1840 and delivered his final qualifying sermon for the priesthood in February 1844. He had delayed ordination on account of his authorial career—a career that suddenly seemed less appealing. To understand this change, not to mention Kierkegaard's post-1846 writings, attention has to be paid to what scholars tend to call "the *Corsair* affair."

The Corsair (*Corsaren*) was a satirical periodical well known for its scandalous attacks on the leaders of Danish culture. In December 1845, one of its anonymous contributors, a literary critic and poet named Peder Ludvig Møller, published an acerbic critique of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous text *Stages on Life's Way*, even questioning the mental stability and moral probity of its "author." Many in Copenhagen's intellectual circles understood that Møller was attacking Kierkegaard. Of course, Kierkegaard did too. Soon he responded with a polemical article of his own, poking fun at Møller's literary and personal foibles and tempting *The Corsair* to ridicule him in its pages. The magazine took the bait. In January 1846, it launched a sustained literary assault on Kierkegaard, repeatedly lampooning his external appearance and depicting him as naïve, self-centered, and even insane.

These incidents carried profound consequences. In fomenting the scandal, Kierkegaard called attention to *The Corsair*'s malevolence and, incidentally or not, wrecked Møller's chances of becoming a professor at the University of Copenhagen. But it was a Pyrrhic victory. Now an object of open ridicule, Kierkegaard could no longer take his regular walks around Copenhagen. In this way, his life came to resemble an archetype all too familiar today—that of the disgraced celebrity, hounded by the press and mocked in society. He did not expect this outcome. He was publicly isolated and, despite his literary achievements, made into a laughingstock.

The Corsair affair forced Kierkegaard to reconsider his vocational intentions. His plans to enter the ministry were put on hold, and, in March 1846, he published *A Literary Review*, a brief but significant work that signaled a change in his activity and in his outlook. Ostensibly a work of literary criticism, occasioned by Thomasine Gyllembourg's 1845 novel, *Two Ages* (*To Tidsaldre*), *A Literary Review* provided Kierkegaard with an opportunity to assess Western society at the midpoint of the nineteenth century. What he found was grim indeed. Kierkegaard argues that, despite its intellectual and technological progress, "the present age" was morally and religiously bankrupt. Enervated by the press, which facilitates envy, gossip, and suspicion,

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

social life has turned away from the noble if sometimes violent aims of the past and been set on a course of decay. Cocktail parties and dilettantes have usurped the place of sacred ceremonies and heroes. This deterioration cannot be easily reformed, since, unlike previous eras, the press now stands between individuals and meaningful action, showcasing the flaws of would-be leaders and undermining the bonds that once held society together. In conclusion, Kierkegaard suggests that religious life may offer an egress from the present age's iniquity, but only if it is patterned on the example of Christ—rigorous in self-dispossession, unafraid of persecution, patient in adversity, and obedient to God in all things.

Emerging from this newfound point of view was, in many respects, a new body of literature, sometimes referred to as Kierkegaard's "second authorship." These post-1846 writings display a marked emphasis on Christian discipleship, paying an increased amount of attention to the theme of *imitatio Christi*. This tendency begins with *Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits* (1847) and turns up in several signed works, including *Works of Love* (1847), *Christian Discourses* (1848), *The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air* (1849), and *For Self-Examination* (1851). Kierkegaard also continued to develop a pseudonymous authorship, albeit with some differences. For example, two of his most celebrated later works, *The Sickness unto Death* (1849) and *Practice in Christianity* (1850), are attributed to Anti-Climacus. This name harks back to Johannes Climacus, the pseudonymous author of *Philosophical Fragments* and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. Yet, whereas Johannes Climacus epitomizes an ironic, quizzical approach to Christianity, Anti-Climacus stands as a Christian of penetrating insight. The prefix "Anti-" ("opposite" or "before") already discloses this point, as it signals both a contrast to and a precedence over his predecessor. For that reason, some commentators have suggested that the later pseudonyms represent a new form of pseudonymity—one centered on religious truth.

In any case, after the publication of *For Self-Examination*, Kierkegaard's activity as an author ground to a halt, at least *publicly*. For over three years, he confined himself to private matters and musings. He increasingly registered disdain for modern society in general and for the Danish state church in particular. As he saw it, an authorship that had unfolded as an endeavor to awaken and to upbuild Danish Christianity had proven unsuccessful. He would have to ponder what went wrong and what else, if anything, could be done. He also hoped that members of the clergy, headed by Jakob Peter Mynster, bishop of Zealand, would come forward and admit that institutional Christianity had failed to uphold traditional Christian ideals, particularly those involving the imitation of Christ. Only such an admission, he con-

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

cluded, would truly recover the church in Denmark. And so he waited and waited. This was the proverbial calm before the storm.

THE FINAL ACT: KIERKEGAARD'S "ATTACK UPON CHRISTENDOM"

To get a sense of how controversial Kierkegaard's last years were, one might well start with his funeral. It was held on 18 November 1855, one week after his passing. The service concluded at Assistens Cemetery, the burial place of many of Copenhagen's notables. The cemetery swelled with people. After the ceremonial rites, a man emerged from the crowed and doffed his hat. His name was Henrik Sigvard Lund, a son of Kierkegaard's deceased sister, Nicoline Christine Lund. Observing his uncle commemorated by the very institution he had died condemning, Lund could not help but register both irony and horror. He read from Kierkegaard's short essay "We Are All Christians" and then addressed the gathering, arguing that a state-church funeral did violence to Kierkegaard's legacy. Applause briefly rang out, but Lund's words did not so much produce fury as silence. A few people began to leave. Others stuck around, wondering if more histrionics would ensue.

This scene was, in a sense, a fitting summary of Kierkegaard's authorship. His doctoral dissertation on irony focused, among other things, on Socrates's mission to undermine the establishment of ancient Athens. In similar fashion, Kierkegaard's copious pseudonymous writings were intended to needle the reader, forcing her to confront the choice between what Socrates called "the unexamined life" and one of genuine ethico-religious commitment. *The Corsair* affair only intensified these tendencies. Moreover, it convinced him of the poverty of the present age, which, despite its celebration of "progress" and nominal acceptance of Christian doctrine, lacked the moral and spiritual resources to seek justice and truth. Thus the stage was set for Kierkegaard's attack upon Christendom.

By "Christendom" (*Christenheden*) Kierkegaard understood something quite different than "Christianity" (*Christendommen*). He equated Christianity with the teachings of the New Testament, particularly as embodied in the lives of Jesus Christ and the apostles. Furthermore, he insisted that Christianity involves striving to realize their example, even if such a standard exceeds one's own capability. That is why true Christianity also entails the need for forgiveness. The Christian may fall short of holiness, but, if he is honest about such failures, God will both forgive and provide the grace needed to resume and, hopefully, to fulfill the task of sanctity.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

In contrast, "Christendom" describes the attempt to translate Christianity into the sociopolitical sphere. It encompasses a peculiar conception of the church—namely, as an institution dedicated to indoctrinating persons into a given society or, simply put, as a wing of the state. For Kierkegaard, the trouble with this ecclesiology is manifold. Christendom etiolates the challenge of Christ's life and coaxes people to make peace with the status quo. Thus Kierkegaard rejected the assumption that Western society had become Christian. For him, the Christian church was ipso facto a militant church, which stood in contrast to the secular order.

Kierkegaard had adumbrated such views for years—a tendency that became unmistakable with the publication of *Practice in Christianity* and *For Self-Examination*. Still, he had avoided a direct and public confrontation with the Danish church, partly because J. P. Mynster was his father's pastor and partly because he continued to hope for change. Mynster's death in 1854 would force him to reassess the situation.

Mynster was eulogized by Hans Lassen Martensen, an upwardly mobile churchman and theologian. With an eye on the deceased's bishopric, Martensen highlighted the triumphs of Mynster's 20-year episcopacy, even declaring him a true imitator of Christ and a witness of Christian truth. These claims roused Kierkegaard from his period of quiet. He dashed off a rejoinder to Martensen, in which he maintained that, however great Mynster's earthly accomplishments, the bishop should in no way be confused with a "witness of truth" (*Sandhedsvidne*). The latter is characterized by a total commitment to the life and teachings of Jesus Christ, while Mynster ought to be seen as a career-minded ecclesiastic who tendered a diluted version of Christianity in exchange for political stability and personal gain.

Bearing the title "Was Bishop Mynster a 'Truth-Witness,' One of 'the Authentic Truth-Witnesses'—Is *This the Truth?*," the piece appeared in December 1854. People were bewildered and offended. Mynster's association with the Kierkegaard family was well known, and, despite Kierkegaard's protests to the contrary, his article was widely regarded as a gratuitous betrayal of the deceased. At that time, Kierkegaard's journals were unpublished, and he remained an elusive figure for many. Misunderstandings abounded. Conservatives, among whom he was once numbered, were scandalized by the antiestablishment undercurrent of his polemics. Liberals, of whom he had been critical, supported him in private and eventually in public. Martensen, for his part, published a brief reply and then refused to comment again. The vast majority of clergy just wanted the situation to go away.

But Kierkegaard was determined to press the issue. At first he simply wanted to provoke further reaction from Martensen. When a response failed to materialize, Kierkegaard released a series of articles and, in time, his own periodical, *The Moment* (Øieblikket). This was an ironic decision, given

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Kierkegaard's criticism of the press in *A Literary Review*. Nevertheless, *The Moment* stands as a satirical masterwork, in which Kierkegaard not only chastises the Danish church but, in fact, seeks to embarrass it. The laity get a drubbing too. In one piece, "The Sort of Person Who Is Called a Christian," Kierkegaard lampoons typical Danish churchgoers, casting them as people who use and abuse Christian teaching for the sake of their own worldly reward. The rot had spread from top to bottom.

In spite of its vitriol, Kierkegaard's attack was not so much trying to *destroy* the Danish church as trying to *keep* it from destroying itself. Repeatedly, he insisted that he was only a "corrective" who aimed to trim the excess from Christendom. This negativity gestures toward something positive—namely, the kind of faith celebrated in the lives of the great martyrs and saints, whose pursuit of justice, truth, and love did not cower before convention or prejudice, precisely because it shared in the overflowing, unlimited generosity of God himself.

Not long before the tenth issue of *The Moment* was to go to press, Kierkegaard became ill. On October 2, 1855, he collapsed in the street, and just over a month later he was dead. The cause of his deterioration was unclear. Kierkegaard himself associated his sickness with his attack upon the Danish church, and it appears that Kierkegaard understood his death as essential to the continuation of his fight. And yet there is a sense in which *The Moment* does not represent Kierkegaard's last word. For his gravestone, Kierkegaard chose the 10th stanza of Hans Adolph Brorson's hymn "Hallelujah! I Have Found My Jesus":

> In yet a little time,
> I will have won,
> Then will the whole struggle
> Be over and done,
> Then I can rest [*hvile*]
> In halls of roses,
> And continually,
> And continually
> Talk with my Jesus.

In selecting this verse for his tombstone, Kierkegaard did more than acknowledge his debt to Brorson. He also made Brorson's words his last communication with the world. As Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus explains in the *Postscript*—a work that dates from the same year Kierkegaard sketched out the plans for his burial site—the words on one's headstone signify what the dead person speaks from the grave. Thus Kierkegaard, dead now for more than 150 years, continues to call out what he saw as the essence of Christian existence—that it, while always a struggle, nevertheless tends toward and culminates in the joy and rest of a relationship with Christ.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

The Dictionary

Following the Danish alphabet, this dictionary alphabetizes the letters æ*,* ø*, and* å *after* z*. People are listed according to surnames. Bold type indicates a separate entry on the word in bold.*

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

A

ABSOLUTE. Kierkegaard uses "absolute" (*absolut*) both as an adjective and as an adverb; he also employs the term substantively (*det Absolute*). Kierkegaard likely became familiar with this Latinate term by way of modern philosophy, where it had come to be associated with whatever is ultimate and unconditioned. Perhaps Kierkegaard's most distinctive application of "absolute" is as a modifier of words such as "**paradox**," typically in order to differentiate between Hegelian **mediation** and **Christianity**. *See also* ACTUALITY; ASCETICISM; GOD; HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1770–1831)/HEGELIANISM; REASON.

ABSURD. The Latin term *absurdus* literally means "out of tune," and in its substantive form it has come to refer to that which is discordant or incongruous. Kierkegaard's concept of "the absurd" (*det Absurde*) accentuates this meaning in two senses: the absurd not only exceeds the comprehension of human **reason**, but, in doing so, it generates an **offense** that can only be resolved in and through passionate **inwardness**. At its highest pitch, such inwardness is tantamount to Christian **faith**, whereby one assents to the ostensibly absurd claim that the eternal **God** has become incarnate in a temporal human being. Kierkegaard links this notion with St. Paul's famous dictum: "The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God" (1 Cor. 3:19). *See also* RESIGNATION.

ACOUSTICAL ILLUSION. According to Kierkegaard, certain movements or testimonies can sound like one thing yet really indicate another. He calls this phenomenon an "acoustical illusion" (*akustisk Bedrag*). For example, one might assume that a certain political position is true when, in fact, it is merely popular. However, the paradigmatic instance of acoustical illusion concerns the **Christian** proclamation that **God** has become incarnate in **Jesus** of Nazareth. Human reason will express **offense** at this claim, but, in truth, the offense comes from Jesus himself, who stated that he and the "Father are one" (John 10:30). Thus the hearer, who is offended, actually points toward the source of the offense. For Kierkegaard, **paradox** and offense are

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

inextricably bound up with the Christian gospel. *See also CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS*; *SICKNESS UNTO DEATH*, *THE*.

ACTUALITY. Kierkegaard distinguishes between "actuality" (*Virkelighed*) and "possibility" (*Mulighed*) and, in doing so, approximates Aristotle's usage of these concepts: whereas possibility refers to something that exists *in potentia*, actuality denotes something that exists *in concreto*. Further, also like Aristotle, Kierkegaard associates *Virkelighed* with the development of a thing from a state of potential to one of realization. Yet, if Aristotle's concept of "actuality" (*energeia* or *entelecheia* in Greek) is generally associated with issues in physics and **metaphysics**, Kierkegaard prefers to use it in connection with ethico-religious becoming. This approach is particularly evident in the writings of Johannes Climacus, who argues that **Hegelian** philosophy wrongly views that which is thought (possibility) as that which is accomplished (actuality). But if this were true, Climacus goes on, then the intellectual would absorb the ethical—a dangerous contradiction, which could open the door for one claiming the moral high ground simply by virtue of what one has thought. In contrast, Climacus insists the ethical is achieved in the human being's **free** actualization of what had heretofore only been possible. Thus *Virkelighed* is superior to *Mulighed*. *See also* ABSOLUTE; EXISTENCE; EXISTENTIALISM; HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1770–1831)/HEGELIANISM; IDEA; INWARDNESS; LEVELING; NECESSITY.

ADLER, ADOLPH PETER (1812–1869). Danish theologian, Hegelian philosopher, pastor, and author. While serving the parishes of Hasle and Rutsker on the island of Bornholm, Adler claimed to undergo a profound religious experience—an event he describes in his 1843 collection *Some Sermons* (*Nogle Prædikener*). According to Adler, **Jesus Christ** appeared to him, dictating a new teaching regarding the origin of **evil** and ordering him to burn his Hegelian writings. These claims were of great concern to Adler's ecclesiastical supervisors, who questioned both his doctrinal **orthodoxy** and mental fitness. In 1845, he was relieved of his pastoral duties, albeit with a pension. He then dedicated himself to his literary work and, on 12 June 1846, published four books simultaneously, including *Attempt at a Brief Systematic Representation of Christianity in Its Logic* (*Forsøg til en kort systematisk Fremstilling af Christendommen i dens Logik*). Adler left Bornholm in 1853 and resettled in Copenhagen, where he lived until his death in 1869.

News of Adler's alleged vision came as Kierkegaard was writing ***Fear and Trembling***, a work that explores the famous *Akedah* narrative (Gen. 22:1–19), in which God commands Abraham to sacrifice his only son, Isaac.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

When Adler visited Copenhagen in 1843, Kierkegaard met with him and found Adler's behavior curious, if also somewhat amusing. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard kept a close eye on the situation with Adler, perusing the documents pertaining to his suspension and then purchasing all four of his new 1846 publications. It was around this time that Kierkegaard began working on a series of writings either focused on or occasioned by Adler's case. He only issued one of these in his lifetime, namely, "The Difference between a Genius and an Apostle" in ***Two Ethical-Religious Minor Essays*** (1849), attributed to the pseudonym H.H., Kierkegaard felt that the rest of his literature on Adler did not warrant publication—chiefly because it involves personal judgments regarding the illegitimacy of Adler's revelation—though the entire *Book on Adler* (*Bogen om Adler*) was released in 1872. *See also* CHURCH; HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1770–1831)/HEGELIANISM.

ADMIRATION. For Kierkegaard, one of the great errors of **Christendom** is that it transforms the human being's relation to Christ into one of "admiration" (*Beundring*). The Danish verb *beundre* is etymologically related to the English "wonder," and thus "to admire" is to regard something with awe, surprise, and veneration. For Kierkegaard, herein lies the problem of admiration in Christendom: Christ does not command his followers to be in awe of him but, rather, to **imitate** him. Yet, since Christ's way is precisely a way of self-denial and **suffering**, Christians have come to accept admiration of Christ as a worthy substitute—a problem exacerbated by the **church**, whose leaders benefit from an attenuated form of discipleship. Kierkegaard particularly presses this message in ***Practice in Christianity*** (1850), ascribed to the pseudonym Anti-Climacus and intended to provoke church authorities, including Bishop **Jakob Peter Mynster**, to provide a public response. *See also* ART; DYING TO; ETHICAL/ETHICS; FAITH; SELF, THE.

AESTHETIC. The Danish words *Æsthetik* and *æsthetisk* can be traced back to the Greek verb *aisthanesthai*, which means "to perceive," especially by the senses. Kierkegaard's category of "the aesthetic" assumes this definition, generally indicating an existential orientation toward the senses. Yet, according to Kierkegaard, such an approach to life is bound to frustrate. First, inasmuch as sensory life is necessarily **temporal**, the aesthetic is subject to the ravages of time and thus to change, diminishment, and **death**. Second, given its fundamental **immediacy**, the aesthetic gravitates toward the interesting as a means of warding off boredom. Hence, unless the aesthetic is put in service to **ethical-religious** life, it promotes arbitrariness and discontinuity at the expense of genuine freedom.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

According to Kierkegaard, some people live in the aesthetic unconsciously, while others do so intentionally. Yet, even among dedicated aesthetes, there are differences in expression: a figure such as Don Juan represents erotic compulsion, while the pseudonymous Johannes the Seducer exemplifies a life of reflective (and self-reflexive) titillation. In any case, given Kierkegaard's theological anthropology, an aesthete lacks the altruism, balance, and tranquility of a **self** that has rooted out **despair**. This point can be illustrated in relation to **love**. Whereas the aesthete is aroused by love either as erotic infatuation or seductive diversion, ethical-religious conceptions of love center on **the other**, both in terms of social responsibility and, at an even higher pitch, self-sacrifice for the sake of **God**. *See also* ART; *EITHER/OR*; ETHICAL/ETHICS; LIFE-VIEW; PAGANISM; RELIGIOUS/RELIGIOUSNESS.

ANDERSEN, HANS CHRISTIAN (1805–1875). Novelist and poet, best known for fairy tales such as "The Little Mermaid" (*Den lille havfrue*, 1837) and "The Ugly Duckling" (*Den grimme ælling*, 1843). Born in Odense and raised in poverty, Andersen moved to Copenhagen at the age of 14 to pursue a career in the **theater**—an aspiration that soon shifted to literature. With the help of influential benefactors, Andersen received a good education, and, during the 1820s, he began to publish in earnest, leading to the release of his allegorical travel novel *Journey on Foot from Holmens Canal to the East Point of Amager* (*Fodreise fra Holmens Canal til Østpynten af Amager*) in 1829. The success of *Journey on Foot* paved the way for Andersen to travel abroad, and he grew into one of Denmark's most notable *hommes de lettres*. His *Fairy Tales Told for Children* (*Eventyr, fortalte for Børn*) first appeared in 1835, and he would continue to issue installments of fairy tales until 1872. And yet, despite such public success, Andersen's private life remained difficult: he never married and struggled with psycho-spiritual conflicts, particularly regarding sexuality. He died of liver cancer in 1875, already a Danish icon.

For a time, Kierkegaard and Andersen lived within a mile of one another in central Copenhagen—a proximity that, in 1838, facilitated their most well-known encounter. In his autobiography, Andersen recounts that he chanced upon Kierkegaard in the street and that the latter promised to write a positive review of Andersen's novel *Only a Fiddler* (*Kun en Spillemand*, 1837). However, when Kierkegaard's ***From the Papers of One Still Living*** (*Af en endnu Levendes Papirer*) arrived in September 1838, it tendered incisive criticism instead. According to Kierkegaard, *Only a Fiddler* lacks an appropriate **life-view**: by way of its protagonist—a failed musician named Christian—the novel suggests that self-actualization is determined by biological and social factors. This assumption is evident in Andersen's treatment of **genius**. Whereas Christian's fate implies that genius is fragile and in need of social

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

patronage, Kierkegaard argues that the power of genius persists and, indeed, rages in spite of unfavorable circumstances. Hence, as Kierkegaard's first publication, *From the Papers of One Still Living* not only situates Kierkegaard among his contemporaries in Golden Age Copenhagen, but it anticipates some of the key themes of his impending oeuvre. *See also* ASSISTENS CEMETERY; *THE CORSAIR*; CULTURE.

ANONYMITY. It is well known that Kierkegaard's authorship features **pseudonymity**, but the issue of "anonymity" (*Anonymitet*) turns up as well. To be anonymous is to lack or to withhold a name in public activity, and, with this in mind, Kierkegaard's interest in anonymity is twofold. First, he occasionally employs literary anonyms (such as "A" and "B") instead of proper pseudonyms (such as Victor Eremita and Johannes Climacus) in his own work. Second, he raises objections to literary anonymity, especially when it is used in the popular **press**. These two points are not necessarily in contradiction. Kierkegaard does not oppose anonymity *tout court*. Rather, he argues that, in matters of sociopolitical concern, one must take responsibility for one's own views in order to underline their ethical **earnestness**. Kierkegaard pressed this point with particular force in his various forays into the issue of Denmark's emergent free press, beginning in the mid-1830s and culminating with the publication of ***A Literary Review*** in 1846. *See also* COMMUNICATION; *THE CORSAIR*; CROWD/PUBLIC; LEVELING; *POINT OF VIEW FOR MY WORK AS AN AUTHOR*, *THE*.

ANXIETY. One of the core concepts of Kierkegaard's analysis of the **self** is "anxiety" (*Angest*). The word itself is etymologically related to the Latin *angustiae*, meaning "constricted" or "painful." This signification generally corresponds to the contemporary usage of "anxiety," which connotes a sense of disquiet in relation to a perceived menace or risk. For Kierkegaard, insofar as **the self** is structured as a synthesis of **finitude** and infinitude, **temporality** and **eternality**, **necessity** and **freedom**, it will be conscious of a **dialectical** tension between these elements. More specifically, as the self becomes conscious of its own possibility to freely act and choose, it is at once attracted to and repulsed by its personal responsibility. Thus anxiety is not **sin** and is indeed an essential aspect of self-development, though, if not handled properly, it can be crippling.

Angest is utilized throughout Kierkegaard's corpus, though its definitive treatment is in ***The Concept of Anxiety*** (1844), attributed to the **pseudonym** Vigilius Haufniensis. It could be argued, moreover, that Kierkegaard ultimately subsumes anxiety under the related notion of **despair** (*Fortvivelse*), which he fully develops in ***The Sickness unto Death*** (1849). At the same

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

time, however, it is possible that Kierkegaard viewed anxiety as a psychic experience that anticipates the spiritual crisis of despair. Whatever the case, he insists that both phenomena, if left unchecked, have the potential to bring the self to ruin. *See also* CHOICE; EVIL; HOPE; INDIVIDUAL.

APOSTLE. Kierkegaard typically uses "apostle" (*Apostel*) in its New Testament sense, referring to one who is a "messenger" (in Greek *apóstolos*) of the good news of **Jesus Christ**. But there is a difference in emphasis. The New Testament tends to use the term historically, citing Jesus' disciples and Paul of Tarsus as "apostles," whereas Kierkegaard is more interested in the conceptual meaning and theological implications of identifying a human being as a messenger of the divine. The need to clarify the significance of *Apostel* was brought to the fore by **Adolph Peter Adler**, a Danish priest and theologian who claimed to have received a divine **revelation**. However, when this claim generated controversy, Adler revised his story, framing his experience as one of intellectual and spiritual inspiration. For Kierkegaard, this was a category error representative of modern **Christendom**: people have forgotten the difference between a **genius**, whose status lies in an achievement of immanent and relative import, and an apostle, whose status lies in the reception and **communication** of a divine revelation that terminates either in **offense** or **faith**. For that reason, the apostle is also characterized by a willingness to **suffer** for his teaching, both externally and internally. Thus the apostle does not just tell others about Christ; he comes to **imitate** Christ more and more. *See also* AUTHORITY; *TWO ETHICAL-RELIGIOUS MINOR ESSAYS*; WITNESS.

ARCHIMEDEAN POINT. Kierkegaard adopts the expression "Archimedean point" (*Archimediske Punkt*) on a number of occasions throughout this authorship, though he uses it in a fairly idiosyncratic manner. After all, the phrase can be traced back to Archimedes of Syracuse, one of the most important engineers and mathematicians of Greek antiquity, who reportedly claimed that even the Earth could be moved if one had the right fulcrum and lever. Kierkegaard takes this notion of a powerful yet undiscovered physical locus and treats it as a **metaphor** for the philosophical and spiritual quest for the point by which life can be truly understood and thus transformed. Indeed, it is notable that, while "Archimedean point" crops up in various published writings, Kierkegaard's most well-known usage dates from his early journals and papers, when he applied it to his own search for purpose and **truth**. *See also* EXISTENCE; INDIVIDUAL; OBJECTIVITY; SELF, THE; SUBJECTIVITY.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

ART. Kierkegaard was a connoisseur of art (*Kunst*) who, at the same time, wrestled with its ambiguous significance for human life. This tension follows from his understanding of the **aesthetic**. On the one hand, great works of art—for example, the **music** of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart (1756–1791) or the sculptures of Bertel Thorvaldsen (1770–1844), both of which Kierkegaard deeply appreciated—are able to capture the vicissitudes of feeling and **passion**, not to mention the contours of a particular **life-view**. On the other hand, Kierkegaard was keenly sensitive to art's ability to beguile and to distract, thereby leading one away from ethico-religious commitment. This concern is by no means limited to "secular" art. In fact, perhaps the most stringent critique of art in Kierkegaard's authorship is found in ***Practice in Christianity*** (1850), in which Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** Anti-Climacus argues that depictions of **Jesus Christ** often encourage **admiration** rather than **imitation**. And yet it is also clear that he did not think this outcome necessary, inasmuch as he came to see himself as a religious "poet" whose writings seek to foster spiritual **upbuilding** and, in turn, true Christian discipleship. *See also* ROMANTICISM; WRITING.

ASCETICISM. Kierkegaard's analysis of "asceticism" (*Askese*) is characteristically dialectical. **Pseudonyms** such as Judge William and Johannes Climacus tend to identify asceticism with monastic life, particularly in its cloistered, medieval expression. As a result, the practice of asceticism—defined as abstinence from sensual pleasure for the sake of spiritual growth—is seen as an outer representation of one's **inner** disposition and thus as susceptible to abuse. After all, the one who renounces food or material possessions may be regarded as an exceptional person, receiving worldly honor in the process, and thereby nullifying the initial **sacrifice**. On the other hand, the Judge and Climacus allow that ascetic practice rightly acknowledges that the **absolute** cannot be related to in ordinary, relative terms. To relate to **God**, in other words, is to have one's life transformed. Since, for Kierkegaard, modern **Christendom** is more likely to eschew asceticism than to take advantage of it, his later authorship tends to stress the importance of ascetical "works," not because such works have salvific import in and of themselves but because they bring one closer to the example of **Jesus Christ**. With this in mind, one might well argue that much of Kierkegaard's later authorship involves the reintroduction of asceticism to Christendom. *See also* MARRIAGE; MONASTICISM; PRAYER; SUFFERING.

ASSISTENS CEMETERY. The Kierkegaard family grave site is found in Assistens Cemetery (*Assistens Kirkegård*), located northwest of Copenhagen's city center in the district of Nørrebro. Though initially designed in

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

1760 to absorb overflow from (or "to assist") nearby graveyards, Assistens Cemetery later became the resting place of many of Copenhagen's most well-known denizens, from Kierkegaard to **Hans Christian Andersen** to Niels Bohr. The Kierkegaard family plot comprises a grassy area enclosed by a short metal fence, and it features a large stone monument adorned with a cross, along with three tablets bearing the names of those interred there, including **Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard** and **Ane Sørensdatter Lund**. Søren Aabye Kierkegaard was buried in Assistens Cemetery on 18 November 1855, and, at the committal of his body, a controversy erupted. Kierkegaard's nephew **Henrik Sigvard Lund** disrupted the proceedings, arguing that the Danish **state church** should not have officiated Kierkegaard's funeral, given the latter's public rejection of ecclesiastical leadership and polity. In order to amplify his point, Lund read from the Book of Revelation and from Kierkegaard's polemical paper ***The Moment***. In 1874, Kierkegaard's brother **Peter Christian Kierkegaard** properly ordered the family gravesite and, in keeping with Søren Aabye's documented wishes, added a few lines from the Danish hymnist and poet **Hans Adoloph Brorson** to his brother's headstone.

ATONEMENT. The Judeo-Christian concept of "atonement" crops up throughout Kierkegaard's authorship. The word entered the theological lexicon chiefly by way of English translations of the Hebrew verb *kipper*, which, in the Old Testament, refers to the removal of impurity from the Temple through the ritual **sacrifice** of an animal scapegoat. The New Testament concept is related but not identical. According to the Apostle Paul, **Jesus Christ**'s **suffering** and **death** represent the ultimate atoning sacrifice, namely, for the **forgiveness** of **sins**. Thus Paul understands Christ himself as the one who reconciles **God** and humanity, and, indeed, the New Testament word for "atonement" (*katallegēn*) is often translated as "reconciliation" (as in Rom. 5:11). This same etymological intersection exists in Kierkegaard's Danish, in which both *Soning* and *Forsoning* can be rendered as "atonement" or "reconciliation." However, Kierkegaard tended to use *Forsoning* with more regularity.

In terms of the concept itself, Kierkegaard frequently uses it in the Pauline sense, albeit with little interest in debating the finer points of atonement theory. Indeed, for Kierkegaard, whether or not one agrees with Athanasius or Anselm is not critical. What *is* critical is that one confront the **Christian** claim that one is reconciled with God solely on the basis of Christ's Passion. Such a realization may engender adoration, or it may engender **offense**. Either way, one should not relate to the atonement as an abstract teaching but, rather, as a kind of mirror in which one sees one's deepest convictions about God, the world, and oneself. Moreover, for those who view the atonement with eyes of **faith**, it should not only move one to thanksgiving but also

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

embolden one to strive to **imitate** Christ. *See also* DAMNATION; REVELATION; SALVATION.

ATHENÆUM. Founded in 1824, and located at Østergade 68, the Athenæum Society (Selskabet Athenæum) was a literary club and one of the preferred haunts for Copenhagen's intelligentsia. Kierkegaard, like any other member, paid a fee to use the Athenæum's private library and reading room, and he was a regular and noteworthy visitor, particularly during the last few years of his life. Indeed, by this time, Kierkegaard had grown so exasperated with the Danish **state church** that, rather than attend worship service, he spent his Sunday mornings in the Athenæum's reading room—a visible yet curious form of protest, which was not lost on those who had been following his so-called attack upon **Christendom** in the **press**. *See also* CHURCH; GIØDWAD, JENS FINSTEEN (1811–1891).

AUTHORITY. Kierkegaard uses two words to connote "authority." The first is *Autoritet*, and, as with its English cognate, it can be traced back to the Latin *auctor* ("master" or "author"). The second is *Myndighed*, which is etymologically related to the Latin *manus* ("hand") and thus has connotations of taking hold of something—that is, of commanding power and respect. In both cases, authority has to do with the ability to influence others, whether by virtue of one's disposition, reputation, or office. References to authority are scattered throughout Kierkegaard's authorship, indicating a general preference for *Myndighed* over *Autoritet*. Kierkegaard was also deeply interested in authority as a concept, and, for the most part, his reflections center on the nature of authority in a **Christian** context.

Kierkegaard's most sustained treatment of this issue occurs in "The Difference between a **Genius** and an **Apostle**," the second treatise in ***Two Ethical-Religious Minor Essays***. Ascribed to the pseudonym H.H., "The Difference between a Genius and an Apostle" seeks to clarify the distinction between worldly authority and its Christian counterpart. The former, inasmuch as it has to do with **finite** and **temporal** creatures, is ipso facto relative and can be evaluated as such. For example, one who seems to be a figure of authority—say, a political leader—may undermine his authority based on poor decision making, particularly if a rival leader (whose authority is itself relative and subject to criticism) reasonably demonstrates the error of his opponent's ways. Christian authority is different. Since, for Kierkegaard, its basis lies in the life, teaching, and **imitation** of **Jesus Christ**, it does not present itself as an object for rational consideration but, rather, as that to which only two responses are possible—**faith** or **offense**. In other words, Christian authority is rooted apostolicity rather than genius, and to confuse the two is to create a

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

misleading and injurious category error. One who has Christian authority is called by **God** and thus derives authority from God, whereas one possessing worldly authority does so within an immanent sphere of transitory qualifications.

Not all who seem called by God, however, can be said to have "divine authority." As Kierkegaard's critique of Christendom demonstrates, ecclesial ordination is not tantamount to divine authority. The latter is manifested paradoxically in the apostle's willingness to **suffer** and die for the sake of God, and thus well-heeled clergy, not to mention prestigious artists and thinkers, are ultimately "without authority" (*uden Myndighed*). Kierkegaard tended to frame his own authorship in just this way, thereby gesturing toward his own pedagogical strategy of indirect **communication**, as opposed to authoritative teaching. *See also* CHURCH; EARNESTNESS; POLITICS; PSEUDONYMITY; STATE CHURCH.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

B

BALLE, NIKOLAI EDINGER (1744–1816). Danish pastor and theologian who served a lengthy stint as bishop of Zealand (1783–1808). Balle's episcopacy was marked by doctrinal and liturgical reforms, which he hoped would equip the **church** to effectively yet faithfully respond to its modern critics. Whereas a number of prominent liberal activists—influenced by the Enlightenment in general and the philosophy of Immanuel Kant in particular—argued that dogmatic theology had become superfluous, Balle maintained that **reason** and **revelation** could be harmonized. With this in mind, he developed a new catechism for the Danish **state church**, calling it *Textbook in the Evangelical-Christian Religion* (*Lærebog i den Evangelisk-christelige Religion*, 1791). His goal was to provide a streamlined, civically minded compendium of the **Christian** faith to replace Erik Pontoppidan's cumbersome *Truth for Piety* (*Sandhed til Gudfrygtighed*, 1737)—a catechism rooted in the then unfashionable tradition of Halle **Pietism**.

In one sense, Balle was remarkably successful. His *Lærebog* was adopted as the official catechism of the Danish church in 1794, and it became a presupposition in the nation's cultural life, taking its place alongside the Bible as essential religious reading. On the other hand, Balle's catechism caught flak from both traditionally minded believers and modern rationalists, each of whom argued that the *Lærbog*'s centrism conceded too much to the opposition. Nevertheless, Balle's catechism enjoyed a sales monopoly until 1856, and one could say that it represented the accredited, conventional position in Danish Lutheranism for the entirety of Kierkegaard's life.

It is not surprising, then, that Kierkegaard's works make a number of references to Balle's catechism, most notably in the second part of ***Either/Or***, where Kierkegaard's pseudonym Judge William cites it in support of his critique of the **aesthetic**. According to the Judge, Balle's catechism demonstrates that **ethics** lies at the center of the good life; thus there is no opposition between the ethical and the **religious** and, in turn, no fundamental opposition between the world and **God**. At the same time, however, the Judge's writings fail to explore the **paradoxical** aspects of Christianity—namely, that one must die to oneself in order to live and that **truth** and goodness are bound to **suffer** on account of human **sin**. For Kierkegaard, such omissions

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

represent the weaknesses of the Judge's writings. That the Judge himself frames his writings as a supplement to Balle's *Lærebog* means that Kierkegaard's concerns likewise apply to the mainstream Danish church writ large. *See also* CREATION; DOCTRINE/DOGMA; GOD; LUTHER, MARTIN (1483–1546).

BANG, OLUF LUNDT (1788–1877). Danish physician, generally known as Ole Bang. The son of physician and professor of medicine Frederik Ludvig Bang—who, incidentally, was the stepfather of **Jakob Peter Mynster**—Ole Bang followed in the footsteps of his father. After receiving his medical doctorate in 1813, Bang became a professor at the **University of Copenhagen** and eventually ascended to the position of head doctor at **Frederik's Hospital**, where he was both an active clinician and probing researcher. In 1852, he published *Handbook in Therapy* (*Haandbog i Therapien*), which proved influential in the field of internal medicine.

Bang was Kierkegaard's personal physician, and, indeed, Kierkegaard refers to Bang in a few key journal entries, particularly in the period of 1846–1847. Realizing that his **melancholy** was both persistent and intense, Kierkegaard consulted Bang for a medical opinion. Bang's precise diagnosis and prognosis remain unknown, but, according to Kierkegaard, Bang doubted that Kierkegaard would be able to overcome his psycho-spiritual unhappiness—something that Kierkegaard, following the Apostle Paul, referred to as his "thorn in the flesh" (2 Cor. 12:7). Notably, if also curiously, Kierkegaard was comforted by Bang's ostensible conclusion, inasmuch as Kierkegaard believed that his **suffering** was bound up with his providentially guided authorial mission.

BAPTISM. Throughout his authorship, Kierkegaard makes several references to "baptism" (*Daab*)—the sacrament of initiation into the Christian **church**. Depending on the practice of the community in question, baptism is done either by pouring water on the catechumen's head or by immersing the catechumen's entire body in water. The former is preferred by churches that practice pedobaptism (infant baptism), the latter more typical of those that observe credobaptism (believer's baptism). Denmark's **state church** has long favored pedobaptism, and, for much of Kierkegaard's life, the state required parents to have their babies baptized in the established church. This regulation was by no means uncontroversial. In fact, Kierkegaard's older brother **Peter Christian Kierkegaard** found himself embroiled in a dispute over compulsory baptism. Although a prominent pastor in the Danish church, P. C. Kierkegaard twice refused to forcibly baptize the children of credobaptists. The matter became something of a cause célèbre, and, eventually,

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

the decree of compulsory baptism was rescinded. The issue was altogether nullified when Denmark ratified a democratic **constitution** in 1849, thereby sanctioning religious **freedom**.

Given this history, it is not surprising that Kierkegaard would take an interest in baptism. He too had been baptized as an infant—by the Rev. J. E. G. Bull at Holy Spirit Church (*Helligaandskirken*) on 3 June 1813—and he was familiar with how baptism doubled as a sacramental rite and political necessity in Danish society. He venerated the former, criticized the latter. More specifically, both Kierkegaard's signed and **pseudonymous** works censure the assumption that baptism is a kind of certification of one's commitment to **Christianity**. Moreover, he saw this problem as particularly worrisome in churches that practice pedobaptism, insofar as they too often treat baptism as a matter of course, as if one's Christianity is secured simply by virtue of being born. On the other hand, Kierkegaard refuses to call for an end to infant baptism and instead insists that the Christian must always strive to *appropriate* his or her baptism. The trouble, in short, is not infant baptism per se. It is that the church has too long implied that baptism, rather than virtues such as **faith**, **hope**, and **love**, is a voucher of one's status as a Christian. Kierkegaard himself sought to correct this error. *See also* DYING TO; FAITH; POLITICS; SALVATION.

BARTH, KARL (1886–1968). Swiss Reformed theologian who is widely considered one of modernity's most significant and influential theological minds. Born in Basel, Barth was primarily raised in Bern, where his father, Fritz, served as a professor of New Testament and early church history. The Barth home was deeply influenced by **Pietism**, particularly in its Moravian expression, and Barth's early studies were informed by and indebted to the tender, humanistic theology that emerged out of the Pietist movement by way of thinkers such as Friedrich Schleiermacher. Around the time of World War I, however, Barth's outlook began to change. Convinced that liberal Protestant theology had nourished the nationalism behind the Great War, Barth published *The Epistle to the Romans* (*Der Römerbrief*, 1918), a provocative commentary on the Pauline epistle that sought to reorient the Protestant theological tradition. Drawing on figures such as Fyodor Dostoevsky, Friedrich Nietzsche, and, indeed, Kierkegaard, Barth's *Romans* underlines the fallenness and frailty of human **culture** and, in turn, the inability of human beings to arrive at knowledge of the transcendent **God**, who is definitively revealed in the paradoxical and always mysterious revelation of **Jesus Christ**. The success of *Romans* propelled Barth to a number of important academic appointments in German universities. However, upon drafting the "Barmen Declaration" (*Die Barmer Theologische Erklärung*) in 1934, which decried

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

the influence of Nazism on German **Protestantism**, he was forced to return to Switzerland. His exile ultimately led to his greatest achievement—the decades-spanning, multivolume magnum opus *Church Dogmatics* (*Kirchliche Dogmatik*), which Barth was still working on when he died in December 1968.

Barth's relation to Kierkegaard was ambivalent. On the one hand, he was among the first major Christian thinkers to popularize Kierkegaard's writings, drawing particular attention to Kierkegaard's penetrating insight into the alterity of God—the so-called "infinite qualitative distinction" between the **temporal** and the **eternal**. On the other hand, Barth was critical of Kierkegaard's sympathy for Pietism and its tacit anthropocentrism. He expanded on this concern in April 1963 when he accepted the Sonning Prize (*Sonningprisen*) at the **University of Copenhagen**. While expressing gratitude for Kierkegaard's critique of bourgeois Protestantism, Barth added that Kierkegaard's stress on the **individual** actually paved the way for atheistic humanism and thereby weakened the Christian community. *See also* EXISTENTIALISM; OTHER, THE; SCRIPTURE.

BEING/BECOMING. The foundation of Kierkegaard's **metaphysics** lies in the meaning of and relationship between "being" (*Væsen*) and "becoming" (*Vorden*). For Kierkegaard, the whole of reality is divided into two overarching domains. The first is *Væsen*, and it is characterized by a set of transcendent attributes—eternality, immutability, infinitude, and simplicity. The domain of being, in short, is the domain of **God**. The second domain is *Vorden*, and it is characterized by a set of sublunary attributes—materiality, **temporality**, changeableness, and composition. The domain of becoming, in short, is the domain of **nature**.

Despite this dual structure, Kierkegaard does not think that the domains of being and becoming are utterly distinct. In fact, the two can be synthesized. In the highest sense, this synthesis happens in the person of **Jesus Christ**, who, paradoxically, is the union of being and becoming, of eternality and temporality. And yet, Kierkegaard also contends that the human **self** as such is a synthesis of these disparate elements, and thus the self's fundamental task is to harmonize its eternal being and temporal becoming. It can only do so, however, if it comes to **rest** in God in the **imitation** of Christ. But most selves either avoid or refuse this undertaking, preferring instead to incline toward one category or the other. This is the condition of **despair**. Kierkegaard's most detailed treatment of this issue is in the ***The Sickness unto Death***, attributed to the pseudonym Anti-Climacus. *See also* DEATH; FINITUDE/INFINITY; FREEDOM; LOVE; MOVEMENT.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

BOESEN, EMIL FERDINAND (1812–1881). Danish pastor whose family had longstanding connections to the Kierkegaard family. Both families were among the elites of Copenhagen, and both cultivated a strong respect for religion in their homes, particularly by adhering to Moravian **Pietism**. After taking a degree in theology in 1834, Boesen taught in and around Copenhagen for a number of years and even dabbled as an author. In 1849, however, he moved to the Jutland peninsula, where he served a parish in Horsens for over a decade. Boesen would move again in 1863, assuming an administrative ecclesiastical post in Aarhus. Upon retiring in 1877, Boesen returned to the Copenhagen area, where he died a few years later.

Boesen was Kierkegaard's closest friend and confidante. It was Boesen with whom Kierkegaard corresponded during the period of his breakup with **Regine Olsen**, and it was Boesen—and only Boesen—with whom Kierkegaard would converse as he lay on his deathbed in **Frederik's Hospital**. By that time, Boesen was firmly established as a **state church** pastor, and the two had grown apart. Nevertheless, as Boesen put it in a letter to his wife, Kierkegaard treated him as a kind of confessor, pouring out his feelings on a number of topics, from his strained personal relationships to his refusal to receive Holy Communion from a priest. These visits began on Sunday, 14 October 1855, and the two met periodically over the next couple of weeks. A decade later, at the request of H. P. Barfod, who was editing Kierkegaard's posthumous writings, Boesen provided a written account of his final conversations with Kierkegaard, a document now well known for its essential biographical information. *See also* FIBIGER, ILIA (1817–1867); GIØDWAD, JENS FINSTEEN (1811–1891); LUND, HENRIK SIGVARD (1825–1889); NIELSEN, RASMUS (1809–1884); SCHELLING, FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH VON (1775–1854).

BORGERDYD SCHOOL. Kierkegaard attended the School of Civic Virtue (Borgerdydskolen) from 1821 to 1830. During that time, the school shared a building with the Gyldendal bookshop and publishing house, which was located on Klareboderne, a narrow side street in the heart of Copenhagen. The headmaster of Borgerdydskolen was Michael Nielsen, whose emphases on classical education and strict discipline would define the school for decades. As a student, the acerbic and obstinate Kierkegaard conflicted with Nielsen. However, the headmaster was well aware of Kierkegaard's academic excellence, and Kierkegaard eventually taught Latin at Borgerdydskolen in various stints throughout the 1830s. In November 1840, Nielsen wrote a letter of recommendation on behalf of Kierkegaard, noting the intellectual and pedagogical merits of his former pupil. It would seem that the feelings were

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

mutual, as Kierkegaard gave Nielsen dedication copies of his upbuilding discourses (*see EIGHTEEN UPBUILDING DISCOURSES*) in 1843. *See also* KIERKEGAARD, PETER CHRISTIAN (1805–1888); LEHMANN, PETER MARTIN ORLA (1810–1870).

BREMER, FREDERIKA (1801–1865). Swedish author and feminist reformer who spent roughly a year in Copenhagen, starting in the autumn of 1848. Bremer arrived in the Danish capital as a kind of celebrity. Already, she had published a number of novels, including *The Neighbors* (*Grannarna*, 1837) and *The Home* (*Hemmet*, 1839), and in 1844 the Swedish Academy (later famed for awarding the Nobel Prize) presented her with its great gold medal of merit. Bremer was also interested in philosophy, politics, and theology, and she sought to align her progressive social views with an active (if unorthodox) spiritual life. Her frequent travels abroad provided further encouragement to her writing and activism. In fact, not long after her stint in Copenhagen, she journeyed to the United States, where she met with American luminaries such as Ralph Waldo Emerson and Nathaniel Hawthorne and eventually made it as far as the Deep South. Later, in 1856, she published the novel *New Sketches of Everyday Life: Hertha, or, A Soul's History: A Sketch from Real Life* (*Nya Teckningar ur Hvardagslifvet: Hertha, eller En själs historia: Teckning ur det verkliga livet*), which promoted greater independence for **women**. Many of her desired reforms were realized prior to her death on New Year's Eve 1865.

During her stay in Copenhagen, and as was her wont, Bremer made the rounds among the local cognoscenti. In May 1849, she wrote Kierkegaard a letter and requested a meeting. He politely refused. For that reason, he was surprised when his name appeared in Bremer's 1849 travelogue *Life in the North* (*Lif in Norden*). It was not an arbitrary reference. Bremer was hoping to give the reader a sense of Denmark's intellectual life, and, to that end, she provided sketches of a number of distinguished cultural figures, including **Jakob Peter Mynster**, **Hans Lassen Martensen**, and Kierkegaard. Her depiction of Kierkegaard was not entirely critical, but it was not flattering either, portraying him as distant and irascible. In his journals, Kierkegaard contends that Bremer was little more than a mouthpiece for Martensen, and he implies that she sought (and, in some cases, consummated) romantic liaisons with elites. In a later journal passage, he adds, with caustic irony, that Bremer's account confirms that he is an outcast among Copenhagen's intelligentsia. *See also* LANGUAGE.

BRORSON, HANS ADOLF (1694–1764). Danish priest and hymnist who, for over two decades, was the bishop of Ribe in southwest Jutland. Brorson's

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

academic career was somewhat checkered: he matriculated at the **University of Copenhagen** in 1712 but did not finish his theological examination until 1721. However, an encounter with **Pietism** gave him direction. While serving a parish in Tønder, which lies on Denmark's border with Germany, Brorson came under the influence of a German-born and -educated cleric named Johan Herman Schrader. Schrader had been influenced by the civic-minded Pietism associated with the University of Halle, and as a means of inculcating Hallensian ideals, he wrote hymns. This approach made an impression on Brorson, and he began issuing his own hymnody in 1732. Several years later, he had enough hymns to publish an anthology, which he called *The Rare Jewel of Faith* (*Troens rare Klenodie*, 1739). Brorson's collection was beloved in Denmark, especially by those inclined toward Pietism, and his episcopal appointment in 1741 established him as one of the **state church**'s key proponents of the Pietist movement. Though busy with **church** affairs and suffering from a number of personal troubles, Brorson remained active as a hymnist. Upon his death in 1764, his posthumous work was collected and later published as *Swan Song* (*Svane-Sang*, 1765). Today, he is considered one of Denmark's three great hymn writers along with Thomas Kingo (1634–1703) and **N. F. S. Grundtvig**. What distinguishes Brorson's hymnody in particular is its combination of formal sophistication and mystical themes.

Given his own Pietist background, Kierkegaard's affinity for Brorson is unsurprising. He would have encountered Brorson's hymns from a young age, both in state church services and at the popular Sunday evening "meetings" hosted by the Moravian Society of Brothers (*see* PIETISM). Certain journal passages explain that, for Kierkegaard, Brorson represented a venerable and authentic form of devotion, one that had been displaced by the anodyne bromides of **Christendom**. Hence, particularly in his later journals, Kierkegaard turned to Brorson's hymns as thematic touchstones: what Brorson would articulate in verse, Kierkegaard would flesh out in prose. This practice is also exemplified in "From on High He Will Draw All to Himself," the third and final section of ***Practice in Christianity***, which uses a line from Brorson's hymn "Jesus, Draw Me" ("Drag, Jesu, mig," 1739) as the basis for extended theological reflection.

Still, perhaps Kierkegaard's most significant reference to Brorson is on a tablet at the Kierkegaard family gravesite in **Assistens Cemetery**. In a fragment found among his posthumous papers, Kierkegaard had requested that the tenth stanza of Brorson's "Hallelujah! I Have Found My Jesus" ("Halleluja! jeg har min Jesus fundet," 1735) be memorialized at his place of burial. Today it endures as a testimony to Brorson's influence on Kierkegaard as well as a summary of their shared understanding of Christian existence: "In yet a little time, / I will have won, / Then will the whole struggle / Be over and

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

done, / Then I can rest / In halls of roses, / And continually, / And continually / Talk with my Jesus." *See also* JESUS CHRIST; MARTYRDOM.

BRØCHNER, HANS (1820–1875). Danish philosopher and distant relation of the Kierkegaard family, albeit not by blood. Brøchner entered the **University of Copenhagen** in 1836, showing interest in both **philosophy** and theology. Yet, due to concerns about his fidelity to Christian teaching, Brøchner eventually settled on philosophy, completing his doctoral thesis in 1845. After a number of years abroad, Brøchner returned to Denmark and began lecturing at the University of Copenhagen. He was appointed professor of philosophy in 1870.

Brøchner and Kierkegaard were well acquainted, first meeting during their student years and remaining in contact until Kierkegaard's death. The significance of their relationship, however, is enhanced by Brøchner's scholarly activity *after* Kierkegaard's death. The first was a pseudonymous article in the *Fatherland* (*Fædrelandet*) titled "On Søren Kierkegaard's Activity as **Religious** Author" ("*Om Søren Kierkegaards Virksomhed som religieuse Forfatter*") and issued on 1 December 1855, less than a month after Kierkegaard's passing. Scholars consider it one of the most discerning early summaries of Kierkegaard's corpus, displaying a keen sensitivity to the coherence of Kierkegaard's authorial plan. In the ensuing years, Brøchner would come to be seen as a champion of Kierkegaard, and he went so far as to offer a series of lectures on Kierkegaard's thought at the University of Copenhagen. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Brøchner wrote down his memories of Kierkegaard in late 1871 and early 1872, just a few years before his own death. Dubbed "Recollections of Kierkegaard" ("Erindringer om Søren Kierkegaard"), Brøchner's account was posthumously edited and published by his student Harald Høffding, who himself would go on to be a major figure in Danish philosophy. *See also* CLAUSEN, HENRIK NICOLAJ (1793–1877); MONEY.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

C

CATHOLICISM. Kierkegaard's published writings do not indicate much interest in Catholicism (*Catholicismen*), but his later journals contain a number of notable references to the practice and teaching of the Roman Catholic Church. Underlying these remarks is Kierkegaard's escalating frustration with Denmark's **state church**. For Kierkegaard, the very notion of **Christendom** cheapens authentic Christian commitment, insofar as it suggests that **church** membership and a tacit assent to **orthodox doctrine** is sufficient to make one an authentic Christian. Yet, he argues, this problem is mitigated in Catholicism, since the Catholic Church still requires devotional works of its members and recommends a life of **asceticism** as the Christian ideal. In short, even amid the **leveling** of modern society, Catholicism continues to insist on the **imitation** of **Jesus Christ**. At the same time, however, Kierkegaard cautions that Catholicism's outward piety can engender a false confidence in one's own righteousness and, moreover, a sense of superiority in relation to others. Ultimately, then, he views Catholicism as a much-needed counterpart to **Protestantism**: whereas the latter rightly contends that **salvation** is by **grace** alone, the former rightly understands that divine grace incites, rather than obviates, actual existential commitment. Yet, whenever one side becomes dominant, abuses are likely to follow.

Kierkegaard's ecumenical **dialectic** recalls his roots in **Pietism**. Still, his generally positive evaluation of Catholicism made him a figure of interest in Catholic circles, particularly once his writings were translated into languages such as French and German. In fact, a number of Catholic theologians who participated in and shaped the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) were influenced by Kierkegaard, including Henri de Lubac and Hans Urs von Balthasar. *See also* HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1889–1976); KOFOED-HANSEN, HANS PETER (1813–1893).

CHATTER. Kierkegaard was interested in the phenomenon of frivolous and meaningless speech, and he tended to designate this use of **language** as "chatter" (*Snak*). On occasion, he employed other words that have the same meaning, for example, "drivel" (*Vrøvl*), "gossip" (*Bysnak*), and "prattle" (*Passiar*). For Kierkegaard, chatter is a possibility within language itself, and thus it can

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

arise whenever a speaker discusses events or objects that are extraneous to her or his field of responsibility, whether an upcoming weather forecast or a trivial news item. Such cases are particularly relevant in modern society, since the popular media thrives on fomenting *Snak*.

In works such as ***A Literary Review*** as well as in his journals, Kierkegaard pays particular attention to this situation. The more people chatter, he argues, the less they concentrate on what really matters and on how it is to be accomplished. A society of chatter is therefore a society devoid of **passion**. As a result, indolent **reflection** comes to replace consequential activity. *See also* PRESS; SILENCE.

CHILDHOOD. Kierkegaard does not systematically analyze childhood (*Barndom*). Rather, he offers a variety of observations about the development of **the self**, many of which touch on childhood and its relation to other **existential** stages and viewpoints. Generally speaking, Kierkegaard views childhood as a period of **aesthetic immediacy**, and thus he contrasts it with adulthood's affinity for **reflection**. Yet these distinctions are not absolute: some adults continue to live in aesthetic categories, just as some children are precociously reflective. In fact, Kierkegaard understood his own childhood as marked by self-conscious introspection; consequently, he saw it as an abnormal, but not inconceivable, example of that existential stage. If, however, childhood can at times approximate adulthood, there is a sense in which adulthood aspires to childhood. In ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, Johannes Climacus notes that the child's basic standpoint—being present in the moment—is also the standpoint of the self-actualized adult. In both cases, the self is enslaved neither to past recollection nor to future-oriented reflection; instead, it receives the present in **inwardness** and thanksgiving. *See also* BAPTISM; GOD; MONEY.

CHOICE. Kierkegaard employs the noun "choice" (*Valg*) as well as its related verb "to choose" (*vælge*) in numerous writings and across a variety of contexts, often in the manner of everyday Danish speech. At times, however, he treats choice as a philosophical or theological category, a treatment that has made a significant mark on subsequent thinking. Controversially, the Scottish philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre charged Kierkegaard's notion of choice with destroying the West's tradition of rational morality since it seems to reduce **ethics** to a matter of arbitrary preference.

Kierkegaard's most well-known discussion of the subject is found in his early poly-pseudonymous treatise ***Either/Or***, especially in the sections attributed to Judge William. According to the Judge, the one who wants to develop as a person is tasked with choosing the ethical since **aesthetic**

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

choices are fundamentally immediate and multiplicitous and, for that reason, do not qualify as choice in the categorical sense of the word. Later writings continue to develop this line of thinking. In signed texts such as ***Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits*** and ***Christian Discourses***, Kierkegaard argues that the importance of choice is, in fact, rooted in the Bible: "Ye cannot serve God and mammon" (Matt. 6:24). That the human being is granted such a choice signifies both **God**'s generosity and the person's dignity. What the human being must do, then, is sincerely confront this choice, realizing that the very meaning of one's life is at stake—*either* God *or* the world, *either* **faith** *or* **offense**. *See also* DAMNATION; DECISION; DUTY; ETERNITY; EVIL; EXISTENCE; FREEDOM; GOOD; INDIVIDUAL; RELIGIOUS/RELIGIOUSNESS; SALVATION; SELF, THE.

CHRISTIAN DISCOURSES. Kierkegaard began composing *Christian Discourses* (*Christelige Taler*) in mid-1847 and completed it early in 1848. The book was issued on 26 April 1848, and it sold well enough to earn a posthumous second edition in 1862. In retrospect, the volume stands as Kierkegaard's major publication of 1848, though that was a fairly quiet year by his standards.

Thematically, *Christian Discourses* continues and arguably intensifies the development of Kierkegaard's authorship in the wake of his literary fracas with ***The Corsair***. Whereas early **religious** works featured concerns and questions that appealed to human nature writ large (*see* UPBUILDING), the so-called *Corsair* affair impelled Kierkegaard to devote more attention to **Christian** religiousness. Indications of this turn are present as early as ***A Literary Review*** (1846), but the very title *Christian Discourses* renders Kierkegaard's intentions unmistakable. The volume is divided into four parts: (1) "The Cares of the Pagans," (2) "States of Mind in the Strife of Suffering," (3) "Thoughts That Wound from Behind—for Upbuilding," (4) "Discourses at the **Communion** on Fridays." *See also* DEATH; DISCOURSE/DELIBERATION/SERMON; JESUS CHRIST; PAGANISM; REDOUBLING/REDUPLICATION.

CHRISTIANITY/CHRISTENDOM. Kierkegaard frequently highlighted the tension between "Christendom" (*Christenheden*) and "Christianity" (*Christendom*). The former, according to Kierkegaard, is a false and dangerous misapplication of the latter. More specifically, Christendom hijacks the gospel of Christianity—which is communicated in the New Testament and subsequently preserved by **apostles** and other **witnesses**—and converts it into a political establishment and cultural identity.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Throughout his career, Kierkegaard was at pains to show that Denmark is a prime example of Christendom, arguing, among other things, that the Danish **state church** is effectively an arm of the government and that Danes see themselves as Christian simply by virtue of the fact that they are citizens of the state. Yet, while he tended to lampoon the conflation of national conscience and Christian allegiance in his earlier writings, later works such as ***The Moment*** are bitterly hostile toward it. His increasing pessimism can be attributed to a number of factors, ranging from his evolving sense of authorial mission to his escalating frustration with Denmark's ecclesiastical leadership. What is certain is that while Kierkegaard once hoped to reintroduce Christianity into Christendom via the maieutic style of a **Socrates**, he eventually soured on this idea and opted for direct polemics instead. *See also* ADMIRATION; CULTURE; DOCTRINE/DOGMA; EXISTENCE; GOD; IMITATION; PAGANISM; SUFFERING.

CHURCH. Kierkegaard's relation to the church (*Kirke*) vexed his contemporaries and remains puzzling to scholars. Part of the trouble is that, while the term *Kirke* appears almost 300 times in Kierkegaard's writings, Kierkegaard never developed a proper ecclesiology. His most sustained attempt appears in ***Practice in Christianity***, in which his pseudonym Anti-Climacus draws a sharp distinction between the "triumphant church" and the "militant church." At issue here is not denominational affiliation but, rather, **existential** authenticity. Since, as Anti-Climacus argues, the goal of the Christian life is to imitate **Jesus Christ** (*see* IMITATION), whose devotion to **God** led him to **suffer** at the hands of sinners, so must the pilgrim church on earth traverse its own *via dolorosa*. Thus the notion that the church can enjoy heavenly triumph on its earthly pilgrimage is nothing less than **paganism**.

Ever skeptical of attempts to prioritize communal rule over the **individual**, especially in light of modern **leveling**, Kierkegaard argued that the basis of authentic ecclesial life is personal commitment. In other words, the *Kirke* is only as strong as the individuals who make it up. Hence, despite scholarly attempts to view Kierkegaard as an **orthodox** Lutheran (*see* MARTIN LUTHER [1483–1546]) or even as a potential convert to **Catholicism**, his approach to the church is most reminiscent of **Pietism**, a multidenominational movement that stressed personal holiness rather than doctrinal definition. *See also* COMMUNION; DOCTRINE/DOGMA; STATE CHURCH.

CLAUSEN, HENRIK NICOLAJ (1793–1877). Danish theologian and statesmen. Born in Lolland but raised in Copenhagen, Clausen was a precocious student. The son of a prominent churchman, Clausen first studied theology at the **University of Copenhagen**, graduating with distinction in 1815.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Two years later, he took his doctorate in **philosophy**, writing a dissertation on the reception of Plato in the early **church**. After a period abroad, he returned to Denmark as a champion of the thought of Friedrich Schleiermacher—the so-called father of modern liberal theology who argued that the foundation of religious **faith** lies not in objectively revealed dogma but, rather, in a subjective feeling of absolute dependence. Clausen's subsequent ascent at the University of Copenhagen was rapid, and, by 1822, he was already a professor of theology. He cemented his status as one of Denmark's leading minds with the 1825 publication of *Catholicism's and Protestantism's Church Constitution, Doctrine and Ritual* (*Catholicismens og Protestantismens Kirkeforfatning, Lære og Ritus*). Despite inducing a fierce response from **N. F. S. Grundtvig**, Clausen's work influentially argued that the task of biblical scholarship is to apply rational scrutiny to **scripture**, so as to further the church's ongoing attempts to understand and to expand on divine **revelation**. Accolades would soon mount. Clausen became doctor of theology in 1826, eventually serving as rector of the university on a number of occasions. During the 1830s, he emerged as an active participant in liberal **politics** and, from 1849 to 1853, completed a stint as a member of parliament. He remained a figure of note until his death on 28 March 1877.

During his student years, Kierkegaard attended a number of Clausen's lectures; these included courses on the New Testament, biblical hermeneutics, and Lutheran **doctrine** (*see* MARTIN LUTHER [1483–1546]), as well as seminars on theological **writing**. Kierkegaard took notes during a significant portion of Clausen's lectures, recording them in his journals. At the same time, however, there is evidence that Kierkegaard and Clausen did not get along. For example, according to **Hans Brøchner**, Kierkegaard clashed with Clausen over the validity of certain assignments and, in turn, was inclined to skip Clausen's lectures. The two were also at odds over the cogency of theological rationalism, which Kierkegaard decries in his journals and opposes throughout his authorship, albeit with varying degrees of intensity. On the other hand, Kierkegaard doubtless learned much about the New Testament from Clausen, and they occasionally corresponded—most notably, when Kierkegaard sent a dedication copy of ***Practice in Christianity*** to his former teacher. Still, it is telling that, over two decades after Kierkegaard's death, Clausen's memoir mentions Kierkegaard only once, recalling his erstwhile student as impractical and excitable. *See also* LINDBERG, JACOB CHRISTIAN (1797–1857); PASTORAL SEMINARY; PRESENT AGE, THE; RUDELBACH, ANDREAS GOTTLOB (1792–1862).

COMIC/COMEDY. The terms "comic" and "comedy" are related to the Greek noun *kōmos*, which can be translated as "carousal" or "merrymaking."

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Since antiquity, the word *kōmōidia* has been applied to a particular form of drama, in which the audience is meant to be amused and tragic endings avoided. Kierkegaard refers to "the comic" (sometimes as *det Komiske*, more frequently as *det Comsike*) and "comedy" (sometimes as *Komedie*, more frequently as *Comedie*) in numerous places and for diverse purposes in his authorship, with the greatest concentration of references occurring in ***Stages on Life's Way*** and ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***. Further complicating matters is the fact that Kierkegaard employs concepts that are related to but not synonymous with comedy—namely, **humor** and **irony**, which are subcategories within the comic.

For Kierkegaard, comedy is more than a kind of drama; it is a philosophical standpoint in relation to life's contradictory elements. In this sense, it resembles **tragedy**. And yet, if tragedy involves the **suffering** of contradiction, comedy involves laughing at contradiction. At the same time, however, the comic can be more precisely defined in relation to the **existential** stage in which it appears. At the **aesthetic** level, the comic is essentially preposterous, as when Don Quixote claims to be a gallant knight but is, in truth, an aging hidalgo. With regard to the **ethical** and the **religious**, the comic is present as an aid to self-actualization, whereby the individual is cognizant of avoiding ludicrous incongruities and egotistic expressions of piety. Here its role is primarily a matter of preserving due **inwardness**, and hence, in keeping with Kierkegaard's philosophic treatment of the subject, comedy transcends mere amusement and is actually key to the development of **the self**.

COMMON MAN. Over the course of Kierkegaard's lifetime, Europe experienced a great deal of social upheaval. Denmark was no exception. What was once an early modern society, presided over by an absolute monarchy, was transformed into a mass society governed by liberal principles of free trade and popular sovereignty. The age of noble elites had yielded to the age of "the common man" (*den menige Mand*).

Kierkegaard was interested in, if also ambivalent about, this phenomenon. On the one hand, he saw a great threat. Under the influence of the popular **press**, the common man might be sucked into the undertow of modern **leveling** and thereby be rendered an instrument of reflective nihilism (*see* REFLECTION). Thus empowered, the common man might see popularity as the litmus test by which **truth**—even the truth of **Christianity**—is decided. In this case, the common man is subsumed into the **crowd**. On the other hand, precisely by being excluded from the sophisticated politesse of bourgeois culture, the common man has the potential to retain a kind of primitivity in relation to existential questions and religious **faith**. Here the common man is viewed as essential for the future of authentic Christian discipleship.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Kierkegaard's hope in the common man was no mere social observation. His father, **Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard**, was born into a peasant family in Jutland, and, despite later accruing a fortune as a merchant, M. P. Kierkegaard never broke from his origins among the working classes, whether in terms of the Kierkegaard family's involvement with **Pietism** or its association with leaders of popular religious movements, including **N. F. S. Grundtvig** and **Jacob Christian Lindberg**. It is not surprising, then, that Kierkegaard too sought to retain a connection to the common man, so much so that, by the end of his life, and in the midst of an almost Pyrrhic conflict with the Danish **state church**, Kierkegaard wrote that his place is among *den menige Mand*. *See also* SOCIAL AND POLITICAL, THE.

COMMUNICATION. The concept of "communication" (*Meddelelse*) is one of the important in Kierkegaard's authorship; it is also one of the most nuanced. First, it is important to note that Kierkegaard distinguished his approach to communication from that of "speculation" (*Spekulation*). As in **Hegelian** philosophy or in certain forms of **Christian** dogmatics, speculative thinking views communication principally as a matter of transmitting objective knowledge. On this model, successful communication occurs whenever critical information—say, a medical theory, philosophical concept, or theological **doctrine**—is presented by the communicator and ostensibly received by the listener. While not denying the usefulness of such "direct" (*direkte*) communication, Kierkegaard argues that its priority has been uncritically and thus dangerously assumed by modern Western culture. After all, the simple fact that one can regurgitate information does not mean that one understands it. Moreover, certain kinds of knowledge are essentially worthless unless they are personally appropriated. What good is it, for example, to know everything there is to know about ethical conduct if, in reality, one conducts oneself in an unethical manner?

For that reason, Kierkegaard came to believe that a different form of communication is also necessary, particularly in areas that require **existential** application such as **ethics** and **religion**. Such areas, in other words, not only require that one understand ethical or religious concepts but also that one practice them in one's own life—what Kierkegaard would come to call **reduplication**. In order to facilitate this process, the communicator must pass on more than a message; she must pass on a path toward actualization as well. With this in mind, Kierkegaard devised a set of strategies grouped under the heading "indirect communication" (*indirekte Meddelelse*). The overarching goal of indirect communication is to explore the types of **passion** that guide human behavior, slowly but surely drawing the reader toward passional activity that imbues life with coherence, structure, and ultimate meaning.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Kierkegaard's most recognizable strategy of indirect communication is authorial **pseudonymity**, but he utilizes other literary methods as well, including **humor**, **irony**, maieutics, story, and thought experiments (*Experimenter*).

In 1847, convinced that this way of approaching philosophical and theological matters had been misunderstood and neglected, Kierkegaard sketched out a series of university lectures on indirect communication in his journals. He never actually delivered these lectures, but he did return to the issue in later writings—most importantly, ***The Point of View for My Work as an Author***, which was written during 1848 but not published until after his death in 1859. Still, it is clear that Kierkegaard did not see indirect communication as a pioneering theory. Rather, he viewed it as a retrieval of the communicative strategy of **Socrates** and **Jesus Christ**, figures from the ancient world who understood that certain truths, particularly those involving the transcendent, cannot be handed down in direct, objective fashion. *See also* AUTHORITY; CHATTER; INNER; LANGUAGE; OFFENSE; SILENCE; SIN; TRUTH; UPBUILDING; *WORKS OF LOVE*.

COMMUNION. In most Christian churches, including the **state church** wherein Kierkegaard was raised, "communion" signifies the culmination of the liturgy of the eucharist, in which the earthly elements of bread and wine are ritually consecrated by a minister and subsequently shared among the congregation as the body and blood of **Jesus Christ**. In this way, communion represents the new covenant established by Christ's reconciling death and resurrection, and it anticipates the eventual fulfillment of the kingdom of **God**. Communicants are frequently expected to prepare themselves to receive the sacramental elements, whether by confessing grave **sins**, fasting, or praying.

Kierkegaard not only refers to "communion" (*Altergang*) in a number of his writings, but he wrote several discourses for sacramental preparation. Seven of his eucharistic writings were included in ***Christian Discourses***; five more were issued in a pair of slim volumes—*Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays* (1849) and *Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays* (1851). It is indeed characteristic of Kierkegaard's communion discourses that he wrote them for the liturgy on Fridays. His father, **Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard**, had long preferred Friday communion, and, as a young man, Kierkegaard regularly accompanied his father to the eucharistic table. Later, Kierkegaard would argue that those who communicate on Friday do so out of a profound desire to be with Christ, rather than by force of habit or social convention, as is often the case on Sunday (*see* CHURCH). While individual longing for Christ's presence may not be required by ecclesial **doctrine**, Kierkegaard argues that it is crucial if one is to receive the sacrament properly. After all, the goal of communion is not merely to participate in the liturgical

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

celebration; it is to deepen one's relationship with Christ, so much so that one remains in communion with him at all times. *See also* BAPTISM; *FOR SELF-EXAMINATION*; FREDERIK'S HOSPITAL.

CONCEPT OF ANXIETY*, *THE*.** Kierkegaard began drafting *The Concept of Anxiety* (*Begrebet Angest*) in October 1843. Despite simultaneously working on other projects, including ***Philosophical Fragments, he was able to finish *The Concept of Anxiety* in May 1844. The book was published on 17 June 1844 and attributed to the pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis.

The ironically convoluted subtitle to *The Concept of Anxiety* nevertheless establishes the book's interests and style: it is *A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin*. Haufniensis presents himself as a psychologist who is trying to come to grips with the nature of **the self** and how it relates to the theological anthropology of **Christianity**. The goal, he insists, is not to confuse the two. On the contrary, the **science** of **psychology** has its own proper domain, just as Christian **dogma** has its own. What psychology can do, then, is explore the psycho-emotional states of human existence that precede the ethico-spiritual concerns of dogmatics. In particular, according to Haufniensis, psychology shows that **anxiety**, which emerges when human beings become conscious of their **freedom** and their responsibility, is the **inner** precondition of **sin**. Hence, in relation to the dogmatic claim that sin is "original" to human nature, psychology can at least agree that anxiety, precisely as the situation from which sin develops, is basic to the self's constitution.

With its generic complexities and labyrinthine prose, *The Concept of Anxiety* was largely ignored upon its publication. Yet, by the late 19th century, and particularly after the rise of psychoanalysis in the 1890s, the book's esteem rose. Later thinkers, including **Martin Heidegger** and Jean-Paul Sartre, also saw its themes as antecedents to 20th-century phenomenology and **existentialism**. Thus *The Concept of Anxiety* remains one of Kierkegaard's most influential works. *See also* INDIVIDUAL; METAPHYSICS; MOOD; MØLLER, POUL MARTIN (1794–1838); TEMPORALITY/TIME; TEMPTATION.

***CONCEPT OF IRONY*, *THE*.** Kierkegaard's doctoral dissertation, *The Concept of Irony* (*Om Begrebet Ironi*), began taking shape in the summer of 1837, when, in the aftermath of a conversation with **Poul Martin Møller**, Kierkegaard began comparing and contrasting different forms of **irony** in his journals. It was also around this time that he first noted a desire to write his dissertation in Danish, citing Latin's unsuitability for a thesis on modern topics such as **Hegelianism** and **Romanticism**. On 2 June 1841, with *The Concept*

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

of Irony all but complete, Kierkegaard formally asked King Christian VIII for permission to submit his thesis in the vernacular—a request that, if not unprecedented, was nevertheless unusual. Kierkegaard bolstered his case by pointing out his excellent record as a student and teacher of Latin, and he further promised to append Latin theses to his dissertation and to conduct his oral defense in Latin.

On 29 July 1841, the king granted Kierkegaard's request, and, precisely two months later, Kierkegaard defended *The Concept of Irony* in public. His defense lasted from 10:00 a.m. to 7:30 p.m., with a two-hour break from 2:00 to 4:00 p.m. Nine speakers debated Kierkegaard, with **Frederik Christian Sibbern** and Peter Oluf Brøndsted serving as official (rather than *ex auditorio*) opponents. Other notable opponents included **Johan Ludvig Heiberg** and **Peter Christian Kierkegaard**. Though the dissertation was generally criticized for its puckish style, Sibbern and Brøndsted reported to university administrators that Kierkegaard's oral defense matched the perspicacity and skillfulness of his written work. Not only, then, did Kierkegaard pass, but Sibbern encouraged him to seek a university position—a suggestion that Kierkegaard ignored, preferring instead to leave Copenhagen for an extended stay in Berlin. In fact, Kierkegaard was already en route to Berlin when, on 26 October 1841, it was announced that the degree of *Magister Artium* (the equivalent to a doctorate) could be conferred on him by the faculty of **philosophy**.

The Concept of Irony is divided into two major sections. Part 1 examines the irony of **Socrates**, surveying how the theme of ironic ignorance is handled in the respective accounts of Xenophon, Plato, and Aristophanes. It also contains an appendix devoted to Hegel's view of Socrates. Part 2 offers Kierkegaard's own analysis, in which he considers the conditions under which irony is an appropriate literary-cum-philosophical device. Here he pays special attention to romantic irony (*see* ROMANTICISM), arguing that when irony is posited as a means of creative self-invention—an accusation that Kierkegaard levels at the novelist and poet Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829)—the **individual** dangerously takes precedence over **actuality** and, in turn, is situated beyond **ethics**. Ultimately, for Kierkegaard, **the self** cannot find reconciliation with the world through its own capricious power but, rather, through a self-effacing **religiousness**.

Published on 16 September 1841, *The Concept of Irony* was almost certainly well-known among Copenhagen's intelligentsia, given the large audience at Kierkegaard's defense. Nevertheless, sales records were not kept, and only a pair of contemporaneous reviews were issued—one of which appeared in ***The Corsair***, along with a postscript by **Meïr Aaron Goldschmidt**. For his own part, Kierkegaard tended to ignore *The Concept of Irony*, excluding it

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

from retrospective accounts of his literature (*see POINT OF VIEW FOR MY WORK AS AN AUTHOR*, *THE*). Still, it is clear that many of the themes explored in his dissertation would come to define his authorial career. *See also* COPENHAGEN, UNIVERSITY OF; *EITHER/OR*; LANGUAGE; LIFE-VIEW; NEGATION; TEMPORALITY/TIME.

CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS. Published on 27 February 1846, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments* (*Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift til de philosophiske Smuler*) was the last work that Kierkegaard would ascribe to Johannes Climacus, generally considered the pseudonym whose standpoint most closely resembles his own (*see* PSEUDONYMITY). Kierkegaard began his "Climacan authorship" in November 1842, when he crafted the semiautobiographical treatise *Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est*—a narratival exploration of the Cartesian injunction to "doubt everything." Kierkegaard neither finished nor published this manuscript, but, in the process, he gained clarity about his stance in relation to modern **philosophy**. As he sees it, Descartes's methodological doubt is chimerical, inasmuch it presupposes the existence of **the self**, and **Hegel**, too, falsely claimed a presuppositionless beginning. Hence, Climacus reasons, it is essential for existing beings to express ideality in and through **actuality**.

The next work that Kierkegaard attributed to Johannes Climacus is ***Philosophical Fragments***. Here the fundamental issue is how one arrives at **truth**. Is it possible for one to learn the truth, as **Socrates** and Plato attested? Or must the condition for learning the truth be provided by an external, transcendent agent, as **Christianity** has declared? If Christianity is right, then **faith**, in a key sense, is distinct from and superior to knowledge. For it would seem that faith, and not human **reason**, is that by which an eternal **happiness** is gained.

Concluding Unscientific Postscript begins where *Fragments* leaves off. That is to say, the former takes up and builds on the central issue raised in the latter, namely, the relationship between historical knowledge and eternal happiness. Climacus's *Postscript*, which is significantly and no doubt ironically longer than its predecessor, is divided into two major sections. Part 1 explores the truth of Christianity from an objective point of view; part 2 explores the truth of Christianity from a subjective point of view. In the first case, Climacus maintains that the validity of Christian truth-claims cannot be definitively established on objective grounds, be they rooted in historical evidence or in metaphysical **speculation**; in the second case, Climacus argues that, precisely because Christianity resists objective demonstration, the individual's attempt to be an authentic Christian is always already ongoing. His contention is *not* that objective truths are unreal; it is that certain activities demand existential

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

participation and thus can never be realized *sub specie aeternitatis*. For such activities, which include the **ethical** and the **religious**, there is a very real sense in which **subjectivity**, understood as the **individual**'s constant existential **striving**, is truth.

With this in mind, Climacus returns to the problem of *Fragments*. The religious individual seeks an eternal happiness, but there are roadblocks everywhere. Reason can be hostile to faith, and, even when it is not, it cannot conclusively guarantee the **paradoxical** claims of Christian **dogma**. To further complicate matters, the religious subject himself is ineluctably finite (*see* FINITUDE/INFINITY), fallible, and thus **guilty** in an ultimate sense. As the individual confronts this situation and becomes conscious of the chasm separating actuality from ideality, she will go through stages of existential pathos, chiefly **resignation** and **suffering**. Climacus argues that this process of inward deepening (*see* INWARDNESS) is immanent to human life, as evidenced by **pagan** thinkers such as Socrates. For that reason, he labels it "Religiousness A." He goes on to distinguish this natural form of religiousness from that of Christianity, or "Religiousness B," which is a transcendent faith rooted in divine **revelation**. Crucially, however, Climacus insists that authentic Christianity does not oppose Religiousness A but, rather, presupposes and transforms it.

It is worth adding that *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* also features a pair of retrospective accounts of Kierkegaard's oeuvre. The former is attributed to Climacus, who, with a wink, reviews a recent string of pseudonymous writings that have articulated a number of his own concerns. The second, dubbed "A First and Last Explanation," is ascribed to Kierkegaard himself, who takes responsibility for his pseudonymous productivity while simultaneously asking commentators to refrain from equating his personal views with those expressed by the pseudonyms. That Kierkegaard appended "A First and Last Explanation" to the *Postscript* indicates a notion that he had been brooding over during the first few months of 1846—namely, to take leave of his literary career. Disheartened by the public controversy resulting from his quarrel with ***The Corsair***, Kierkegaard contemplated a move to parish ministry. Such a decision was put on hold while he finished up ***A Literary Review***, which gave him time to reevaluate his plans and, eventually, to embark on a new (if not discontinuous) phase of his authorship.

This revitalization, at any rate, was not owing to the success of the *Postscript*. Now thought of as one of Kierkegaard's masterworks, it only sold around 50 copies at the time. Reviews were equally scarce, and it is perhaps telling that, though *The Corsair* mentioned the book's publication, it did so while mocking Kierkegaard's appearance. *See also* COMIC/COMEDY; DECISION; ETERNITY; EXISTENCE; GOOD; GOVERNANCE/

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

PROVIDENCE; HUMOR; IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE; IMMORTALITY; REFLECTION; SYSTEM, THE.

CONSCIENCE. Kierkegaard treats "conscience" (*Samvittighed*) not only as the person's **inner** awareness of right and wrong but also as the point of contact, so to speak, between the human and the divine. Kierkegaard's most sustained treatment of this topic is found in "Love Is a Matter of Conscience," a chapter in part 1 of ***Works of Love***. Drawing on 1 Timothy 1:5, Kierkegaard argues that a good conscience is necessary if one is to **love** in a **Christian** sense. This is true because (1) **God** communes with human beings in and through the conscience, and (2) this internal relationship with God, which is native to all persons, is capable of transforming human relationships by minimizing the importance of external differences and, in turn, making all people equals in the eyes of God.

That is not to suggest, however, that Kierkegaard believed that living according to one's conscience is easy. As he details in ***The Sickness unto Death***, dialectical components constitute **the self**, including the tension between **eternity** and **temporality**. As a finite creature, constrained by external and impersonal forces, the self belongs to the world (*see* WORLDLINESS/SECULARISM). Yet the self has also been created by God and thus comes from and longs for eternity. This fundamental connection to the eternal is expressed in and through one's conscience. Kierkegaard develops this point in ***Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits***, where he distinguishes between the herd mentality (*see* CROWD/PUBLIC) often favored in the world and the individuating role of conscience, whereby each person stands alone before God. It is true that, on account of human **sin**, this intimacy with God is often felt as **guilt**. And yet, in and through **Jesus Christ**, God reaches out to comfort, save (*see* HAPPINESS; SALVATION), and ultimately transform one's life. *See also* ANONYMITY; DEMONIC.

CONSTITUTION, DANISH. The Constitutional Act of the Kingdom of Denmark (Danmarks Riges Grundlov) was ratified on 25 May 1849 and signed by King Frederick VII on 5 June 1849, the latter of which is known today as Constitution Day (Grundlovsdag). This significance of this act is best understood against the backdrop of the previous regime. In 1665, King Frederick III established the Law of the King (Kongeloven), which made the hereditary monarchy **absolute** in Denmark and Lutheran **Protestantism** the state religion (*see* STATE CHURCH). What this meant in practice was that the king was situated above all human laws and accountable only to **God**. Hence, for nearly two centuries of Danish history, unconditional legislative power was passed down from one king to another.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Unsurprisingly, this arrangement was delicate. Significant cracks appeared when King Christian VII (1749–1808) became mentally ill and fell under the influence of a number of corrupt advisors. Later, the Napoleonic Wars would add additional strain. King Frederick VI (1768–1839) oscillated between upholding absolutism and promoting democratic reforms, but, in the 1830s, he took a definitive step in the latter direction, creating four Provincial Consultative Assemblies (Provinsialstænder). This trend would intensify in conjunction with political tensions in the Danish duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. The subsequent monarch, King Christian VIII (1786–1848), came to believe that, if those territories were to remain in union with Denmark, a new constitution would need to be drafted. This task was handed on to his son King Frederick VII (1808–1863), who, in the face of mounting pressure from democratic nationalists, dissolved the absolute monarchy in March 1848. Later that year, the Constitutional Assembly of the Realm (Den Grundlovgivende Rigsforsamling) was formed by a combination of popular election and royal appointment. It was this assembly, led by the efforts of drafters Ditlev Monrad and **Orla Lehmann**, that ultimately ratified the Danmarks Riges Grundlov.

Kierkegaard's response to these developments is complex. Going back to his student days, he expressed skepticism about the ideological roots of political reform, especially liberalism and nationalism, which were often interleaved at that time. In fact, during his student years, Kierkegaard emerged as a notable opponent of Lehmann and other advocates of representative government and a free **press**. On the other hand, Kierkegaard's respect for and hope in the **common man** rendered him a poor fit for conservative elitism. In short, Kierkegaard's interests, while clearly intersecting with the major sociopolitical questions of the day, lay outside the domain of partisan **politics**. Thus his stance in relation to the Grundlov, as with other such issues, could be summed in a phrase he himself preferred—"armed neutrality." *See also* BAPTISM; GIØDWAD, JENS FINSTEEN (1811–1891); GRUNDTVIG, NIKOLAI FREDERIK SEVERIN (1783–1872); HAGE, JOHANNES (1800–1837); KIERKEGAARD, PETER CHRISTIAN (1805–1888); MYNSTER, JAKOB PETER (1775–1854); OSTERMANN, JOHANNES ADREAS; STUDENT ASSOCIATION; VOTING.

CONTEMPORANEITY. Two of Kierkegaard's most important texts—***Philosophical Fragments*** and ***Practice in Christianity***—foreground the notion of "contemporaneity" (*Samtidighed*). It is a term that literally could be translated as "the quality of being at the same time" or, more generically, as the copresence of certain persons or things. The ontological basis of Kierkegaard's interest in this subject is sketched in ***Concluding Unscientific***

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Postscript, a text, like *Philosophical Fragments*, ascribed to the **pseudonym** Johannes Climacus. For Climacus, modernity's fixation on **objectivity**, particularly as expressed in **reason**, **science**, and **technology**, hinders the full development of **the self**. In other words, since human **existence** also demands the activation of one's **subjective** capacities, including a **passion** for the **good** and an ability to imagine possibilities (*see* IMAGINATION), it is crucial that one be able to hold together the various aspects of selfhood. Climacus refers to this process of existential integration as *Samtidighed*.

While this analysis would be applicable to human life writ large, Kierkegaard's other treatments of contemporaneity emphasize its centrality for one's **religious** development. In the *Fragments*, Climacus wrestles with the problem of having **faith** in **Jesus Christ**: is it possible that Jesus' contemporaries were more likely to have faith in him than subsequent generations of persons? After all, the former were granted a direct access to "the god" (as Climacus tends to put it) that the latter were denied. Climacus ultimately concludes that, while Jesus' peers did have unique *historical* knowledge of him, this knowledge ought not be conflated with faith, which is a condition given by **God** and, in turn, accepted by the believer (*see* FREEDOM). The pseudonymous author of *Practice in Christianity*, Anti-Climacus, delves deeper into this problem. He reasons that Jesus' lowly station and eventual persecution ostensibly contradicted his claims to divinity and thereby presented immense challenges to his historical contemporaries. As a result, each generation must be brought to the essential decision—faith or **offense**. If the former, the believer enters into a contemporaneous relationship with Christ, in which she pictures encountering the incarnate Christ in his abasement. The closer one comes to authentic contemporaneity, the closer one comes to living as Christ did—an ideal that Kierkegaard would come to stress in his retrieval of **Pietism**'s *imitatio* motif (*see* IMITATION).

COPENHAGEN, UNIVERSITY OF. The University of Copenhagen (Københavns Universitet) is Denmark's oldest and most distinguished university. Founded in 1479, it is Scandinavia's second-oldest institution of higher learning (trailing only Sweden's Uppsala University), and, from the mid-16th century, it was the lone Danish university for almost 400 years. Originally a hub for Catholic learning (*see* CATHOLICISM), the University of Copenhagen was later reestablished as a Lutheran college by King Christian III (1503–1559), who, after hearing **Martin Luther** speak at the Diet of Worms, became committed to advancing **Protestantism** in Denmark. The university grew over the ensuing centuries, and, despite suffering major infrastructural damage during the British bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807, it could boast four teaching faculties and over 1,000 students by Kierkegaard's day.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Kierkegaard entered the university in October 1830, and he excelled from the start, earning grades of "praiseworthy" (*laudabilis*) and "outstanding" (*laudabilis præ ceteris*) on his matriculation examinations. His next sets of exams—referred to as the *examen philologico-philosophicum*—came in April 1831 and October 1831, respectively. For the first exam, he earned *laudabilis* in Latin, Greek, Hebrew, and history. For the second exam, he merited *laudabilis præ ceteris* in higher mathematics, practical and theoretical **philosophy**, and physics. The latter effort garnered him the distinction *summa cum laude*. His studies then turned to theology. He started his program in earnest, attending, for example, a series of lectures by **H. N. Clausen**. However, by the mid-1830s, he seemed to lose interest in theology as an academic subject—an early indication that he was skeptical about the extent to which **Christianity** could be assimilated into modern Western culture (*see* OBJECTIVITY). Nevertheless, in July 1840, Kierkegaard took his theology exam, receiving a mark of *laudabilis*. His last major undertaking as a student at the University of Copenhagen came in September 1841, when he successfully defended his doctoral thesis, ***The Concept of Irony***.

CORRECTIVE. Kierkegaard thought seriously about how to characterize his authorship, and, in this connection, he frequently returned to the concept of "corrective" (*Correctiv*). The word itself stems from the Latin verb *corrigere*, which can be rendered "to put straight" or "to reform." That Kierkegaard describes his authorial task as a "corrective" thus implies that it is concerned with reform, though its nature and purpose is complex, even peculiar. Unlike other great historical reformers—say, a **Martin Luther** or a Jane Addams (1860–1935)—Kierkegaard did not expect or necessarily desire his ideas to achieve normative status. Instead, he viewed himself as one whose criticism was meant to goad the establishment into reforming itself. That is why he often found himself caught between the powers that be and their radical critics.

One can see this approach at work in different parts of Kierkegaard's oeuvre. He understood his Socratic emphasis on **existence**, **negation**, and **subjectivity** to be a corrective to the day's dominant mode of philosophizing, namely, the speculative **metaphysics** (*see* SCIENCE/SPECULATION) favored in **Hegelianism**. This move was not intended to do away with **objectivity** altogether but, rather, to provide the appropriate counterbalance to the philosophical establishment's one-sided tendencies. Kierkegaard's polemics against the Danish **state church** can be viewed in a similar light. For most, if not all, of his authorship, Kierkegaard insisted that he was not trying to undermine ecclesiastical authority; on the contrary, his task was to enliven the life of the **church** by properly accentuating the importance of translating **dogma**

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

into discipleship. In both cases, Kierkegaard likened his enterprise to that of a cook, whose application of a certain spice is a *Correctiv* that enriches the whole dish. *See also* PHILOSOPHY; PRESENT AGE, THE; REFLECTION; REPENTANCE; SOCRATES (c. 470–399 BCE)/SOCRATIC.

***THE CORSAIR*.** Founded by **Meïr Aaron Goldschmidt**, *The Corsair* (*Corsaren*) was a weekly paper specializing in social and political satire. The name *Corsaren* was adopted both as an homage to Parisian revolutionaries and as an indication of the paper's disposition. Derived from the Latin words *cursarius* ("pirate") and *cursus* ("raid"), "corsair" is another name for "privateer," that is, a privately owned ship authorized for plundering during times of war. In *The Corsair*'s inaugural issue (8 October 1840), Goldschmidt underlines this connection, noting that his paper intends to fight with any and all comers and is thus a "pirate paper." So vituperative were *The Corsair*'s attacks that it often ran afoul of the censors (*see* PRESS), and, in due course, Goldschmidt himself was imprisoned on a number of occasions. In fact, the possibility of police intervention was significant enough that Goldschmidt hired men in financial straits—an alcoholic grocer, a retired sailor, and so on—to serve as nominal editors. As a result, they served the jail time otherwise earmarked for Goldschmidt.

A new issue of *The Corsair* appeared each Friday, and, in its heyday, the paper boasted a print run of 3,000 across Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. One could purchase it in bookstores, or one could take out a subscription for five marks every three months. Due to its scurrilous attacks on public figures, ranging from literary notables such as **Hans Christian Andersen** to political leaders such as **Orla Lehmann**, *The Corsair* was a sensation, enjoyed by working-class persons and gossiped about by members of the upper classes. It is thus noteworthy—and more than a little ironic—that Kierkegaard was treated well by the paper at first. Goldschmidt personally esteemed Kierkegaard's intellectual ability, and *The Corsair*'s 14 November 1845 issue extolled Kierkegaard's contributions to Danish culture.

Yet the situation quickly deteriorated when, in December 1845, the Danish literary critic and poet **Peder Ludvig Møller** wrote an article in the aesthetic yearbook *Gæa* suggesting that Kierkegaard's remarkable productivity was the result of a disturbed mind. The two were already on unfriendly terms, not least because Kierkegaard did not approve of Møller's known association with yellow journalism in general and *The Corsair* in particular. Thus Kierkegaard fired back with a **pseudonymous** article in the liberal newspaper the *Fatherland* (*Fædrelandet*), insinuating that Møller's piece was motivated by financial problems and publicly exposing his ties to *The Corsair*. This revelation struck a decisive blow to Møller's hopes for a professorial

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

appointment, and so, on 2 January 1846, *The Corsair* launched a months-long literary assault on Kierkegaard. Initially, Kierkegaard welcomed the attacks, even publicly requesting that *The Corsair* mock him in its pages. Yet, as the affair lingered, the polemics became increasingly meanspirited. Kierkegaard's physical appearance was made the object of burlesque scrutiny, and he found himself ostracized in Copenhagen. Many now saw him as a butt of jokes rather than as a venerable thinker.

When the dust finally settled, all three major participants were changed. Goldschmidt felt guilty about the depths to which *The Corsair* had sunk in its ridicule of Kierkegaard, and he sold the paper in October 1846. Møller, his reputation in Denmark tarnished and career prospects spent, left his homeland in 1848 and did freelance literary work around Europe; always on the verge of poverty, he died of complications from syphilis in 1865. Kierkegaard too considered leaving Copenhagen, but he ultimately decided to stay and to reignite his authorial career, albeit with a more pronounced emphasis on **Christian** discipleship and, in turn, on the importance of **suffering** for the **truth**. In this way, his altercation with *The Corsair* decisively contributed to his oeuvre and changed the direction of his life. *See also* ANONYMITY; ATHENÆUM; *CHRISTIAN DISCOURSES*; COMMON MAN; *CONCEPT OF IRONY*, *THE*; *CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS*; CONSTITUTION, DANISH; CROWD/PUBLIC; CULTURE; DEER PARK; GIØDWAD, JENS FINSTEEN (1811–1891); LEVELING; *LITERARY REVIEW*, *A*; MARTENSEN, HANS LASSEN (1808–1884); MONEY; PRESENT AGE, THE.

CREATION. Kierkegaard's understanding of "creation" (*Skabelse*) begins with **God**. As expressed in the basic **dogmatic** manuals of the Danish **state church** (*see* BALLE, NIKOLAI EDINGER [1744–1816]), Kierkegaard subscribed to **Christianity**'s claims that God created the world out of nothing (*creatio ex nihilo*) and that God continues to sustain creation (*creatio continua*). This has a number of important implications. First, since God possesses the fullness of being and therefore is perfection itself (**eternal**, omnipotent, omnipresent, and so on), and since creation proceeds from God, then creation must be intrinsically **good**. Second, that God is the sole origin of creation means that creation is *not* God. There is, in other words, an irreducible and qualitative dissimilarity between God and creatures. Third, inasmuch as creation is utterly distinct from God, then the same is true of human beings, despite their apparently unique status as intentional and rational (*see* REASON) creatures. Indeed, it might seem that, as intelligent agents, human beings stand in a competitive relationship with God. Yet, as Kierkegaard argues,

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

God's incomparable transcendent power is expressed precisely in bestowing **freedom** on humanity.

In each of the above ways, Kierkegaard sketches an understanding of creation that suggests wonder at and gratitude for God's creative activity. At the same time, however, he was clearly interested in—even *more* interested in—the irruption of **sin** in the world and the consequent necessitation of God's works of **salvation**. In ***The Concept of Anxiety***, Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** Vigilius Haufniensis distinguishes between the original state of creation and its condition after the fall of Adam and Eve (Gen. 3). The abuse of freedom described in the Bible casts creation in a different light: its sensuous beauty is now an occasion for **anxiety** and sinfulness. Still, even under these precarious circumstances, the created world continues to yearn (Rom. 8:19) for reconciliation with God, an indication that sin cannot stamp out creation's primordial orientation. Thus the door is left open for a new and, indeed, better relationship with God, in which human beings turn to the divine with the eyes of **faith**, believing in the biblical **revelation** that God has delivered the world from sin in and through **Jesus Christ**. *See also* BEING/BECOMING; FINITUDE/INFINITY; HISTORY; MEDIATION; OTHER, THE; REDOUBLING/REDUPLICATION; REST; TEMPORALITY/TIME.

CROWD/PUBLIC. Kierkegaard's opposition to "the crowd" (*Mængden*) or "the public" (*Publikum*) spans his entire authorship, though his interest in the subject peaked in the wake of his literary skirmish with ***The Corsair***. This outcome is not surprising, since, as Kierkegaard saw it, *The Corsair*'s brand of popular invective verified his fears about the crowd—that it divests individuals of personal responsibility and, in turn, allows them to vanish into an amorphous and anonymous abstraction.

Sensu stricto, the problem of *Mængden* is as old as human society, and it was by no means lost on Kierkegaard that the crowd's influence was a key factor in the persecution and slaughter of **Jesus Christ** (Mark 15:8–15). And yet Kierkegaard believed that modernity is especially accommodating to the crowd. This is because the urban and technological character of modern life has shielded human affairs from **nature** and, in turn, obviated an encounter with the primitive questions of human **existence**. As a result, human beings have come to emphasize the relative ends of the modern bourgeois city, rooting their **happiness** and self-worth in material comfort and social status rather than in actual need. In short, the standard to which people seek to conform is now established by other human beings, and, in this way, the **absolute** ideal of divine **truth** has been usurped by the reductive benchmark of numerical consent.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

As Kierkegaard sees it, a number of modern institutions stand in a reciprocal relationship with the crowd. Liberal economic and political agencies pledge the greatest good for the greatest number but consistently ignore **ethical** and **religious** questions in order to achieve their ends. The **church** in general and the Danish **state church** in particular manipulate **dogma** to suit bourgeois interests, albeit at the expense of properly **Christian** emphases on each **individual**'s relationship with **God** and vocation to live in **imitation** of Christ. Arguably worst of all is the **press**, which promises **freedom** of speech only to deliver a cacophony of misleading headlines, half-baked opinions, and slanderous gossip. Kierkegaard provides a detailed analysis of the press's influence in ***A Literary Review***, which he published in the midst of *The Corsair* affair. There he observes that a society committed to a wide-ranging, technologically mediated form of communication—that is to say, a society committed to the liberal press—will necessarily diminish person-to-person discourse and, in turn, give priority to the will of *Publikum*. The press conjures up "the public" in order to buoy readership, but, since the public is not a definable person or thing, it actually conjures up a ghost—an abstract entity that people fear to oppose, even though it does not truly exist.

In this sense, *Publikum* is an advance on *Mængden*: what was once a spontaneous phenomenon is now at the root of modern society. That is one reason why Kierkegaard was skeptical about the freedom assured by liberal societies. As different sectors of the press try to shepherd public opinion, individuals are told, whether explicitly or implicitly, that they should align themselves with the dictates of "the public." Kierkegaard argues that this is a new form of servitude, and he calls it **leveling**—one of the core principles of modernity, whereby people are unified in their resistance to being different than one another. *See also* CONSCIENCE; DYING TO; EQUALITY; OBJECTIVITY; OTHER, THE; POLITICS; PRESENT AGE, THE; REFLECTION; SCIENCE/SPECULATION; *UPBUILDING DISCOURSES IN VARIOUS SPIRITS*.

CULTURE. In Kierkegaard's era, as in contemporary society, the concept of "culture" (*Dannelse*) has a variety of meanings, a number of which overlap in curious ways. In Danish, the term is etymologically related to the verb *danne*, which connotes making and producing. One might say, then, that a person of "culture" is one who has been "made," usually through a particular kind of upbringing. One might also think of a national or regional "culture," indicating the arts, customs, and institutions produced by a given people. In general, this use of "culture" is descriptive, prosaic. For example, one might compare and contrast the cultures of various cities, assuming that the differences between them are essentially superficial. Sometimes, however, it is

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

said that a culture is deeply flawed, even iniquitous—say, the culture of Germany's Third Reich (1933–1945). In such cases, it is implied that the culture in question has generated corrupt and vicious forms, which compel people of good will to become *countercultural*—that is to say, resistant to what those cultures have produced.

Kierkegaard's interaction with and understanding of *Dannelse* tends to center on this latter signification. Like other notable countercultural figures, from religious martyrs (*see* MARTYRDOM) to political revolutionaries (*see* REVOLUTION), Kierkegaard believed that his culture was fallacious and thus demanded opposition. But here is an **irony**. Kierkegaard was a key member of what historians now call the Danish Golden Age, generally dated from 1800 to 1850. During this cultural period, Denmark boasted some of Europe's most gifted artists and thinkers, including painter Martinus Rørbye, ballet master August Bournonville, poet Adam Oehlenschläger, churchman **Jakob Peter Mynster**, scientist **Hans Christian Ørsted**, and authors **Johan Ludvig Heiberg** and **Hans Christian Andersen**.

Kierkegaard himself was largely formed by the *Dannelse* of the Danish Golden Age, though, as his career unfolded, he grew increasingly hostile toward the assumptions, habits, and organizations that underlay this epoch. The brunt of his critique was directed at Denmark's **state church**, which, in his mind, had accommodated and advanced the nation's rising bourgeoisie. Instead of prophetically challenging the culture's decadent complacency and pretentious manners, the church effectively baptized it, thereby associating Denmark's "aesthetically cultured" (*æsthetisk Dannede*) **religion** with authentic **Christianity**. For Kierkegaard, this conflation of **church** and state, **faith** and *Dannelse*, set the person of **Jesus Christ** in the background and replaced him with a deified established order, one in which bumptious academics and shrewd businessman could claim to support and even to elevate Christian discipleship (*see* IMITATION). Kierkegaard viewed this cultural arrangement as a kind of Faustian bargain: the church has acquired sociopolitical power by making a deal with **worldliness**. This is the essence of Christendom, which Kierkegaard spent the last year of his life attacking in writings such as ***The Moment***. *See also THE CORSAIR*; LEVELING; LIFE-VIEW; PRESS; SOCIAL AND POLITICAL, THE.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

D

DAMNATION. Perhaps surprisingly, Kierkegaard uses the term "damnation" (*Fortabelse*) rather frequently in his authorship—indeed, well over 100 times. The word is etymologically linked to the verb *fortabe*, which has connotations of losing or forfeiting one's right to a particular good. Hence, as is the case with the English expression "damn," not to mention related terms such as "condemn," the applications of *Fortabelse* and *fortabe* can vary, from vulgar speech to legal argot to ecclesial **dogma**.

Kierkegaard's authorship, while employing *Fortabelse* in a range of senses, pays significant attention to the theological implications of damnation. In one 1834 journal entry, Kierkegaard worries that, if understood the wrong way, the idea that some are damned suggests that divine **salvation** is limited to a particular socio-historical locus. Thus **Christianity** appears to be one earthly **religion** among many, rather than an eternal expression of God's love for humankind. And yet, a number of other passages, particularly from the latter part of his career, maintain that modern **Protestantism** has cheapened the message of the New Testament precisely by trying to eliminate the possibility of damnation. On the contrary, Kierkegaard argues, the notion that an **individual** could be irrevocably cut off from eternal life, though terrifying, should encourage Christians to fear **God** and to plead for divine mercy.

These two approaches to damnation are not necessarily in contradiction, since they are both rooted in Kierkegaard's **metaphysics**. As the utterly transcendent **Other**, God's nature cannot be reduced to an immanent and relative human agenda: he is Love (1 John 4:8), and thus his love exceeds all historical differences. It is for *all* of **creation**, and no created thing, not even a malevolent spirit (such as "the devil"), is capable of nullifying this basic ontological fact. And yet, despite being created by God, **the self**'s temporal (*see* TEMPORALITY/TIME) journey back to **eternity** is not automatic. God has endowed human beings with **freedom**, and thus some may choose to isolate themselves from God, whether through weakness or defiance. In ***The Sickness unto Death***, Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** Anti-Climacus tenders a robust analysis of this psycho-spiritual condition, generally referring to it as **despair**. Similarly, in an 1854 journal entry, Kierkegaard underscores that

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

one's eternal destiny cannot be determined in the abstract, as if a few ecclesial pronouncements could make it clear who is saved and who is damned. Rather, it is profoundly intimate matter, which must be worked out in and through one's relationship with God. Comparing this view to the conclusion of ***A Literary Review***, he suggests that this is a modern way of approaching the question of *Fortabelse*, coming on the heels of the decline of Christendom and the rise of **leveling** as a social principle. Hence, while some may interpret this religious freedom as a sign of progress, it is also a dreadful form of judgment. *See also* CHOICE; IMMORTALITY; INDIVIDUAL; SIN.

DEATH. Kierkegaard employs the word "death" (*Død*) frequently and in a variety of ways. At times, he uses it as a **metaphor**, especially for the spiritual condition of **the self**. This type of usage, however, is not necessarily uniform. For example, expanding on the words of **Jesus Christ** (John 11:4), ***The Sickness unto Death*** identifies *Død* with **despair**. And yet, also drawing on Jesus's teaching, texts such as ***Christian Discourses*** and ***For Self-Examination*** treat *Død*, understood as "dying" to one's own egoistic desires and schemes, as the remedy for the *Død* of despair. Hence, in order to overcome spiritual death, one must undergo a different kind of **inner** death.

At the same time, however, Kierkegaard's interest in death was not just metaphorical-cum-spiritual. References to bodily *Død* appear throughout his authorship, though the final part of ***Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions***, titled "At a Graveside," summarizes a number of Kierkegaard's reflections on the subject. That the subsistent functions of all living beings (*see* BEING/BECOMING) must eventually come to end is a biological fact. Yet, in the manner of great thinkers both before (Plato) and after (**Martin Heidegger**), Kierkegaard argues that this fact has great significance for life. Oftentimes, Kierkegaard argues, people think of *Død* merely in its scientific sense, that is, as an aspect of the human condition that can be biotically examined or statistically plotted (*see* OBJECTIVITY). This approach is valid within its own sphere, but it omits a number of crucial existential considerations. First, death is not merely an objective datum that pertains to "others"; it is also a reality that each **individual** must confront precisely qua individual. Second, while death itself is certain for all persons, it is mysterious in many ways too. When one will die or what happens after one's death—these are questions that have no definite answers. According to Kierkegaard, the combination of death's inevitability and obscurity leads to a third point—that one should properly fear it. An appropriate fear of death finds the golden mean between carelessness on one hand or pusillanimity on the other, thereby encouraging one to make the most of whatever **time** one is given.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Thus Kierkegaard's reflections on *Død* ultimately terminate in a kind of **hope**. Despite being the "wages of sin" (Rom. 6:23), death can deepen one's existential earnestness and, with it, one's pursuit of the **good**. In this way, Kierkegaard's philosophical reflections on death point to more explicitly Christian (*see* CHRISTIANITY) treatments of the subject, which, in the death and resurrection of **Jesus Christ**, see both a pledge and pattern (*see* IMITATION) of death's eventual overcoming. *See also* AESTHETIC; DESPAIR; MARTYRDOM; SIN; TEMPORALITY/TIME.

DECISION. For Kierkegaard, the common terms "decision" (*Afgjørelse*) and "decide" (*afgjøre*) are existentially significant. That is to say, a decision is not just something one makes at, say, the grocery store or in the **voting** booth. Rather, as Judge William explains in ***Either/Or***, each **individual** must make a fundamental "decision" to adopt a certain **life-view**, whether the **aesthetic**, the **ethical**, or the **religious**. In other works, including ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, Kierkegaard shows that **reason** too plays a role in one's orientation toward **existence**, but it is too irresolute (*see* REFLECTION) to take on this burden by itself. Ultimately, then, one must make a **leap**—a willed decision to live this way or that way, regardless of whatever intellectual doubts one harbors. Thus every existential *Afgjørelse* is, in a sense, a matter of **faith**. Yet the highest or ideal form of decision is found in the religious, wherein **the self**'s temporality is brought into union with the eternal nature (*see* ETERNITY) of divine **truth**. Kierkegaard also refers to this union as "the moment" (*see MOMENT*, *THE*). *See also* CHOICE; FREEDOM; IDEA; IMAGINATION; IMMEDIACY; REDOUBLING/REDUPLICATION; RESIGNATION; SUBJECTIVITY.

DEER PARK. Jægersborg Deer Park (Dyrehave) is a multipurpose recreational area roughly 10 miles north of central Copenhagen. Its origins as a park date back to 1669, when King Frederick III (*see* CONSTITUTION, DANISH) fenced in a wooded area and drove the local deer within its bounds. Hence, for nearly a century, the area served as a royal hunting ground. During the second half of the 18th century, however, the land was made available to the public, and Deer Park became a fashionable excursion among Copenhagen's emerging bourgeoisie. The grounds boasted several attractions: a natural spring purported to have healing powers (Kirsten Piils Kilde); the world's oldest amusement park (Dyrehavsbakken or, colloquially, Bakken), featuring roller coasters and carnival games; the old royal hunting lodge (Eremitageslot); the hawthorn flats that were (and are) popular destinations for picnickers (Hvidtjørnesletten); and, of course, the roughly 2,000 deer that continue to

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

roam the area. Today, Deer Park is frequented by Danes and tourists alike, and, in 2015, it was recognized as a UNESCO World Heritage Site.

Kierkegaard makes dozens of references to Deer Park in his authorship, albeit under a variety of names (Dyrehavsbakken, Bakken, and most commonly Dyrehaven). Many of these allusions are illustrative, adding color to his portraits of quotidian life in Golden Age Denmark (*see* CULTURE). In other cases, however, Kierkegaard uses Deer Park to explore serious philosophical questions. The most well-known example of this tendency is found in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, in which Johannes Climacus wrestles with whether or not the strenuousness of **religious** life can permit frivolous pleasures such as day trips to Deer Park. For Climacus, Dyrehaven is nothing more than bourgeois amusement, but, since he views the religious as primarily a matter of **inwardness**, he does not rule out the possibility that an authentic religious **individual** could pass through its famous red gates unstained. Yet Kierkegaard continued to revisit this question, particularly in the wake of his public row with ***The Corsair***. Phenomena such as the free **press**, mass transit (*see* TECHNOLOGY), civic **Christianity**, and Bakken manifest the rise of the **crowd** and thus portend the nihilism of **leveling**. *See also* HAPPINESS; WORLDLINESS/SECULARISM.

DEMONIC. The Danish adjective *dæmonisk*, like its English cognate, stems from the Greek noun *daimōn*, which denotes a lesser deity or tutelary spirit. This original sense is still reflected in the English word "daemon," which can indicate a benign supernatural being or even an **inner** source of guidance, not unlike the more common term **conscience**. And yet, the Septuagint (an early Koine Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible) used *daimoníois* to translate the Hebrew *shedim* ("false gods" or "idols," as in Deut. 32:17), and the **Christian** New Testament similarly uses *daimōnes* to indicate malignant spirits (Matt. 8:31). Thus an alternative meaning of *daimōn* emerged, and words such as "demonic" (*dæmonisk*) came to connote something diabolical or **evil**. This was, indeed, its primary meaning in 19th-century Denmark.

Well versed in the culture of antiquity, Kierkegaard himself makes a number of references to the *Dæmon* of **Socrates**, thereby showing his familiarity with the term's antique significance. More importantly, however, he also developed a concept of "the demonic" (*det Dæmoniske*) in his analysis of **the self**. This usage is owing to, but not identical with, the Judeo-Christian interpretation of *daimōn*. The key text in this connection is ***The Concept of Anxiety***. Ascribed to the **pseudonym** Vigilius Haufniensis, this work offers a general definition of "the demonic," namely, that it is **anxiety** about the **good**. Just as the New Testament depicts demons fleeing from the presence of **Jesus Christ**, so does Haufniensis understand demoniacs as persons who

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

evade better alternatives to their own self-enclosed **freedom**. In other words, *det Dæmoniske* is a state in which one, perceiving the good as a threat, withdraws into oneself. This is not a homogenous condition. For example, ***Stages on Life's Way*** portrays the demonic as a kind of denial: the pseudonym Quidam refuses to repent before **God** by equivocating about the extent of his **guilt**. In contrast, ***The Sickness unto Death*** posits a demonic form in which God is not only avoided but even disdained. Whatever the case, the crimson thread running through all types of *det Dæmoniske* is a transposition: what is seen as virtue is **sin**; what is seen as freedom is unfreedom; what is seen as relationality is a life *incurvatus in se*.

DESPAIR. The Danish word for "despair" is *Fortvivelse*, and its etymological construction can shed light on Kierkegaard's use of the term. The prefix *for-* often serves to intensify its conjoining word, which, in this case, is *Tvivl* ("doubt"). Thus *Fortvivelse* is a heightened form of doubt. But what is doubt? *Tvivl* itself is comprised of the prefix *tve-*, which indicates something that can be divided into two parts—something, then, that lacks wholeness. So, if the one who doubts is "of two minds," then the one who despairs is caught up in an even more profound form of doublemindedness. In this way, Kierkegaard's understanding of "despair" comes into view: it is the condition in which **the self** lacks proper integration and is thereby deeply wounded by this **inner** division.

References to despair permeate Kierkegaard's authorship, even dating back to his student years. A number of these instances are autobiographical in nature, though texts such as ***Stages on Life's Way*** ensconce them in an ostensibly fictional context. However, around the time of ***Works of Love***, Kierkegaard began to take a more systematic approach to *Fortvivelse*. It is not, he argues, a matter of adverse circumstances or of a quirky disposition; rather, it involves an imbalance or "misrelation" within the self. ***The Sickness unto Death*** provides a comprehensive analysis of this construct. Attributed to the **pseudonym** Anti-Climacus, it defines despair as a spiritual (*see* SPIRIT) sickness, which results from the self's failure to bring its contrasting elements—for example, **eternity** and **temporality**—into harmony by way of the **God**-relationship. Not all despair, however, is equal. Anti-Climacus develops a taxonomy of *Fortvivelse*, arguing that it can be classified according to the extent to which it is conscious and intentional. Thus the most intense form of despair is to will to be oneself in despair. The person in this condition does not regret being the self that she is but, rather, wills to be herself at the exclusion of the ground of her existence. In **Christian** terms, this is an extreme and **demonic** form of **sin**: the self deifies itself, despite being bound to **finitude** and temporality—a false god. In contrast, the only way to root out *Fortvivelse*

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

is to will to be oneself precisely by resting transparently (*see* REST) in God and, as a result, bringing the self's binary components into balance. *See also* ANXIETY; BEING/BECOMING; DEATH; DYING TO; ETHICAL/ETHICS; FAITH; FORGIVENESS; IMAGINATION; MELANCHOLY.

DIALECTIC. Kierkegaard's interest in "dialectic" (*Dialektik*) was at once historical and contemporary. Since the time of Plato, *dialektos* (or "conversation") had been seen as an important philosophical process, whereby **truth** is attained through the question and answer of interpersonal debate. On the other hand, the philosophy of **G. W. F. Hegel** had recently cast "dialectic" in different terms, describing the unfolding of **history** as an ongoing dialectal movement between thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Discerning this world-historical process is, for Hegel, the privilege of speculative **reason**.

Kierkegaard typically associated *Dialektik* with **Socrates**, and he incorporated Socratic maieutics into his own conception of indirect **communication**. And yet, while often considered an opponent of Hegel's thinking, Kierkegaard nevertheless adapted the Hegelian concept of dialectical stages for his own intellectual project. Whereas Hegel's dialectical categories are applied to objective matters, Kierkegaard's writings primarily relate them to **subjectivity**, especially to the existential spheres of the **aesthetic**, the **ethical**, and the **religious**. The dialectical tension between these stages is, moreover, implicit in Kierkegaard's authorship writ large, wherein different **pseudonyms**, each representing an existential **life-view**, are set in a kind of *dialektos*. In this sense, Kierkegaard might be seen as mingling Socratic and Hegelian dialectic, encouraging readers to view questions from multiple perspectives and to see these points of view in relation to one another. *See also* METAPHYSICS; NEGATION; PHILOSOPHY.

DISCOURSE/DELIBERATION/SERMON. Kierkegaard sought to complement his pseudonymous authorship (*see* PSEUDONYMITY) with writings published under his own name. For example, the pseudonymous tome ***Either/Or*** was paired with the "signed" collection *Two Upbuilding Discourses* and so on. Indeed, Kierkegaard labels most of his signed writings as "discourses" (*Taler*), and this term is chosen carefully. A "discourse" (*Tale*) is a rhetorical address, albeit one that is not as officious as, say, a political speech. Rather, as the word itself suggests, a discourse is a "talk," a kind of conversation (*Samtale*) between acquaintances. On occasion, however, Kierkegaard categorized his signed writings as something other than discourses. The texts that comprise ***Works of Love*** serve as a case in point. Kierkegaard refers to them as "deliberations" (*Overveielser*), and, in an 1847 journal entry, he clarifies that a deliberation is intended to awaken persons and to provoke

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

action, whereas a discourse assumes a shared understanding between speaker and audience and thus seeks to provide edification and succor.

In any case, both *Taler* and *Overveielser* are to be distinguished from "sermons" (*Prædikener*). Whether as a churchgoer (*see* CHURCH) or as a seminarian, Kierkegaard had a great affinity for preaching, and he himself took a course in homiletics and gave a number of sermons from pulpits in Copenhagen. Yet, since he lacked the **authority** of ecclesiastical ordination, Kierkegaard did not prefer to describe his signed writings as "sermons." For example, one of Kierkegaard's final publications was *The Changelessness of God: A Discourse* (*Guds Uforanderlighed: En Tale*), which came out on 3 September 1855, roughly a month before he was admitted to **Frederik's Hospital** with a terminal illness. But this *Tale* was originally a *Prædiken*: Kierkegaard had preached it on 18 May 1851 at the Church of the Citadel (Kastelskirken) in Copenhagen. He recontextualized its generic significance upon publication, thereby underscoring that he was "without authority." *See also CHRISTIAN DISCOURSES*; *EIGHTEEN UPBUILDING DISCOURSES*; *THREE DISCOURSES ON IMAGINED OCCASIONS*; *UPBUILDING DISCOURSES IN VARIOUS SPIRITS*.

DOCTRINE/DOGMA. Kierkegaard generally (if not exclusively) uses the terms "dogma" (*Dogme*) and "doctrine" (*Doctrin* or *Lære*) to indicate the foundational and authoritative tenets of **Christianity**. For him, these words are more or less interchangeable, though *Lære*, which can also be translated as "teaching," appears most frequently in his writings. A forerunner of **existentialism**, Kierkegaard's philosophical emphasis on **subjectivity** is sometimes understood to entail a rejection of doctrine. In truth, however, his view on the matter is nuanced. On the one hand, Kierkegaard is critical of those who treat Christian teaching as a series of abstract propositions tendered for cognitive assent. The problem with such a perspective, he argues, is that it forgets that Christianity involves the transformation of one's **existence** by a lived encounter with **Jesus Christ**. On the other hand, Kierkegaard does not think that this transformation is possible if *Lære* is altogether jettisoned. In other words, doctrine is needed to present Christian concepts in such a way that they define the appropriate character of the Christian life, lest **faith** become merely whatever the **individual** wants it to be. Put differently, doctrine supplies the basic categories of Christian **language** and life, thereby establishing what it means to be a follower of Jesus (*see* IMITATION) and preventing the translation of Christianity into other conceptual fields. In sum, Kierkegaard stresses that *Lære* is a matter of divine **revelation**, while simultaneously insisting that it is not enough simply to acknowledge this fact. One must also allow doctrine to shape one's existential activities and passions.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

See also AUTHORITY; BALLE, NIKOLAI EDINGER (1744–1816); LAW; LOVE; PIETISM; STATE CHURCH.

DOUBLE MOVEMENT. The “double movement” (*Dobbelt-Bevægelse*) is an important feature of Kierkegaard’s concept of **faith**. As developed in ***Fear and Trembling***, faith has a twofold character. First, it requires that one accept that one cannot realize the highest on one’s own—an infinite movement of **resignation**. But it also involves a second movement whereby one trusts that the highest *can* be realized in and through the help of **God**. This latter movement is the *conditio sine qua non* of faith, and, without it, the first movement is finally **tragic**. In other texts, including ***Either/Or***, the notion of a “double movement” takes on a more universal, humanistic form, whereby one wills to break with an object or an event and yet returns to it, changed. For example, in **repentance**, one rejects the **sin** of one’s past and yet continues to recognize that it happened, so as not to repeat it. *See also* DESPAIR; EXCEPTION/UNIVERSAL; FINITUDE/INFINITY; INDIVIDUAL; MOVEMENT; WORLDLINESS/SECULARISM.

DUTY. Kierkegaard makes more than 200 references to “duty” (*Pligt*) in his authorship, with particularly notable treatments being found in ***Either/Or***, ***Fear and Trembling***, and ***Works of Love***. For Kierkegaard, duty involves more than fulfilling (or trying to fulfill) abstract principles such as Immanuel Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.” That is to say, while not denying that duty involves the **decision** to fulfill precepts such as Kant’s, Kierkegaard also argues that the **ethical** is not reducible to the mere discharge of duty. Rather, the truly ethical **individual** consciously takes up duty as part of her identity and as a sign of her **eternal** legitimacy. Thus duty is something felt and not just something executed.

The situation is somewhat more complex is **Christianity**. Insofar as **God** is utterly transcendent, any duty owed to God must be **absolute**. On occasion, this may mean that a particular religious duty conflicts (or seems to conflict) with those prescribed by human society, as one finds in the story of the binding of Isaac (Gen. 22). Moreover, Christianity insists that one has a duty to **love** both neighbor and oneself (Mark 12:31), thereby underscoring that charity is not just a preferential feeling but, rather, a divine command. Here, again, this form of obligation may run counter to the ethical mandates of human **reason**. Yet, inasmuch as Christian duty comes from God, it always supersedes that of the established order. *See also* EXCEPTION/UNIVERSAL; GOOD; INDIVIDUAL; INNER; LOVE; MARRIAGE; TRUTH.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

DYING TO. When discussing the renunciation of something, particularly in a religious context, Kierkegaard was fond of using the verbal construction "dying to" (*afdøe*). Related to the adjective *afdød* ("dead" or "deceased"), *afdøe* turns up nearly 150 times in Kierkegaard's authorship, albeit with greater regularity in his journals. For example, one 1852 journal entry is titled "God Is Love—Dying To" (*Gud er Kjerlighed—det at afdøe*), and in it Kierkegaard argues that, in order to **love** God, one must die to the world (*see* WORLDLINESS/SECULARISM). This notion resembles the emphasis on the purgative way found in **mysticism** in general and **Pietism** in particular: the one who aspires to follow **Jesus Christ** must refocus those **passions** that distract one from discipleship. Thus it constitutes a kind of **double movement**—first, away from sinful attachments (*see* ASCETICISM) and, second, toward a deeper and more authentic relation to **God** and neighbor.

Though Kierkegaard often viewed the issue of *afdøe* within the framework of Christian spirituality (*see* SPIRIT), framing it as an **inner** disposition essential to breaking from **despair** and **sin**, he is nevertheless clear that the one who dies to the world in a Christian manner will encounter public (*see* CROWD/PUBLIC) opposition. This perspective is sharpened in later works such as ***Practice in Christianity*** and ***For Self-Examination***. In the latter text, for example, Kierkegaard observes that the **imitation** of Christ was preeminently exemplified by the **apostles** and martyrs (*see* MARTYRDOM), who died to both **self** and world in their desire for God. A few years later, this understanding of Christianity would become the source of immense civic scrutiny, when Kierkegaard protested the notion that decorated churchmen such as **Jakob Peter Mynster** were authentic representatives of the Christian faith (*see* WITNESS). In his periodical ***The Moment***, Kierkegaard insisted the **state church** neither embodied nor properly taught the concept of *afdøe*. *See also* ADMIRATION; BAPTISM; DESPAIR; *EITHER/OR*; FAITH; HOLY SPIRIT; SALVATION.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

E

EARNESTNESS. The term “earnestness” (*Alvor*) appears close to 1,000 times in Kierkegaard’s writings, making it a recurring (if oft-overlooked) concept in his authorship. Etymologically related to the Old High German *alawari* (“wholly true”), *Alvor* generally indicates an attitude or a life characterized by authenticity and urgency, a definition that Kierkegaard more or less assumes. Indeed, for Kierkegaard, earnestness can be present at each sphere of **existence**, insofar as what one actively cares about (*see* PASSION) establishes a kind of personal **identity**. In this sense, one can be an aesthete (*see* AESTHETIC) in earnest, and one can even **will** the **demonic** in earnest. At the same time, however, Kierkegaard is clear that *Alvor* cannot be sustained unless its object is a secure authority. A lover, for instance, may be earnest in the erotic moment, but this disposition will pass unless it is bound to the **eternal** significance of **marriage**. Moreover, as Vigilius Haufniensis argues in ***The Concept of Anxiety***, it is not enough that one merely acknowledges an eternal ideal such as marriage; rather, one must nurture it by continuing to will it (*see REPETITION*). Thus earnestness is not to be confused with the routine discharge of an outward **duty**. It is a matter of the heart or, more specifically, of **conscience**. The truly earnest person, then, is on an ongoing quest for what grounds and moves **the self**, and this search ultimately leads to **God**. *See also* AUTHORITY; DEATH; ETHICAL/ETHICS; IMAGINATION; INDIVIDUAL; RELIGIOUS/RELIGIOUSNESS.

EIGHTEEN UPBUILDING DISCOURSES. Though famous for his pseudonymous authorship (*see* PSEUDONYMITY), Kierkegaard published signed literature throughout his career, most notably in the genre of **discourse**. Indeed, for a number of years, Kierkegaard would issue a collection of discourses in conjunction with the publication of a pseudonymous work. For example, the volume *Three Upbuilding Discourses* was released on the same day (16 October 1843) as ***Fear and Trembling*** and ***Repetition***. As indicated, these discourses are distinguished by the adjective “**upbuilding**” (*opbyggelige*). Moreover, each collection is dedicated to Kierkegaard’s late father, **Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard**, remembered as “formerly a clothing merchant [*Hosekræmmer*] here in the city,” and addressed either to “that

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

single individual" (*hiin Enkelte*) or "the single individual" (*den Enkelte*), whom Kierkegaard also refers to as "*my* reader" (min *Læser*). Kierkegaard's emphasis on the **individual**, particularly when invoking the more general *den Enkelte*, indicates that his upbuilding discourses are meant to appeal to "the universally human," that is to say, to the innate capacities and concerns of all human beings. This is a notable detail, because the discourses are, in essence, extended reflections on biblical passages—a sign of Kierkegaard's rich yet nuanced understanding of **religiousness**.

Ultimately, Kierkegaard issued six volumes of upbuilding discourses. They were neither popular with the public nor of interest in the academy. Kierkegaard remaindered the unsold copies to the publisher P. G. Philipsen, who, in May 1845, released them in a single tome, namely, *Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 1843–1845* (*Atten opbyggelige Taler, 1843–1845*). This larger collection seems to have been more commercially successful than the individual ones, though sales still were not astounding. No doubt Kierkegaard's contemporaries would have been surprised to learn that, roughly a century later, one of the world's most celebrated philosophers, **Martin Heidegger**, would declare that Kierkegaard's upbuilding discourses were generally of greater philosophical import than his pseudonymous writings. *See also* FAITH; IMMEDIACY; PATIENCE; SELF, THE.

EIRÍKSSON, MAGNUS (1806–1881). Icelandic-born theologian who became a prominent figure during the Danish Golden Age. The son of a farmer, Eiríksson grew up in the remote northeastern region of Iceland, but, after a successful stint at Bessastad Latin School near Reykjavík, he immigrated to Denmark to attend the **University of Copenhagen**. Eiríksson elected to study theology, and he developed a strong interest in biblical studies, taking a particular liking to the rationalism of **Henrik Nicolaj Clausen**. After graduating in 1837, Eiríksson worked as a tutor to theology students and launched an authorial career. Much of his energy was directed against the thought and standing of **Hans Lassen Martensen**, whom he saw as a defender of the status quo and thus as a hindrance to the rational purification of Christian **doctrine**. For Eiríksson, in other words, true **faith** is rooted in what can be established by **reason**; consequently, faith has nothing to do with mystery and **paradox**, a position that involved him in a number of public disputes and eventually tarnished his reputation as a tutor.

It was under these circumstances that Eiríksson began to reach out to Kierkegaard. After reading ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, Eiríksson concluded that Kierkegaard was an intellectual ally, inasmuch as both were opposed to **Hegel**'s influence on theology. He also eyed Kierkegaard as a potential benefactor who could financially support him during his campaign against Martensen. Kierkegaard did not see things the same way, noting in his

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

journals that Eiríksson badly misunderstood the *Postscript* and that the two neither have been nor will be collaborators. Kierkegaard also flatly, if civilly, refused to patronize Eiríksson's polemics against Martensen, a decision that says more about Kierkegaard's feelings toward Eiríksson than about his relationship with Martensen. After all, Martensen would become one of the chief targets of Kierkegaard's late attack on the Danish **state church**.

EITHER/OR. Released on 20 February 1843, *Either/Or* (*Enten-Eller*) marks the beginning of Kierkegaard's proper authorship. The work began to take shape during the autumn of 1841, around the time that Kierkegaard published and defended his doctoral thesis, ***The Concept of Irony***, and, in a fateful decision, broke off his engagement to **Regine Olsen**. Following these events, Kierkegaard absconded to Berlin, where, in January 1842, he wrote to his friend **Emil Boesen** that he was working diligently on a book called *Either/Or*. In March 1842, Kierkegaard returned to Copenhagen and resumed work on the project, finally wrapping it up in November 1842. Given that *Either/Or* was released in two substantial volumes, and that it was written in less than a year, Kierkegaard later remembered it as a project of frenetic inspiration.

Put simply, *Either/Or* is a collection of miscellaneous papers, ostensibly found and published by the book's pseudonymous editor Victor Eremita. The writings of part 1 are **aesthetic** in nature, and Victor ascribes them to a mysterious figure known only as "A." In contrast, the writings of part 2 are **ethical** in nature, consisting of two lengthy letters attributed to a civil servant named Judge William, plus a short sermon credited to a pastor from Denmark's Jutland peninsula. But this summary, while broadly accurate, does not do justice to the diversity and nuance of the project writ large. For instance, as Victor Eremita explains in his "Preface" (*Forord*), the volume's two parts seem to constitute a communication between A and Judge William, though the nature and the outcome of this exchange is by no means clear. One might wonder if the Judge's writings were received as sage advice or if, in fact, they kindled A's productivity. To make matters even more complicated, Victor underlines that the final piece of part 1, an epistolary novella known as "The Seducer's Diary" (*Forførerens Dagbog*), lists A as the editor rather than the author. This layering of authorial voices gives part 1 the character of a "Chinese puzzle," a device that appears to reflect the fragmentation and secrecy of a life dedicated to aesthetic pursuits. Judge William makes a similar observation, and it is clear that his letters are intended to convince A that, in the absence of an ethical or **religious** underpinning, an aesthetic **life-view** is bound to terminate in failure. That which is ever changing, the Judge maintains, can never provide **the self** with the stability needed to be happy (*see* HAPPINESS). Nevertheless, Victor concludes his preface by insisting that, in the end, the reader must decide whose standpoint prevails.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Almost immediately, *Either/Or* made Kierkegaard a figure of note in Danish literature. The book sold out its initial print run of 525 copies, and it was reissued in 1849 with a print run of 750 copies. Unsurprisingly, then, *Either/Or* garnered significant critical attention as well, with reviews by a number of Copenhagen's leading *hommes de lettres*, including **Meïer Goldschmidt** to **Johan Ludvig Heiberg**. The book was widely hailed as a product of genius, though Heiberg spoke for many when he expressed reservations about the racy nihilism of "The Seducer's Diary." Kierkegaard, for his own part, worked hard to ensure that he was not identified as the author of *Either/Or*, going so far as to issue **pseudonymous** and signed newspaper articles meant to cast doubt on the rumor that he was behind the project. This wish, however, had more to do with his concept of indirect **communication** than with a desire to remain utterly anonymous. After all, as Kierkegaard makes clear in an 1853 journal entry, he had hoped that the first part of *Either/Or*, particularly "The Seducer's Diary," would serve to convince Regine that their breakup was for the best. Hence, in his mind, the book was also a gesture of self-renunciation (*see* DYING TO). *See also* AESTHETIC; DUTY; EXCEPTION/UNIVERSAL; EVIL; INDIVIDUAL; REASON; TRAGEDY/TRAGIC; WILL.

ENVY. The concept of "envy" (*Misundelse*) plays an important role in Kierkegaard's social theory (*see* SOCIAL AND POLITICAL, THE). Etymologically, the term connotes the refusal (*mis*-) to give (-*unde*), and thus it has come to signify a disposition in which one refuses to grant that **the other** possesses a certain good. In other words, the one who is envious attempts to devalue, whether consciously or unconsciously, the abilities and virtues of another human being.

Kierkegaard treats *Misundelse* as a key aspect of human sociality. Indeed, that **Christianity** understands **God** as the **eternal**, infinite, and omnipotent font of **being** means that the divine nature is perfect and thus stands in a noncompetitive, unenvious relationship with **creation**. With this in mind, Kierkegaard treats envy as a distinctly human problem, which is particularly pronounced in modernity. Though he touches on this concern in a number of places, Kierkegaard's most focused analysis of envy is found in ***A Literary Review***. In that text, which is an extended examination of **Thomasine Gyllembourg**'s 1845 novel *Two Ages* (*To Tidsaldre*), Kierkegaard juxtaposes the **passion** of the age of **revolution** with the reflectiveness of "**the present age**." The advent of the free **press**, coupled with the newfound stress on **objectivity** found in **philosophy** and **science**, has oriented the present age toward impersonal **reflection**. In this situation, the **individual** is less likely to venerate ideals and traditions and more likely to conform to popular opinion

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

(*see* CROWD/PUBLIC) and scientific prescriptions. As a result, the relationships that defined human society for centuries—say, king and subject, father and son—are not seen as **absolute**. On the contrary, they are now viewed from a historical-critical perspective and analyzed in terms of their utility (*see* TECHNOLOGY). As these tendencies have come to dominate society, people are no longer united by a common set of goals and values. Instead, they are alike only in their shared critical mindset—that is to say, only in their *Misundelse*. That is why Kierkegaard calls envy a "negatively unifying principle."

The consequences of this shift are momentous. In former ages, the envious person craved to be as **good** as those who are excellent; in the present age, the envious person believes that ultimately there really is no such thing as excellence. Kierkegaard calls this phenomenon "characterless envy" (*Charakteerløshedens Misundelse*), and he argues that it is responsible for the **leveling** that stifles passion and principle in modern society. Under this spell, people can and will find fault in whatever another person does, no matter how pure it otherwise seems. As a result, the only real difference between one person and another is material wealth, and thus envy, particularly when it is instantiated and reinforced by the media, contributes to the present age's consumerism, decadence, and nihilism. For that reason, Kierkegaard does not believe that *Misundelse* can be overcome by inherently materialistic secular ideologies (*see* WORLDLINESS/SECULARISM). As he argues in ***Christian Discourses***, only the theological virtues of **faith**, **hope**, and **love** can stem the ascendency of envy, since they are essentially noncompetitive and communicative. In other words, their possession is for the benefit, and never at the expense, of others—a point exemplified by the life, death, and resurrection of **Jesus Christ** (*see* IMITATION). *See also* ADMIRATION; OBJECTIVITY.

EQUALITY. Kierkegaard's understanding of equality (*Lighed*) was informed by two main currents of thought—**Christianity** on the one hand, and political **philosophy** on the other. In Danish, the word is derived from the adjective *lig*, meaning "like" or "similar to"; thus equality, in its most general sense, is a state of likeness between different parties. As Kierkegaard sees it, Christian **doctrine** entails that all human beings are fundamentally equal before **God**. Hence, despite the myriad of differences that obtain in the world, all persons are capable of having a relationship with God, becoming Christians, and living out the theological virtues of **faith**, **hope**, and **love**—virtues that are equally available to everyone, since they are not predicated on external factors such as class, gender, or race. Moreover, in books such as ***Works of Love***, Kierkegaard argues that the existential enactment of faith, hope, and love represents the best and fullest development of *Lighed*. After all, one

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

can desire faith for another without worrying about losing it oneself, and the Christian stress on charity insists that one is to love the neighbor regardless of earthly distinctions. The prototypical instance of this robust form of equality is the person of **Jesus Christ**, who, as Kierkegaard points out, expresses *Lighed* with the humble and the poor while nevertheless refusing to **envy** the powerful and the rich. It is Christ's example of equality that Christians are to imitate (*see* IMITATION).

With this in mind, it is not surprising that Kierkegaard was apprehensive about modern calls for political equality. For him, such demands, whether liberal or socialist, are largely indifferent to the Christian understanding of *Lighed*. They substitute a legal or material equality for one born of love (*see* SOCIAL AND POLITICAL, THE). Put differently, whereas Christianity undercuts worldly distinctions by focusing one's attention on a higher or more ultimate form of equality, modern political philosophies strive to attain a cruder or relative equality that could reconstitute, but never eliminate, worldly distinctions.

Thus Kierkegaard, though a champion of equality in one sense, was ambivalent about equality in another sense. While not denying that certain political measures—and, in the Denmark of his day, that largely meant liberal measures—might help a particular interest group, he insisted that such courses of action were always equivocal and provisional. For example, the extension of enfranchisement to persons previously denied the right *does* create a more equitable electoral process, but to view this as indisputable progress is to beg the question. After all, it may be that the elections favored in liberal representative democracies lead to the tyranny of the **crowd** rather than to genuine and long-term equality—a concern that Kierkegaard shared with thinkers such as **Socrates**. Indeed, as Kierkegaard's early writings on the **press** attest, it was not lost on him that the democratic motto *liberté, égalité, fraternité*, first used by Maximilien de Robespierre in 1790, preceded the so-called "Reign of Terror" (*la Terreur*) that led to over 15,000 political executions in France during the first half of the 1790s. Whether or not this demonstrates that Kierkegaard was a staunch opponent of representative forms of government remains an open question, though it is worth underlining that he described his own political stance as "armed neutrality," a phrase that recalls his desire to serve as a nonpartisan **corrective** to the day's conventional ways of thinking. *See also* CREATION; INDIVIDUAL; SUFFERING; TRUTH; WOMEN.

ETERNITY. The Danish for "eternity" is *Evighed*, taken from the Middle Low German adjective *êwich*, meaning "eternal" or "forever." Its Latinate equivalent, traditionally used in Western Christian **doctrine**, is *aeternitatem*, which can be defined as "endless duration." In both cases, "the eternal" (*det*

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Evige) refers to a domain outside of or beyond the earthly, **temporal** order—a domain that has neither a beginning nor an end but possesses the unchangeable fullness of **being**. Thus "eternity" can be (and has been) seen as an attribute of **God**, in and through whom Christians (*see* CHRISTENDOM/CHRISTIANITY) come to participate in life everlasting (John 11:25–26).

Kierkegaard effectively assumes this framework, and his authorship contains hundreds of references to *Evighed* and *det Evige*, frequently in juxtaposition to notions of **temporality**. That is not to say, however, that he thinks these two domains are necessarily antagonistic. In ***The Sickness unto Death***, Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** Anti-Climacus argues **the self** is a synthesis of eternal and temporal elements, and the task of the self is to bring these two realms into equilibrium, rather than to discard one in favor of the other. Indeed, when the **individual**, who exists in time, uses time to develop the self's eternal attributes, then both temporality and eternity are reconciled. Kierkegaard refers to this reconciliation, wherein the eternal intersects and transforms the temporal, as "the moment" (*see MOMENT*, *THE*). It is preeminently figured in the person of **Jesus Christ**, in whom divinity and humanity are united. For Kierkegaard, that is why Christianity's understanding of *Evighed* marks an advance on pagan (*see* PAGANISM) conceptions of the eternal, since the latter grasped in abstract terms what the former makes concrete. *See also* FREEDOM; HAPPINESS; IMMEDIACY; NATURE; PASSION; RECOLLECTION; RELIGIOUS/RELIGIOUSNESS; REST; SALVATION; SILENCE; SUFFERING; STRIVING; TRUTH.

ETHICAL/ETHICS. Kierkegaard's approach to ethics (*Ethik*) is nuanced yet central to his overall thinking. Derived from the Greek noun *ēthos*, meaning "moral character," ethics simultaneously refers to a customary way of comportment and an intellectual discipline that analyzes behavior, seeking to ascertain which actions and values are right and which are wrong. Since ethical analysis often seeks to establish normative principles of conduct, it has a sociopolitical (*see* SOCIAL AND POLITICAL, THE) application as well. For that reason, Kierkegaard's ethical terminology also features *Sædelighed*, a word that corresponds to the German noun *Sittlichkeit*, often associated with Hegelian (*see* HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH [1770–1831]/HEGELIANISM) conceptions of the established moral order, including family, civil society, and state.

Generally speaking, Kierkegaard views ethics as proceeding either from human **reason** or from divine **revelation**. His best-known treatment of the former is found in the second part of ***Either/Or***, which contains two lengthy **pseudonymous** epistles, ascribed to a married civil servant named Judge William, that posit and illustrate an existential sphere known as "the ethical" (*det*

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Ethiske). According to the Judge, the ethical is more than the discharge of a particular social **duty**; it is also a particular orientation toward life, whereby **the self** wills to be an agent who understands human **existence** in terms of **good** and bad, right and wrong. While this **choice** may seem banal, the Judge argues that it tends to be neglected at the expense of the **aesthetic** sphere of existence, in which the **individual** approaches life in terms of the maximization of pleasure. And yet, on the Judge's reckoning, the aesthetic turns out to be a case of "fool's gold." Since pleasure is fleeting and scarce, subject to the conditions of finitude, it is fundamentally distracting and unreliable; thus the one who pursues it ultimately falls into **despair**. In contrast, the ethical serves to unify the self, insofar as the conditions for ethical fulfillment lie within the person—one's own desire to **will** the good—and do not depend on external fortuity. For that reason, Judge William describes the **decision** to live ethically as a choice of one's **eternal** self, that is, as a choice to live according to eternally binding norms. Such norms have a conventional social character (*Sædelighed*), but, more importantly, they also have a broadly **religious** quality, as evinced by the figure of **Socrates**, whose ethical life centered on the quest to recollect eternal **truth**.

On the other hand, when ethics is rooted in divine revelation, the self's primary task is not to meet societal expectations or to pursue philosophical wisdom; it is to fulfill the commandments of **God**. Such directives can and often do outstrip what sagacity alone can establish. For example, **Jesus Christ**'s command to "love your enemies" (Matt. 5:44) clashes with social prudence, and so the one who follows Christ's teaching (*see* IMITATION) will have difficulty squaring with it the universal dictates of reason. That is one reason why **Christianity** entails **suffering**, both in terms of **inner** isolation and outer persecution. In short, since the Christian has an **absolute** duty to accomplish God's will, the possibility of a clash with the relative **authority** of *Sædelighed* is ever present. Kierkegaard focuses on this aspect of *Ethik* in the latter half of his authorship, first in the more exhortative tone of books such as ***Works of Love*** and, finally, in the confrontational posture of ***The Moment***. In contrast to Judge William's warm yet bourgeois aspirations, which can in principle be achieved, the requirements of Christian ethics are so stringent that they compel the individual to confess the continuance of **sin** and the ongoing need for divine **grace** and mercy. *See also FEAR AND TREMBLING*; LIFE-VIEW; REPENTANCE; TELEOLOGICAL SUSPENSION OF THE ETHICAL.

EVIL. Kierkegaard makes hundreds of references to "evil" (*Onde* or, less frequently, *Ondskab*) in his authorship, though the meaning of the term varies across contexts. This equivocity is, in part, due to Kierkegaard's use of

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

pseudonymity. For instance, while the aesthete from ***Either/Or*** ironically characterizes boredom as "the root of all evil" (*see* AESTHETIC), the pseudonymous author of ***The Concept of Anxiety***, Vigilius Haufniensis, understands evil as the opposite of **good** and, in turn, as a source of **anxiety** within **the self**. In his journals, moreover, Kierkegaard recurrently brands the **press** as a force of evil in the modern world, insofar as it facilitates the process of **leveling** and, with it, the secular (*see* WORLDLINESS/SECULARISM) displacement of authentic **Christianity**. Thus Kierkegaard does not understand *Onde* merely as a psychological phenomenon; evil has traction in **the social and political** sphere as well.

The ominous fluidity that marks the manifestation of evil is, for Kierkegaard, consonant with its nature. In one 1838 journal entry, Kierkegaard notes that evil is a mystery, and elsewhere he observes that **Jesus Christ**'s crucifixion demonstrates that the world is prone to evil. At the same time, however, Kierkegaard falls short of declaring that evil is the ontological equivalent of the good. On the contrary, since he understands the good as unity, evil is disintegration. In ***The Sickness unto Death***, Kierkegaard's pseudonym Anti-Climacus maintains that **despair** and **sin**, which are kinds of evil, result from the self's failure to integrate its dialectical features. The good news is that, through the consciousness of sin and God's promise of **forgiveness**, the **individual** can attain reintegration and resist evil. The same is true on the social scale. In an 1851 journal entry, Kierkegaard argues that evil cannot hold out against the one who is willing to bear injustice in **suffering**. Whereas the secular mentality is impatient and thinks to resist evil with force—thereby leading to further injustice—Christianity insists on a "suffering battle," which takes longer but ultimately paralyzes evil. Thus Kierkegaard believes that evil can be overcome, if one has the proper **ethical** and **religious** orientation. *See also* CHOICE; DEMONIC; DYING TO; FREEDOM; POLITICS; PSYCHOLOGY; TEMPORALITY/TIME; TEMPTATION.

EXCEPTION/UNIVERSAL. Kierkegaard's early **pseudonymous** writings, particularly ***Either/Or***, ***Fear and Trembling***, ***Repetition***, and ***Stages on Life's Way***, pay significant attention to the relationship between "the universal" (*det Almene*) and the "exception" (*Undtagelse*). The former can be broadly defined as a collection of principles that apply to all people at all times. For instance, in the second part of *Either/Or*, Judge William argues that the task of the **individual** is to actualize or to live out universal ethical maxims. This, in fact, is the **duty** of each person, and, and when it is fulfilled, it reconciles the single individual with that which transcends particular existence—a source of harmony and joy, according to the Judge.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

In *Fear and Trembling*, Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes de silentio also conceives of the ethical as *det Almene*. However, he postulates a problem that Judge William does not fully explore. What if, Johannes wonders, there is a situation in which the individual must understand himself as an exception to the universal? In **ethical** terms, such a scenario would amount to either **sin** or **tragedy**. In **religious** terms, however, it may be that the exception is justified, since numerous instances from the Bible or from religious history indicate a rupture from the universal. Famously, Johannes's paradigmatic example of the religious *Undtagelse* is the story of the binding of Isaac (Gen. 22:1–18), in which Abraham demonstrates a willingness to sacrifice his only son out of obedience to **God**'s command. In this case, what appears to be an abrogation of the universal is, from a religious perspective, a declaration of **faith**—or, to use Johannes's language, a "**teleological suspension of the ethical**," since the absolute duty to comply with the divine will supersedes the immanent claims of *det Almene*. Johannes realizes that this position presents a **paradox** that, if understood incorrectly, would be dangerous. That is why he insists that the one who sees herself as a religious *Undtagelse* must undergo a profound spiritual **trial**, featuring internal anguish (*see* INWARDNESS) and external **silence**. The one who tries to profit in worldly fashion (*see* WORLDLINESS/SECULARISM) from being a religious exception is not to be trusted. *See also* HAPPINESS; INDIVIDUAL; OFFENSE; REASON.

EXISTENCE. Kierkegaard uses two words that can be translated as "existence." The first is *Existents*, which broadly signifies the fact that an earthly entity has objective reality; the second is *Tilværelse*, which, quite literally, indicates a state of presence or "being there." In ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, Johannes Climacus adds that to exist (*at existere*) pertains to a thing that is in the process of becoming.

With the above definitions in mind, Kierkegaard's concept of "existence" comes into focus. First, existence is predicated of an entity that is present in **actuality**, as opposed to one that is merely possible. Second, in broadly Aristotelian fashion, actuality is marked by the **movement** of a thing from a state of potential to one of realization, that is, a movement of "becoming" (*Vorden*). Third, since movement can only take place in **time**, existence is distinguished by historical features: entities come into **being**, develop in and over time, and then pass out of being. Fourth, whatever exists does so as a concrete thing—a particular instantiation of an essential nature. Hence, while one can *think* of abstract entities, existing things must be actual.

Kierkegaard's understanding of existence has significant implications. Theologically, it signifies that **God**, *sensu stricto*, does not exist. In other words, the fact that God is **eternal** means that God does not come into being

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

and pass out of being in the manner of existing entities. God infinitely and qualitatively transcends existence. Anthropologically, it signifies that human beings are existing beings, albeit with an important qualification: inasmuch as human beings have been endowed with **reason** and **spirit**, they are not just existing, time-bound beings but also have the capacity for the infinite. Thus **the self**'s becoming entails the historical actualization of its eternal possibility—a synthetic task of **ethical** and **religious** development that Kierkegaard most fully explicates in the **pseudonymous** treatise ***The Sickness unto Death***. *See also* AESTHETIC; CHOICE; EXISTENTIALISM; FAITH; FINITUDE/INFINITY; FORGIVENESS; HAPPINESS; HISTORY; HOPE; IDEA; IMAGINATION; IMMORTALITY; INDIVIDUAL; INNER; SYSTEM, THE; WORLDLINESS/SECULARISM.

EXISTENTIALISM. The term "existentialism" is used to denote a mode of Western **philosophy** that, in the latter half of the 19th century and in the first half of the 20th century, came to prominence. Existentialists emphasized a number of common themes. First, existentialists argued that philosophy should start from the actual (*see* ACTUALITY) and often discontinuous experience of the **individual** subject, rather than from a set of systematic principles about objective reality. Second, and following on from the previous point, existentialists tended to stress that human beings do not have an essential nature per se but, instead, are the products of their capacity for **freedom** and **decision**. Third, precisely because existentialists viewed the individual's life against the backdrop of a world that cannot be objectively encapsulated, they often addressed the discordance between the existing subject, who is tasked with forging a unique and irreducible path in the world, and modern society's increasing prioritization of **science** and **technology**. Fourth, existentialists frequently highlighted the entire range of human life, placing great importance on **the self**'s ever changing affects and **moods**—a pivotal contribution to Western thought, which paved the way for modern **psychology**.

Though these themes recur in writings associated with existentialism, it would be a stretch to say that it is a well-defined "school" of philosophy. Here Kierkegaard serves as a case in point. Often referred to as the "father of existentialism," Kierkegaard's authorship nevertheless predates the mid-20th-century heyday of existentialism by nearly a century. Indeed, by the time Jean-Paul Sartre issued his magnum opus *Being and Nothingness* (*L'être et le néant*, 1943), often considered an existentialist manifesto, the movement had taken a secular and atheistic turn largely opposed to Kierkegaard's roots in **Christianity**. Furthermore, while Sartre's play *No Exit* (*Huis Clos*, 1944) famously declared that "Hell is other people" ("L'enfer, c'est les autres"), Kierkegaard's authorship has less to do with solipsistic isolation than with

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

intersubjective relationship, preeminently expressed in and through the **love** of **God**. At the very least, then, Kierkegaard's link to existentialism must be qualified, taking into account that, as with figures such as Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821–1881) and German theologian Paul Tillich (1886–1965), Kierkegaard's existentialism bears a decisively **religious** character, so much so that it cannot be conflated willy-nilly with the existentialism of a Sartre. *See also CONCEPT OF ANXIETY*, *THE*; DEATH; EXISTENCE; FAITH; LIFE-VIEW; MELANCHOLY; PASSION; SELF, THE; SUBJECTIVITY.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

F

FAITH. The word “faith” (*Tro*) appears more than 700 times in Kierkegaard’s oeuvre, though he does not employ it in univocal fashion. Sometimes Kierkegaard treats faith as an epistemological matter, contrasting it with **knowledge**; other times he distinguishes between various kinds of **religious** faith, noting, for example, that the nominal faith of civic religion is not to be confused with the paradoxical faith of true **Christianity**. Apart from Kierkegaard’s signed discourses, which tend to focus on the **individual** appropriation of Christian *Tro*, three of his **pseudonyms** offer particularly noteworthy analyses of the concept. For Johannes de silentio, author of ***Fear and Trembling***, faith is not a matter of course but, rather, an ongoing existential task, whose call to trust in and to adhere to the will of **God** can lead one into moments of great spiritual **trial**, not least because faith may demand actions or beliefs that run counter to the dictates of **reason** (*see* EXCEPTION/UNIVERSAL). In ***Philosophical Fragments***, Johannes Climacus differentiates between the **Socratic** understanding of reason—namely, as a self-sufficient faculty capable of learning the **truth** without divine aid—and the Christian conception of *Tro*, whereby the condition for truth is provided by God, whom the human being must either believe or reject (*see* OFFENSE). Third, in both ***The Sickness unto Death*** and ***Practice in Christianity***, Anti-Climacus treats faith as essential to the overcoming of **despair** and the flourishing of **the self**, since faith is the means by which one becomes truly open (or “transparent”) to God’s **grace** and, in turn, made ready to live in the manner of **Jesus Christ**.

In each of these cases, Kierkegaard is determined to undermine modern attempts to convert faith into a civic virtue or a philosophical abstraction—dangers that, in his day, he saw associated with **Hegelianism**. In this mode, according to Kierkegaard, faith is no longer a divine gift but, instead, a human quality that can all too easily be manipulated or neglected. With this in mind, Kierkegaard’s late attack on the Danish **state church**, though shocking to many at the time, can be seen as a polemical expression of what he had been carefully working out for years in his writings: *Tro* is not reducible to membership in an ecclesial body or to cognitive assent to religious propositions; it is a personal and passionate response to God’s loving offer of **salvation**. *See also* DOCTRINE/DOGMA; DOUBLE MOVEMENT; DYING TO; GUILT;

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

IMITATION; IMMEDIACY; LEAP; PARADOX; REST; REVELATION; SACRIFICE.

FEAR AND TREMBLING. It is ironic that *Fear and Trembling* (*Frygt og Bæven*) has become Kierkegaard's most recognizable book. Released on 16 October 1843, it was issued on the same day as ***Repetition*** and *Three Upbuilding Discourses* (*see EIGHTEEN UPBUILDING DISCOURSES*) as well as in the same year as ***Either/Or***. A lesser book might have been eclipsed by such accompanying texts, but *Fear and Trembling*'s exploration of timeless yet controversial themes, combined with its literary élan, set it apart. Indeed, Kierkegaard himself believed it to be a masterpiece—an evaluation that has proven accurate.

Both biographically and thematically, *Fear and Trembling* bears the scars of Kierkegaard's broken engagement with **Regine Olsen**. In the aftermath of this breakup, Kierkegaard took two lengthy trips to Berlin. During the first he worked on *Either/Or* and during the second on *Repetition* and *Fear and Trembling*, the latter primarily throughout the early summer of 1843. Attributed to the **pseudonym** Johannes de silentio, *Fear and Trembling* can be described as a philosophical analysis of the *Akedah*—the story of Abraham's near **sacrifice** of his only son, Isaac (Gen. 22). Biblical exegesis has long viewed Abraham's act as a demonstration of **faith** in and obedience to **God**, but Johannes argues that the story is not so straightforward. This becomes clear in the book's almost Midrashic "Exordium," in which Johannes imagines four different versions of the narrative, each highlighting a point of tension passed over by the scriptural text. After a "Eulogy on Abraham," which marvels at the patriarch's trust in what otherwise seems impossible, Johannes arrives at the main body of his text—the so-called "Problemata." From an **ethical** point of view, Johannes begins, Abraham is an attempted murderer; from a **religious** point of view, he is a paragon of faith, willing to **sacrifice** his greatest joy for the sake of God. Johannes probes this opposition in different ways. "Problema I" asks whether or not the religious **individual** can rightly "suspend" the ethical norms of human society in deference to divine command (*see* EXCEPTION/UNIVERSAL). "Problema II" deepens this question, examining the extent to which one's **duty** to God is absolute. "Problema III" explores the spiritual **trial** involved in any such break from social normativity, underlining that the dilemma facing Abraham is not communicable in universal terms. Throughout, Johannes continues to insist that he does not understand Abraham, even though, in the book's "Epilogue," he states that faith is the "highest passion" (*høieste Lidenskab*) in a person.

Ultimately, then, *Fear and Trembling* covers a great deal of ground. Johannes's analysis of the philosophical-cum-theological grounds on which one

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

would break from society's expectations is clearly reminiscent of Kierkegaard's **decision** to terminate his engagement. And yet, as Kierkegaard well knew, this very intimate problem has profound implications. **Hegelianism** had insisted that the moral order of society, dubbed *Sittlichkeit*, is an indispensable feature of ethical life in general. However, Johannes maintains that this Hegelian concept must either subsume the **religious** life of the individual or declare it unethical—a genuine aporia in a society that understands itself as Christian (*see* CHRISTIANITY/CHRISTENDOM) and even has a **state church**. Still, despite such provocative material, *Fear and Trembling* did not sell out its initial print run, and it only garnered four reviews in the wake of its publication. Ironically, the most positive response was authored by Bishop **Jakob Peter Mynster**, who, under the pseudonym "Kts," maintained that *Fear and Trembling* shed important light on the challenges facing the one who would abide by the divine **will**. *See also* DOUBLE MOVEMENT; IMMEDIACY; INNER; JUDAISM; LEAP; REVELATION; SCRIPTURE; SELF, THE; SOCIAL AND POLITICAL, THE; TELEOLOGICAL SUSPENSION OF THE ETHICAL.

FIBIGER, ILIA (1817–1867). Social worker, author, and senior nurse at **Frederik's Hospital** in Copenhagen from 1854 until 1860. Kierkegaard was admitted into the hospital on 2 October 1855 after collapsing in the street. He was put under the care of Fibiger, who, as it happens, was also an admirer of his work. Indeed, in November 1851, Fibiger had sent the manuscripts of three of her plays to Kierkegaard, asking for Kierkegaard's "impartial and thoughtful evaluation." His response is unknown, though it is notable that Fibiger remained a devoted reader, once remarking that ***For Self-Examination*** and the New Testament were her most cherished books. Eventually, her play *Contradictions* (*Modsætninger*) would be performed by the Royal Danish Theatre in 1860.

During Kierkegaard's lengthy hospital stay, which ended with his death on 11 November 1855, Fibiger proved to be a fastidious caregiver. For example, in addition to her medical duties, she attempted to brighten Kierkegaard's room with flowers. He had them removed, observing that flowers must eventually die. Moreover, according to Kierkegaard's close friend **Emil Boesen**, Fibiger had been emotionally shaken by Kierkegaard's illness, so much so that she cried on his behalf. Boesen's account also suggests that Kierkegaard was aware of Fibiger's compassionate attention.

Intriguingly, Fibiger's younger sister Mathilde (1830–1872) was a prominent author and a pioneering advocate for **women** in Danish society. In December 1850, Mathilde published the epistolary novel *Clara Raphael, Twelve Letters* (*Clara Raphael, Tolv Breve*), which features the titular character as

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

a young, intelligent woman who does not want to be constrained by the customs and expectations of polite society. The book was championed by **Johan Ludvig Heiberg** and soon became a cultural sensation. Kierkegaard did not review the book formally, but, in a lengthy journal entry, he argues (with palpable sarcasm) that *Clara Raphael* claims to promote the emancipation of women but is unclear as to what that means. He cites the book's ending—in which Clara "marries her beloved—but as brother and sister"—as an example of its confusion. That Heiberg had positioned himself as Mathilde Fibiger's benefactor also needled Kierkegaard. Whether or not this matter influenced Kierkegaard's later interactions with Ilia Fibiger is uncertain, though it is evident that, for her part, Ilia bore Kierkegaard no ill will.

FINITUDE/INFINITY. Kierkegaard frequently invokes the difference between "finitude" (*Endelighed*) and "infinity" (*Uendelighed*); he also employs related phrases such as "the finite" (*det Endelige*) and "the infinite" (*det Uendelige*). The precise meaning of this juxtaposition varies according to context. At the most basic level, "finitude" and "infinity" correspond to other dialectical concepts in Kierkegaard's oeuvre, including **being** and becoming as well as **eternity** and **temporality**. That is to say, *Endelighed* denotes that which is corporeal, changeable, limited, and time bound, whereas *Uendelighed* signifies that which is immaterial, unchangeable, unlimited, and timeless.

Kierkegaard's **metaphysics** presupposes and entails these long-established categorical distinctions; what distinguishes his thought is how he applies these concepts to **the self**. For example, ***The Sickness unto Death*** argues that the human being is a synthesis of opposing elements such as finitude and infinity, temporality and eternity, and so on. Put in more ordinary terms, the self is composed of both bodily and spiritual components, and thus its task is to bring these contraries into balance. Hence, for Kierkegaard, the self's **happiness** hinges on the proper relationship between the finite and the infinite, but he does not treat this as a matter of detached, speculative interest (*see* OBJECTIVITY). Rather, through his use of **pseudonymity** and various modes of **communication**, he attempts to awaken the **individual**'s desire to realize this appropriate balance in **existence**. *See also* ACTUALITY; *CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS*; DESPAIR; FREEDOM; MOVEMENT; NECESSITY; NEGATION; RESIGNATION.

FOR SELF-EXAMINATION. With the publication of *For Self-Examination* (*Til Selvprøvelse*) on 10 September 1851, Kierkegaard's pen fell silent for roughly three years. Though this fallow period was not intentional—*For Self-Examination* came on the heels of *On My Work as an Author* and *Two*

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, both issued on 7 August 1851, and was supposed to be succeeded by *Judge for Yourself!* (*Dømmer selv!*), published posthumously in 1876—it was significant all the same. For it meant that *For Self-Examination* was Kierkegaard's last publication prior to his so-called "attack" on the Danish **state church**, which officially began in December 1854.

That the main themes of *For Self-Examination* anticipate those of the polemical articles comprising ***The Moment*** is likewise telling. The book itself was fashioned out of three sermons that Kierkegaard had planned to deliver—one for the fifth Sunday after Easter, one for the Feast of the Ascension (traditionally the 40th day of the Easter season), and one for Pentecost. It is not surprising, then, that *For Self-Examination* has an evangelical purpose, albeit with qualification. As Kierkegaard writes in a brief preamble, he hopes that his efforts "win people" but only to the extent that they first express the fear of **God**. In this sense, *For Self-Examination* lives up to its name, as each of its sections focuses on the ideality of **Christianity** and on how each **individual** must acknowledge the high standards of discipleship. "What Is Required in Order to Look at Oneself with True Blessing in the Mirror of the Word?" argues that the Bible is not primarily a document for academic study; rather, it is the Word of God offered to each person for appropriation and **upbuilding**. "Christ Is the Way" is arguably Kierkegaard's most direct formulation of the theme of *imitatio Christi* (*see* IMITATION), which he inherited, above all, from **Pietism**. "It Is the Spirit Who Gives Life" is a reminder that the Holy Spirit, often referred to as "helper" or "counselor" in Trinitarian theology (John 14:16), can only animate those who are willing to die to themselves (*see* DYING TO) and to surrender in **faith** to God.

Despite (or, perhaps, because of) such provocative themes, *For Self-Examination* proved to be a popular book. It sold out its initial print run and was released in a second edition in 1852. Reviewers were also generally enthusiastic, though a number of them viewed the text as a kind of swan song—a perspective fostered by Kierkegaard's preface to *Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays*, in which Kierkegaard states that his authorship is coming to a close. Little did such reviewers know that, in a few years, Kierkegaard would recommence his authorship in indelible fashion. *See also* CROWD/PUBLIC; DEATH; HOLY SPIRIT; MARTYRDOM; SACRIFICE; SCRIPTURE; SILENCE.

FORGIVENESS. Though Kierkegaard makes reference to "forgiveness" (*Tilgivelse* or, less frequently, *Forladelse*) throughout his authorship, the concept becomes increasingly prominent in his later writings. Both the English "forgive" and the Danish *tilgive* indicate an **absolute** and charitable

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

self-donation, and thus the term became associated with the remission of debt or the absolution of **sin**. Kierkegaard tends to concentrate on the latter meaning, developing a two-pronged approach to the forgiveness of sins. On the one hand, books such as ***Works of Love*** and ***The Sickness unto Death*** focus on the divine basis for forgiveness and its implications for human life. For example, *The Sickness unto Death* presents the various ways that sin manifests itself in one's bodily and spiritual **existence**, arguing, in short, that **the self** does not just need to be forgiven for this sin or that sin but, rather, for its fundamental orientation away from **God**. The gravity of this situation may produce **despair**, yet, in and through **faith**, the human being can **rest** assured that God's mercy no longer regards her as culpable (*see* GUILT). Similarly, both with regard to one's relationships with others and to one's own self-relationship, one is called to imitate (*see* IMITATION) God's loving forgiveness—a divinely ordained "like for like" that Kierkegaard features in *Works of Love*.

Elsewhere, however, Kierkegaard is less interested in forgiveness' **ethical** and **religious** logic than in its lived exemplification. In these texts, he is inclined to depict scenes or "icons" of forgiveness, as if aesthetically drawing one to its beauty. A number of his later writings, including ***Christian Discourses*** and ***Practice in Christianity***, present **Jesus Christ** as an icon of divine forgiveness. Yet, in later discourses such as "The Woman Who Was a Sinner" (1849), he paints the picture from a different perspective, so to speak. Here the focus is on how the human being is brought to perfection not by personal accomplishment but by total dependence on and appreciation for God's loving and merciful forgiveness. *See also* AESTHETIC; FREEDOM; GOVERNANCE/PROVIDENCE.

FREDERIK'S HOSPITAL. Opened in March 1757, King Frederik's Hospital (*det kongelige Frederiks Hospital*) was the first large hospital in Denmark, established primarily to serve the health needs of Copenhagen's poor. Located on Bredgade, just northeast of center city, the hospital had several hundred beds and was staffed by three head doctors (*see* BANG, OLUF LUNDT [1788–1877]), three senior residents, nurses (*see* FIBIGER, ILIA [1817–1867]), a chaplain, and sundry staff. In addition to setting a precedent for public health care, Frederik's Hospital was also a notable architectural achievement. Designed by Nicolai Eigtved (1701–1754) and Laurids de Thurah (1706–1759), the building was a testimony both to Rococo architecture and to modern functionality. Patient wards, for example, were constructed as airy, elongated galleries, so as to supply an abundance of useful space and natural light. In 1910, the Danish government assumed control of Frederik's Hospital, renamed it the Public Hospital (Rigshospitalet), and va-

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

cated the location on Bredgade. At present, the original building and grounds are home to the Danish Museum of Design (Designmuseum Danmark).

Kierkegaard's own association with Frederik's Hospital was brief yet poignant. Over the course of September 1855, and still in the midst of his public "attack" on the Danish **state church**, Kierkegaard's health deteriorated, culminating in a collapse on the street at month's end. On 2 October, Kierkegaard went to Frederik's Hospital for an examination. His attending physician was a recent medical graduate named Harald Krabbe, whose hospital journal mentions that Kierkegaard believed he was destined to die for the sake of his "religious battle." As a paying patient, Kierkegaard was checked into a well-appointed private room—Room 5 on the hospital's second floor—under the care of physician-in-chief Seligmann Meyer Trier (1800–1863). The exact cause of his illness remains a mystery, but his symptoms included paresis, nausea, and a chronic cough. Thus some commentators have reasoned that Kierkegaard suffered from tuberculosis, perhaps Pott's disease, which is a form of extrapulmonary tuberculosis. Others have suggested Guillain–Barré syndrome, a rare neurological disorder that can be triggered by a bacterial or viral infection.

In any case, by 6 October, word began to spread that Kierkegaard was gravely ill, and, on 14 October, **Emil Boesen** made his first visit to Kierkegaard's bedside at Frederik's Hospital. The two met intermittently over the next couple of weeks. Kierkegaard received a few other visitors, including his brother-in-law Johan Christian Lund and his niece Sophie Vilhelmine Lund, but he refused to see his own brother **Peter Christian Kierkegaard**, a decision at least partly motivated by Peter Christian's ecclesiastical leadership. In point of fact, Kierkegaard told Boesen that he would only take Holy **Communion** from a layperson and that his brother would not accept this wish. During the first week of November, Kierkegaard's condition rapidly worsened, and, by 9 November, he was no longer capable of speaking. He died at 9 p.m. on Sunday, 11 November, and the next morning his body was moved to the morgue at Frederik's Hospital. He was just 42 years old. *See also* GIØDWAD, JENS FINSTEEN (1811–1891); GRACE; LUND, HENRIK SIGVARD (1825–1889); MARTENSEN, HANS LASSEN (1808–1884); MONEY.

FREDERIKSBERG GARDEN. One of Copenhagen's largest and most charming green spaces, which dates back to the early 18th century. The oldest son of King Christian V (1646–1699), King Frederik IV (1671–1730), spent his youth studying and traveling abroad. Inspired by the architecture and landscape of Italy, he resolved to build a summer palace about three miles west of central Copenhagen. Perched atop a prominence known as Solbjerg,

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Frederiksberg Palace (Frederiksberg Slot) is indeed Italian Baroque in style. The original one-story building was completed in 1703, though it was significantly expanded over the ensuing decades. The palace was in royal use for well over a century, but it fell into disrepair after the death of Queen Marie of Hesse-Kassel (1767–1852), dowager of King Frederik VI (1768–1839).

More famous than Frederik's *Slot* is the estate surrounding it. Known simply as Frederiksberg Garden (Frederiksberg Have), it was originally meant to be a parterre—a style of Baroque grounds, featuring finely manicured hedgerows and patterned walking paths. In the late 18th century, however, it was converted into an English-style park, intended, above all, to reproduce a pristine pastoral landscape of rolling lawns, waterways, and bridges, but also inclusive of architectural exotica such as the Apis Temple and the Chinese summerhouse. Thus designed, Frederiksberg Garden became a favorite retreat for Frederik VI, who even opened it to the public for the sake of civic welfare. It was particularly popular on Sundays, when Copenhageners would come to hear the royal band and, on occasion, to watch the king and his daughters navigate the canals in a gondola.

Kierkegaard himself frequented Frederiksberg Garden, where he would enjoy cigars and people watching. He incorporated his experiences into some of his writings. For example, in ***Either/Or***, Johannes the Seducer cites the grounds as an ideal place to observe pretty women, and, in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, Johannes Climacus describes the *Have* as "a pleasant diversion" and a place of "wistful elevation above the world." He recalls spending Sunday afternoons at Josty's, a popular café in the garden. It was there, puffing on a cigar, that Climacus made the **decision** to become an author after years of "splendid inactivity." In both cases, Kierkegaard indicates that, for denizens of mid-19th-century Copenhagen, Frederiksberg Garden was a place of bourgeois leisure—a place to see and to be seen. *See also* DEER PARK; GOLDSCHMIDT, MEÏR AARON (1819–1887).

FREEDOM. As a writer associated with **existentialism**, Kierkegaard has been thought of as a champion of "freedom" (*Frihed*). In truth, however, Kierkegaard's approach to and understanding of freedom varies according to context and intention. Early **pseudonymous** writings such as ***The Concept of Anxiety*** interlink freedom and the notion of "possibility" (*Mulighed*): **the self**, in its various spheres of **existence**, is presented with any number of possibilities and is "free" (*fri*) to choose between them. This task, while a sign of the human being's potential for excellence, is nevertheless experienced as **anxiety**, since the **individual** must eventually confront the consequential **choice** between **good** and **evil**. And yet, this conception of *Frihed*, not to mention the freedom exercised in mundane matters (as, say, at a restaurant), is

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

ultimately adjuvant to the **absolute** choice facing the individual—what Judge William in the second part of ***Either/Or*** identifies as the choice of oneself in one's **eternal** validity. Here freedom lies at the very basis of the self whose ongoing existential project is oriented toward **ethical** growth.

Nevertheless, as Kierkegaard's authorship unfolds, the shadow side of freedom begins to take on more importance. In ***The Sickness unto Death***, Anti-Climacus conceives of the self as a synthesis of a number of opposing elements, including freedom and **necessity**. What this means is that, while the human being's self-determination is constrained by various factors, ranging from genetic tendencies to environmental conditions, she nevertheless has the freedom to self-reflexively explore possibilities within her given context. In fact, for Anti-Climacus, the self's ability to relate itself to itself *is* freedom—a freedom that is granted by **God**, who is the ground of the self and who wants the self to freely bring its contraries into equilibrium. But in this blessed possibility (*see* HAPPINESS) lies a real danger: freedom can be misused either out of weakness or defiance. The upshot is **despair**, whose potentiation before God is **sin**. Thus the gift of *Frihed* can lead to the self's ruination as much as to its **salvation**. *See also* BEING/BECOMING; DECISION; EARNESTNESS; FINITUDE/INFINITY; INNER; IRONY; SUBJECTIVITY.

FROM THE PAPERS OF ONE STILL LIVING. During the spring and summer of 1838, Kierkegaard worked on a review of **Hans Christian Andersen**'s 1837 novel *Only a Fiddler* (*Kun en Spillemand*). Andersen had gotten the impression that Kierkegaard's review would be positive, but, when it finally appeared on 7 September 1838, Andersen discovered otherwise. Titled *From the Papers of One Still Living* (*Af en endnu Levendes Papirer*), Kierkegaard's lengthy and recondite analysis argues that *Only a Fiddler* pivots around an unredeemable premise—that **genius** requires external support in order to flourish. On the contrary, Kierkegaard insists, genius is a force that is not snuffed out by adversity but, rather, kindled by it. For that reason, he maintains that the protagonist of *Only a Fiddler*, a struggling musician named Christian, is little more than a passive victim, whose lack of artistic commitment betrays a fatal flaw in Andersen's own **life-view**. Whereas great authors write from a well-defined perspective, thereby imbuing their work with balance and depth, Andersen exposes himself as a poet of chance and **mood**.

From the Papers of One Still Living was more or less ignored by the general public, and it did not require a second edition until 1872. Yet, in retrospect, the review taps into some of key themes of Kierkegaard's oeuvre, most notably the nature of genius and the priority of the **individual**. For his part, Andersen was initially wounded by Kierkegaard's criticism, and he responded in kind. On 13 May 1840, Andersen debuted *A Comedy in the Open*

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Air (*En Comedie i det Grønne*), a one-act vaudevillian play in which Kierkegaard is lampooned as a hairdresser who dabbles in **Hegelian** philosophy. This rankled Kierkegaard, who penned but did not publish a caustic reply. Doubtless a degree of tension persisted between the two celebrated *hommes de lettres* for the rest of their lives, though, in 1849, Kierkegaard sent a copy of ***Either/Or*** to Andersen, who thanked him profusely. *See also* APOSTLE; AUTHORITY; GYLLEMBOURG, THOMASINE (1773–1856); *LITERARY REVIEW*, *A*; REVELATION; SOCIAL AND POLITICAL, THE.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

G

GENIUS. Derived from the Latin verb *gignere* ("to bring forth"), "genius" in its broad etymological sense refers to the source of a person's inspiration and, more specifically, to the "guiding spirit" who influences one's unique ability or talent. This notion was "disenchanted" (in the Weberian sense) during the Enlightenment and became a source of great discussion. According to Christian Molbech's 1833 Danish lexicon, "genius" (*Genie*) refers to the human being's innate ability and talent, rather than to any supernatural force behind it. Kierkegaard was familiar with the term's evolving significance, but, by and large, he presupposed the later Kantian-cum-Romantic definition. As he explains in a journal entry from the mid-1840s, "genius is . . . the seminal point of departure within the sphere of immanence."

At two pivotal points in his authorship, Kierkegaard felt compelled to reflect on the nature and implications of *Genie*. In ***From the Papers of One Still Living***, he criticized **Hans Christian Andersen**'s 1837 novel *Only a Fiddler* (*Kun en Spillemand*) for suggesting that genius is fragile and dependent on external support in order to thrive. In "The Difference between a Genius and an Apostle," published in ***Two Ethical-Religious Minor Essays*** (1849), Kierkegaard's pseudonym H.H. maintains that the **authority** of the genius is rooted in innate capacity, whereas that of the **apostle** is rooted in divine **revelation**—an argument worked out in response to the claims of **Adolph Peter Adler**, who stirred up controversy when he conflated his own **religious** experience with a revelation from **God**. These two cases encouraged Kierkegaard to clarify his authorial self-understanding as well. In a number of his later writings, he insists that he is "without authority" and thus a *Genie* whose unique task is to dialectically analyze and to poetically present religious concepts. *See also* FAITH.

GIØDWAD, JENS FINSTEEN (1811–1891). Journalist and news editor who was a significant figure in the rise of Danish liberalism. The son of a wealthy merchant, Giødwad was raised in the North Jutland city of Aalborg, where he attended the prestigious Aalborg Cathedral School (Aalborg Katedralskole). After graduating in 1828, he moved on to the **University of Copenhagen**, finishing a law degree in 1832. Giødwad's affluence and

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

political interests opened doors for him in the Danish capital. He was a paid member of the **Athenæum** Society, whose private library contained, among other things, an abundance of national and international newspapers. Gripped by the so-called July Revolution (*révolution de Juillet*) of 1830, which led to the overthrow of Bourbon monarch Charles X (1757–1836) and the re-institution of liberal policies in France, Giødwad left his legal career and became involved with Copenhagen's burgeoning print media. Along with his friend **Orla Lehmann**, Giødwad sought to push Denmark, however slowly, toward a free constitution (*see* CONSTITUTION, DANISH). The two began publishing discourses by French liberals such as Paul Louis Courier (1772–1825), and, 1835, they assumed editorship of the political material in the *Copenhagen Post* (*Kjøbenhavnsposten*), a daily newspaper. In 1837, Giødwad became editor-in-chief of the *Copenhagen Post*, and this move brought him both public distinction and legal scrutiny—the fate of anyone at that time who would challenge the absolute monarchy's censorship of the Danish **press**. Health problems forced him to resign his position with the *Copenhagen Post* in April 1839; however, the following year he took up a new editorial post with the *Fatherland* (*Fædrelandet*), which had recently become a daily paper. Under his leadership, along with that of Lehmann and the liberal journalist Carl Parmo Ploug (1813–1894), the *Fatherland* emerged as Denmark's most influential paper for roughly two decades. Despite failing eyesight, Giødwad remained active in Danish political life—even frequenting the Athenæum regularly—until his death from heart disease in 1891.

It is perhaps surprising that Kierkegaard, a well-known critic of the press, became friends with Giødwad. And yet, the two were in frequent contact throughout Kierkegaard's literary career, and, from 1842 to 1855, Giødwad published 31 articles by Kierkegaard in the *Fatherland*. Their relationship took time to develop—Kierkegaard's public dispute with Lehmann during the 1830s initially set the two at odds—but Kierkegaard eventually found Giødwad to be a kind of sounding board whose expertise and perspicacity proved useful as he sought to protect his authorial use of **pseudonymity**. In fact, before publicly disclosing his responsibility for early pseudonymous works such as ***Either/Or*** and ***Philosophical Fragments***, Kierkegaard entrusted Giødwad to handle his contracts with printer Bianco Luno (1795–1852) and bookseller **Carl Andreas Reitzel**. At the same time, however, the two were never able to come to an agreement regarding the nature and purpose of the press, and Kierkegaard was wounded by the *Fatherland*'s (and thus Giødwad's) tolerance of "rabble" papers such as ***The Corsair***. This same tension reemerged during Kierkegaard's late polemics against the Danish **state church**. From December 1854 to May 1855, the *Fatherland* published Kierkegaard's articles decrying the influence of Bishop **Jakob Peter Mynster**,

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

but, fearing that his "attack" was being misconstrued as a partisan critique of the Danish establishment, Kierkegaard ceased publishing with the *Fatherland* and launched his own paper, ***The Moment***. According to **Emil Boesen**'s account of Kierkegaard's last days at **Frederik's Hospital**, Giødwad was not welcome at Kierkegaard's bedside since Kierkegaard felt that the newsman had put his **politics** over their friendship. And yet, it is likely that the anonymous yet warm obituary, published in the *Fatherland* the day after Kierkegaard's passing, was penned by none other than Giødwad himself.

GOD. Kierkegaard uses the term "God" (*Gud*) well over 1,500 times in his published writings and nearly 2,500 times in his journals and papers. Indeed, it is not a word that is confined to a few books or even to a particular phase of his authorship; on the contrary, *Gud* turns up in each of his published works and thus runs the gamut of his literary project, from **pseudonymous** texts such as ***Fear and Trembling*** to signed treatises such as ***Works of Love***. Of course, Kierkegaard's employment of *Gud* varies across contexts and genres. In some cases, he speaks of God in the language of **philosophy**, engaging the **metaphysics** of figures such as **Hegel** and **Schelling**. In other cases, he discusses pagan theology (*see* PAGANISM), referring, say, to the conception of God prevailing in ancient Greek thought. A prominent example of this tendency is found in ***Philosophical Fragments***, in which the pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus describes the deity of **Socrates** as "the god" (*Guden*). Nevertheless, Kierkegaard's overwhelming inclination is to invoke the God of **Christianity**, deriving many of his theological ideas from traditional Christian sources, including the Apostle Paul (c. 5–c. 67), Augustine of Hippo (354–430), and **Martin Luther**, not to mention the popular Danish catechism of **Nikolai Edinger Balle**. At the same time, however, Kierkegaard *applies* these traditional Christian concepts in fresh yet controversial ways, arguing that certain aspects of modern society (*see* SOCIAL AND POLITICAL, THE) have obscured the nature of God and, in turn, made an authentic relation to God increasingly difficult.

In an 1849 journal entry, Kierkegaard notes that the "major premise" of Christianity is that there "is an infinite, radical, qualitative difference between God and man." This statement can be seen as a summation of his conception of *Gud*, which has a noticeable apophatic bent. For Kierkegaard, in other words, God's otherness is so **absolute** that, without the help of divine **revelation**, human beings are incapable of comprehending God's nature. Thus the fundamental task of theology is to explore and to understand what God is *not*. Indeed, Kierkegaard assumes and occasionally examines the negative attributes of God, including **eternity**, infinity (*see* FINITUDE/INFINITY), immutability, and simplicity. For instance, in an 1846 journal passage,

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Kierkegaard argues that the doctrine of divine omnipotence—the notion that God's potential is fully actualized and thus *unlimited* by external factors—is actually the guarantor of human **freedom**, since an omnipotent **being** ipso facto does not stand in a competitive relationship with a finite one. In other words, the wrangling for power and control that is characteristic of earthly **politics** is unnecessary for God, whose strength is manifested precisely through the bestowal of independence. Such reflections almost situate Kierkegaard in the classical *De Deo Uno* tradition of a Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), though, in contrast to Aquinas, Kierkegaard does not offer logical demonstrations of God's existence and nature. For Kierkegaard, the real task is to facilitate a relationship with God in **earnestness** and in **truth**.

This emphasis on relating to God is evident throughout Kierkegaard's oeuvre. That God is infinitely and qualitatively different from creatures is not an abstract **metaphysical** assertion but, rather, the basis for **hope** in an eternal **happiness**. If God is not subject to the unavoidable limitations and deterioration of fallen **creation**, then a number of key Christian **doctrines** are possible, including the union of divinity and humanity in the person of **Jesus Christ**. God's majesty entails God's intimacy. As Kierkegaard writes in another 1849 journal entry, "First the infinite conception of God's infinite sublimity, and then, then the next, the childlike openness to become involved with him." Many of Kierkegaard's **upbuilding** writings aim to facilitate this movement from "infinite conception" to "childlike openness." Perhaps the best example of this literature is one of Kierkegaard's last publications, namely, *The Changelessness of God: A Discourse* (*Guds Uforanderlighed: En Tale*), which appeared on 3 September 1855 in the midst of Kierkegaard's "attack" on the Danish **state church**.

Curiously, while Kierkegaard's authorship is brimming with references to God, divine **governance**, and the "God-man," the Dane shows little interest in reflecting on the Christian claim that God is triune, that is, a single God subsisting in three coequal, coeternal divine persons known as the Father, the Son, and the **Holy Spirit**. Kierkegaard by no means denies this doctrine—in fact, the prayer that opens *Works of Love* makes explicit reference to the three persons of the Trinity—but the speculative aspect of Trinitarian theology seems to lie outside his authorial purview. Indeed, since Kierkegaard's principal focus was on the God-relationship, he tends to bypass theoretical questions about the divine essence and, instead, to emphasize what God means for human **existence**. In this connection, perhaps the most striking feature of Kierkegaard's theology is the **imitation** of Christ, a motif that he inherited from **mysticism** and **Pietism**. For Kierkegaard, the one who would truly know God must imitate the self-sacrificial **love** of the Son of God, who became a human being in order to deliver (*see* SALVATION) people from **sin**.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

See also ACTUALITY; CONSCIENCE; DAMNATION; EQUALITY; FORGIVENESS; GOOD; GRACE; IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE; LEAP; LOVE; REASON; REST; SCRIPTURE; WORLDLINESS/SECULARISM.

GOLDSCHMIDT, MEÏR AARON (1819–1887). Danish author and publisher. Born in Vordinborg to a prosperous Jewish family, Goldschmidt was raised in Copenhagen, where he received a classical education. His personality and interests were influenced by this variegated background. On the one hand, the royal "Letter of Freedom of the Jews," issued on 29 March 1814, had granted a number of legal rights to Denmark's Jewish population, thereby improving its internal circumstances considerably. Thus Goldschmidt came of age during a period of unprecedented freedom for Danish Jewry. On the other hand, Jews nevertheless remained outsiders in Denmark, ever susceptible to antisemitic sentiment—a reality underscored by the so-called Hep-Hep riots, which began in Würzburg, Germany, and eventually spilled over into Denmark. In September 1819, antisemitic literature began turning up in Copenhagen, and Jewish homes and shops were targeted by looters, many of whom perceived the progress of Denmark's Jews as a threat to their livelihood. Waves of unrest would resurface periodically. In 1830, the construction of a new and prominent synagogue in central Copenhagen incited rioters to break the windows of Jewish homes and even to carry out random attacks on Jewish people.

It was against this backdrop that Goldschmidt decided to become a journalist. Fiercely committed to republican ideals, and a great admirer of the French Revolution, Goldschmidt launched a string of liberal papers in the late 1830s, culminating in the founding of ***The Corsair*** in 1840. During the first half of the 1840s, *The Corsair* emerged as essential reading for Denmark's literati, who enjoyed its political satire as well as its book reviews. Yet, under the influence of Goldschmidt's collaborator **Peder Ludvig Møller**, the paper degenerated into a popular tabloid, disseminating scurrilous gossip and ridiculing the personal lives of public figures. When, in December 1845, Møller and Kierkegaard quarreled over Møller's impertinent review of ***Stages on Life's Way***, *The Corsair* pinpointed Kierkegaard as its next target. The resulting "affair" lasted for several months, and it altered the fortunes of its principal figures. Kierkegaard saw *The Corsair*'s wide circulation as an indictment of modern Danish society, and he vowed to expose the rot in the nation's cultural fabric, focusing on two powerful institutions—the **press** and the **state church**. Both Goldschmidt and Møller gave up *The Corsair* and left Denmark for a time. Yet, while Møller's reputation was irrevocably damaged by the incident. Goldschmidt reemerged as a notable *homme de lettres*. Not only did he establish a long-running liberal paper *North and South* (*Nord og*

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Syd, 1847–1859), but, following his 1845 novel *A Jew* (*En Jøde*), he became known as a distinctive writer of fiction who was unafraid to tackle weighty and controversial subjects. In 1877, he published his autobiography, *My Life's Recollections and Results* (*Livserindringer og Resultater*), but he would live another decade, dying in Frederiksberg (*see* FREDERIKSBERG GARDEN) in 1877.

Kierkegaard and Goldschmidt had a peculiar relationship. After meeting in the summer of 1837, the two developed a kind of mutual admiration, and they would often chance upon one another in the street, exchanging news and pleasantries. At one point, Kierkegaard even seemed to encourage Goldschmidt's interest in the **comic**. Of course, Kierkegaard's skirmish with Møller and the ensuing polemics on both sides disrupted this burgeoning friendship. In fact, Goldschmidt attributed the termination of *The Corsair* to an encounter he had with Kierkegaard: the two passed one another on Møntergade in central Copenhagen, but Kierkegaard refused to greet Goldschmidt, giving only an accusatory and aggrieved look. It was in this moment, according to Goldschmidt, that he resolved to abandon *The Corsair* and to prove himself a genuine literary talent. He made good on this vow, but it is remarkable that, well into the 1870s, Goldschmidt continued to wrestle with his role in *The Corsair* affair. In these late remembrances, Goldschmidt concedes Kierkegaard's **genius** and yet insists that his superciliousness had contributed to, and perhaps even necessitated, *The Corsair*'s attacks. For his part, Kierkegaard never accepted the fact that Goldschmidt was able to refashion himself as a serious author, esteemed even by Bishop **Jakob Peter Mynster**. "Once an instrument of contemptibleness," Kierkegaard wrote in an 1851 journal entry, "now the respectable, the virtuous one!" *See also EITHER/OR*; JUDAISM.

GOOD. For Kierkegaard, the concept of "the good" (*det Gode*) or "goodness" (*Godhed*) can be understood in different ways. In **absolute** terms, the good pertains to the highest that an individual can realize, which Johannes Climacus, particularly in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, broadly characterizes as an "eternal happiness" (*evig Salighed*). Thus the good, in this ultimate sense, is to be contrasted with finite, temporal goods, which are only *relatively* different from one another. In "An Occasional Discourse," the opening treatise of ***Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits***, Kierkegaard fleshes out Climacus's analysis. Since existing things are in a state of chaotic flux, subject to the conditions of **finitude**, human beings can only find unity and coherence by willing (*see* WILL) the good. Moreover, this good must be understood as eternal (*see* ETERNITY), since temporal (*see* TEMPORALITY/TIME) goods are ipso facto manifold and evanescent. Hence, even if the **individual** has an abundance of worldly goods, she is vulnerable to change

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

and disorder, not to mention **anxiety** about this eventuality. In contrast, the one who wills *det Gode* is characterized by a single-mindedness that imbues **existence** with what Kierkegaard calls “purity of heart” (*Hjertets Reenhed*).

In other parts of Kierkegaard’s authorship, particularly the second part of ***Either/Or***, the good is also related to concrete action. For example, Judge William argues that certain **ethical** standards and social occupations best express the antecedent **choice** of willing *det Gode* as such. These particular goods include friendship and **marriage**, exemplars of the Judge’s overall stress on civic **duty**. However, whether or not such relative recommendations betray the Judge’s failure to perceive the teleological absolute of eternal happiness remains an open question among commentators. *See also* EVIL; SIN; UPBUILDING.

GOVERNANCE/PROVIDENCE. Kierkegaard makes hundreds of references to “governance” (*Styrelsen*) and “providence” (*Forsyn*) in his authorship, with the former term recurring far more often than the latter. His interest in these concepts is almost exclusively theological. According to Christian (*see* CHRISTENDOM/CHRISTIANITY) **doctrine**, *providentia* refers to **God**’s eternal plan for the world, while *gubernatio* signifies God’s execution of this plan in time. These notions are rooted in **Scripture**. For example, in the Old Testament, there is the story of Joseph. Sold into slavery by his resentful brothers, Joseph’s ability to interpret dreams rendered him an important advisor to the Egyptian Pharaoh, and, in this role, he was able to do many good deeds. Later, upon reuniting with his brothers, Joseph laid out what might be considered a pithy summary of divine providence: “Ye thought evil against me; *but* God meant it unto good, to bring to pass, as *it is* this day, to save much people alive” (Gen. 50:20). In the New Testament, **Jesus Christ** teaches that God’s providence encompasses all of **creation** and that such divine care should serve to assuage human **anxiety**: “Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than meat, and the body than raiment? Behold the fowls of the air: for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye not much better than they?” (Matt. 6:25–26). Early Christian theologians such as Augustine of Hippo (354–430) and Salvianus of Massilia (c. 400–c. 475) picked up on these biblical passages, arguing that, despite the havoc caused by human **sin**, God continues to steer the world toward a harmonious end. In this way, the doctrines of God’s *providentia* and *gubernatio* were invoked in opposition to a variety of dissenting teachings, including pagan (*see* PAGANISM) fatalism and gnostic dualism.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

While Kierkegaard never developed a systematic analysis of divine *Styrelsen* or *Forsyn*, it is clear that these concepts were both intellectually formative and personally meaningful. In ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, Johannes Climacus famously observes that **existence** is a system (*see* SYSTEM, THE) only for God, a comment that is often treated as a rebuke of **Hegelianism**, though it intimates belief in a divine "plan" as well. Elsewhere Kierkegaard is more straightforward. In an 1851 journal entry, Kierkegaard contrasts the stoicism of Cicero (106–43 BCE), who argued that the gods care only about significant earthly matters, to Christianity's insistence that God is concerned with all of creation. The former view, Kierkegaard concludes, smacks of anthropocentrism, while the latter view properly grasps God's eternal (*see* ETERNITY) nature. With this in mind, it is hardly surprising that Kierkegaard also penned a cycle of devotional **discourses** titled *The Lilies of the Field and the Birds of the Air* (1849), which gathers together a number of his reflections on divine providence, albeit with a focus on how this teaching should guide and comfort the believer.

To be sure, Kierkegaard himself was certain that his life and oeuvre had been led by *Styrelsen*. For example, he expresses gratitude that Governance has enabled him to convert his **sufferings** into literary productivity—a productivity, moreover, that has allowed him to serve God's purposes in the world. In addition to such inner encouragement, Kierkegaard also believed Governance was at work in affairs that might otherwise seem mundane, including the timing of when to publish a book or the choice of a given **pseudonym**. Even if, on occasion, Kierkegaard found the guidance of *Styrelsen* difficult to accept, his journals consistently suggest what Anti-Climacus avers in ***Practice in Christianity***: "Governance is love." *See also* FORGIVENESS; GRACE; HISTORY; SALVATION.

GRACE. Kierkegaard's conception of "grace" (*Naade*) is largely indebted to Christian theology (*see* CHRISTIANITY/CHRISTENDOM). According to the New Testament, grace (χάρις) refers to any gift that **God** bestows freely and lovingly, and the greatest of such gifts is the **salvation** offered by **Jesus Christ** to all human beings through **faith** (Rom. 3:21–26; 1 Tim. 2:4–6). Systematic Christian theology has traditionally tried to classify grace according to certain qualities: for example, "efficacious grace" has been used to designate any divine grace that is accepted by a human being, while "sufficient grace" denotes any divine grace that has been offered but is refused. In contrast to this approach, Kierkegaard tends to refer to *Naade* in more general fashion. This inclination at least partly stems from his focus on the subjective (*see* SUBJECTIVITY) reception of divine grace, rather than on its objective (*see* OBJECTIVITY) reality.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Indeed, Kierkegaard insists, far too often people speak of God's grace as if it were extrinsic to the life of the believer—a kind of "Get Out of Jail Free card," which one receives without effort or obligation. The danger of adopting this attitude is present for all Christians, though, for Kierkegaard, it is especially prevalent among those churches (*see* CHURCH) whose **dogma** is derived from the teachings of **Martin Luther**, including the Danish **state church**. If Luther's principle of *sola gratia* was justified as a **corrective** to the indulgences (both literal and metaphorical) of late medieval **Catholicism**, it has now become an indulgence in its own right, used to rationalize **ethical** inaction and **religious** listlessness. As a response to this degeneration, Kierkegaard appropriated the insights of a number of Christian spiritual writers, most of which were popular in the transnational and transconfessional church movement known as **Pietism**. In turn, Kierkegaard came to emphasize that *Naade* not only inspires the believer to imitate (*see* IMITATION) the life of Christ but assures the believer that, whatever her failings in this regard, salvation is still promised through divine grace. Authentic Christianity is a twofold movement of **individual** ethico-religious striving on the one hand and the unmerited reception of God's grace on the other. It is not surprising, then, that in the wake of Kierkegaard's controversial and personally exhausting "attack" on the Danish state church, he remained adamant on this point. When asked on his deathbed (*see* FREDERIK'S HOSPITAL) if he continued to depend on God's grace, Kierkegaard simply replied, "Naturally—what else?" *See also* ETERNITY; MEDIATION; LAW; LOVE; PROTESTANTISM; REPENTANCE; SCRIPTURE; SIN.

GRIB FOREST. Covering an area of nearly 22 square miles, Grib Forest (Gribskov) is one of Denmark's largest remaining woodlands. Located about 25 miles north of Copenhagen, the forest has been attested since the Middle Ages, when its land was divided between Esrum Abbey (Esrum Kloster), a Cistercian monastery, and the Danish crown. In 1559, following the Protestant Reformation, the abbey's estate was transferred entirely to the monarchy, and, for centuries, Grib Forest was frequently used as a royal hunting ground. The area has also been known for its numerous bodies of water. Lake Esrum (Esrum Sø) is by far the largest of these, and it has long been recognized for its fishing. But the forest's seemingly countless bogs, ponds, and streams have defined it as well. Large Grib Lake (Store Gribsø) is particularly notable. Due to its high concentration of humic substances, its waters are brownish-black in appearance, giving it an air of mystery—a point confirmed by the legend that the lake is actually bottomless. Today, Grib Forest is maintained by the Danish government as part of the Royal North Zealand National Park (Nationalpark Kongernes Nordsjælland).

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

An avid walker, Kierkegaard was fond of taking excursions from Copenhagen to Grib Forest. In one 1835 journal entry, he vividly describes a carriage ride along the shores of Lake Esrum, in which he passed through "continuous forest, alternately beech and spruce" and eventually found himself caught in a storm: "There I sat soaked to the skin amid thunder and lighting and pouring rain in the heart of Grib Skov." In ***Stages on Life's Way***, the pseudonym William Afham speaks wistfully about the "Nook of the Eight Paths" (Otteveiskrogen), a place in Grib Forest where a network of hunting paths come together. For William, that these old trails are no longer in use gives the spot an eerie yet exhilarating sense of solitude: "Eight paths and not a traveler! Indeed, it is as if the world were dead." Thus it is an ideal getaway, where one can spend hours "in recollection's pursuits" (*see* RECOLLECTION). In 1913, a stone was placed at an eight-path junction in Grib Forest known as Rødepæl Star, with the goal of commemorating Kierkegaard's love of the place. However, the forest contains other such crossroads, and it is possible that Kierkegaard's preferred "nook" remains a mystery. *See also* NATURE.

GRUNDTVIG, NIKOLAI FREDERIK SEVERIN (1783–1872). Danish polymath whose influence on Denmark's cultural life spans a range of fields, including education, literature, **politics**, and theology. Born and raised in the South Zealand village of Udby, Grundtvig was the son of a priest in the Danish **state church**. In 1800, he commenced his theological studies at the **University of Copenhagen**, finishing his degree three years later. After serving as a private tutor for a well-heeled family in Langeland, Grundtvig returned to Copenhagen, where he undertook a number of research projects concerning Norse mythology, European history, and Christian theology. His studies led to what has been described as a "spiritual crisis," culminating in a rekindling of his Lutheran (*see* LUTHER, MARTIN [1483–1546]) convictions and an increased opposition to rationalism in both **church** and academy. Such views set Grundtvig at odds with the Danish establishment, and for almost two decades he found himself marginalized by church leadership. Most famously, Grundtvig's pastoral career and authorial **freedom** were suspended when he lost a lawsuit to **Henrik Nicolaj Clausen**, who maintained that Grundtvig's 1825 treatise *The Church's Reply* (*Kirkens Gienmæle*) had wrongfully accused him of violating the traditional Lutheran understanding of **Christianity**.

After a lengthy sabbatical, Grundtvig reemerged as a public figure in the late 1830s. He became pastor at Vartov Hospital—an almshouse in central Copenhagen—and he continued to publish works of history, hymnody, and pedagogy. In fact, his 1838 book *School for Life* (*Skolen for Livet*) argued that Danish schoolchildren should be grounded in Scandinavian history and

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

biblical studies, rather than in the classical training favored in Latin gymnasia. Such views ultimately brought him in line with the liberal populism that swept over Denmark in the 1840s. Grundtvig even represented Præstø County in the Danish Constituent Assembly (Den Grundlovgivende Rigsforsamling) of 1848, which presided over the nation's transition from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional democracy (*see* CONSTITUTION, DANISH). Nevertheless, Grundtvig's passion continued to lie in preaching and teaching, and, despite becoming a bishop in 1861, he remained active at Vartov until his death in 1872.

One might expect that Grundtvig's love of **Scripture** and opposition to rationalist theology would have endeared him to Kierkegaard. And it is true that Kierkegaard owned, and occasionally read, a number of Grundtvig's works. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard was generally critical of Grundtvig's thought, fearing that its palpable social influence reflected a penchant for **aesthetic** affectation and a lack of dialectical (*see* DIALECTIC) rigor. Put bluntly, Kierkegaard suspected that Grundtvig's hoary appearance, which seemed to combine a "bellowing blacksmith" with an "Ale-Norse warrior," indicated a fondness for role-playing at the expense of thinking. Even worse, in Kierkegaard's estimation, were the "Grundtvigians," who turned their leader's words into almost oracular pronouncements and translated his folkish ecclesiology into a form of nationalism. In effect, then, Grundtvig replaces the errors of rationalist theology with a new error—a deification of Scandinavian culture that reverts to **paganism**. Such a reversion, for Kierkegaard, is the logical outcome of Grundtvig's prioritization of "the living word" (*det levende Ord*)—that is, of the work of the divine Spirit in and through human history—rather than of the biblical example of **Jesus Christ**. This difference, in turn, explains why Grundtvig was opposed to Kierkegaard's polemics against the Danish state church in ***The Moment***: whereas Kierkegaard sought to measure the 19th-century church by the standards of the New Testament, Grundtvig understood the church as the basis of scriptural authority. *See also* PIETISM; LINDBERG, JACOB CHRISTIAN (1797–1857).

GUILT. In modern society, "guilt" is typically thought of as a forensic term, indicating that a person has violated certain legal standards and, for that reason, is obliged to make restitution, often through a court-ordered penalty. However, Kierkegaard's understanding of guilt (*Skyld*) is far more textured, incorporating older mythological, philosophical, and religious meanings. In fact, for Kierkegaard, the modern sense of guilt belongs to a lower, finite (*see* FINITUDE/INFINITY) category. Whenever one violates (or seems to violate) the **ethical** norms of society, one incurs a debt that requires satisfaction. The more violations one commits (say, three speeding tickets), the greater one's expiatory burden (say, three monetary fines of increasing magnitude).

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Higher levels of *Skyld* are not so straightforward. In ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, Johannes Climacus conceives of an **absolute** form of guilt, which can never be calculated or recompensed in finite, quantitative terms. When one comes to desire an eternal **happiness**, one becomes conscious of the fact that, on account of fallen human nature, no amount of earthly restitution can satisfy the debt owed to **eternity**. The normal means of determining and making amends for one's guilt do not obtain when the object is infinite and incalculable. Moreover, as one grows in awareness of the incongruity between absolute guilt and finite satisfaction, one sinks further into what Climacus calls "guilt-consciousness" (*Skyld-Bevidstheden*). At this point, eternal happiness appears as a horizon toward which one continually moves but never gets closer.

For Climacus, if one is to transcend this state of affairs, one must come to understand the situation in **religious** terms: the fundamental discontinuity between human nature and eternal happiness is not a tragic accident but, rather, the consequence of **sin**. This recognition, in and of itself, does not alter the circumstances of the guilty person, who lacks the wherewithal to attain the eternal. However, when one sees oneself as a sinner, one's guilt is placed in a theological context. One is now guilty before **God**, who, according to **Christianity**, has mercifully pledged to bring **salvation** to penitent sinners. In this way, guilt-consciousness is an important precursor to **faith**, serving to direct the **individual**'s attention to the sole means by which absolute guilt can be overcome. For Kierkegaard, in short, *Skyld* can be **upbuilding**. *See also* DESPAIR; FAITH; FORGIVENESS; PASSION; RESIGNATION; REST; SUFFERING; TRUTH.

GYLLEMBOURG, THOMASINE (1773–1856). Danish novelist and short-story writer who today is considered a pioneer in Scandinavian **women**'s literature. Born in Copenhagen, the eldest daughter of city broker Johan Buntzen, Gyllembourg was engaged at 15 years old to her language tutor Peter Andreas Heiberg, who was 15 years her senior. The couple were married in 1790, and a year later Gyllembourg gave birth to their son **Johan Ludvig Heiberg**. Their marriage, however, would not be a happy one. In addition to differences in temperament, there were also external pressures. Greatly influenced by the French Revolution, Peter Heiberg was embroiled in public controversy throughout the 1790s, culminating in his banishment from Denmark in 1799. Heiberg resettled in Paris, but his wife did not join him. In 1801, the couple formally divorced, and that same year Gyllembourg quickly and somewhat notoriously remarried—namely, to the Swedish baron Carl Fredrik Ehrensvärd (1767–1815). Exiled from Sweden due to his involvement in the assassination of King Gustav III (1746–1792), Ehrensvärd eventually settled

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

in Copenhagen, where he assumed his mother's maiden name, Gyllembourg, and began circulating among the city's liberal intelligentsia, including Peter Andreas Heiberg. In the wake of Heiberg's move to France, a relationship between Thomasine and Carl Frederik began to develop, eventually leading to their marriage. They were to remain married until the latter's death in 1815.

Indeed, it was not until well after her husband's death that Gyllembourg would begin her authorship. In 1827, she contributed a serialized novel *The Polonius Family* (*Familien Polonius*) to *Copenhagen's Flying Post* (*Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post*), a periodical published by her son Johan Ludvig Heiberg, who had become one of Denmark's most influential litterateurs. A year later, she issued *A Story of Everyday Life* (*En Hverdags-Historie*) in similar fashion. Both works were published anonymously, but the success of the latter encouraged Gyllembourg to adopt the anonym "The Author of *A Story of Everyday Life*" (*Forfatteren til En Hverdags-Historie*). Throughout the 1830s and the first half of the 1840s, Gyllembourg was very active as a writer, and her close ties to her son and his wife—the great stage actress **Johanne Luise Heiberg** (née Pätges)—placed her in an influential position in the Danish arts. Gyllembourg's last novel was *Two Ages* (*To Tidsaldre*, 1845), which, by way of a dramatic representation of two distinct epochs of European history, intimated that persons of **culture** and **passion** are best prepared to weather the vicissitudes of life. In her final years, she brought out an edition of her collected works, though, upon her death in July 1856, many still did not know her literary identity.

Kierkegaard mixed with the Heiberg family in the late 1830s, though he was never truly a part of the inner circle that would gather at their home in the Christianshavn neighborhood of Copenhagen. To be sure, Kierkegaard had his differences with Johan Ludvig Heiberg, though he greatly respected the aesthetic talent of both Heiberg's wife and mother. For example, in ***From the Papers of One Still Living***, Kierkegaard contrasts Gyllembourg's ability to convey a mature **life-view** with that of **Hans Christian Andersen**, whose characters are submissive to external forces. Most notably, Kierkegaard issued a lengthy review of Gyllembourg's *Two Ages* in 1846. Entitled ***A Literary Review***, this assessment not only commends Gyllembourg's novel but, more importantly, uses it as an occasion to analyze **the social and political** dimensions of modernity. On 29 March 1846, Kierkegaard sent two copies of *A Literary Review*, along with two copies of ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, to the Heiberg home. However, since Gyllembourg wrote anonymously, she did not respond to Kierkegaard directly but, instead, arranged for her son to extend a note of appreciation on her behalf. *See also* LEVELING; PRESENT AGE, THE; REITZEL, CARL ANDREAS (1789–1853); REVOLUTION.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

H

HAGE, JOHANNES (1800–1837). Danish teacher, editor, and writer whose efforts contributed to Denmark's gradual push toward a democratic constitution (*see* CONSTITUTION, DANISH). In the wake of France's so-called July Revolution (*révolution de Juillet*), Hage's extensive education and marked social concern were channeled into **politics**, with particular emphasis on the **freedom** of the **press**. In 1834, he helped found the liberal paper the *Fatherland* (*Fædrelandet*), and, soon after, he became its coeditor. Nevertheless, Hage's tendency toward incendiary political commentary, doubtless exacerbated by a string of personal misfortunes, brought him into regular conflict with the Danish government. In June 1837, he was forced to resign his editorship of the *Fatherland*, and, a few months later, he committed suicide.

During his student years, Kierkegaard came into direct conflict with Hage. The occasion came in February 1836, when Kierkegaard, writing under the anonym "B," published a criticism of **Orla Lehmann** in *Copenhagen's Flying Post* (*Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post*), an influential paper headed by **Johan Ludvig Heiberg**. In support of Lehmann, Hage responded with an article of his own, "On the Polemic of the *Flying Post*" (*Om Flyvepostens Polemik*), which appeared on 4 March 1836 in the *Fatherland*. Hage's staid riposte focused on sociopolitical considerations and critiqued the sardonic tone of Kierkegaard's piece. In turn, Kierkegaard fired back with a response to Hage. Once again ascribed to the anonym "B" and released in two parts in *Copenhagen's Flying Post* on 12 and 15 March, respectively, "On the Polemic of *The Fatherland*" (*Om Fædrelandets Polemik*) retained the derisive tenor of its predecessor, mocking Hage for writing with "moralizing's most shrill and heartrending falsetto" and concluding with one of Kierkegaard's wittiest lines: "We owe it to the author in *Fædrelandet* to admit that of the two linguistic errors he has found in our piece, one is a linguistic error." Kierkegaard's refusal to engage Hage in a serious manner does not seem to have been personal. Just a year earlier, in his paper to the **Student Association**, Kierkegaard had referred to Hage as "a frank and honest editor." Hence, what Kierkegaard's early polemical writings indicate is that his aversion to and distrust of politics and popular media was in place well before his authorship properly began. For Kierkegaard, **social and political** reform would have to

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

be found elsewhere, particularly in the **individual**'s commitment to **ethical** and **religious** ideality.

HAPPINESS. Kierkegaard uses two Danish terms that can be translated as "happiness." The first is *Lykke*, which appears just over 500 times in Kierkegaard's authorship and generally denotes "good fortune" or even "luck." In this sense, the "happy" (*lykkelig*) person feels a sense of gratitude that circumstances have proven favorable. The second term is *Salighed*, which Kierkegaard uses slightly more often than *Lykke*, typically to indicate a deeper level of satisfaction. In this case, the "happy" (*salig*) person feels a sense of blessedness or bliss that transcends earthly good fortune. For example, the eight blessings offered by **Jesus Christ** in his Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 5:1–7:29) speak of the spiritual happiness that can emerge when one is willing to suffer for the sake of **God**. In English, these blessings are referred to as "the Beatitudes," but in Danish they are called *saligprisningerne*, which can be loosely rendered "the cost of happiness."

Despite mentioning happiness so frequently, Kierkegaard did not write a systematic treatment of the subject. However, there are parts of his authorship that offer extended reflections on *Salighed*, particularly in the **Christian** sense of "eternal happiness" (*evig Salighed*). This emphasis on blessedness corresponds to his understanding of how happiness varies across human **existence**. For the **aesthetic** person, happiness is tantamount to maximal self-gratification, achieved either through sensuality or through **reflection**. However, as the reflective aesthete knows, the finite (*see* FINITUDE/INFINITY) conditions of earthly existence mean that such happiness is evanescent and the one who seeks it subject to the proverbial "wheel of fortune" (*Lykkehjul*). For the **ethical** person, genuine happiness includes self-gratification but is never reducible to it, since to commit to the moral life is precisely to commit to **universal**, eternally valid principles (*see* ETERNITY). In discharging one's ethical **duty**, one attains a higher former of happiness, that of living in accordance with **truth** and enjoying the assurance of **absolute** existential significance. The ethical form of happiness marks a step toward the **religious**, but the latter adds a decisive qualification. As Johannes Climacus argues in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, the religious **individual** is bound to seek an absolute relation to the absolute telos—a relation that relativizes all earthly commitments, even those prescribed by ethics. Consequently, as is illustrated in works such as ***Fear and Trembling***, one's fidelity to God will likely necessitate a painful break from what **social and political** authorities deem right and true. It may seem, then, that the religious life is ultimately one of *unhappiness*, but this is a misunderstanding. For *evig Salighed* is vouchsafed to the one who, through **faith**, remains grounded in God. Moreover, the one who is

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

certain of eternal happiness is free from **despair** and, paradoxically, able to **love** on earth with constancy. *See also* CONSCIENCE; FREEDOM; GOOD; GUILT; NECESSITY; REASON; SELF, THE.

HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1770–1831)/HEGELIANISM. German philosopher who, in the wake of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), sought to develop a comprehensive and logical **system** of thought, with a particular emphasis on the history of ideas. Born in Stuttgart in southwest Germany to a middle-class family, Hegel excelled as a young student and won a scholarship to Tübinger Stift, a Protestant seminary associated with the University of Tübingen. While at Tübingen, Hegel befriended Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843) and **Friedrich Schelling** (1775–1854), each of whom would become notable, the former as a poet and the latter as a philosopher. After completing his studies, Hegel supported himself as a private tutor for a number of years before moving to the University of Jena, where he served as an adjunct lecturer (*Privatdozent*) and collaborated with Schelling on a number of philosophical endeavors, including the *Critical Journal of Philosophy* (*Kritische Journal der Philosophie*). In 1806, the forces of French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821) defeated the Prussian army at the Battle of Jena-Auerstedt, an event that subjected the Kingdom of Prussia to French rule and, in turn, threw Hegel's personal life into disarray. Nevertheless, it was around this time that Hegel began his authorship proper, publishing *Phenomenology of Spirit* (*Phänomenologie des Geistes*) in 1807, followed by *Science of Logic* (*Wissenschaft der Logik*, 1812–1816) and *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline* (*Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, 1817). In 1818, Hegel took up the chair of **philosophy** at the University of Berlin, succeeding Johan Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814). He remained at Berlin for well over a decade, culminating in his appointment as university rector in 1829. However, in November 1831, he died suddenly, a victim of a cholera epidemic that was ravaging Berlin.

Hegel's thought, broadly characterized as "absolute idealism," proved massively influential. For Hegel, the task of philosophy is to understand the universe as a system. This mission, while ambitious, is possible because **reason** can perceive itself in everything. For example, nature belongs to an **absolute** rational order and is thus inseparable from reason itself, a point supported by **science**'s ability to formulate concepts or "laws" of nature. Human history also instantiates this rational structure. Though historical development appears prima facie chaotic, reason can detect a dynamic yet necessary process through which human beings come to realize their identity with what Hegel calls "Absolute Spirit" (*absoluter Geist*). Famously, Hegel argues that this process is dialectical (*see* DIALECTIC): an indeterminate concept (often

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

called "thesis" by commentators) emerges, only to be countered by a determinate concept or "antithesis"; yet, the two are finally resolved in a "synthesis" or, in Hegel's preferred term, "sublation" (*Aufhebung*). In this way, human history advances toward its own oneness with *Geist*. Social opposition and even violence do not hinder the march of progress but, in a sense, facilitate it. The same is true, naturally, of **religious** development. According to Hegel, there is a fundamental unity between the divine nature and human nature, and thus philosophy is capable of rendering the absolute fully intelligible: **God** is not ontologically different from creation but, rather, is constituted by what and how human beings think of God. The history of religion testifies to the various ways that this pursuit has been undertaken, but, for Hegel, the appearance of **Christianity** marks the ne plus ultra of religious **truth**. In its claim that **Jesus Christ** is the Son of God, Christian doctrine reveals the essential divinity of humanity. "What God creates God himself is," Hegel writes. In this way, Christianity opens the door, as it were, for the emergence of absolute idealism: it manifests that God himself has become comprehensible to human thought and thereby makes religion subordinate to the argot and interests of speculative philosophy.

As Hegel's reputation grew, particularly in the wake of his untimely passing, "Hegelianism" emerged as one of the West's leading philosophical movements, though precisely what was meant by the term was a matter of debate. On the one side were the so-called Right Hegelians (*Rechtshegelianer*), who contended that Hegelianism is a reinscription of traditional Christian thinking and, in turn, a validation of the inevitable rise of Western Christendom. Proponents of this position included German philosopher Johann Eduard Erdmann (1805–1892) and Danish theologian **Hans Lassen Martensen**. On the other side were the Left Hegelians (*Linkshegelianer*), who argued that the radical and transgressive nature of Hegel's dialectical method had yet to be realized and that Hegelianism's Christian-cum-Prussian character would ultimately yield to an atheistic and egalitarian understanding of human life and thought. Proponents of this position included German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872), German theologian David Friedrich Strauss (1808–1874), and German economist Karl Marx (1818-–1883). While the Right Hegelians enjoyed institutional backing in the first decades after Hegel's death, their influence was eventually outstripped by that of the Left Hegelians, whose ideas portended some of the most significant developments of the 20th century, including the establishment of the Soviet Union in 1922.

That Kierkegaard was influenced by and yet critical of Hegelian thinking has long been one of the most documented features of his authorship. Precisely how to interpret this twofold relationship, however, is complicated. It is true, for example, that Kierkegaard's student years saw him circulate in Hegelian

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

circles: he attended lectures by Martensen, associated himself with **Johan Ludvig Heiberg**, and, in late 1841, traveled to Berlin to hear Schelling deliver a series of talks on his *Philosophy of Revelation* (*Philosophie der Offenbarung*). Though Schelling had grown critical of Hegelianism, the latter event was something of a "Who's Who" among *Linkshegelianer*, and the audience also included Russian anarchist thinker Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876), German socialist philosopher Friedrich Engels (1820–1895), and, according to some reports, Engels's future collaborator Marx. In short, Hegelianism was a major part of Kierkegaard's intellectual upbringing, and, while he later lamented its patent influence on his doctoral dissertation, ***The Concept of Irony***, his longstanding use of dialectical categories betrays an indebtedness to Hegel.

And yet, with the publication of ***Either/Or*** in 1843, Kierkegaard slowly but surely emerged as a critic of Hegelianism, no matter the variety. His concerns, while nuanced, generally centered on the pretensions of Hegel's system. Nowhere is this argument pressed harder than in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, though ***Fear and Trembling*** stands as a close second. In both cases, Kierkegaard's **pseudonyms**—Johannes Climacus and Johannes de silentio, respectively—reject the alleged comprehensiveness and finality of Hegel's thought and, with it, his seeming legitimation of the established order. In doing so, they mount a defense of **faith** against the infringement of speculative philosophy, which, in promising to go beyond religion, sets itself up as a religion in its own right. Herein, for Kierkegaard, lies the ultimate danger of Hegelianism. Whereas authentic religious faith respects the ontological difference between the human and the divine, thereby acknowledging that even the best human effort is but an approximation of complete **objectivity**, the Hegelian project fails to perceive that it, too, is limited by **finitude**. That is why Climacus's response to Hegelianism is frequently satirical. In pursuing absolute knowledge, the Hegelian philosopher effectively denies his own **existence**: he is a "fictive objective subject" who crows about abstract, presuppositionless thinking while forgetting that he himself—a mortal human being with contingent concerns and needs—is the one doing it.

In the end, however, Hegel's thought is not unique in this regard. As Kierkegaard makes clear in his later writings, the overarching thrust of modern life, from the rise of science and **technology** to the dominance of majoritarian **politics**, is toward objectivity. Even worse, as he sees it, Christendom in general and the Danish **state church** in particular endorse this trend, ignoring the fact that Christian discipleship is not defined by a shrewd human conformity but, rather, by a passionate (*see* PASSION) **love** of God and neighbor. *See also* BEING/BECOMING; INNER; JUDAISM; MEDIATION; METAPHYSICS; MOVEMENT; NEGATION; PARADOX; SOCRATES (c. 470–399 BCE)/SOCRATIC.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

HEIBERG, JOHAN LUDVIG (1791–1860). Danish *homme de lettres* who also served as director of the Royal Theater (Det Kongelige Teater) in Copenhagen from 1849 to 1856. The only child of Peter and Thomasine Heiberg (*see* GYLLEMBOURG, THOMASINE [1773–1856]), Heiberg was raised mostly by family friends and relatives, a stipulation of his parents' contentious divorce in 1801. After years of private schooling, Heiberg matriculated at the **University of Copenhagen** in 1809. Around this time, Heiberg's mother and her second husband, the Swedish baron Carl Fredrik Gyllembourg-Ehrensvärd (1767–1815), returned to Copenhagen. Their home became a fashionable literary salon, and Heiberg soon found himself circulating among the capital city's elites. After receiving his doctorate in 1817, Heiberg spent a number of years abroad, but, in 1822, he took a position as lecturer of Danish language and literature at the University of Kiel in present-day Germany. During this period, he visited Berlin, where he attended the lectures of **Georg William Friedrich Hegel** and associated with many of the day's leading Right Hegelian thinkers. Upon returning to Copenhagen in 1825, Heiberg immediately became an ambassador for Hegel's thought, particularly in the domain of aesthetics. He began writing and directing vaudevilles for the Royal Theater and, in 1827, founded the influential paper *Copenhagen's Flying Post* (*Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post*). For roughly a decade, it became a desirable vehicle for literary and social criticism in Denmark and, in fact, was the principal venue for his mother's own notable literary career. In 1831, Heiberg married the Danish stage's leading actress, **Johanne Luise Heiberg**, née Pätges, a union that further enhanced the family's reputation. Throughout the 1830s and well into the 1840s, Heiberg cut the figure of a genuine Renaissance man: he taught at the Royal Military Academy (Hærens Officersskole), published works of **philosophy** and poetry, launched new periodicals in fields ranging from Hegelian thought (*Perseus*, 1838) to astronomy (*Urania*, 1844–1846), and helmed the Royal Theater. Yet, as a social conservative, whose play *A Soul after Death* (1840) famously ridiculed bourgeois nescience, he found himself increasingly at odds with the rising tide of populist liberalism in Denmark (*see* CONSTITUTION, DANISH). By the mid-1850s, Heiberg was no longer au courant in Danish letters, though his death in 1860 stood as a reminder that he was one of the major figures of the so-called Danish Golden Age (*Den danske guldalder*), a fact to which the 1862 publication of his collected works, spread across 11 volumes, gave substantial witness.

Kierkegaard's relation to Heiberg evolved in accordance with his own intellectual development. As a student, Kierkegaard contributed to *Copenhagen's Flying Post*, and, during the latter half of the 1830s, he was an occasional participant in Heiberg's salon. That Kierkegaard admired or, at least, professed to admire Heiberg is clear in the final section of ***The Concept of***

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Irony, in which Kierkegaard treats Heiberg as a successor to the German author Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832), particularly in their similar appropriation of **irony** in drama and poetry. Yet Kierkegaard began to cool toward Heiberg over the 1840s. The occasion for this distancing was Heiberg's review of ***Either/Or***, wherein Heiberg criticized the book for being too long and dismissed its first part as "tasteless." And though Heiberg did find value in the work—namely, in the treatises attributed to Judge William, which bear a Right Hegelian ring—he seemed to mistake the book's overarching attempt to relativize Hegelian *Sittlichkeit* (*see* ETHICAL/ETHICS). Writing as Victor Eremita, Kierkegaard responded to Heiberg's critique in the *Fatherland* (*Fædrelandet*, 5 March 1843), mocking Heiberg's literary affectations and chastising him for failing to read *Either/Or* in full. This response marked a definitive break from Heiberg, a break that Kierkegaard referenced, often caustically, in his journals.

Curiously, however, Kierkegaard stopped short of disclaiming his relationship with the entire Heiberg family. ***A Literary Review*** was inspired by the novel *Two Ages* (*To Tidsaldre*, 1845), penned by Heiberg's mother. Moreover, in July 1848, Kierkegaard contributed a series of pseudonymous essays to the *Fatherland* titled *The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress* (*Krisen og en Krise i en Skuespillerindes Liv*), in which he praised the thespian artistry of Heiberg's wife. Heiberg himself, however, did not reconcile with Kierkegaard as a result. In fact, the longstanding critic predictably found Kierkegaard's late polemics against the Danish **state church** (*see MOMENT*, *THE*) to be in poor taste.

HEIBERG, JOHANNE LUISE (1812–1890). Danish actress, widely considered the leading lady of Danish **theater**. Born to Christian and Henriette Pätges, both German immigrants, Johanne Luise grew up in Copenhagen under dire financial circumstances. Nevertheless, her aptitude for dancing was identified at a young age, and she received the attention, not always welcome, of a number of well-heeled benefactors. She entered ballet school in 1820 and, in the late 1820s, transitioned to theater. It was in this context that she met her future husband, **Johan Ludvig Heiberg**, who, among other things, was an influential critic and playwright. The couple married in July 1831 and eventually settled in the Christianshavn neighborhood of Copenhagen. Along with Johan Ludvig's mother, **Thomasine Gyllembourg**, they held the city's most exclusive cultural salon for over two decades. As an actress, Johanne Luise boasted both depth and range. She played nearly 300 different roles throughout her career, from Juliet Capulet in William Shakespeare's **tragedy** *Romeo and Juliet* to Lady Teazle in Richard Brinsley Sheridan's comedy *The School for Scandal*. She was also featured in the works of the era's most

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

celebrated Danish playwrights. Adam Oehlenschläger (1779–1850), credited with popularizing **Romanticism** in Denmark, wrote the tragedy *Dina* for Johanne Luise, and Heiberg himself cast her as the lead in his popular national drama *Elves' Hill* (*Elverhøi*). Heiberg's epochal influence began to wane in the 1850s, and he died in August 1860. Nevertheless, Johanne Luise remained active in Danish theater and in the nation's cultural life. Her last stage performance came in June 1864, but she produced plays well into the 1870s. Moreover, she became increasingly involved in literature, publishing her husband's collected works and ultimately writing her own memoirs, a four-volume collection that was issued after her death in December 1890.

A regular guest in the Heiberg home during the latter half of the 1830s, Kierkegaard knew Johanne Luise personally. Her memoirs even suggest that Kierkegaard would sometimes make unsolicited social calls. And while Heiberg and Kierkegaard had a falling-out after the publication of ***Either/Or***, Kierkegaard retained a strong admiration for both Madame Gyllembourg and Johanne Luise. His 1846 treatise ***A Literary Review*** used Gyllembourg's novel *Two Ages* (*To Tidsaldre*, 1845) as the occasion for an assessment of modern society. Then, in July 1848, he published a series of essays in the *Fatherland* collectively titled *The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress* (*Krisen og en Krise i en Skuespillerindes Liv*). Attributed to the pseudonym Inter et Inter, this work ponders the nature of artistic performance, paying attention to how an actress's age and experience shape and even bring out her creative **genius**. Inter et Inter does not refer to Johanne Luise by name, though Kierkegaard's journals make clear that *The Crisis* was written for and about her. Of particular interest was her performance as Juliet in January 1847. For Inter et Inter, her performance on this occasion was not hindered by her maturity but, rather, enhanced by it. Decades earlier, she had played the part instinctively; yet, with the passing of time (*see* TEMPORALITY/TIME), she has gained the benefit of context and perspective—a capacity to recollect (*see* RECOLLECTION) her younger days and to self-consciously assimilate her experiences into acting. Paradoxically, then, she expresses the ideal of feminine youthfulness onstage only after she has reached adulthood in real life—a "metamorphosis" that is accomplished by virtue of Johanne Luise's unique qualities as an actress, including her innate thespian talent and, most crucially, her deep **passion** for the role.

Kierkegaard's motivation for publishing *The Crisis* was essentially twofold. On the one hand, the piece was a tribute to Johanne Luise, whom he had long admired as an actress. In fact, when Kierkegaard published *On My Work as an Author* (*Om min Forfatter-Virksomhed*) in 1851, he publicly acknowledged that he was the author of *The Crisis*. Subsequently, he sent Johanne Luise a copy of the book, accompanied by a note explaining that she was

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

the intended reader of *The Crisis*. Johanne Luise appreciated the gesture and, years later, quoted approvingly from *The Crisis* in her memoirs. At the same time, however, *The Crisis* was meant to offset the overwhelmingly religious tone of Kierkegaard's output after 1846. Given Kierkegaard's strategy of indirect **communication**, definitively articulated in ***The Point of View for My Work as an Author***, he wanted to avoid the appearance that his turn to themes such as the **imitation** of **Jesus Christ** signified that he himself was claiming religious **authority**. Hence, by publishing *The Crisis*, he demonstrated that he was still an author with **aesthetic** ideas and interests.

HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1889–1976). German philosopher known for his significant contributions to **existentialism**, hermeneutics, phenomenology, and the **philosophy** of **technology**. Heidegger was born in the village of Meßkirch, located in southwest Germany, the oldest child of Friedrich and Johanna Heidegger (née Kempf). Heidegger's upbringing was rooted in tradition. His parents came from working-class stock—farmers and craftsmen. They were also devout Roman Catholics (*see* CATHOLICISM), and Heidegger himself considered the priesthood for a time. Early on, his scholarly work was supported by the **church**, though, by the early 1910s, he became more interested in philosophy than in theology. After completing his doctorate in 1913, Heidegger completed a *Habilitationsschrift* on scholastic thinker John Duns Scotus (c. 1265–1308), and, soon after, he took up a junior teaching position at the University of Freiburg. The next several years would prove turbulent. In March 1917, he married Thea Elfride Petri, a student in one of his courses. She was of Lutheran background, and their relationship would bring him closer to breaking with what he called the "system of Catholicism." Another nudge in this direction came from German philosopher and pioneer of phenomenology Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), whom Heidegger would assist for a number of years. In 1923, Heidegger received an appointment at the University of Marburg, where he flourished, publishing his magnum opus *Being and Time* (*Sein und Zeit*) in 1927. A year later, he returned to Freiburg as the successor to Husserl's chair in philosophy.

It was around this time that Heidegger began to be associated with the National Socialist German Workers' Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei), which had been led by Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) since July 1921. Hitherto inactive in partisan **politics**, Heidegger was slowly but surely drawn into the orbit of Nazism, though the reasons why remain fiercely contested. Doubtless he was a proponent of ethnic (*völkisch*) nationalism, and it seems increasingly clear that this inclination led to a number of biases, none worse than his evident antisemitism. In January 1933, Hitler was appointed chancellor of Germany (*Führer*). A few months later, Heidegger was elected

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

rector of the University of Freiburg and, almost immediately, joined the Nazi Party as well. However, Heidegger was not well suited for either commitment: he resigned as rector a year later and, despite not formally leaving the Nazi Party, grew critical of the Nazi agenda, so much so that the Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei) observed his lectures from 1936 to 1940. In the aftermath of World War II, Heidegger's career was hindered, though not ended, by the process of denazification (*Entnazifizierung*). During the 1950s and 1960s, he was particularly active on the lecture circuit, where papers such as *The Question Concerning Technology* (1953) and *What Is Philosophy?* (1955) solidified what commentators often consider a "turn" (*Kehre*) in his thinking. Whereas *Being and Time* seeks to construct a precise existentialist phenomenology, Heidegger's later work exhibits a consistent interest in **language**, poetry, and the **history** of Western **metaphysics**, which, he argues, has reached its conclusion in modern technology. Heidegger died on 26 May 1976 in Freiburg, though, notably, he was buried at the local cemetery in Meßkirch (Friedhof Meßkirch).

That Kierkegaard helped shape Heidegger's thought has long been acknowledged by scholars. But there are questions about the extent of the Dane's influence. For one thing, Heidegger himself would only grant that he had received "impulses" from Kierkegaard's thought, and he once noted that Kierkegaard was more of a "religious writer" than a philosopher. Moreover, Heidegger's published writings only refer to Kierkegaard on a handful of occasions. Though it contains sustained treatments of Kierkegaardian themes such as **anxiety** and **death**, *Being and Time* only refers to Kierkegaard in three footnotes. The most significant of these addenda distinguishes Kierkegaard's *existenziell* approach from Heidegger's own *existentzial* one, meaning that Kierkegaard is more interested in the **existence** of particular entities (say, an **individual** striving to adhere to the teachings of **Christianity**) than in the structures of existence as such. Later commentators, however, have demurred, arguing that Heidegger actually translates Kierkegaard's ontology into the systematic jargon of the German academy. One can see this move in other aspects of Heidegger's reception of the Dane. For example, Kierkegaard's early critique of modern technology and its facilitation of the phenomenon of the **crowd** was tendered as an incitement for the individual to seek happiness in the **religious** sphere, wherein **the self** is called to attain fulfillment before **God**. Heidegger inherited this critique, particularly the notion of **leveling**, but he bracketed its theological presuppositions and transformed it into a formalized reading of human existence and the essence of **truth** that could be used to justify a partisan and, at worst, fascistic antipathy toward liberal politics. It may be, however, that this tendency is greatest in Heidegger's early thought. Indeed, commentators have noticed that Heidegger's

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Kehre leads to an attitude of inquiry and meditation that better accords with a Kierkegaardian preference for **Socratic** questioning. *See also* INNER; LIFE-VIEW; SYSTEM, THE; TEMPORALITY/TIME.

HISTORY. Kierkegaard's treatment of history (*Historie*) varies across his authorship, though a number of themes are particularly noteworthy. First, Kierkegaard inherited the **Hegelian** notion that history can give an explanation as to how and why ideas develop over time, a perspective that is clearly reflected in his doctoral dissertation, ***The Concept of Irony***. Nevertheless, and second, Kierkegaard grew increasingly skeptical that historical study can achieve certitude. For example, in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, Johannes Climacus argues that even the most reliable "historical knowledge" (*historisk Viden*) is at best an "approximation" of what happened in the past. This is because *Historie* is conditioned by **temporality**, both in terms of the chronological gap separating past from present and in terms of the historian's susceptibility to thinking in time-bound patterns. Third, precisely because history is a consequence of time, it is also a consequence of **existence**. Existing things have histories and can be organized according to historical categories, but **God**, who is existence as such, cannot be understood in this way. That is why people make a mistake when they confuse the history of the **church** with a demonstration of either **Christianity**'s validity or invalidity. While the former can be studied as an unfolding temporal event, the latter is ultimately a matter of **faith**. In other words, no amount of historical evidence can prove or disprove the fundamental claim of the Christian gospel—that the **eternal** God assumed human flesh in the person of **Jesus Christ**. Ultimately, then, *Historie* is incapable of shedding light on the **truth** of Christianity, not only because history is a discipline of approximation, but also because its methodological attention to the temporal order ipso facto excludes the **paradox** of Christian proclamation. In ***Practice in Christianity***, Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** Anti-Climacus sums up this problem in this way: that a single human being claims to be God constitutes an essential **offense** against rational and thus historical inquiry. *See also* ACTUALITY; CREATION; DIALECTIC; GOVERNANCE/PROVIDENCE; INDIVIDUAL; LANGUAGE; METAPHYSICS; PHILOSOPHY; PRESENT AGE, THE; REVELATION; REVOLUTION; STRIVING.

HOLY SPIRIT. According to Christian teaching (*see* DOCTRINE/DOGMA), the Holy Spirit is the third person of the Trinity and, therefore, worshiped and glorified as one in nature and equivalent in personal dignity with the Father and with the Son (*see* GOD). While there are mentions of the divine spirit in the Old Testament (Gen. 1:2, Ps. 51:11, Isa. 63:10, and so on), it is in the New

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Testament that the Holy Spirit (*Pneumatos Hagiou* in Koine Greek) emerges as a divine person. For example, **Jesus Christ** ascribes certain attributes to the Holy Spirit (Mark 13:11), and the Book of Acts makes over 50 references to the Holy Spirit, including, most famously, the Holy Spirit's dramatic descent upon the early **church** on the day of Pentecost (Acts 2:1–13). Despite these declarations, the precise role and status of the Holy Spirit remained a topic of debate for the Church Fathers, and it was not until the First Council of Constantinople in 381 that the divinity of the Holy Spirit was formally avowed.

Though Kierkegaard does not devote a great deal of attention to Trinitarian theology, he doubtless presupposed its most fundamental claims, including the divinity of the Holy Spirit. This point is corroborated by the fact that Kierkegaard allocated an entire **discourse** to the Holy Spirit in ***For Self-Examination***. Named "It Is the Spirit Who Gives Life," this treatise does not try to formulate a systematic pneumatology; rather, it exhorts the reader to realize that the Holy Spirit has an essential role in **Christianity**. In other words, the Holy Spirit is not to be thought of as a nebulous entity, whose **existence** serves the ends of human beings. On the contrary, the Holy Spirit gives life by encouraging one to die to the world. Among other things, this process of **dying to** involves a renouncement of mundane sources of confidence and identity—for example, material prosperity and social prestige—and a recognition that one must turn to God alone in **faith**. The one who does so will receive various spiritual gifts, including **hope**, **love**, and indeed faith itself. Ultimately, then, the Holy Spirit is the "Comforter" (John 14:26), albeit only for those who no longer seek comfort in the world. *See also* SPIRIT.

HOPE. Though frequently associated with concepts such as **anxiety** and **melancholy**, Kierkegaard makes hundreds of references to "hope" (*Haab*) in his authorship. In ***Works of Love***, Kierkegaard associates hope with "expectancy" (*Forventning*), clarifying that, if fear is the expectancy of **evil**, hope is the expectancy of **good**. The nature of the good in question further sharpens the meaning of *Haab*. Some are hopeful about the advent of earthly goods, say, the impending arrival of a better job or an improved relationship. This attitude is instinctive among young people, though some try to retain it throughout life. Nevertheless, since human **existence** is necessarily finite (*see* FINITUDE/INFINITY), it is inevitable that this form of hope will disappoint, either because such earthly goods fail to materialize or because they pass out of existence.

In contrast, there is also hope in **eternity**, which is a religious form of the expectancy of good. Instead of desiring particular and scarce objects, this form of *Haab* yearns for eternal goods—above all, the ultimate triumph of

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

the **love** of **God**. It is in this sense that, according to **Christianity**, authentic love hopes all things (1 Cor. 13:7). *See also* COMMON MAN; EQUALITY; FREEDOM; HISTORY; IMMORTALITY; LEVELING; RESIGNATION; SUBJECTIVITY.

HUMOR. Kierkegaard's understanding of "humor" (*Humor*) and "the humorous" (*det Humoristiske*) comes to the fore in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, though the concept also turns up elsewhere in Kierkegaard's oeuvre. According to Johannes Climacus, humor constitutes the border or *confinium* between the **ethical** and the **religious**, thereby resembling **irony**'s role between the **aesthetic** and the ethical. Moreover, humor resembles irony in that both involve contradiction and thus are related to the **comic**. Both, finally, represent a stance of noncompromise with a fallen world (*see* SIN), albeit in different ways. While an ironist such as **Socrates** seeks to influence the world, the humorist has learned to laugh at it. So thoroughgoing is this standpoint that the humorist does not even take his own life seriously: all earthly pursuits have been relativized, even the humorist's own self-concern and capacity for **decision**.

In this relativization of the earthly, *Humor* does mark an advance toward the religious in general and toward **Christianity** in particular. For example, just as the religious individuality recognizes that an **absolute** relation to an absolute telos (*see* HAPPINESS) is not possible in earthly life, so does the humorist perceive the insufficiency of human **striving**. According to both perspectives, what seems to be the case—that earthly life is the theater of ultimate importance and value—is actually not true at all. On this reading, even Christianity itself is *humoristisk*, since it teaches that **truth** is hidden in mystery and strength found in weakness. At the same time, Climacus observes that, while humor comes "close to the essentially Christian," it fails to relate to **Jesus Christ** in the **actuality** of **history**. Humor promotes the deepening of one's **inner** life but does not submit itself to the paradoxical demands of Christian **faith**.

HYPOCRISY. The concept of "hypocrisy" (*Hykleri* or *Hyklerie*) spans Kierkegaard's authorship, though it appears most frequently and most characteristically during the last few years of his authorial activity. In basic terms, hypocrisy involves a misrelation between the **inner** and the outer: what a person seems to be on the outside is not who she is on the inside. It is a problem that is featured in the New Testament. For example, **Jesus Christ** condemns the Pharisees and scribes as "hypocrites," quoting the prophet Isaiah: "This people honoureth me with *their* lips, but their heart is far from me" (Mark 7:6; also see Isa. 29:13). According to Kierkegaard, the same problem has seeped

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

into **Christendom**, especially in the Danish **state church**. In these historical institutions, some of the key insights of **Protestantism**—namely, that human beings are saved "by grace alone" (*sola gratia*)—have been twisted and abused. People assure themselves that they are Christians based on their external affiliation with the **church**, but they lack the passionate **faith** of authentic disciples, who dedicate their lives to the **imitation** of Christ's humble life. In his late polemics against Denmark's established order, including his periodical ***The Moment***, Kierkegaard maintains that **God** despises hypocrisy above any other **sin**. *See also* ADMIRATION; CULTURE; MEDIATION.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

IDEA. While Kierkegaard was familiar with the Platonic notion of eternal "forms" or "ideas" (*see* ETERNITY), his conception of "idea" (*Idee*) was primarily existential (*see* EXISTENCE). That is to say, he argues that one's personal maturation is dependent on giving **actuality** to a particular idea of the **good**. In this way, **the self** is able to undertake a definite course of action and, in turn, eliminate the extraneous possibilities that threaten to overwhelm it. Famously, Kierkegaard expressed this notion in his August 1835 journal entry from the North Zealand fishing village of Gilleleje: "The crucial thing is to find a truth that is truth for me, to find the idea for which I am willing to live and die." Kierkegaard concedes that many ideas might be seen as worth living and dying for, though, as his authorship progressed, he became increasingly adamant that the idea of **Christianity** constitutes an essential, if also challenging, **life-view**. The one who would express the Christian *Idee* in her own life must be prepared to undergo earthly **suffering**, though the promise of eternal **happiness** serves as encouragement in the face of the idea's full implications. *See also* DECISION; LEVELING; PHILOSOPHY; SOCIAL AND POLITICAL, THE; SUBJECTIVITY.

IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE. The concepts of "identity" (*Identitet*) and "difference" (*Forskjel*) are not often considered crucial to Kierkegaard's thinking, though they are nevertheless subtly important. In terms of **metaphysics**, Kierkegaard submits—in a manner that anticipates **Martin Heidegger**'s subsequent work—that the problem of identity and difference effectively founds Western **philosophy**. For instance, the pre-Socratic (*see* SOCRATES [c. 470–399 BCE]/SOCRATIC) philosopher Parmenides (born c. 515 BCE) held that, while sense experience is unreliable, the mind can perceive an eternal and unchanging unity among all things—identity rather than difference. In contrast, Heraclitus (c. 535–475 BCE) argued that reality exists in a constant flux, and thus nothing is able to retain continuity—difference rather than identity. In Kierkegaard's **pseudonymous** text ***Repetition***, Constantin Constantius attempts to resolve this tension with his concept of repetition. Constantin sides with the Heraclitus's Ionian school by noting that no two **temporal** moments are ever purely identical: **the self** of a teenager, for

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

example, undergoes a multitude of changes by the time of old age. On the other hand, Constantin agrees with Parmenides's Eleatic school that, despite such instability, two temporal moments are not radically discontinuous either: there are aspects of the teenager's self (say, her underlying goals or fears) that recur or *repeat* in that of the elderly person. Without identity, then, **existence** is **absolute** chaos; without difference it is falsely static. The task, says Constantin, is to see how a pair of discrete instants are nevertheless related through repetition, to see how the first moment turns up again, albeit with some variation, in the second. Life is a synergy of *Identitet* and *Forskjel*.

Yet, if this relationship is true of earthly existence in general, Kierkegaard makes an exception for **God**. That is to say, Kierkegaard was critical of the attempt, associated with Hegelian thought (*see* HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH [1770–1831]/HEGELIANISM), to establish an identity between the divine and the human. Instead, in books such as ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, Kierkegaard insists that God and humanity are qualitatively dissimilar. According to Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus, the fact that God is eternal and infinite (*see* FINITUDE/INFINITY) means that there is a deep and irreducible difference between divinity and humanity. In and through **faith**, which is stirred by divine **revelation**, human beings can appreciate this difference qua difference, but the difference itself can never be annulled or comprehended by human **reason**. Otherwise, humanity would obtain *Identitet* with God, having attained a vantage point from which the eternal is circumscribed within a human framework. And yet, in this way, a **paradox** emerges, one not altogether unlike Constantin Constantius's synergistic resolution to the metaphysical problem. The more a person grasps her difference from God, the more she comes to reflect the divine. As Kierkegaard writes in ***Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits***, "The human being and God do not resemble each other directly but inversely; only when God has infinitely become the eternal omnipresent object of worship and the human being always a worshiper, only then do they resemble each other." *See also* APOSTLE; DYING TO; EARNESTNESS; ETERNITY; GENIUS; IMITATION; INDIVIDUAL; JESUS CHRIST; NATURE; OTHER, THE; *TWO ETHICAL-RELIGIOUS MINOR ESSAYS*.

IMAGINATION. Kierkegaard makes hundreds of references to "imagination" (typically either *Indbildning* or *Phantasie*, though the latter is used less often) in his authorship, albeit with a variety of intentions and meanings. Perhaps the most important reference turns up in ***The Sickness unto Death***, in which Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** Anti-Climacus observes that imagination is a capacity interconnected with emotion, knowledge, and **will**. In short, *Phantasie* "is the capacity *instar omnium*," that is, the capacity for all capacities. If

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

the self decides (*see* DECISION) to adopt a new course of action (say, to get a new job or to lose weight), it must first be able to imagine that such changes are possible: the will to change in **actuality** depends on the ability to model images that are not currently available to sense experience. The imagination, then, is essential to self-development.

At the same time, however, an ungoverned imagination can hamper the self. In ***Stages on Life's Way***, the pseudonymous author referred to as Quidam (Latin for "someone") observes that his depression (*see* MELANCHOLY) is rooted in "the power of imagination" (*Indbildningskraften*). Here Quidam's view anticipates Anti-Climacus's argument in *The Sickness unto Death*: when priority is granted to the imagination, the self loses its connection with **necessity** and lapses into **despair**. In other words, imagination can obscure who a person really is and lure him away from existential **earnestness**, which is rooted in **ethical** and **religious** commitment.

In the end, then, imagination is a faculty that can be utilized appropriately or poorly. In the former case, it can be used to envision beautiful and **upbuilding** things, thereby encouraging the self to seek its highest possibility; in the latter case, it can deceive a person, stirring up **passion** for that which is illusory and ephemeral. Either way, Kierkegaard insists that *Indbildning* has an ineluctable influence on human **existence**. *See also* BEING/BECOMING; CONTEMPORANEITY; FINITUDE/INFINITY; ROMANTICISM; SUFFERING; THEATER; *THREE DISCOURSES ON IMAGINED OCCASIONS*; WRITING.

IMITATION. The Danish word for "imitation" is *Efterfølgelse*, which is related to the German term *Nachfolge*. Strictly speaking, both mean "to follow after." In this way, they bear a more active connotation than the Latin *imitatio*, which stems from the verb *imitari* ("to copy"). Nevertheless, these words have come to be associated, and Kierkegaard doubtless understood their connection in Christian spirituality (*see* CHRISTIANITY/CHRISTENDOM). For example, one of his favorite **upbuilding** writings was *The Imitation of Christ* (*De Imitatione Christi*), which was written in the early 15th century by the Augustinian canon regular Thomas à Kempis (c. 1380–1471). A German translation of Thomas's work appeared as early as 1434, and it was called *Nachfolge Christi*. Kierkegaard himself owned three books by Thomas à Kempis, including two editions of *The Imitation of Christ*—one in Latin, the other an 1848 Danish edition titled *Om Christi Efterfølgelse*, compiled and introduced by **Andreas Gottlob Rudelbach**. As Rudelbach makes clear in his preface, Thomas's book urges people not to ape or mimic the life of **Jesus Christ** but literally to follow in his footsteps—a path that would inevitably lead to **suffering**.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

To be sure, Kierkegaard's own approach to *Efterfølgelse* was rooted in what he called an "older" spiritual literature. He encountered many of these writings by way of his upbringing in the post-Reformation **church** movement known as **Pietism**, which combined aspects of the **mysticism** of medieval **Catholicism** with the evangelical faith of **Protestantism**. It was not uncommon, for example, for Pietists such as Lutheran churchman and theologian Johann Arndt (1555–1621) to draw on sources as diverse as Catholic mystic Johannes Tauler (1300–1361) and Protestant reformer **Martin Luther** in the same text. That is not to suggest, however, that such authors were used indiscriminately. Indeed, for the Pietists, one of the key concepts linking these spiritual authors was their shared emphasis on *imitatio Christi*.

This point was by no means lost on Kierkegaard. As his authorship unfolded, *Efterfølgelse* became a central category of Kierkegaard's thinking, and it could be argued that one of his principal tasks was to update this notion for the modern world. According to Kierkegaard, the decline of monastic life in Protestant Europe meant that religious **faith** had been largely confined to a private, **inner** experience. There were some benefits to this change—as Johannes Climacus argues in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, **monasticism** had wrongly assumed that a temporal (*see* TEMPORALITY/TIME) expression of piety was capable of satisfying the requirements of **eternity**—but there were also losses. People began to assume that whether or not Christian faith took on a particular form was irrelevant, thereby forgetting the traditional motif of *imitatio Christi*. In ***A Literary Review***, Kierkegaard maintains that modernity's tendency to "level" (*see* LEVELING) means that even an outer expression of Christian devotion will not be recognized as such. Thus the one who truly imitates Christ—an injunction that necessarily entails witnessing (*see* WITNESS) to the humble Savior in the midst of the world—will not be rewarded but persecuted. In this way, the *imitatio* motif avoids the presumptuousness of medieval monasticism, even as it reminds Christians that faith requires far more than an inward assent to ecclesial **dogma**.

Kierkegaard carefully worked out his understanding of the imitation of Christ over a number of years. However, in ***The Moment***, he pressed its significance with vitriolic force, making it the linchpin of his critique of the Danish **state church**. Time and again, he insisted that Denmark's clergy had misrepresented the true nature of Christianity. Instead of encouraging the laity to imitate Christ, clerics such as **Jakob Peter Mynster**, bishop of Zealand, suggested that it was enough to spend a "quiet hour" at a Sunday worship service and to be respectable members of civil society. For Kierkegaard, such an approach constituted a betrayal of the New Testament and, in turn, made a mockery of **God**. Kierkegaard's goal was to provide a **corrective** to this conventional standpoint, and, in the end, it meant that he felt compelled

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

to break with the state church. *See also* ADMIRATION; INWARDNESS; LOVE; MARTYRDOM; ORTHODOXY; PASSION; PATIENCE; *WORKS OF LOVE*.

IMMEDIACY. The Danish word for "immediacy" is *Umiddelbarhed*, which corresponds to the German *Unmittelbarkeit*. Both terms denote an unbroken or, indeed, unmediated relationship between two entities. People often refer to immediacy in a practical manner. For example, a doctor might say that a patient has to be taken to the hospital "immediately," indicating that there should be no stops between where the patient currently is and the nearest medical center. In **philosophy**, however, the concept of immediacy is typically associated with epistemology. Does human **knowledge** always come through media that are interposed between the one who knows and that which is known? Or is it possible for the knower to attain direct access to the object of her thought? Though ostensibly simple, the implications of these questions are profound, and a number of modern thinkers, from René Descartes (1596–1650) to Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), made the question of immediacy central to their work.

With this in mind, it is not surprising that Kierkegaard too would show an interest in the concept of *Umiddelbarhed*. However, he did not approach the matter in the abstract, purely philosophical manner of a Kant. Rather, in **pseudonymous** works such as ***Either/Or*** and ***Fear and Trembling***, he classifies immediacy as an aspect of human experience, which involves the emotional and intuitive side of **the self**. The immediate person is caught up in the here and now. In this way, immediacy is juxtaposed with **reflection**, which prioritizes the use of **reason** and thereby adopts a more analytical, objective (*see* OBJECTIVITY) posture toward matters of **time** and **eternity**. Immediacy, then, is analogous to **music**, whereas reflection is analogous to **language**.

Based on this comparison, one might assume that Kierkegaard confines immediacy to the **aesthetic** sphere. But the issue is complex. Kierkegaard distinguishes between a "first immediacy" (*første Umiddelbarhed*) and a second or "new immediacy" (*nye Umiddelbarhed*). The former is indeed aesthetic, pertaining to innately human feelings and impulses; the second is **religious** and, more specifically, a key feature of **Christianity**. That is to say, while the aesthetic **individual** is passionately drawn toward the erotic, the person of faith is passionately drawn to the **absolute paradox** of Christianity, namely, that the "Word became flesh and made his dwelling among us" (John 1:14). This proclamation cannot be understood through rational reflection but, rather, must be accepted through Christian **faith**. In other words, it is precisely as **passion** that faith in **Jesus Christ** represents a new *Umiddelbarhed*, whereby one arrives at a transparent relation to **God** by resting (*see* REST)

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

in divine **revelation**. *See also* CHILDHOOD; DECISION; *EIGHTEEN UPBUILDING DISCOURSES*; INNER; JOY; LOVE; MARRIAGE; WORLDLINESS/SECULARISM.

IMMORTALITY. Kierkegaard's concept of "immortality" (*Udødelighed*) was simultaneously modern and traditional. With regard to the former, Kierkegaard was well aware that Enlightenment thinkers had produced significant critiques of biblical and ecclesiastical notions of immortality. To cite one prominent example, the Tübingen theologian David Friedrich Strauss (1808–1874) issued *The Life of Jesus, Critically Examined* (*Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet*) in 1835–1836, arguing that the New Testament's historical claims (*see* HISTORY) were dubious. Strauss further concluded, in the manner of a **Hegel**, that the life of **Jesus Christ** is best viewed as disclosing mythical **truth** about humanity's ultimate unity with the divine. In the wake of figures such as Strauss, church **dogma** about, say, Jesus' resurrection from the dead (Luke 24:1–47) was no longer treated as sacrosanct. On the contrary, it became fodder for the putative **objectivity** of modern scholarship or, more popularly, a cliché for a conventional humanistic *Weltanschauung*.

In one sense, Kierkegaard acceded to this turn. He frequently treats *Udødelighed* as an existential aspiration, which, no matter its historical **actuality**, gives focus and purpose to a person's life. For Judge William, **pseudonymous** author of the second part of ***Either/Or***, the **decision** to live in an **ethical** manner confirms that the soul is immortal, since the very notion of ethics assumes that there are **universal** commitments that transcend the otherwise chaotic flux of space and **time**. In ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, the pseudonym Johannes Climacus cites the antique pagan thinker **Socrates** as an example of one who, in seeking immortality, imbues **existence** with meaning and **passion**. If immortality lies outside the purview of what **philosophy** and **science** can apprehend, it is nevertheless significant as an impetus toward subjective (*see* SUBJECTIVITY) development. In short, Kierkegaard shares the Straussian supposition that the concept of *Udødelighed* says a great deal about how human beings interpret the world and their place in it.

At the same time, however, Kierkegaard was loath to abandon **Christianity**'s insistence that immortality is also state of postmortem existence. In one 1853 journal entry, Kierkegaard asserts that he expects to continue to live after bodily **death**, a claim that corresponds to the emphasis on eternal **happiness** found in other texts. Several of the treatises in ***Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses*** make reference to personal immortality, particularly in relation to those who have Christian **faith**. In "Patience in Expectancy," the second discourse in *Two Upbuilding Discourses* (1844), Kierkegaard contrasts temporal **hope** with hope in **eternity**, the latter of which includes immortality.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

As he explains, "You are expecting the resurrection of the dead, of both the righteous and the unrighteous; you are expecting a blessed reunion with those whom death took away from you and with those whom life separated from you; you are expecting that your life will become transparent and clear to you." Moreover, he goes on to clarify that, while **hope** for earthly things is tentative, **religious** figures such as New Testament prophetess Anna (Luke 2:36–38) demonstrate that Christian hope is proleptic: it acts as if the object of expectancy—in this case, immortality—has already been accomplished. In "There Will Be the Resurrection of the Dead, of the Righteous—and of the Unrighteous," the fourth discourse in the third part of ***Christian Discourses***, Kierkegaard observes that while many thinkers debate whether or not immortality can be demonstrated, Christian teaching offers a different perspective: "Do not doubt whether you are immortal—tremble, because you are immortal." Thus Kierkegaard implies that immortality is not synonymous with **salvation**; it is synonymous with judgment. Some will choose eternal happiness, others eternal **damnation**, and Christianity ties this **choice** to the manner in which each **individual** lives on earth. It is the task of faith to ensure that one never loses sight of one's immortal (*udødelig*) destination.

INDIRECT COMMUNICATION. *See* COMMUNICATION.

INDIVIDUAL. Kierkegaard uses two terms for "individual." The first is *Individ*, which is cognate with the Latin *individuum*; the second is *Enkelt*, often styled *den Enkelte* ("the single individual"), which is derived from the Middle Low German *enkel* and related to the extant German word *einzeln* ("single") and the Danish *enkel* ("simple"). Kierkegaard uses *Individ* roughly 300 times in his authorship, *Enkelt* and *Enkelte* more than 2,000 times. The sheer frequency of these words suggests that "individual" is among Kierkegaard's most important concepts, though the reasons why are complex.

It is worth noting at the outset that Kierkegaard's "individualism," if it can be called that at all, should not be conflated with the economic individualism promoted by classical liberals such as Scottish economist Adam Smith (1723–1790). Smith presupposes that the individual is naturally self-interested, but he also reasons that, if tolerated, human egoism will redound to the common good by way of a divinely ordained "Invisible Hand." In contrast, Kierkegaard promotes *den Enkelte* precisely as a spanner in the works of the status quo, as an **exception** to modernity's seemingly inexorable march toward commercial growth and technological (*see* TECHNOLOGY) achievement. In other words, Smith views the individual as *homo economicus*, Kierkegaard as *homo spiritualis*: the former achieves **happiness** through material prosperity, the latter through spiritual deepening.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

And yet, one might wonder, why does Kierkegaard believe that the individual is the cornerstone of human self-realization (*see* SELF, THE)? It could certainly be argued that a lone person, who is but one among billions of others, is of little significance in relation to the great movements of **history** or the penetrating insights of **science**. To give a concrete example: of what value is, say, a single construction worker in Portugal over against the technical development and worldwide distribution of an RNA vaccine to combat coronavirus diseases? The latter could improve global health for generations to come, whereas the former, at best, may have a beneficent influence on coworkers, friends, and family in his local area. In objective terms, there really is no comparison.

However, Kierkegaard rejects **objectivity** as the sole or even as the primary means of assessing existential worth. Drawing on the teachings (*see* DOCTRINE/DOGMA) of **Christianity**, Kierkegaard starts with the notion of divine **creation**: as the origin of all things, **God** wills the **existence** of each and every individual person, no matter how dissimilar in a quantitative sense. The priest in Mozambique, the migrant worker in El Salvador, the financier in Singapore—all are equal (*see* EQUALITY) in the eyes of God and all are equally accountable before God. Though this assumption shares affinities with some of modernity's most notable political movements—liberalism and Marxism in particular—Kierkegaard frequently disparages the political application of egalitarian principles. That is not to suggest that he objects to governmental reform per se. It *is* to say that he thinks that **the social and political** crises of the modern world are rooted in an erroneous conflation of worldly equality and the **religious** equality denoted by Christianity. In following the example of **Jesus Christ** (*see* IMITATION), the Christian does not treat differences in class, ethnicity, race, or status as paramount: the Christian is to **love** the neighbor, whether she is elite or lowly, esteemed or reviled. As Kierkegaard writes in ***Works of Love***, "When the difference hangs as loosely as this, then every individual is seen as that essential Other, that which all are equally, in which we are eternally, alike, our likeness." In contrast, modern politicians are typically indifferent to the *essential* similarity of all human beings, instead preferring to eliminate the finite (*see* FINITUDE/INFINITY) distinctions of earthly life. According to this logic, equality has been achieved when different people have the same assets or privileges. As a result, the political goal is to create a society in which all individuals are, in effect, identical with regard to material rights and things.

Kierkegaard was skeptical about the underlying motivation for such egalitarianism, and he grew critical of its influence on **ethical** and religious life. In ***A Literary Review***, for instance, he contends that modern society, despite its claims of progress, is actually dominated by the process of **leveling**, whereby social cohesiveness is obtained not by making people better but by

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

making them homogeneous. The individual who resists the undertow of leveling and thus separates herself from the **crowd** is certain to face pressure to conform, whether in terms of interpersonal criticism or perhaps even public persecution. The alternative, however, is the overthrow of ethico-religious ideality and the tyranny of mass **culture**—a **revolution** facilitated and reinforced by the **press**. Consequently, Kierkegaard intended his authorship to help the individual stand firm against leveling and, in turn, to become the person whom God, and not the crowd, wants her to be. In fact, many of his writings, especially those in the genre of **discourse**, are explicitly dedicated to the individual. As Kierkegaard writes in the preface to *Four Upbuilding Discourses* of 1844 (*see EIGHTEEN UPBUILDING DISCOURSES*), "[This book] seeks that single individual [*hiin Enkelte*] whom I with **joy** and gratitude call my reader, in order to pay him a visit, indeed, to stay with him, because one goes to the person one loves." Later, in an appendix (*Bilag*) to the posthumously published ***The Point of View for My Work as an Author***, Kierkegaard included a two-part essay titled "Den Enkelte." It begins with a distinction between **politics** (*Politik*) and religion before moving on to an analysis of the individual, the latter of which, Kierkegaard observes, is the antithesis of "fantastic social categories" and, instead, "is the first condition of all religiousness." Hence, while modern politics is moving in the direction of impersonal bureaucracy and collective identities, religion must insist on the primacy of *den Enkelte*, which "from the Christian point of view . . . is the decisive category." Such, indeed, was Kierkegaard's mission as an author: "The single individual is the category through which, in a religious sense, the age, history, the human race must go. And the one who stood at Thermopylae was not so secure as I, who have stood, in order at least to bring about an awareness of it, at this narrow pass, *the single individual*." *See also* DECISION; GOD; MEDIATION; OFFENSE; OTHER, THE; REVELATION; SOCRATES (c. 470–399 BCE)/SOCRATIC; SUBJECTIVITY; SYSTEM, THE; UPBUILDING.

INNER. Over the course of his authorship, Kierkegaard showed significant interest in the distinction between "inner" (*Indvortes* or *Indre*) and "outer" (*Udvortes* or *Ydre*). The former involves the life of the **spirit** or that which animates a person, whereas the latter concerns an external and typically mundane sphere of **existence**. The question of whether or not these domains can be reconciled is significant in both **philosophy** and theology, and, generally speaking, Kierkegaard was inclined to juxtapose philosophical responses with theological ones. For example, **Hegel** had argued that the very distinction between inner and outer was erroneous, since whatever is inside must come to expression in whatever is outside. Essence, in other words, manifests itself in appearance. As Kierkegaard summarizes in an 1846 journal entry:

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

"Das Innere ist das Aussere, das Aussere das Innere." In contrast, many of **Christianity**'s seminal writings differentiate between inner and outer, spirit and flesh. The Apostle Paul formulates the classic distinction: "Though our outward man perish, yet the inward *man* is renewed day by day" (2 Cor. 4:16). In his *On the Freedom of a Christian* (*De Libertate Christiana*, 1520), **Martin Luther** would apply this logic to his understanding of justification: a person can be outwardly unwell but spiritually healthy, and vice versa. Thus the goal of the Christian life is not to fashion a precise correspondence between inner and outer but, rather, to have **faith** in **God**, who, in the person of **Jesus Christ**, demonstrates that **salvation** is not a matter of outer perfection but of inner fidelity to the **will** of the Father. To realize this point, Luther concludes, is to gain one's **freedom** from the world, which falsely places its trust in outward things such as manner of dress or ritual practice.

On the whole, Kierkegaard accepts the Pauline–Lutheran distinction between inner and outer and, in turn, seeks to undermine the Hegelian marriage of the two domains. This undermining is often understated. For example, Victor Eremita, the **pseudonymous** editor of ***Either/Or***, hazily observes that life "at times" gives one cause to "doubt somewhat the accuracy of the familiar philosophical sentence that the outer is the inner and the inner is the outer." Ironically, however, *Either/Or* goes on to demonstrate Victor's statement, insofar as the character of Johannes the Seducer, whose diary concludes the book's first part, is able to manipulate others precisely by fashioning a genial outer self that disguises his diabolical inner one. This point is reiterated in ***Fear and Trembling***, albeit in a very different way. According to the pseudonym Johannes de silentio, the **ethical** presumes a correspondence between inner and outer, while faith prioritizes the inner over the outer, lest faith become something one can earn, exploit, or possess. Indeed, part of the burden of the biblical patriarch Abraham is that his inner **religious** devotion cannot be translated into an outer expression that would be sanctioned by the societal mores.

Yet, if such examples call the Hegelian thesis into question, Kierkegaard elsewhere struggles with the Christian reading of this issue. In ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, Johannes Climacus acknowledges that the interiorization of religious faith is problematic, since it allows one to relish a worldly lifestyle (*see* WORLDLINESS/SECULARISM) while simultaneously claiming to have an authentic inner faith. This incommensurability between inner and outer has come to make a mockery of Christendom in general and the Danish **state church** in particular. Yet, Climacus worries, the presumption that an external way of living signifies internal piety is equally troublesome, because, as was seen in medieval **monasticism**, it opens up the door for works-righteousness and the volatilization of faith. In the end, Kierkegaard would seek to resolve the tension between inner and outer by stressing the

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

imitation of Jesus Christ. As he argues throughout the latter part of his authorship, Christian faith entails that one seek to live in the manner of the Son of God; yet, far from making one prosperous or renowned, this commitment will lead to persecution and **suffering**. In highlighting this **paradox**, Kierkegaard challenges Luther's dualistic understanding of inner and outer, while nevertheless destabilizing Hegel's glib conflation of the two domains. *See also* ASCETICISM; *CONCEPT OF ANXIETY*, *THE*; CONSCIENCE; DEATH; DEMONIC; DESPAIR; DYING TO; HUMOR; HYPOCRISY; REPENTANCE; REST; SELF, THE; SIN; TEMPTATON.

INWARDNESS. Kierkegaard mentions "inwardness" (*Inderlighed*) hundreds of times in his authorship, and he also makes a number of related references to "inward deepening" (*Inderliggjørelse*). These concepts are particularly crucial in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, in which **pseudonym** Johannes Climacus links inwardness with **passion** and **subjectivity**. For Climacus, the pivotal questions that face human beings—for example, what is **happiness**, and how can it be enjoyed for eternity?—are not merely or even primarily theoretical. After all, the person who looks into such questions, even if she is a theoretician, is nevertheless a living human being, who cannot escape the characteristics and limitations of **existence**. Even the greatest thinker or public figure is located within a particular sociohistorical context and must one day succumb to **death**. And yet, Climacus argues, there are many people in the modern world who, disregarding the actual (*see* ACTUALITY) human situation, give priority to matters of **objectivity** instead. They believe it is more important to engage what can be known and used with demonstrable confidence, and thus they concentrate on earthly affairs, from new political arrangements to improved **technology**. Climacus contends that such a mundane standpoint opts for abstract **reflection** at the expense of passionate inwardness, a preference that attenuates one's **ethical** and **religious** life.

For Climacus, then, it is critical that one cultivate the affective aspect of human existence, nurturing desires and feelings that form and guide a person's life over **time**. This affective aspect is *Inderlighed*, while the process of developing it is *Inderliggjørelse*. Only if **the self** is attuned to this dimension of existence can it reach its full potential. Since inwardness is a condition for the maturation of one's religious attitudes and practices, Climacus also insists that inwardness is essential for Christian **faith**. And yet, he acknowledges that the very nature of *Inderlighed* means that it is "hidden," thereby making it possible for some people to claim to have an abiding **inner** faith while nevertheless skirting ethico-religious responsibilities. Later in his authorship, Kierkegaard would come to lambast the acceptance of such **hypocrisy** in **Christendom**, and he ultimately came to argue that the **imitation** of **Jesus Christ** is the true sign of faith. *See also* ABSURD; CROWD/PUBLIC;

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

INDIVIDUAL; LANGUAGE; MONEY; MOVEMENT; PATIENCE; SILENCE; SUFFERING; *UPBUILDING DISCOURSES IN VARIOUS SPIRITS*; *WORKS OF LOVE*; WORLDLINESS/SECULARISM.

IRONY. Like its English cognate, the Danish term *Ironi* is derived from the Greek *eironeia*, meaning "dissimulation" or "feigned ignorance." It was a word that was first applied to the philosopher **Socrates**, who sought to expose his interlocutors' lack of knowledge by pretending to need their guidance. Later, "irony" took on a number of other meanings. By the modern period, it was used more broadly to describe a condition or situation divergent from expectations, and, in **Romanticism**, it came to signify the **freedom** of the creative subject (*see* SUBJECTIVITY) in relation to objective (*see* OBJECTIVITY) circumstances.

Kierkegaard had an extensive and an intensive interest in irony. Not only did he title his doctoral dissertation ***The Concept of Irony***, but he continued to explore and to appropriate irony throughout his authorship. Ultimately, he viewed irony as both a linguistic tool and as an existential **life-view**. In the first case, irony is a manner of speaking, in which what is said is not what is meant: the outer stands in contradiction with the **inner**. Thus irony can serve as a **comic** device or as a means of resistance, signifying that the speaker, qua ironist, is not bound by her words. In the second case, irony transcends its literary application and becomes central to the development of **the self**. Here the estrangement between inner and outer does not only affect speech; it permeates one's **existence**, albeit in various ways. According to Kierkegaard, Socrates's appropriation of irony was "purely negative," insofar as he used it to unmask and to undermine the established order. In other words, by revealing the corruption of the Athenian gentry, Socrates sought to encourage the **individual** to think for himself. As a result, he made a new era of thought possible, even though he refused to specify what should come next. Kierkegaard contrasts Socratic irony with the "infinite absolute negativity" of Romantics such as Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829). In this case, irony is not so much about undercutting the established order as negating **actuality** itself, since the ironist's perception of an **inner** infinity (*see* FINITUDE/INFINITY) of possibilities means that the self believes that it has freed (*see* FREEDOM) itself from the limitations of **history** and **time**. Yet, for Kierkegaard, this assumption is chimerical, and it risks forfeiting both the ironist's self and any **hope** of genuine transformation. In the end, then, both Socratic and Romantic *Ironi* remind one that the world is not necessarily what it seems, but neither form of irony is capable of effecting **salvation**. For that, a turn to **religiousness** is necessary. *See also* MARRIAGE; MARTYRDOM; NEGATION; PAGANISM; PARADOX; *TWO ETHICAL-RELIGIOUS MINOR ESSAYS*.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

J

JESUS CHRIST. First-century Jewish rabbi (c. 4 BCE–c. 30 CE) who became the central figure of **Christianity**, a monotheistic religion that, according to a 2015 survey by the Pew Research Center, remains the largest in the world. The name "Jesus" is derived from the Hebrew *Yehoshua*, meaning "Yahweh is salvation." However, "Christ" is not a personal name but an honorific title, which can be traced back to the Hebrew *mashiah* and its Greek equivalent *Khristos*, both meaning "the anointed one." Jesus was also identified patronymically (Luke 4:22) and in relation to his hometown of Nazareth (John 1:45) in the northern part of present-day Israel; however, his popular and, at times, scandalous public ministry invited other designations. While some considered him a blasphemer (Matt. 26:65), his disciples came to see him as the Christ (Matt. 16:16). At issue was his commanding interpretation of Torah, which attracted great popular interest but also much disagreement. According to the New Testament, the best extant source of Jesus' life and teachings, Jesus questioned and, at times, condemned many of the assumptions and practices of Second Temple **Judaism**, coming into frequent conflict with the Pharisees, a rabbinic movement and school that promoted strict adherence to Mosaic law. Their disagreement came to an apex when Jesus invoked divine **authority** in his reading and application of Torah, even going so far as to claim personal unity with **God** (John 10:38). On the evidence of a series of powerful healings (Mark 1:40–45) and wonders (John 11:1–44), Jesus' followers accepted his messianic assertions. But the Pharisees, with the perfunctory support of Roman political authorities, arranged for his arrest, trial, and execution on the cross (Luke 22:39–23:56). Their expectation was that Jesus' death would stamp out this controversy. Yet, a few days later, his tomb was found empty, and his disciples began to report encounters with him—a sign, they claimed, that God had resurrected him from the dead (Acts 2:24). Eventually, a number of Jesus' followers, citing inspiration of the **Holy Spirit**, would form a community known as the **church** (Acts 2:1–47) and come to spread the "good news" (*euangelion*) of Jesus' life, ministry, death, and resurrection. Also known as **apostles**, these early ecclesial leaders would establish Jesus as the locus of divine **salvation** and of human reconciliation with God.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Kierkegaard was raised in the Danish **state church** and, in keeping with the mores of the time, received a thorough grounding in Christian **dogma** (*see* BALLE, NIKOLAI EDINGER [1744–1816]), chiefly if not exclusively within the Lutheran (*see* LUTHER, MARTIN [1483–1546]) tradition. Consequently, he knew, understood, and embraced the fundamentals of mainstream Christology—for example, the so-called "hypostatic union," which states that Jesus Christ was a single person (*hypostasis*) in whom the divine nature and a complete human nature were united. Thus Jesus Christ was, sensu stricto, the God-man. Yet Kierkegaard was not content merely to admit church proclamation on this matter. More interesting to him were the implications that Christology has for human **existence**, a topic that he treats, albeit diversely, in a number of writings.

Practice in Christianity serves as a case in point. Attributed to the **pseudonym** Anti-Climacus, it is a text that highlights the contradiction between Christ's transcendent divinity and his **suffering** humanity, arguing that the interplay between the two must produce **offense** in the **individual** who relates to Christ contemporaneously. Many will be repelled, but others will arrive at **faith**, whereby Christ is recognized as both savior and archetype (*Forbillede*). After all, as the Son of God, Christ could have conferred divine **forgiveness** irrespective of human **freedom**. But he saw fit to become incarnate as a humble and persecuted human being, so that all persons (*see* EQUALITY) might be capable of receiving faith and expressing divine **love**. Hence, out of gratitude, the Christian believer is to strive to imitate (*see* IMITATION) Christ in her life, expecting to suffer as the Savior did on account of earthly **sin**. In ***The Moment***, Kierkegaard's late series of diatribes against the Danish clergy, he repeatedly presses this logic against the church. Rather than accept the consequences of orthodox Christology, ecclesiastical leaders have self-interestedly transmuted Christ into a triumphant yet indulgent deity who serves as the patron of the Western secular (*see* WORLDLINESS/SECULARISM) establishment. *See also* ADMIRATION; ASCETICISM; AUTHORITY; COMMUNION; INSPIRATION; SCRIPTURE.

JOY. Despite his reputation as "the **melancholy** Dane," Kierkegaard refers to "joy" (*Glæde*) throughout this authorship. Ever the dialectician, he distinguishes between many types of joy, including "earthly joy" (*jordiske Glæde*) and "eternity's joy" (*Evighedens Glæde*). He adds further nuance by ascribing different understandings of joy to different spheres of **existence**. For example, an **aesthetic** approach to joy will diverge from a **religious** one, and Kierkegaard grants a measure of autonomy to the **life-view** in question.

At the same time, however, it is also clear that Kierkegaard believes that various forms of *Glæde* can be categorized according to their degree of per-

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

fection. For example, in ***Either/Or***, the aesthete known as "A" describes joy as his "companion," though he also devotes much attention to depression. For him, then, joy is a fleeting thing, which can temporarily cover, but never fully heal, life's unhappiness. Moreover, since he lacks **ethical** and religious commitments, the aesthete is incapable of getting off the inevitable seesaw of joy and depression: he is a slave to momentary fortune. At the other end of the spectrum is **religious** joy, which is not defined as an absence of **suffering** but as **rest** in **God**. This type of joy is synonymous with **faith**. It is marked by a profound trust in God's **love**, as exemplified in the person of **Jesus Christ**, and by a consequent **immediacy** wherein **the self** is totally present to itself in the moment (*see MOMENT*, *THE*) of **eternity**. *See also* DUTY; *EITHER/OR*; HAPPINESS; SACRIFICE.

JUDAISM. In one form or another, Kierkegaard refers to Judaism (*Jødedom*) throughout his corpus—sometimes in a philosophical vein, sometimes in a more personal one. Further complicating matters is the fact that it can be difficult to extricate personal remarks from philosophical ruminations, and vice versa. For example, in early writings such as ***The Concept of Irony*** and ***Either/Or***, Kierkegaard presents a **religious** schematic that owes a great deal to **Hegelianism**: **paganism** represents **aesthetic** religion, Judaism **ethical** religion, and **Christianity** the apex of religious development. Similarly, in an 1854 journal entry, he criticizes **Nikolai Grundtvig** and his followers for swapping Christian discipleship for "Jewish [*jødisk*] optimism": instead of emphasizing the **imitation** of **Jesus Christ**, the Grundtvigians associate Christian **faith** with a "Jewish view of **marriage**" and a "Jewish superstition about lineage." Are the latter comments a product of the earlier schematic? Or, as some have suggested, did Kierkegaard harbor antisemitic biases that crept into his **philosophy** and theology?

A definitive answer here is not possible, but a few key points are worth bearing in mind. First, there is no doubt that Kierkegaard was exposed to antisemitism in Danish society (*see* GOLDSCHMIDT, MEÏR AARON [1819–1887]), and it would be naïve to assume that Kierkegaard was immune to such cultural presuppositions. And yet, Kierkegaard tends to discuss Judaism when pressing a more fervent critique of Christendom, meaning that his critical appraisal of Jewish religious life was applied to Christian religious life too, indeed, in still harsher terms. Thus the Hegelian influence on Kierkegaard is notably mitigated: yes, Kierkegaard agrees that "true Christianity" (*see* PIETISM) is higher than Judaism, but he rejects the notion that **Protestantism**, particularly as practiced in modern Europe, fulfills religious authenticity or even transcends Jewish religiousness. His censure of Judaism, then, has nothing to do with ethnicity per se; it *does* have to do with what he understood

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

to be "Jewish piety" (*jødisk Fromhed*), which, he claims, is marked by emphases on the fatherland, shared cultural norms, and the rewards of family life. To the extent that Christianity reproduces these characteristics—and Kierkegaard was convinced that the Danish **state church** fostered just such a religiousness—it is scarcely distinguishable from Judaism. As Kierkegaard writes an 1851 journal entry, "I have never seen a Christian. Among so-called Christians I have seen some beautiful examples of Jewish piety."

Ultimately, Kierkegaard's theory of existential stages (*see* EXISTENCE) was the primary lens through which he viewed various figures and movements. Hence, as was his wont, he situated ideas and persons associated with *Jødedom* anywhere along the spectrum of the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. On the aesthetic end is the so-called wandering Jew (*evige Jøde*), a mythical character, celebrated in **Romanticism** as an exemplar of rootless **despair**; on the religious end is Abraham, the Old Testament patriarch whom Kierkegaard treats as an icon of authentic faith in the pseudonymous ***Fear and Trembling***; in the middle stands the "Jewish piety" that Kierkegaard seemingly found most common and challenging. In his characterization of the latter, certain Jewish stereotypes occasionally emerge, indicating that Kierkegaard was not untainted by the prejudices of his **time** and place. Yet, even here, the essence of his critique echoes that of his larger and more vehement critique of Christendom. *See also* GOD; LAW; LEVIN, ISRAEL SALOMON (1810–1883).

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

K

KIERKEGAARD, MICHAEL PEDERSEN (1756–1838). Danish cloth merchant and father of seven children, whose wealth made him a notable figure in Copenhagen during the first half of the 19th century. Born in the tiny West Jutland parish of Sædding, Michael was the fourth child of Peder Christensen Kierkegaard (1712–1799) and Maren Andersdatter Steengaard (1726–1813). As a serf, Peder's surname was taken from his occupation, namely, to maintain the churchyard (*kirkegaard*) adjacent to Sædding parish church. The Kierkegaard family was poor, and there are apocryphal tales of the young Michael cursing his fate, and **God**, as he toiled out on the heath. At some point in the late 1760s, Michael was sent to Copenhagen in order to apprentice with his uncle Niels Andersen Sædding (1720–1796), who operated a hosiery shop at 29 Østergade. In 1777, Michael acquired his freedom and, in 1780, his full citizenship. In time, he developed a successful business as a hosier and commodities broker, even trading overseas.

And yet, in many respects, prosperity did not change Michael. Religion is a significant example. Sædding parish was located in an area known for its adherence to **Pietism**, whether in its sanctioned form within the Danish **state church** or in its separatist Moravian iteration. By the late 18th century, rationalist theologians, seeking to square Danish Lutheranism (*see* LUTHER, MARTIN [1483–1546]) with Enlightenment **philosophy**, came to steer **church** life away from Pietism's influence. However, Michael resisted this trend, attending churches that retained leadership with Pietist affinities and, even more importantly, getting involved with Copenhagen's Congregation of Brothers (Brødremenighed). This society was founded in 1739 but came to flourish in the early 19th century, partly as a reaction against the state church's rationalistic turn. Not only did Michael participate in the Brødremenighed's Sunday-evening services, but he served on its governing board, advising the society on practical matters, including the move to a new and larger meeting hall in November 1816.

By this time, Michael had a family of his own, and it goes without saying that his wife and children were also active in the Brødremenighed. Following the death of his first wife, Kirstine Nielsdatter Røyen (1758–1796), Michael married his second wife, **Ane Sørensdatter Lund**, and, with her, had seven

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

children: Maren Kirstine Kierkegaard (1797–1822), Nicoline Christine Lund (1799–1832), Petrea Severine Lund (1801–1834), **Peter Christian Kierkegaard** (1805–1888), Søren Michael Kierkegaard (1807–1819), Niels Andreas Kierkegaard (1809–1833), and Søren Aabye Kierkegaard. In a series of tragic misfortunes, five of Michael's children would die between the years 1819 and 1833, along with his wife in 1834. Effectively retired since the turn of the century, Michael kept his home on Nytorv in central Copenhagen and would increasingly suffer from **melancholy**. There is no doubt that his surviving sons were privy to and shaped by Michael's feelings of **guilt** and regret. These feelings were likely a combination of personal remorse—whether for his youthful bitterness toward God or for the fact that he had impregnated Anne, his serving maid, out of wedlock—and a deeply ingrained sensitivity to **sin** and the possibility of **damnation**. He died on 9 August 1838, wealthy but shattered.

Kierkegaard's relationship with Michael remains a touchstone for biographers, though its complexity renders tidy conclusions impracticable. On the one hand, Kierkegaard felt a shared burden with his father. As he writes in an oft-cited 1838 journal entry, "Then it was that the great earthquake occurred. . . . Then I surmised that my father's old age was not a divine blessing, but rather a curse, that our family's exceptional intellectual capacities were only for mutually harrowing one another; then I felt the stillness of **death** deepen around me, when I saw in my father an unhappy man who would survive us all. . . . A guilt must rest upon the entire family." Passages such as this suggest that Kierkegaard's interest in topics such as death and sin had roots in his relationship with Michael. At the same time, however, Kierkegaard clearly looked at his father—or, more precisely, the *memory* of his father—as a positive stimulus for his literary work. A number of his **upbuilding** discourses (*see EIGHTEEN UPBUILDING DISCOURSES*) are dedicated to Michael, and in various journal entries he expresses a profound respect, even reverence, for Michael. If, in one sense, Michael represents the congenital onus of **despair** and sin, in another sense he represents the **love** of God, who is Father par excellence. It is not an exaggeration, then, to say that Kierkegaard's understanding of and relation to **Christianity** is inextricably bound up with Michael. *See also* LINDBERG, JACOB CHRISTIAN (1797–1857); MONEY; MYNSTER, JAKOB PETER (1775–1854); NAPOLEONIC WARS; RECOLLECTION.

KIERKEGAARD, PETER CHRISTIAN (1805–1888). Eldest son of **Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard** and **Ane Sørensdatter Lund** and a prominent figure in Danish cultural life, perhaps especially during his tenure as bishop of Aalborg from 1857 to 1875. Peter Christian was also the lone sibling to

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

survive the youngest child in the Kierkegaard family, Søren Aabye. Born in Hillerød, just north of Copenhagen, Peter Christian received a first-rate education at the capital city's **Borgerdyd School** from 1816 to 1822 and subsequently at the **University of Copenhagen**, graduating with a degree in divinity in 1826. Over the next decade or so, his life would be unsettled if not unproductive. He taught classical languages at the Borgerdyd School and, in fact, was Søren's instructor for a time—a convergence that his youthful brother sought to exploit. During the late 1820s and early 1830s, Peter Christian spent significant time abroad. In Berlin, he began work on his doctoral dissertation and attended lectures by **Hegel**, whom he thought a poor historian of early **Christianity**. In December 1829, he completed his studies at the University of Göttingen, defending a thesis on the concept and morality of lying (*De notione atque turpitudine mendacii*). From there he traveled through the Low Countries and finally landed in Paris, where, by chance, he witnessed the July Revolution (*révolution de Juillet*) of 1830. Soon thereafter, Peter Christian returned to Denmark, and for a number of years he struggled to decide between a career in the **state church** and one in the academy. However, his increasing reputation as a "Grundtvigian" (*see* GRUNDTVIG, NIKOLAI FREDERIK SEVERIN [1783–1872]) situated him outside of the academic mainstream, despite the fact that he attained a degree of divinity in January 1836. By the early 1840s, he was ready to take a clerical appointment, and, for a lengthy period, he served as parish priest of Pedersborg and Kindertofte, near the town of Sorø. But the tension between Grundtvigianism and the state church would follow him there, most notably when Peter Christian refused to forcibly baptize the infants of Baptist parents, thereby contravening the 1842 decree of Bishop **Jakob Peter Mynster**. This move might have cost him his position, but, with Grundtvig's support, he outlasted his opponents. In the wake of the new Danish **constitution** in 1849, the issue became moot, and Peter Christian emerged as a political figure of note, serving as a member of the upper house (Landstinget) from 1849 to 1852. For that reason, it was not a total surprise when he was appointed bishop of Aalborg in 1856, the first Grundtvigian to attain such a high standing in the state church. Peter Christian's episcopal tenure would last nearly two decades and was considered successful. However, he would eventually decide to resign his post, believing himself unfit for office. His final years were marked by a deepening depression and, finally, dementia. He died on 24 February 1888 in Aalborg.

In some ways, Peter Christian's personal relationships mirrored the turbulence of his career. He wedded twice—in 1836 and in 1841—but both marriages were strained. His first wife, Elise Marie Boisen (1806–1837), apparently had a warm and sunny disposition, and she and Peter Christian seem to have been fond of one another. Yet his career took precedence, and

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Marie (as she was known) tragically died of typhus in July 1837. The couple had no children. Peter Christian's second wife was Sophie Henriette "Jette" Glahn (1809–1881). After giving birth to their son, Poul Egede Kierkegaard (1842–1915), Jette experienced an illness that extant writings indicate was essentially psychosomatic. Indeed, Jette's brother-in-law Søren, who suffered his own bouts of **melancholy**, wrote her a number of sympathetic letters that reflect his insight into the condition. Nevertheless, she remained homebound for the rest of her years. Such domestic gloom did not leave Poul untouched. Following a decorated stretch as a theology student in Copenhagen, he abandoned his **faith** and began associating with Darwinian freethinkers such as Hans Sofus Vodskov (1846–1910) and Jens Peter Jacobsen (1847–1885). Poul developed a drinking problem, incurred debt, and was admitted to an insane asylum for a spell. Though he was later discharged, his intellectual promise was ultimately squandered on frenzied philosophical tracts and bizarre poetic sketches: "My uncle was Either-Or, my father Both-And, and I am Neither-Nor," he once wrote.

Peter Christian's most famous, and perhaps most strained, relationship was with his younger brother. The two were simultaneously alike and different. Both inherited their father's fierce intelligence, brooding self-consciousness, and crushing sense of **sin**. But they harnessed these traits in distinct ways, and their career paths collided on a few notable occasions. For instance, whereas Peter Christian was one of Denmark's most distinguished Grundtvigians, Søren generally found Grundtvig and his followers intolerable. Thus the brothers disagreed, sometimes publicly, about the nature of Christianity and the task facing the **church** in modernity. In October 1849, Peter Christian gave a lecture at the Roskilde Landemode—a diocesan assembly of the clergy—that was subtly critical of Søren. The younger brother fumed at his older brother's impertinence, arguing that, as was often the case with Grundtvigians, Peter Christian had come to confuse popularity with clarity. It was all too predictable, Søren surmised, that Peter Christian would get involved with **politics**. These skirmishes, however, were but a prelude to a much more significant conflict. In July 1855, amid the publication of Søren's polemical journal ***The Moment***, Peter Christian again critiqued his younger brother at the Roskilde Landemode, suggesting that the latter's emphasis on the radical **imitation** of **Jesus Christ**, even unto **martyrdom** and **suffering**, was an exaggeration. At this point, Søren swore off all relations with Peter Christian, and, lying on his deathbed a few months later (*see* FREDERIK'S HOSPITAL), he refused to see his older brother.

That Peter Christian subsequently presided over Søren's state-church funeral was considered a scandal by some (*see* LUND, HENRIK SIGVARD [1825–1889]). But it appears that this move, however muddled, was mo-

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

tivated by fraternal devotion. Indeed, in a poignant twist, Peter Christian would facilitate the release of Søren's posthumous writings, including, almost shockingly, a second edition of *The Moment* in 1877. *See also* BAPTISM; *CONCEPT OF IRONY*, *THE*.

KOFOED-HANSEN, HANS PETER (1813–1893). Danish author, educator, and **state church** priest. Born in Zealand's Saaby Parish, Kofoed-Hansen was educated at the Roskilde Cathedral School (Roskilde Katedralskole) and, in 1837, completed his theological examination at the **University of Copenhagen**. Subsequently, he traveled abroad, spending time in Germany, England, France, and Italy. He returned to Denmark and took on a variety of pedagogical and clerical appointments, despite already having an active literary career. Indeed, writing under the pseudonym (*see* PSEUDONYMITY) Jean Pierre, Kofoed-Hansen had published psychological novels such as *Dialogs and Sketches of a Physiognom's Posthumous Papers* (*Dialoger og Skitser af en Fysiognoms efterladte Papirer*, 1840), *Life out of Death* (*Liv af Død*, 1842), and the two-volume *Flesh and Spirit* (*Kjød og Aand*, 1846). Moreover, he was active in literary criticism, providing an insightful review of Kierkegaard's ***Either/Or*** in October 1843. Kofoed-Hansen's pursuits were not lost on Kierkegaard, who, in April 1846, wrote him a remarkably appreciative letter. Explaining the reason for his unexpected correspondence, Kierkegaard says, "I have often thought of you and thought about the rewarding circumstances under which you work as an author and about how you still retain your enthusiasm and energy." He goes on to clarify that he respects Kofoed-Hansen's determination to be an author and that he is glad *Flesh and Spirit* recently received an "extensive and favorable" review—one that Kierkegaard had hoped to write himself. The letter is signed: "In friendship, / S. Kierkegaard."

It is not certain that Kofoed-Hansen received this particular note from Kierkegaard. Nevertheless, a few years later, Kierkegaard would grow fond of hearing Kofoed-Hansen preach at the Church of Our Savior (Vor Frelsers Kirke) in the Christianshavn neighborhood of Copenhagen, and the two men also seem to have spoken on occasion. Their fates, however, would become entwined in the wake of Kierkegaard's polemical journal ***The Moment*** and his subsequent death in November 1855 (*see* FREDERIK'S HOSPITAL). Kierkegaard's attacks on state-church leaders **Jakob Peter Mynster** and **Hans Lassen Martensen** had been unpleasant for many in Copenhagen, but Kofoed-Hansen was deeply sympathetic to Kierkegaard. Moreover, Kofoed-Hansen would not let the matter die. He published the treatise *Dr. S. Kierkegaard against Dr. H. Martensen* (*Dr. S. Kierkegaard mod Dr. H. Martensen*) in 1856 and *S. Kierkegaard against the Established Order* (*S. Kierkegaard*

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

mod det Bestaaende) in 1857. These efforts rejuvenated Kofoed-Hansen's authorial career—notably, in 1864, he issued *One People—the People* (*Et Folk—Folket*, 1864), a Kierkegaardian critique of Danish populism—but he was increasingly set at odds with **church** leadership. Over time, he began investigating a move to **Catholicism**. In 1881, he released *Confession* (*Skriftemaalet*), which argued that the practice of confession is essential to Christian (*see* CHRISTIANITY/CHRISTENDOM) life. Two years later, he left the priesthood and commenced a final flurry of polemical writings such as *Are We Still Lutherans?* (*Ere Vi Fremdeles Lutheranere?*, 1885) and *Where Is the Church?* (*Hvor er Menigheden?*, 1887). At this point Kofoed-Hansen's break from Lutheranism (*see* LUTHER, MARTIN [1483–1546]) was complete, and he became a member of the Roman Catholic Church. In 1893, he died in Copenhagen, leaving an impressive legacy in his own right, but also forecasting Kierkegaard's burgeoning recognition among Catholic thinkers.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

L

LANGUAGE. Along with a number of modern philosophers, Kierkegaard displayed an interest in "language" (*Sprog*), with a particular focus on language as a mode of **communication**. For example, in a way that anticipates **Martin Heidegger**'s well-known concept of "idle talk" (*Gerede*), Kierkegaard was attentive to the ways language can simultaneously reveal and conceal: "There is much deception in the language of people's daily conversation," he writes in ***Christian Discourses***, adding that words are capable of making malintent sound virtuous and irresolution sound wise. This layered aspect of language is intrinsic to the medium itself. As Kierkegaard argues in ***The Concept of Irony***, it is not only possible for the **inner** content of words to diverge from their external form, but the appropriation of this linguistic discontinuity varies across context and **history**. Modernity has been especially influenced by language. The development and proliferation of print **technology** has produced a veritable deluge of words, many of which are meant to pass the **time** in frivolous or indolent fashion. In ***A Literary Review***, Kierkegaard analyzes the influence of the **press** on society, maintaining that it has hastened and intensified an era of **reflection**, in which people treat language as a commodity—as something to be bought, sold, and consumed—rather than as a means of inward deepening (*see* INWARDNESS) and existential transformation. In this situation, language is a problem to overcome, and Kierkegaard increasingly recommends the lost art of **silence**, which, if practiced well, establishes an environment in which language can reacquire its communicative power.

These observations doubtless undergirded Kierkegaard's method of "indirect communication." Rather than use language in order to directly convey his ideas and motivations, thereby providing boilerplate material for political causes or footnotes in a philosophical **system**, Kierkegaard sought to make his words strange in a variety of ways. His practice of adopting pseudonyms (*see* PSEUDONYMITY) was meant to deflect questions about authorial intent and, in turn, to rekindle the reader's subjective (*see* SUBJECTIVITY) engagement with the material. Even in signed works, Kierkegaard not only explicitly renounces his own **authority** as an author and teacher, but his distinctive rhetorical techniques, which include a flowing sense of punctuation

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

and an obvious penchant for tag questions, instantiate both the desire for and the challenge of existential authenticity. That *Sprog* bears a spiritual potentiality that transcends its lexical and syntactical elements is indeed a crucial presupposition of Kierkegaard's entire oeuvre. As he writes in "Love Upbuilds," the first deliberation (*see* DISCOURSE/DELIBERATION/SERMON) of the second series of ***Works of Love***: "All human speech about the spiritual, even the divine speech of Holy **Scripture**, is essentially figurative. . . . Just as the **spirit** is invisible, so is its language [*Sprog*] a secret as well." Thus language does not have to be used in the flat, literalistic manner of modern media; it can serve as a bridge from **actuality** to possibility, from the mundane to the divine (*see* GOD). *See also* ART; CHATTER; ETHICAL/ETHICS; METAPHOR; MYSTICISM; ROMANTICISM; THEATER; WRITING.

LAW. Kierkegaard's most sustained treatment of the concept of "law" (*Lov*) is found in ***Works of Love***, particularly in the fourth deliberation (*see* DISCOURSE/DELIBERATION/SERMON) of the book's first part. Titled "Love Is the Fulfilling of the Law," this piece focuses on the **dialectic** between law and **love**, seeking to unite two important premises of **Christianity**—that **Jesus Christ** exemplifies the love of **God** and that he is the fulfillment of the Jewish (*see* JUDAISM) law. From these doctrinal (*see* DOCTRINE/DOGMA) claims, Kierkegaard arrives at a few key conclusions. First, Christian love does not oppose Jewish law; rather, the latter is akin to a "sketch" (*Udkast*) that the former completes. "There is only one power that can carry out the work for which the Law is the sketch—namely, love. Yet, just as the sketch and the work are by one and the same artist, so also the Law and love are from one and the same source." Second, Kierkegaard compares the relationship between love and law to that between **faith** and understanding. The law stipulates and the understanding calculates, but neither arrives at a place of **rest**, since every stipulation and every calculation "still has indefiniteness that it can become even more definite," resulting in an "undying disquietude." In contrast, love and faith attain the whole that the other two gesture toward but cannot give. With this in mind, Kierkegaard quotes the Apostle Paul: "The end of the commandment is charity out of a pure heart" (1 Tim. 1:5). Third, Kierkegaard clarifies that only Christ's love, sensu stricto, is capable of fulfilling the law in this fashion, since he is the very enfleshment of divine love. In a manner that recalls **Martin Luther**, Kierkegaard insists that Christ's example stands as a reminder of the unbreachable chasm separating the Savior from all other human beings, whom Christ is like in all things but **sin** (Heb. 4:15). Thus the one who would imitate (*see* IMITATION) Christ must rely on the **grace** of God. Indeed, God is the origin and end of Christian love, and so it is essential that a person help others love God. The more the love of God is

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

kindled in others, the closer people come to meeting the demands of the *Lov*. *See also* OFFENSE.

LEAP. Kierkegaard is often associated with the concept of the "leap" (*Spring*), particularly the so-called leap of faith. In truth, however, it is a notion fairly well confined to his early pseudonymous (*see* PSEUDONYMITY) writings. During this period, Kierkegaard was trying to resolve a question that he formulated in an 1842–1843 journal entry: "Can there be a transition from quantitative qualification to a qualitative one without a leap? And does not the whole of life rest in that?" In other words, how is it possible for one to make a qualitative change, since the idea of quality—of what a thing is—is extraneous to quantity. A basket full of apples cannot become oranges just because one adds to or subtracts from its number; an opinion does not become **truth** simply on account of how many people subscribe to it. So qualitative change cannot be explained on the basis of number. As Kierkegaard puts it in an 1844 journal entry, "Every quality consequently emerges with a leap."

Kierkegaard was convinced that this problem had been insufficiently addressed in modern **philosophy**, particularly in **Hegelianism**. The modern quest for a comprehensive and dispassionate **system** of thought brackets off questions of human **freedom** and, thereby, fails to explain that which is discontinuous and sudden. Kierkegaard's category of the *Spring* was meant to fill this void, showing that transitions in **existence** are rooted in **passion**. In ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, Johannes Climacus connects this insight to German polymath Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–1781), whose debate with Lutheran (*see* LUTHER, MARTIN [1483–1546]) theologian Johann Daniel Schumann (1714–1787) had a profound influence on modern Protestant (*see* PROTESTANTISM) theology. Whereas Schumann had attempted to furnish concrete evidence of **Christianity**'s validity, Lessing countered by pithily summing up the difference between historical (*see* HISTORY) events and rational demonstrations: "Contingent truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason" (*Zufällige Geschichtswahrheiten können der Beweis von notwendigen Vernunftwahrheiten nie werden*). This difference between contingency and necessity, Lessing added, is a "broad and ugly ditch" that requires an earnest "leap" (*Sprung*) to get across. According to Climacus, Lessing thereby grasps that the move from the historical to the **eternal** is effectively qualitative and thus belongs to "the category of decision." This conclusion becomes central to Kierkegaard's understanding how one transitions to Christian **religiousness**: it cannot be done by quantitative approximation, particularly since **Jesus Christ** was a historical figure. No amount of historical details add up to **faith** per se; rather, out of an "infinite

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

interest" in one's eternal **happiness**, one must leap into faith. *See also* DECISION; MIRACLE; RELIGIOUS/RELIGIOUSNESS; SELF, THE; WILL.

LEHMANN, PETER MARTIN ORLA (1810–1870). Danish political reformer and statesman who was instrumental in the development of parliamentary government in Denmark. Lehmann was born to a home with political interests. His father, Martin, was a court official who hailed from Holstein, a German-speaking region on the Jutland peninsula, which has long been a contested border territory between Denmark and Germany; his mother Frederikke was the daughter of a former mayor of Copenhagen. Though his father insisted on speaking German at home, Lehmann nevertheless came to identify himself as a Dane. As a young man, he moved among Copenhagen's elite social circles, including the multitalented Ørsted family (see ØRSTED, HANS CHRISTIAN [1777–1851]) and poet Adam Oehlenschläger (1779–1850). Lehmann's education was similarly privileged: he graduated from the **Borgerdyd School** in 1827 and took a law degree from the **University of Copenhagen** in 1833. During this period, Lehmann emerged as a notable political activist. His oratorical skill made him a popular speaker at the university's **Student Association**, and he soon became a leader of Denmark's burgeoning liberal movement. Following a tour abroad, he returned to Copenhagen and embarked on a career in journalism. Along with **Jens Finsteen Giødwad**, he edited the *Copenhagen Post* (*Kjøbenhavnsposten*) and, subsequently, the *Fatherland* (*Fædrelandet*), both liberal papers. This was his springboard into **politics** proper. Over the course of the 1840s, Lehmann publicly and, at times, controversially advocated for both pan-Scandinavian unity and a representative constitution. The latter was finally achieved in 1849 (*see* CONSTITUTION, DANISH), and Lehmann had a hand in its preparation. From the early 1850s to the early 1860s, he was an energetic member of the Danish parliament, but he unhappily withdrew from political affairs after a stint in the cabinet of Foreign Minister Carl Christian Hall (1812–1888). Lehmann died in Copenhagen in September 1870.

Kierkegaard's primary involvement with Lehmann had to do with the **press**, an issue that had roiled Danish society since the latter half of the 18th century. After a period of press **freedom** under the government of Johann Friedrich Struensee (1737–1772), the Danish crown reasserted its control in the 1770s. For example, authors or printers who published polemical writings critical of the state were subject to fines and even arrest. Royal decrees of 1799 and 1810 introduced additional restrictions. Yet, in the wake of the liberal July Revolution (*révolution de Juillet*) in France, the tide began to turn in the 1830s. A miscellany of progressive newspapers appeared, and a number of young intellectuals came to their defense, including Lehmann. In

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

early 1836, he penned a series of articles in the *Copenhagen Post*, arguing that press freedom facilitates political engagement. He also asked readers to bear with journalists as they continue to refine their craft. On 18 February 1836, Kierkegaard responded to Lehmann in *Copenhagen's Flying Post* (*Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post*), which was edited by literary tastemaker **Johan Ludvig Heiberg**. Ascribed to the anonym "B," Kierkegaard's piece contends that Lehmann has passed off the mistakes of journalists as inevitable by-products of human fallibility when, in reality, the press thrives off of such mistakes: the more discord it foments, the more stories it churns out, the more attention it garners. Ultimately, "B" does not reject the idea of a free press altogether, but he warns that a societal preference for news comes at the expense of sophisticated "retrospection." Though "B" registers a number of key points, his impish tone rankled both Lehmann and his fellow journalist **Johannes Hage**, and eventually Lehmann was prodded to respond in writing, issuing a rejoinder in the *Copenhagen Post* on 31 March 1836. Propitiative yet resolute, Lehmann's article vows "to terminate the polemical combat" while simultaneously insisting that the liberal press is working for the betterment of Danish society. Almost two weeks later, on 10 April, Kierkegaard countered with an open letter in the *Flying Post*. Simply titled "To Mr. Orla Lehmann," this piece expands on the points previously articulated by "B," arguing that journalists confuse talking about reform with reform itself. What appears to be ethically (*see* ETHICAL/ETHICS) serious, then, is more akin to shadowboxing—a point to which Kierkegaard would return in ***A Literary Review***, by which time the two figures had embarked on different vocational paths. Nevertheless, it appears that their brief rivalry was followed with great interest. As one contemporary observer wrote, "There has . . . been a change in the Student Union. Their chief and leader, Lehmann, has fallen . . . and the victor is the younger Kierkegaard." *See also THE CORSAIR*; CROWD/PUBLIC.

LEVELING. The concept of "leveling" (*Nivelleringen* or *Nivelleren*) is arguably Kierkegaard's most significant contribution to **social and political** thought. Derived from the verb *nivellere*, which can be translated as "to make even" or "to bring to the same level," the sociopolitical meaning of "leveling" dates back to 17th-century England, when a political faction committed to popular sovereignty and free speech became known as "Levellers." Kierkegaard's conception of *Nivelleringen* bears a resemblance to this historical movement, though he believes that the modern world writ large is marked by leveling. He makes this case primarily in ***A Literary Review***. Drawing on **Thomasine Gyllembourg**'s novel *Two Ages*, Kierkegaard contrasts a bygone "age of revolution" with "**the present age**" (*Nutiden*): the former is marked by **passion** and violence, the latter by **reflection** and **envy**. More specifically,

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Kierkegaard maintains that the present age has been cast into a speculative and incredulous mindset by the proliferation of the **press**. Simultaneously lacking in shared purpose and **individual** aspiration, the people of *Nutiden* relate to one another in "equivocal and ambiguous" fashion. In other words, they are not united by what they are for but by what they are against, namely, that one would dare step out from the **crowd** and dedicate one's life to an **idea**.

When this private *ressentiment* expands to a societal scale, leveling emerges. As Kierkegaard explains, *Nivelleringen* is the victory of abstraction over individual desire; it is like a "deathly stillness in which nothing can rise up." Even worse, it feeds off the envious wish that interpersonal distinctions be eliminated and excellence be distrusted—a wish that finds instantiation in the press, which conjures up a spectral "public" (*Publikum*) to convince spectators that whatever personal momentum they possess is inconsequential in relation to world-historical concerns or events. Should a hero nevertheless surface—say, a political or religious leader—the public can be quickly marshaled to reduce him or her to the level of others. For example, when a politician calls for a certain strategic reform, the press can announce that "the public" does not approve. Of course, this *Publikum* is not an actual (*see* ACTUALITY) human being. Kierkegaard compares it to a "monstrous non-entity" used to compel social conformity. With this in mind, he concludes that the public is "the actual master of leveling," whereas the media is "the dog" that serves the public with salacious stories and pugnacious opinions.

Since leveling undermines both heroic action and communal harmony, it is a process that, as Kierkegaard sees it, is nearly impossible to reverse. In one journal passage, he likens leveling to the "spontaneous combustion of the human race." And yet the situation is not utterly hopeless (*see* HOPE). Kierkegaard argues that authentic **religiousness** can provide an escape from leveling's captivity. Insofar as leveling crushes excellence, it cannot be overcome by strength, only by weakness. With this in mind, religious individuals, who ipso facto are willing to suffer (*see* SUFFERING) on behalf of **equality** and **truth**, will defeat leveling by becoming "unrecognizables" (*Ukjendelige*), existing like "secret agents" in the midst of the present age. That is to say, in their **love** of **God**, and in **imitation** of **Jesus Christ**, the unrecognizables are willing "to serve in suffering, to help indirectly." Hence, despite its wickedness, leveling can be seen as a trial or, as Kierkegaard puts it, an *examen rigorosum*, in which certain persons will **leap** "into the embrace of God." *See also THE CORSAIR*.

LEVIN, ISRAEL SALOMON (1810–1883). Danish linguist and literary critic who worked as a secretary for Kierkegaard in the 1840s. Born to a Jewish (*see* JUDAISM) family in the industrial city of Randers, Levin never

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

finished an academic degree but carved out a reputation as a fine critic and translator, publishing collections of works by Danish authors such as Ludvig Holberg (1684–1754) and Johan Herman Wessel (1742–1785). During 1841–1842, Levin edited the literary review section of the newspaper the *Day* (*Dagen*), and he was an active if polemical participant in both the **Student Association** and the Society for the Promotion of Danish Literature (Samfundet til den danske Litteraturs Fremme). In 1844, he issued the first part of his *Handbook of the Grammar of the Danish Language* (*Haandbog i det danske Sprogs Grammatik*) but never completed the project. Years later, he would embark on an official Danish dictionary but failed to finish it as well, though his meticulous research would be incorporated into subsequent dictionaries. Surly by nature, and more valued than liked, Levin spent his career on the margins of Copenhagen's intelligentsia. In December 1869, he was invited by Niels August Wolff (1833–1886), a military commander and an admirer of Kierkegaard's writings, to author a biography of the great Danish thinker. Characteristically, Levin replied that he had "slaved enough for others without recognition."

Levin was hired by Kierkegaard in 1844. His principal tasks were to make copies and to take diction, the latter of which Levin found bothersome. "The depiction of situations and the pointedness of phrasing," Levin once wrote of Kierkegaard, "cost an enormous amount of labor. What with all the corrections, and yet more corrections, we almost never finished [certain writings]." Nevertheless, Levin worked for Kierkegaard for several more years, sometimes spending as much as eight hours per day with him. Such intimacy gave Levin untold access to Kierkegaard, and he recorded a number of peculiar observations, including Kierkegaard's penchant for putting piles of sugar in his coffee and his almost farcical pyrophobia. Whether or not Levin's tales are accurate is another question, and, in any case, the fractious feelings seem to have been mutual. Kierkegaard's extant communiqués to Levin are typically curt and more than a little patronizing. In one note, written at some point between 1844 and 1846, Kierkegaard asks Levin to pay him a visit on the same morning. "After all," Kierkegaard adds, "you are unoccupied these days—for the fact that you find yourself squabbling with all society cannot be considered any kind of activity." In an 1845 memo, Kierkegaard tells Levin that he does not want to contribute to a volume on handwriting that the latter was compiling: "That kind of draft [*Kladderie*] could easily become daft [*Kludderie*]," he quips. However, it is curious—indeed, seemingly inexplicable—that Kierkegaard kept a copy of this very book in his library, not to mention two other works by Levin. *See also* MONEY.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

LIFE-VIEW. Kierkegaard uses the noun "life-view" (*Livs-Anskuelse*) well over 100 times in his authorship, whereas he uses the similar term "world-view" (*Verdens-Anskuelse*) on a mere 12 occasions. This discrepancy is somewhat surprising, given the eventual popularity of the German noun *Weltanschauung*, a word that came to be featured in the thought of philosophers such as Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) and **Martin Heidegger**. Also rendered in English as "worldview," *Weltanschauung* came to denote a set of presuppositions that one holds, whether consciously or subconsciously, about the nature of the world. It is the basic standpoint from which one attends to **existence**. Moreover, a worldview often remains unexamined until it is challenged by someone or something from the outside.

The notion of *Livs-Anskuelse*, at least in the sense that Kierkegaard uses it, is related but slightly different. There are passages that liken a life-view to the fundamental perspective of a given existential stage. In ***Either/Or***, for example, the aesthete's attempt to maximize sensuous pleasure is described as a life-view. In a different but related vein, Johannes Climacus complains in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript*** that modern **Christianity** finds itself in "dubious situation" in which "life-views . . . far lower than Christianity are introduced within Christianity and have pleased people (the Christians) more, which is natural, since Christianity is the most difficult." With this in mind, a life-view can be understood as an outcome of one's **decision** to live in accordance with a particular **idea**, though, as has been seen, life-views are not necessarily of equal validity. They can be inchoately adopted or poorly developed. Indeed, one of the most enduring observations in Kierkegaard's corpus is that the cogency of one's life-view is known by its fruits. In ***From the Papers of One Still Living***, he criticizes **Hans Christian Andersen**'s novel *Only a Fiddler* for prioritizing **mood** over life-view, even as in ***A Literary Review*** he praises **Thomasine Gyllembourg** for maintaining a consistent life-view throughout her authorial activity. The two writers, not to mention their works, thereby represent the importance of the concept of *Livs-Anskuelse*: the one who lacks a determinate life-view will be subservient to the unrest of earthly existence, whereas the one who possesses an authentic life-view is able to assimilate the various aspects of life into a coherent whole. In the latter case, **the self**'s temporal (*see* TEMPORALITY/TIME) unfolding is viewed as a task consonant with **eternity**, rather than as a by-product of accidental forces. *See also* AESTHETIC; CULTURE; ETHICAL/ETHICS; IMAGINATION; INDIVIDUAL; LOVE; RELIGIOUS/RELIGIOUSNESS.

LINDBERG, JACOB CHRISTIAN (1797–1857). Danish priest, theologian, and politician. Son of an auxiliary priest (*Kapellan*) at Ribe Cathedral, Lindberg was primed for a predictable career in Denmark's **state church**. He

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

matriculated at the **University of Copenhagen** in 1815, studied theology, and graduated in 1822. However, his unique interests and fierce personality set him on a distinctive path. With regard to the former, Lindberg became an accomplished scholar of Hebrew grammar and antique numismatics, completing his doctoral degree in 1828 with a thesis on Phoenician and Greek coin inscriptions. Meanwhile, in theological circles, he became well known both as an associate of **Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig** and as an opponent of rationalism. In 1829, Lindberg published an article attacking Professor **Henrik Nikolaj Clausen**, who was a key advocate for the modernization of church **doctrine**, a move that quashed Lindberg's prospects for an academic appointment. During the 1830s, Lindberg independently pursued a number of intellectual projects, including a translation of the Bible, which he would not complete for well over a decade. He was also known to hold free religious meetings at his home, "Little Serenity" (Lille Rolighed), on the outskirts of Copenhagen—a cause célèbre at the time, which resulted in the ridicule of Lindberg both in the **press** and in public. Nevertheless, in 1844, Lindberg left Copenhagen for a pastoral charge on the island of Falster. He served there dutifully for a several years and, like Grundtvig, developed an interest in **politics**. In 1853, he was elected as a representative to the Danish parliament (Folketing) and was later reelected. However, in December 1857, he died of typhoid.

Kierkegaard's father, **Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard**, and older brother **Peter Christian Kierkegaard** were on friendly terms with Lindberg, and the latter was a regular guest in the Kierkegaard family home in Nytorv. In a number of journal entries, particularly during the 1830s, Kierkegaard himself makes sympathetic, if not uncritical, references to Lindberg, usually in connection to Grundtvig. Later, in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, Johannes Climacus refers to Lindberg as a man of "many excellent abilities," thereby contrasting him with Grundtvig, whom Climacus criticizes sharply. The precise significance of such passages remains a matter of debate. It is worth underlining, however, that Lindberg's polemics against state-church bureaucracy and his call to follow **Jesus Christ** even in opposition to ecclesiastical authority bear a resemblance to Kierkegaard's so-called "attack upon **Christendom**" (*see MOMENT*, *THE*) of 1854–1855. Indeed, one might infer that, whereas Kierkegaard's father and older brother appreciated Lindberg behind closed doors, Kierkegaard himself came to imitate (*see* IMITATION) Lindberg's radical Christian discipleship of the 1830s. That Lindberg, a Jutlander, had been marginalized by Copenhagen's cultural elites may have made an especially strong impression on the young Kierkegaard. As Jørgen Bukdahl has observed, it is striking that Kierkegaard's mother, **Ane Sørensdatter Lund**—herself a Jutlander, who came to Copenhagen as a servant girl

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

and lacked the erudition of the men in her family—was particularly fond of *Zion's Harp: A Christmas Gift to the Christian Congregation* (*Zions Harps: En Jule-Gave til den christne Menighed*, 1831), which Lindberg put together for the religious meetings at his home. In short, Kierkegaard's final appeal to the simple piety of the **common man** over against the bourgeois politesse of state-church Christianity doubtless has roots in the social tumult stirred up by figures such as Lindberg decades earlier.

LITERARY REVIEW, A. In October 1845, **Thomasine Gyllembourg** issued her last novel, *Two Ages* (*To Tidsaldre*). As was typical of her authorship as a whole, she published this work under an anonym—"the author of *A Story of Everyday Life*," a reference to her popular 1828 novel *En Hverdags-Historie*, which had been released serially in her son **Johan Ludvig Heiberg**'s paper *Copenhagen's Flying Post* (*Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post*). Notably, Madame Gyllembourg's readership, including Kierkegaard himself, did not know that the acclaimed author was a woman, though Heiberg's involvement hinted that he was close to the person in question.

Kierkegaard began to write a review of *Two Ages* soon after its publication, albeit in fits and starts. However, upon delivering the manuscript of ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript*** to the printer in December 1845, he was able to devote more attention to the project. It was a tumultuous period in his career. Not only was Kierkegaard considering giving up his authorial work for a pastoral appointment, but he was embroiled in a public fracas with the satirical paper ***The Corsair***, a scandal that indirectly would play a role in Kierkegaard's analysis of Madame Gyllembourg's novel. Still, Kierkegaard soldiered on and issued the review on 30 March 1946, giving it the redundant and, by his standards, bland title of *A Literary Review* (*En literair Anmeldelse*). Perhaps that is why the book failed to make an immediate impression. It was not assessed by a single contemporary critic and more or less fell into obscurity until 1940, when Alexander Dru published an English translation of its third part, calling it *The Present Age*. Since then, *A Literary Review* has been recognized as a significant and almost prophetic text, which features some of Kierkegaard's most penetrating insights into **the social and political** conditions of modernity. It might also be viewed as one the best examples of Kierkegaard's talent for literary criticism.

A Literary Review comprises three main parts: (1) a survey of Madame Gyllembourg's novel *Two Ages*, which traces the development of family life since the French Revolution, with one generation roiled by the liberal upheavals of the late 18th century and the next generation marked by bourgeois contentment; (2) an appraisal of the novel's aesthetic qualities, which Kierkegaard commends for its "balanced and dignified faithful reproduction

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

of **actuality**;" and (3) a philosophical conclusion, in which Kierkegaard expands on "the consequences" of Madame Gyllembourg's portrayal of two ages—first, "The Age of Revolution" (*Revolutions-Tiden*), followed by "The Present Age" (*Nutiden*). While *A Literary Review* is meant to be read as a complete work, it is the third section that has received the most interest from commentators. This scholarly discrepancy is understandable. The third section, titled "The Gains from the Observation of the Two Ages" ("Udbytte for Iagttagelsen af de tvende Tidsaldere"), uses Madame Gyllembourg's dialectical (*see* DIALECTIC) schema to develop an incisive analysis of the modern bourgeoisie. In the process, Kierkegaard fleshes out some of the most important concepts in his oeuvre, including **crowd/public**, **envy**, **leveling**, and **reflection**. Moreover, he expands on his long-standing criticism of the **press**, which first emerged in his student debates with figures such as **Orla Lehmann** but did not come to fruition until *The Corsair* began ridiculing him in its pages. In a way that strikingly anticipates the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), Kierkegaard argues that the culture of *Nutiden* suppresses **individual** excellence in favor of mass conformity—a "soft" but ultimately violent form of social control, in which the highest possibilities of human **existence** are held in check by a utilitarian "public." Unlike Nietzsche, however, Kierkegaard argues that only a turn to authentic **religiousness** can offer an egress from this situation, since the religious life repudiates the deconstructive spite of the leveling process and, through **suffering**, gives **witness** to a genuine **equality** predicated on the **love** of **God**. *See also* COMMUNICATION; CULTURE; HISTORY; IMAGINATION; IMITATION; INWARDNESS; LANGUAGE; LIFE-VIEW; MONEY; PASSION; *POINT OF VIEW FOR MY WORK AS AN AUTHOR*, *THE*; POLITICS; PRESENT AGE, THE; REVOLUTION.

LOVE. The English noun "love" translates two main Danish words—*Elskov* and *Kjerlighed*. There is a general preference to render *Elskov* as "erotic love" and *Kjerlighed* as "altruistic love," but this distinction is not always present. In fact, the verbal form "to love" (*at elske*) encompasses a wide range of meanings, from finding someone or something particularly attractive to caring for another. Kierkegaard uses both *Elskov* and *Kjerlighed* in his authorship, with the former appearing more than 200 times and the latter nearly 900 times. Moreover, an interest in love and its significance ranges across Kierkegaard's corpus, including discussions in early pseudonymous (*see* PSEUDONYMITY) works such as ***Either/Or*** and ***Stages on Life's Way*** and in late signed writings such as ***The Moment***. At the same time, however, Kierkegaard's most sustained treatment of love is the aptly named ***Works of Love***, which was published roughly at the midpoint of his literary career.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Kierkegaard's analysis of love is fundamentally dialectical (*see* DIALECTIC). That is to say, he puts two overarching types of love in conversation and thereby attempts to shed light on where they overlap and where they diverge. In the process, he highlights various fault lines that run through philosophical and theological conceptions of love, whether the rift between **paganism** and **Christianity**, between Plato's *Symposium* (c. 385–370 BCE) and the biblical New Testament, between the Greek god Eros and **Jesus Christ**, or between two kinds of loves, *erōs* and *agapē*. As a rule, Kierkegaard argues that pagan love is rooted in sensual or intellectual inclination and **passion**; thus it is a natural (*see* NATURE) and fundamentally immediate (*see* IMMEDIACY) response to various earthly stimuli. In contrast, Christian love is a **duty** whose basis lies in Jesus' interpretation of the *Sh'ma Yisrael* (Deut. 6:4–9): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second *is* like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets" (Matt. 22:37–40). Since Christian love is rooted in obedience to the unchanging **God**, it should be free from the vicissitudes of worldly affection and preference. At the same time, however, Christian love is not opposed to the natural love praised in, say, the *Symposium*; rather, it upholds and elevates love's erotic dimension. Indeed, as Kierkegaard argues in *Works of Love*, the one who loves another in a Christian manner ipso facto introduces a "third" into the relationship, namely, God. As he puts it, "Christianity teaches that love is a relationship between: a person—God—a person, that is, that God is the middle term." From a Christian point of view, this tripartite structure is present no matter the human relationship: in and through God, love views every person as "neighbor" (*Næste*). Elsewhere in *Works of Love*, Kierkegaard refers to this as love's "eternal **equality**," noting that the one who loves Christianly does not—or must not—make distinctions between persons. Thus coming to love in a Christian fashion is a process, which slowly but surely requires **the self** to detach from its finite (*see* FINITUDE/INFINITY) and **temporal** proclivities in order to ground itself in the enduring **ethical** and **religious** standards of **eternity**. *See also* AESTHETIC; DYING TO; IMITATION; LAW; MARRIAGE.

LUND, ANE SØRENSDATTER (1768–1834). Second wife of **Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard** and mother to seven children, including Søren Aabye. Ane grew up in modest circumstances in central Jutland. One of six children of tenant farmer Søren Jensen Lund (c. 1725–1798) and his wife Maren Larsdatter (c. 1731–1821), Ane went into domestic service at a young age, first in her native region and then in Copenhagen, where her older brother Lars Sørensen Lund (c. 1755–1824) worked as a distiller. She eventually took a posi-

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

tion in the home of cloth merchant Mads Nielsen Røyen (1741–1827), whose sister Kirstine Nielsdatter Røyen would marry Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard in 1794. At this time, Ane began to work for the Kierkegaards. In the winter of 1796, Kirstine came down with pneumonia and, on 23 March of the same year, passed away. What happened next is simultaneously murky and evident. For any number of reasons, the widower Kierkegaard commenced a relationship with Ane and, on 26 April 1797, took her as his second wife. Less than five months later, Ane gave birth to the couple's first child, Maren Kirstine. It seems clear, then, that Michael Pedersen decided to marry Ane after learning that she was pregnant with his child—an inference validated by the fact that the couple's marriage contract, dated 10 March 1797, specifies that they were not planning to live together. So parsimonious was this contract that Michael Pedersen's attorney requested that he draft a second version. Eventually, the couple's nuptials took place at home, out of the public eye.

Despite this inauspicious beginning, it appears that Michael Pedersen and Ane grew to **love** one another. In any case, as their home filled with children, Ane was a notable and doubtless indispensable counterbalance to her husband. Whereas Michael Pedersen was gloomy and thin, Ane was stout and cheerful; whereas Michael Pedersen intensely engaged in the day's most pressing ideas and issues, Ane could not write and, it seems, read primarily for devotional purposes. Her maternal demeanor appears to have made a lasting impression on her children. For example, when the Kierkegaards' sixth child, Niels Andreas, unexpectedly died of tuberculosis in Paterson, New Jersey, the attending minister—the Rev. Ralph Williston of St. Paul's Episcopal Church—sent a letter directly to "Mrs. Anna Kierkegaard." According to Williston, Niels Andreas, who had left Denmark to seek his fortune in America, had spoken tenderly of his mother in his final days, even crediting her (rather than Michael Pedersen) with his upbringing in **Christianity**. Famously, Niels Andreas's younger brother Søren would have no such trouble speaking of his father. And yet, when Ane died after a lengthy bout with typhus on 31 July 1834, it was reported that Søren was overcome with grief. In fact, the mother of **Hans Lassen Martensen** once recalled that she had never seen a person "so deeply distressed" as Søren Kierkegaard upon the death of his mother. This recollection is somewhat surprising, given that Ane does not appear by name in Kierkegaard's writings. And yet, in certain passages, one seems to get a glimpse of how Kierkegaard viewed his mother—for example, in an 1844 journal entry where he extols the "beautiful sight" of a mother carrying her weary child down a bustling Østergade. *See also* ASSISTENS CEMETERY; KIERKEGAARD, PETER CHRISTIAN (1805–1888); WESTERGAARD, ANDERS CHRISTENSEN (1818–1867).

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

LUND, HENRIK SIGVARD (1825–1889). Danish physician. Born in Copenhagen, Henrik Sigvard was the oldest child of clothier Johan Christian Lund (1799–1875) and his wife, Nicoline Christine Kierkegaard (1799–1832), the latter of whom was the second child of **Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard** and **Ane Sørensdatter Lund**. Thus Henrik Sigvard was the nephew of Søren Aabye Kierkegaard. The two seem to have been close at least since Henrik Sigvard's youth. In an 1841 letter to Danish philosopher **Frederik Christian Sibbern** (1785–1872), Kierkegaard relays that "my nephew Henrik Lund" had successfully conveyed Sibbern's recent message. In October 1844, Kierkegaard sent a note to the Royal Library (Det Kongelige Bibliotek) assuming liability for any books Henrik Sigvard borrowed from its holdings. Likewise, on 3 May 1849, Henrik Sigvard dispatched a brief message to Kierkegaard from the Baltic island of Als, where he was serving as a doctor with the army. The occasion of this letter was Kierkegaard's upcoming birthday, but Henrik Sigvard closes with a note of affection: "From your nephew who never forgets you." Kierkegaard's response is characteristically avuncular. After calling himself an "old man," Kierkegaard resorts to some potty humor, seemingly alluding to a bout of constipation: "Yes, postponement is a dangerous thing, as I myself all too unfortunately realize these days. . . . Just as one can speak of suffering from lockjaw, similarly and no differently, I inform you respectfully that I am suffering from lockass."

There are additional extant exchanges between uncle and nephew, but, in October 1855, their fates would become more deeply entwined. In the midst of his so-called attack upon Christendom (*see MOMENT*, *THE*), Kierkegaard was admitted to **Frederik's Hospital** in Copenhagen. Henrik Sigvard was then completing his residency at the hospital and checked on his uncle daily. Indeed, it was often through Henrik Sigvard that Kierkegaard's extended family received updates on the patient's worsening condition. Likewise, it was Henrik Sigvard who wrote to **Emil Boesen** on the day of Kierkegaard's death, giving the sad news: "He is no more. You have lost a friend of your youth." In this same letter, moreover, Henrik Sigvard declares his fondness for his uncle, calling him "my only and best friend, a tried and faithful counselor, an experienced and certain guide!"

Given this depth of feeling, it is perhaps unsurprising that Henrik Sigvard became involved in Kierkegaard's posthumous affairs. First, and most famously, Henrik Sigvard interrupted Kierkegaard's burial proceedings on 18 November 1855. After a packed and tense funeral at Copenhagen's Church of Our Lady (Vor Frue Kirke), in which **Peter Christian Kierkegaard** gave the eulogy, the service moved to **Assistens Cemetery**. After Archdeacon Christoffer Eggert Tryde cast earth on Kierkegaard's casket, Henrik Sigvard stepped forward and began to speak. Tryde warned him that only ordained

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

clergy were authorized to speak at **church** funerals, but many in attendance encouraged Henrik Sigvard to continue. His subsequent speech, which was published in the *Fatherland* (*Fædrelandet*) four days later, testifies to his deep connection to his uncle: "I am bound to him . . . by the memory of my mother, who died young, and it was only through him that I believed I had a living image of my mother." Yet, controversially, it also touches on Kierkegaard's recent polemics against the Danish **state church**, noting that the clergy had avoided the subject during the funeral: "I have not heard [Kierkegaard's views] mentioned with a single word. On the contrary, I have heard only long-winded beating around the bush." With this in mind, Henrik Sigvard launches into his own critique of the *Folkekirke*, arguing that its errors are prefigured in the third chapter of the Book of Revelation: "I know thy works, that thou art neither cold nor hot: I would thou wert cold or hot. So then because thou art lukewarm, and neither cold nor hot, I will spue thee out of my mouth" (Rev. 3:15–16). Ultimately, the very fact that Kierkegaard was buried in an ecclesiastical ceremony demonstrates the church's deceit: "[Kierkegaard] has been brought here against his repeatedly expressed will," Henrik Sigvard declares, "and has in a way been violated."

Since Henrik Sigvard's speech contravened Danish law; he was fined 100 rixdollars and had to pay court costs to boot. Moreover, he was required to apologize to Archdeacon Tryde. For a period of time, Henrik Sigvard's outburst was a cause célèbre, a fitting coda to his uncle's legacy. But Henrik Sigvard had more pressing matters to attend to. For roughly the next year, he set about organizing Kierkegaard's literary remains, which were found at Kierkegaard's final address in central Copenhagen (present-day 38 Skindergade/5 Dyrkøb). However, when Henrik Sigvard took a medical appointment on the island of St. John (Sankt Jan) in the Virgin Islands, Kierkegaard's papers were put into storage, first with Henrik Sigvard's father and then with Peter Christian Kierkegaard. Nevertheless, Henrik Sigvard can rightly be considered as the first person to testify to the idiosyncratic manner in which Kierkegaard had stored his various journals, notebooks, and papers. *See also* CULTURE; MARTENSEN, HANS LASSEN (1808–1884).

LUTHER, MARTIN (1483–1546). German monk, theologian, and **church** reformer whose views led to the Protestant Reformation. Born in the town of Eisleben in the Holy Roman Empire's County of Mansfield, Luther grew up in an ambitious middle-class family. In 1501, he matriculated at the University of Erfurt with the expectation of studying **law** but, in due course, gravitated toward **philosophy** and theology. In 1505, after a period of **inner** conflict, Luther entered St. Augustine's Monastery (Augustinerkloster) in Erfurt. Under the guidance of Augustinian Superior Johann von Staupitz

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

(c. 1460–1524), Luther turned to scholarship as a means of assuaging his spiritual doubts. He followed Staupitz to the University of Wittenberg, where he studied both the Bible and the *Four Books of Sentences* (*Libri Quattuor Sententiarum*) of Peter Lombard (c. 1096–1160). Luther received his doctorate in October 1512 and immediately became chair of theology at Wittenberg, a position he held for the rest of his career. Famously, he entered into controversy on 31 October 1517 when he sent a letter to Albrecht von Brandenburg (1490–1545), archbishop of Mainz, arguing that the sale of plenary indulgences was theologically incoherent. This letter was accompanied by a catalog of propositions for academic debate, originally titled *Disputation on the Power and Efficacy of Indulgences* (*Disputatio pro declaratione virtutis indulgentiarum*) but now popularly known as the *Ninety-Five Theses*. Luther's propositions were widely distributed throughout Europe. In time, what was meant to be a theological discussion morphed into a full-blown ecclesial crisis. In April 1521, Luther was summoned to the Diet of Worms (Reichstag zu Worms), where he was asked to defend his views. Roughly a month later, on 25 May 1521, Emperor Charles V (1500–1558) issued a decree declaring that Luther was a heretic and should be "apprehended and punished." Yet, with the help of Frederick III, Elector of Saxony (1463–1525), Luther went into hiding, staying in the secluded Wartburg Castle in Thuringia. While at Wartburg, Luther deepened and expanded his critique of **Catholicism**. By 1522, it was clear that Luther's teaching had sparked not only a new denomination of Christian **doctrine** but, indeed, an open sociopolitical rebellion, albeit one that lacked a center. Luther returned to Wittenberg and attempted to provide stability, though his efforts proved to be muddled and, finally, controversial. After backing the right of secular authorities to put down revolts among the peasantry, Luther set about organizing a new church. His personal life also changed dramatically: in June 1525, he married Katharina von Bora (1499–1552), a former Cistercian nun, and the couple had six children. Nevertheless, by the late 1530s, Luther's health was increasingly poor, and, after a stroke, he died in Eisleben on 18 February 1546.

As with any important thinker, Luther's ideas resist simplification. Still, it is almost obligatory for scholars to mention the so-called three *solae* of Lutheran theology. The first, *sola fides* ("faith alone"), avers that human beings are justified or made acceptable to **God** only through **faith** in **Jesus Christ** (Rom. 1:17), rather than through the works of the **law** (Rom. 3:28). The second, *sola gratia* ("**grace** alone"), professes that only God's **love** and Christ's merits are capable of justifying human beings and, consequently, that no human deed is to be understood as salvifically meritorious. The third, *sola scriptura* ("**Scripture** alone"), affirms that the Bible, and not church tradition, is the supreme religious **authority**, providing all of the guidance

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

necessary for one to obtain **salvation**. This core of Lutheran theology was worked out by Luther in almost ad hoc fashion, first coming to expression in polemical writings such as *The Babylonian Captivity of the Church* (*De captivitate Babylonica ecclesiae*, 1520) and *The Freedom of a Christian* (*De Libertate Christiana*, 1520). Years later, after **Protestantism** emerged as an autonomous form of **Christianity**, Luther's ideas were codified in a number of texts, including Luther's own *Small Catechism* (*Der Kleine Katechismus*, 1529) and *Smalcald Articles* (*Schmalkaldische Artikel*, 1537), as well as the summa of Lutheran dogma, *The Book of Concord* (*Concordia*, 1580), compiled by a group of theologians under the leadership of Jakob Andreae (1528–1590) and Martin Chemnitz (1522–1586). These and other documents would ultimately comprise the doctrinal backbone of Denmark's Evangelical-Lutheran People's Church (Evangelisk-Luthereske Folkekirke), which King Christian III (1503–1559), aided by Wittenberg theologian Johannes Bugenhagen (1485–1558), founded as the nation's **state church** in 1536.

As a Danish citizen, Kierkegaard was reared in the *Folkekirke* and thus was well acquainted with Lutheran teaching (*see* BALLE, NIKOLAI EDINGER [1744–1816]). At the same time, however, it appears that Kierkegaard's direct knowledge of Luther's writings was limited. He himself indicates this point in an 1847 journal entry, wherein he admits that he is beginning to study Luther for the first time. Indeed, from around the period of ***Works of Love***, Kierkegaard seems to have taken a pronounced interest in Luther, even noting in April 1848 that he is reading an anthology of Luther's homilies—namely, *A Christian Book of Sermons* (*En Christelig Postille*, 1828)—"according to plan." In this same entry, he adds with ardor: "O, Luther is still the master of us all." That is not to suggest, however, that Kierkegaard became a devotee of the great reformer. In a manner that betrays sympathies with **Pietism**, Kierkegaard argues that Luther bungles the dialectic between law and gospel, works and **faith**. While Kierkegaard grants that Luther was right to correct (*see* CORRECTIVE) the excesses of the medieval church, he concludes that Luther's reform was insufficiently nuanced: in razing the notion of works-righteousness, Luther created a situation in which Christian discipleship has become little more than a private assent to ecclesial teaching. In other words, the **imitation** of Christ has given way to the grace of Christ, so much so that Christian **existence** is now indistinguishable from secular **worldliness**. "On the whole," Kierkegaard writes in an 1850 journal entry, "Luther struck too hard." At times, Kierkegaard even sounds as if he thinks Protestantism writ large is a category error. Its basic principles are not in service to Christianity but to human self-indulgence: "[Luther] was muddle-headed. A reform which amounts to casting off burdens and making life easy is appreciated—and one can easily get friends to cooperate."

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Whether or not Kierkegaard's criticisms of Luther are well founded is doubtless a matter of debate. What is certain, however, is that Kierkegaard's late writings increasingly sought to correct Luther's corrective. By the time of his so-called attack upon Christendom (*see MOMENT*, *THE*), Kierkegaard was holding up *imitatio Christi* and **martyrdom** as signs of authentic faith in direct contradistinction to Lutheran **orthodoxy**. And yet, despite this unmistakable trajectory, it would be rash to conclude that Kierkegaard's onetime appreciation of Luther had been extinguished. As he put it in an 1850 journal entry, "Luther's true successor will come to resemble the exact opposite of Luther." *See also* MONASTICISM; MYSTICISM; REPENTANCE; RUDELBACH, ANDREAS GOTTLOB (1792–1862).

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

M

MARRIAGE. Though Kierkegaard himself never married, the concept of "marriage" (*Ægteskab*) plays an important role in his life and thought. On a personal level, Kierkegaard experienced significant **anxiety** over whether or not to marry. On 10 September 1840, Kierkegaard asked for **Regine Olsen**'s hand in marriage; she agreed. Famously, however, he broke off the engagement roughly a year later, a **decision** that had a formative influence on his work as an author. This influence can be understood in different ways. For example, that Kierkegaard remained a lifelong bachelor meant that he had more time for his literary activity. It also meant that he was able to devote more attention to his relationship with **God**, to whom—in a journal entry written on the 12th anniversary of his engagement to Regine—Kierkegaard professed to be truly engaged.

Yet, on an intellectual level, Kierkegaard's experience with Regine encouraged him to ponder the philosophical and theological significance of marriage. In both ***Either/Or*** and ***Stages on Life's Way***, Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** Judge William (also referred to as "A Married Man" [*En Ægtemand*]) treats marriage as an **ethical** institution, which delivers erotic **love** from its penchant for caprice and self-gratification and thereby preserves **aesthetic** beauty in and through **duty**. Put differently, marriage is the **religious** authorization and sublimation of natural (*see* NATURE) love. Thus marriage is a prime condition for earthly **happiness**, since it unites both **eternity** and **temporality**. The one who forsakes it is bound to lapse into carnal **immediacy** or spiritual **melancholy**, both of which are forms of **despair**. In ***Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions***, a signed work that Kierkegaard published in tandem with *Stages on Life's Way*, Kierkegaard coalesces a number of these ideas. In particular, the book's second discourse, "On the Occasion of a Wedding" ("Ved Anledningen af en Brudevielse"), maintains that marriage is tantamount to **earnestness**. In the wedding ceremony, the couple resolves to abide by the right conception of God and marriage, summed up in the expression "love conquers everything" (*Kjærlighed overvinder Alt*). That Kierkegaard could articulate such a positive philosophy of marriage seems to illuminate his oft-quoted 1843 journal entry: "If I had had faith, I would have stayed with Regine."

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

At the same time, however, Kierkegaard's late writings tend to look at marriage in a different light. Rather than consider the institution from an ideal point of view, Kierkegaard begins to stress that it has been perverted by social custom and bourgeois comfort. In ***Practice in Christianity***, Anti-Climacus argues that **Christendom** has used marriage as a means of obfuscating the fundamental claim of the New Testament—that discipleship consists in the **imitation** of Jesus Christ, even unto **martyrdom**. In the posthumously published *Judge for Yourself!* (*Dømmer selv!*, 1876), Kierkegaard ironically (*see* IRONY) suggests that pastors in the Danish **state church** only warn against the indulgences of marriage—after getting married themselves. Several late journal passages expand on these points, observing that marriage is, at best, a **corrective** to the works-righteousness of asceticism and that the ideal Christian state is to remain unmarried and celibate. However, whether or not these perspectives represent a recantation or a refinement of his earlier writings on marriage remains an open question. *See also* EXCEPTION/UNIVERSAL; EXISTENCE; RECOLLECTION; *REPETITION*.

MARTENSEN, HANS LASSEN (1808–1884). Danish theologian, philosopher, and bishop. Born in Flensborg on the Jutland peninsula—a port city that today is called Flensburg and is part of the northernmost German state of Schleswig-Holstein—Martensen had a tumultuous childhood. His father, Hans Andersen Martensen (1782–1822), was a mariner who, due to poor health and in search of better opportunities, moved his family to Copenhagen in 1817. A few years later, Hans Andersen died, leaving his family in dire circumstances. Nevertheless, his only son, Hans Lassen, showed great promise as a student and, with the aid of benefactors, was able to receive a top-notch education. He first attended the prestigious Metropolitan School (Metropolitanskolen) and later the **University of Copenhagen**, where he graduated with a degree in theology in 1832. Over the next decade, Martensen emerged as one Denmark's most talented and ambitious young thinkers. After studying in Berlin, Vienna, and Paris, Martensen returned to Copenhagen, intent on harmonizing Christian theology and **Hegelianism**. In 1837, he completed his licentiate thesis, *The Autonomy of Human Self-Consciousness in Modern Dogmatic Theology* (*De autonomia conscientiae sui humane in theologiam dogmaticam nostril temporis introducta*), proposing a religious epistemology in which self-consciousness is dependent on a prior relationship to **God**, particularly in and through the human faculty of **conscience**. In 1840, Martensen received an honorary doctorate from the University of Kiel and, in fairly short order, published works on a range of topics, including a treatise on the thought of medieval German mystic Meister Eckhart (c. 1260–c. 1328) and a notable summa on Christian **dogma**. Additional accolades and promotions

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

followed. Martensen juggled a professorate at the University of Copenhagen with an 1845 appointment as preacher to the royal court. Two years later, he was made knight in the Order of the Dannebrog, thereby paving the way for him to eventually receive a bishopric.

Indeed, while Kierkegaard and Martensen had known each other for years, it was in this capacity that the two were destined to collide. In 1854, following the death of **Jakob Peter Mynster**, Martensen delivered and subsequently published a sermon commemorating the deceased primate. Kierkegaard, who had been tutored by Martensen as a student, followed the events in the newspaper with a jaundiced eye. He knew that Martensen was a candidate to succeed Mynster and that the former's eulogy was partly a political performance, meant to exhibit Martensen's fitness for the vacant episcopal see. Even worse, Martensen used the occasion to trump up Mynster's legacy. Both were considered sophisticated yet reliable conservatives: thus the greater Mynster's bequest, the greater the likelihood of Martensen's appointment. Predictably, then, Martensen's speech was replete with superlatives, including his claim that Mynster was a "a link in this holy chain of witnesses to the **truth**," which stretches "across the ages, from the days of the Apostles up to our own times." A few months later, in April 1854, Martensen was named bishop of Zealand, and he was consecrated during an extravagant ceremony at Pentecost. The whole affair gnawed at Kierkegaard on multiple levels. He was already of the opinion that the Danish **state church** was more like an **aesthetic** display of **Christianity** than an institution committed to forming disciples of **Jesus Christ**. But to see Mynster posthumously granted the status of an **apostle**, not to mention the partisan wrangling for governmental power, was more than he could bear. After a period of **silence**, during which he sought to distance himself from the public debate about Mynster's successor, Kierkegaard finally issued a protest on 18 December 1854. Titled "Was Bishop Mynster a 'Witness to the Truth,' One of 'the True Witnesses to the Truth'—Is This the Truth?" ("Var Biskop Mynster et 'Sandhedsvidne', et af 'de rette Sandhedsvidner'—er dette Sandhed?") and published in the liberal paper *Fatherland* (*Fædrelandet*), Kierkegaard's piece draws a sharp distinction between an authentic **witness** to truth, who undergoes worldly suffering in **imitation** of Christ, and one who plays at Christianity like "a child plays at being a soldier." The latter, Kierkegaard contends, is typical of Mynster, Martensen, and others who seek material prestige and profit from Christian **faith**.

Kierkegaard's article caused a hullabaloo, and, 10 days later, Martensen issued a response in *Berling's Times* (*Berlingske Tidende*), a prominent conservative newspaper. In this piece, Martensen presents a semantic discussion about the meaning of "witness to truth" (*Sandhedsvidne*) but also makes sure to critique "Dr. S. Kierkegaard" personally, arguing that the philosopher's

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

ideas have grown "all too rigid" and that he has come to resemble a Danish Thersites. This last reference is a double entendre: Thersites is an Achaean soldier from the second book of the *Iliad*, famed not only for his insubordination but also for his hobbled and hunchbacked bearing. That Martensen is simultaneously calling Kierkegaard a traitor and mocking his appearance—a tactic already used by ***The Corsair***—is evident. In a January 1855 letter, Martensen refers to his riposte as a "well-deserved slap," though he adds that he will not respond to Kierkegaard again in public.

He would, however, be tempted to do so. For much of 1855, Kierkegaard continued to issue tirades against the Danish state church, ultimately putting together his own periodical on the matter, ***The Moment***. From May until September, Kierkegaard published nine installments of *The Moment*, each vehemently attacking the Danish clergy. When he fell ill and was admitted to **Frederik's Hospital** in October, the polemics ended. But Martensen was not yet able to get comfortable. Following Kierkegaard's death in November, a number of controversies erupted. Most prominently, the deceased's nephew **Henrik Sigvard Lund** illicitly criticized the state church during his uncle's burial at **Assistens Cemetery**. With roughly a thousand people in attendance, Lund's outburst was witnessed by a substantial audience, and thus Martensen, as head of the established **church**, felt compelled to seek Lund's legal punishment. On 5 July 1856, Lund was fined 100 rixdollars, thereby paving the way for Martensen to wash his hands of Kierkegaard for good.

To be sure, in the near term, Martensen enjoyed the kind of success that had eluded Kierkegaard. Just a few years after the latter's death, Martensen was elevated to commander in the Order of the Dannebrog. In 1869, he was awarded the Grand Cross of Denmark, and, in 1882–1883, he published his autobiography, *From My Life* (*Af mit Levnet*). Almost three decades after Kierkegaard's so-called attack upon Christendom, Martensen's memoirs indicate that his attitude toward Kierkegaard had not changed: in his view, Kierkegaard was a gifted if flawed thinker whose declining mental state resulted in a scandal. In February 1884, Martensen died in office, apparently oblivious to what lay ahead—that it would be Kierkegaard, rather than him, who would be celebrated by future generations. *See also* BREMER, FREDERIKA (1801–1865); EIRÍKSSON, MAGNUS (1806–1881); KOFOED-HANSEN, HANS PETER (1813–1893); LUND, ANE SØRENSDATTER (1768–1834); NIELSEN, RASMUS (1809–1884); *PREFACES*.

MARTYRDOM. The word "martyr" appears on more than 100 occasions in Kierkegaard's authorship, and, while the term "martyrdom" turns up just once, the cognate *martyrium* occurs dozens of more times. Linguistic peculiarities aside, the concept of "martyrdom" is crucial to Kierkegaard's under-

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

standing of **Christianity**. Derived from the Greek noun *martyr* (“witness”), martyrdom indicates a state of **suffering** for the sake of one’s beliefs or **faith**. In this way, the martyr gives concrete **witness** to her **inner** allegiances and convictions; moreover, she makes a powerful testimony to the **truth** of her principles. While examples of martyrdom are found through the Bible, the New Testament brings the notion to the fore, particularly in and through the person of **Jesus Christ**. That Jesus suffered and was murdered for his proclamations about **God** (Acts 3:14–15) sets forth a clear archetype for his disciples (Acts 22:20). Hence, when the persecution of Christians became extensive and methodical in the Roman Empire, peaking during the reign of Diocletian from 284 to 305 CE, it was seen as an opportunity to practice the **imitation** of Christ. Moreover, the New Testament seemed to confirm that it was by martyrdom that Christianity would ultimately prevail: “And they overcame [the accuser] by the blood of the Lamb, and by the word of their testimony (*martyrias*); and they loved not their lives unto the death” (Rev. 12:10–11). Even after the Edict of Milan (Edictum Mediolanense) in 313 CE, in and through which Christianity was granted legal status in the Roman Empire, the Christian **church** continued to revere martyrs in a number of ways. In fact, the first Christians to be venerated as saints were martyrs, and liturgical services recurrently invoke the memory and succor of the martyrs. At the same time, however, it is hardly the case that martyrdom is no longer a problem for Christians around the world. More Christians were martyred in the 20th century than in all other previous centuries combined.

According to Kierkegaard, martyrdom is indeed an ongoing reality for anyone willing to follow Christ. Even as **the social and political** conditions for martyrdom evolve, the proclamation of Christian truth will entail public suffering. In one 1853 journal entry, Kierkegaard observes, “Formerly martyrdom always meant blood-martyrs; nowadays we perhaps can also think of the martyrdom of laughter. In a rational age the martyrdom of laughter is just what can be expected.” The essential point, however, is that some kind of martyrdom is unavoidable for one whose life is conformed to the pattern established by Christ. As Kierkegaard explains in an 1854 journal passage: “If the Christian view is not firmly maintained, that the martyr is the highest, the true . . . then Satan is not only rampant but has conquered. Just as all the nerves converge in the fingertips, so the entire nervous system of Christianity converges in the reality of martyrdom.” At the same time, however, Kierkegaard stops short of claiming that Christians are supposed to *pursue* martyrdom. Betraying the influence of **Pietism**, Kierkegaard argues that martyrdom is not an end in itself but, rather, the outcome of a spiritual disposition detached from personal concern and grounded in God’s **love**. The more one’s **existence** is oriented toward Christ, the more likely it is that martyrdom will

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

ensue. And yet, this is a sign of the fallenness of the world (*see* WORLDLINESS/SECULARISM) and the perduring **actuality** of **sin**, not a call for martyrdom as such. Kierkegaard expands on this viewpoint in the **pseudonymous** 1849 treatise “Does a Human Being Have Permission to Let Himself Be Killed for the Truth?” (“Har et Menneske Lov til at lade sig ihjelslaae for Sandheden?”) (*see TWO ETHICAL-RELIGIOUS MINOR ESSAYS*), which contends that the person who authentically relates to the truth will not want to be martyred. And yet, a profound **irony** lies in this conclusion: anyone who loves God and other human beings so much that he does not want them to become guilty (*see* GUILT) of persecution and murder is likely to eschew partisan alliances (*see* CROWD/PUBLIC), arouse indignation, and ultimately suffer martyrdom. *See also* DYING TO; *FOR SELF-EXAMINATION*; *PRACTICE IN CHRISTIANITY*.

MEDIATION. Kierkegaard uses the noun *Mediation* only a few dozen times in his authorship—several of which are bunched together in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***—but the concept is central to his analyses of both Hegelianism and **Christianity**. Derived from the Latin *mediatio*, the word connotes a meeting or a brokerage: the one who mediates brings together two disparate parties for the sake of reconciliation. In **philosophy**, the question of mediation took on renewed importance after the publication of Hegel’s *Science of Logic* (*Wissenschaft der Logik*, 1812–1816). According to Hegel, the so-called principle of the excluded third (*principium tertii exclusi*), which receives definitive treatment in Aristotle’s thought, is an impracticable theory that overlooks the conceptual unity obtaining between two opposites. Whereas the Aristotelian tradition argues that a given proposition is either true or its negation true ($p \vee \sim p$), Hegel insists that there is a “third” or mediatory possibility. That is to say, for Hegel, the relation between two contraries does not terminate in a simple “either/or.” Instead, a positive third comes into view. In this way, Hegel insists that the classical understanding of **dialectic** is too rigid and should be replaced by a theory that views opposites as mutually related. Hegel’s concept of mediation had significant implications for Christian theology. According to some commentators, mediation explains that **God** and **creation** exist in a reciprocal relationship. Instead of positing an **eternal** realm over against a **temporal** one—long a basic tenet of Christian **dogma**—a Hegelian-inflected theology might understand the divine and the human as different aspects of the same reality. On this reading, the world is both immanent and transcendent.

The “both/and” nature of Hegelian mediation was a source of provocation for Kierkegaard. While not repudiating it entirely—in fact, the conception of **the self** offered in ***The Sickness unto Death*** borrows liberally from Hegel’s

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

logic—Kierkegaard nevertheless believed that, if received uncritically, mediation bears dangerous implications for Christian life and thought. This line of thinking is especially clear in early **pseudonymous** works such as ***Fear and Trembling*** and ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***. Both texts argue, albeit in different ways, that mediation threatens to relativize the **individual**'s relation to God, which, according to biblical **revelation**, challenges and at times even contradicts the dictates of human **reason**. To cite a case in point: the **choice** between God and mammon posited by **Jesus Christ** (Matt. 6:24) is vitiated by mediation's suggestion that all contraries can be reconciled. Indeed, this very logic can be applied to Christ himself, who no longer appears as the irreducible **paradox** of Christian **orthodoxy** but, rather, as an emblem of speculative mediation and, in turn, of human wisdom. For Kierkegaard, this approach ultimately does violence to the otherness (*see* OTHER, THE) of God.

MELANCHOLY. The Danish term *melankoli*, like its English cognate, can be traced at least as far back as Hippocrates of Kos. The Hippocratic text *Airs, Waters, Places* (c. 400 BCE) was the first to attest *melancholiê*, deriving the term from the adjective *melancholos* ("of black or dark bile"). Strictly speaking, then, melancholy bears an implicit connection to "humoralism," an ancient system of medicine in which the human personality is understood in relation to the four major fluids (or "humors") present in the body—blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile. It was the last of these four humors that was said to cause melancholy, whether as a humor innate in the patient or as one resulting from the degradation and subsequent transformation of other types of bile. And yet, no matter how *melancholiê* was acquired, its symptoms were generally agreed on. First, a "prolonged fear or despondency" was considered typical of the disease, followed by secondary traits such as psychical confusion and even corporeal paralysis. As modern psychiatry and **psychology** developed, melancholic dispositions-cum-moods were increasingly distinguished from melancholy as a mental *disease*, the latter eventually yielding to the contemporary term "depression."

It was not until Emil Kraepelin—the German psychiatrist, who was a born a year *after* Kierkegaard's death—that "depression" emerged as the dominant term in the field of psychopathology. Consequently, there is no clear distinction between "melancholy" and "depression" in Kierkegaard's writings, though terminological nuance remains present. English translators have used "melancholy" to interpret two closely related Danish words: *Melancholi* and *Tungsind*. While the former is clearly related to the Hippocratic medical term, the latter resembles the German word *Schwermut*, suggesting a burdened spirit or "heavy mind" (*tung* + *sind*). In this sense, *Tungsind* does

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

recall the term “depression,” which literally means “the state of being pressed or weighed down” (*nedtrykthed* in contemporary Danish). And yet, *Tungsind* can also be translated as “melancholy,” meaning that *Melancholi* and *Tungsind* have corresponding meanings, despite their unrelated etymology

While Kierkegaard tends to use *Tungsind* in relation to his own psychospiritual state and *Melancholi* to describe certain poetic-cum-romantic **moods**, the two terms are often treated synonymously by translators. Indeed, linguistic equivocality aside, the crucial point is that “melancholy” is an important concept in Kierkegaard’s oeuvre, both on a personal and on a theoretical level. With regard to the former, Kierkegaard’s journals frequently refer to his own *Tungsind*, particularly in relation to his difficult upbringing and broken engagement with **Regine Olsen**. In the mid-1840s, Kierkegaard consulted with his physician **Oluf Lundt Bang** on whether or not his melancholy was medically treatable. The two concluded that the problem was ultimately spiritual, and Kierkegaard came to refer to it as a “thorn in the flesh” (2 Cor. 12:7).

Kierkegaard’s personal struggles with melancholy doubtless encouraged him to try to understand it. Beginning with ***Either/Or***, a number of writings make reference to the problem, culminating in the systematic analysis presented in ***The Sickness unto Death***. In this work, Kierkegaard’s **pseudonym** Anti-Climacus warns that *Tungsind* emerges when the self is insufficiently attentive to the necessary (*see* NECESSITY) features of **existence**—for example, the unique limitations of space and time experienced by each person. This vacuum is filled, as it were, by possibility, and a twofold danger thereby emerges. First, **the self** can begin to see itself as its own invention—an illusion that it can engineer and manipulate at **will**. For a time, the self might find this possibility titillating, yet, oblivious to its own concrete reality and eternal (*see* ETERNITY) validity, it will enslave itself to caprice, fashion, and instinct. Second, and following on from the previous point, a self so disposed will tend to become anxious (*see* ANXIETY), pursuing evanescent desires and objects and, for that reason, constantly worrying about losing them. The weight of this burden—of wanting, and of being told to want, what can never actually be had—results in *Tungsind* or, in Anti-Climacus’s words, a “depressed-fantastical” (*tungsindig-phantastiske*) form of existence.

Ultimately, however, Kierkegaard’s assessment of melancholy is not a counsel of **despair**. Since melancholy is rooted in the self’s divinely ordered structure, it must also point toward the self’s conditions for **happiness**. The challenge, then, is not to run from melancholy but to confront it head-on, acknowledging, with ever deepening sincerity, that one cannot finally master it on one’s own. The more one realizes this fact, the more one comes to **rest** in **God**, and herein lies the overcoming of melancholy and the promise of

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

blessedness. *See also* AESTHETIC; GUILT; JOY; *POINT OF VIEW FOR MY WORK AS AN AUTHOR*, *THE*; SCIENCE/SPECULATION; *STAGES ON LIFE'S WAY*; WRITING.

METAPHOR. Kierkegaard uses the Latinate noun *Metaphor* only once in his entire authorship. That should not suggest, however, that he was uninterested in the significance of figurative language. He employs the word "metaphorical" (*overført*), which is etymologically related to the German verb *überführen* ("to transfer"), on dozens of occasions. An *overført* expression is one in which meaning is transferred or "carried over" from a literal to a symbolic sense. One perceives the similarity between two entities and linguistically highlights their correspondence, often transferring a familiar signification to something more abstract. For example, in the Bible, **God** is often described in metaphorical terms, whether as a fortress (Ps. 18:2) or as a lion (Isa. 31:4). **Jesus Christ** himself was fond of using metaphors, as when he compares himself to a mother hen who longs to protect her brood (Luke 13:34).

It is perhaps with such examples in mind that, in ***Works of Love***, Kierkegaard makes his most well-known remark about metaphor: "All human speech, even the divine speech of Holy **Scripture**, about the spiritual is essentially metaphorical [*overført*] speech." He goes on to add that, for "the spiritual person," an expression that is meant literally can take on metaphorical significance—a process that he likens to a spiritual awakening. Precisely how this mysterious dynamic of the **spirit** is related to linguistic conceptions of metaphor is unclear. Doubtless Kierkegaard understood the formal structure of metaphorical language, but he seems to suggest that, in the fullest sense, metaphor also involves an **inner** transformation—a new way of relating to **existence** that is not reducible to hermeneutical or linguistic theories. *See also* DEATH; LANGUAGE; WRITING.

METAPHYSICS. Derived from the expression *ta meta ta physika*, first used to indicate the 13 treatises that came after (*meta*-) Aristotle's works on physics and natural science, metaphysics is the branch of **philosophy** that attempts to understand the fundamental nature of reality. Kierkegaard does not mention metaphysics (*Metaphysik*) very often in his authorship—less than two dozen times, with the bulk of these references appearing in his unpublished journals and papers—but his philosophy is incomprehensible apart from the trends in metaphysics that characterized his era. On the one hand, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) sought to place restrictions on the scope of **reason**, arguing that speculation about the transcendent, including the nature of **God**, lies beyond the domain of rational thought—a critique that Kant was not afraid

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

to extend to Christian dogma. On the other hand, **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel** maintained that metaphysics is effectively unavoidable—that categorical assumptions about the nature of the world always shape human thought. Hence, in contrast to Kantian thought, Hegel's philosophy seeks to cognize the **absolute**, launching an inquiry into **being** qua being, albeit in such a way that Hegel restricts his focus to the universe as such rather than a transcendent being beyond it. Thus Hegel accepts Kant's metaphysical critique of reason while nevertheless seeking to move beyond it.

Kierkegaard is generally seen as a critic of metaphysics—and for good reason. In texts such as ***Stages on Life's Way*** and ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, Kierkegaard depicts the project of metaphysics as an intellectual abstraction by which one brackets out lived experience in order to identify being and thought. According to Kierkegaard, this is a category error: whenever reason subjects **existence** to **mediation**, it necessarily overlooks the fact that metaphysics attempts to do something that is actually impossible—namely, attain the absolute viewpoint of **eternity** (*sub specie aeterni*). In this way, the metaphysician is a type of aesthete (*see* AESTHETIC), who imagines (*see* IMAGINATION) that the thought of a single **individual** is capable of overcoming the aporias of real life. While this mistake bears **comic** elements, it is ultimately no laughing matter: insofar as metaphysics feigns completion, it attenuates the passionate (*see* PASSION) sense of striving that characterizes **ethical** and **religious** goals.

Yet, whether or not Kierkegaard's criticism of metaphysics entails a firm rejection of metaphysics remains an open question. After all, many of the concepts and questions that Kierkegaard invokes either presuppose or implicate metaphysical claims, from Kierkegaard's ontology of **the self** to his utilization of Christian **doctrine**. It would appear, then, that Kierkegaard is not an opponent of metaphysics as such. Rather, he is a consistent enemy of metaphysical projects that, in confusing thought with existence, diminish the individual's fervent interest in her own self-development. *See also* ACTUALITY; CORRECTIVE; MYSTICISM; NECESSITY; SCIENCE/SPECULATION.

MIRACLE. The Danish word *Mirakel* is derived from the Latin *miraculum*, which is itself taken from the Latin verb *mirari*, meaning "to wonder at" or "to marvel." Thus a *Mirakel* is an object of wonder, often associated with supernatural events that transcend rational explanation. Kierkegaard refers to *Mirakel* over 50 times in his authorship, though he also uses other words, including *Under* ("marvel") and *Vidunder* ("wonder"), to denote the same phenomenon.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Kierkegaard has an expansive understanding of the miraculous. On the one hand, he regularly cites and glosses miracles recorded in the Bible. For example, in ***Practice in Christianity***, Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** Anti-Climacus expounds on Matthew 17:24–27, in which **Jesus Christ** pays the state tax with a shekel taken from the mouth of a fish—an event that portends a deeper confrontation with the established order. That "he procures the coin by means of a miracle [*Mirakel*]" indicates that, as the God-man, he presents an essential **offense** to those who encounter him. On the other hand, Kierkegaard also argues that miracles can occur in a less palpable sense. In an 1850 journal entry, Kierkegaard maintains that, although many celebrated miracles convert the small into the big (as in the so-called feeding of the multitude, Mark 6:31–44), miracles can also occur when the big is turned into the small. Here, presumably, he is referring to the divine relativization of **temporal** powers and principalities. With this in mind, Kierkegaard concludes, "Every qualitative change, every infinite change in quality, is genuinely a miracle [*Mirakel*]."

A miracle, then, involves a qualitative transformation that cannot be accounted for by quantitative determinants—a kind of **leap**. Indeed, Kierkegaard even describes theological virtues such as **faith** as miraculous. As Johannes de silentio puts it in ***Fear and Trembling***, "Faith is a marvel [*Vidunder*]." Again, though, the wonder of faith is not that it absolutely opposes the laws of **nature** but that it involves an **inner** transformation whose ultimate referent is **God**, with whom all things are possible (Matt. 19:26). *See also* METAPHOR; MOVEMENT; REVELATION; SCRIPTURE.

MOMENT*, *THE*.** In September 1851, Kierkegaard published ***For Self-Examination but did not publish a single work again for over three years. Then, in January 1854, Bishop **Jakob Peter Mynster** died in office. After a few months, **Hans Lassen Martensen** was named Mynster's successor as bishop of Zealand in the Danish **state church**. A close associate of Mynster, Martensen once eulogized the deceased primate as a "**witness** of the **truth**" (*Sandhedsvidne*), thereby aligning Mynster's (and his own) establishmentarian approach to **church** and **politics** with that of early **Christianity**. For Kierkegaard, Martensen's conflation of the modern bourgeois **social and political** order with the **suffering** and **martyrdom** characteristic of the early church was both self-aggrandizing and deceitful. Finally, after several months of **silence**, not to mention years of indirect critiques, Kierkegaard decided to confront the state church in direct fashion (*see* COMMUNICATION). Eventually known as his "attack upon Christendom," Kierkegaard's opposition began in December 1854 with "Was Bishop Mynster a 'Witness to the

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Truth,' One of 'the True Witnesses to the Truth'—Is This the Truth?" ("Var Biskop Mynster et 'Sandhedsvidne', et af 'de rette Sandhedsvidner'—er dette Sandhed?") in the daily paper the *Fatherland* (*Fædrelandet*). In subsequent months, nearly two dozen additional articles appeared in the *Fatherland*, the sum total of which amounted to a withering critique of civil religion, particularly as articulated in **Protestantism**.

Nevertheless, Kierkegaard came to believe that he had to continue his polemics as an **individual** rather than as a contributor to the *Fatherland*, whose editor, **Jens Finsteen Giødwad**, was a partisan advocate for liberalism. This was a difficult **decision** in multiple ways. For one thing, Kierkegaard himself had to shoulder the production costs of an independent literary periodical—costs that drew deeply on his remaining savings. Moreover, he had to concede that, despite his longstanding disdain of the **press**, it was now an important, if ironic, part of his attempt to lay waste to state Christianity. Commentators continue to debate whether or not Kierkegaard was able to publish journalistic literature without falling into indefensible contradiction. What is clear is that he did not think so. Indeed, on 24 May 1855, Kierkegaard published his first independent journal, calling it *The Moment* (*Øieblikket*). It had a press run of 1,000 copies, and subscriptions were available through the publisher **Carl Andreas Reitzel**. From June to September, Kierkegaard would issue eight more editions of *The Moment*, and an additional one was ready for press (and later published posthumously) upon his admission to **Frederik's Hospital** in October 1855.

In all, then, Kierkegaard wrote 10 volumes of *The Moment*, and the periodical proved to be a lightning rod for controversy. **Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig** regularly denounced Kierkegaard's polemics from the pulpit at Vartov Church in Copenhagen, and **Frederik Christian Sibbern** accused his former student of becoming a "zealous agitator." On the other hand, *The Moment* was a popular success, and Kierkegaard seemed to relish pitting the **common man** against Denmark's "guild of clerical swindlers." The point to which he continually returned, with a devastating combination of indignation and satire, was that the established order in general and the state church in particular were barriers to the understanding and realization of true Christianity. If, for Kierkegaard, the goal of authentic Christian discipleship is the **imitation** of **Jesus Christ**, the means amid the sophistry of Christendom is the **dialectic** and **irony** of **Socrates**. As he put it in a September 1855 journal entry, "The point of view I have to exhibit, and do exhibit, is so singular that in eighteen hundred years of Christendom, I literally have nothing analogous, no corresponding situation, to which I can refer. . . . The only analogy I have before me is Socrates; my task is a Socratic one, to scrutinize the definition of what it is to be a Christian."

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

In calling his periodical *The Moment*, Kierkegaard alludes to such a coincidence of the immanent and the transcendent, though he does not use the word *Øieblikket* (literally, "the blink of an eye") univocally. In fact, its meaning varies according to the existential (*see* EXISTENCE) sphere to which it belongs. For **the self** caught up in the **aesthetic**, the moment is but a sliver of time, dissolved in the **passion** and pleasure of sensuality. For example, in ***Either/Or***, the character Johannes the Seducer recognizes that his conquest of the virginal Cordelia is but a fleeting instant, abandoned to the void of the past, never to be recovered or repeated. On the other hand, when the self is conscious of *Øieblikket* as an intersection of **eternity** with **temporality**, time is expanded and redeemed. In this kind of moment, which emerges out of the awareness of **sin**, the self is given insight into its own significance, the true meaning of Christian **doctrine**, and the possibility of **salvation**. The consciousness of time is now filled with eternal meaning—a possibility prefigured in the figure of Jesus Christ. As Johannes Climacus notes in ***Philosophical Fragments***, Christ's incarnation is "the moment" that marks the "fullness of time" and, with it, the recognition that time is the site of divine redemption. With these points in mind, it appears that the title *The Moment* was meant to indicate Kierkegaard's desire to invoke eternal ideals both in time and for time, as opposed to the aesthetic momentariness of the established order. *See also* DOCTRINE/DOGMA; WORLDLINESS/SECULARISM.

MONASTICISM. On the face of it, monasticism (*Munkevæsen*) plays a negligible role in Kierkegaard's authorship. He only uses the word once, namely, in a journal entry from 1838. At the same time, however, Kierkegaard uses the term "monastery" (*Kloster*) far more often, sprinkling over 50 references throughout his published and unpublished writings. This number may be surprisingly high, given that monasteries had effectively vanished from Denmark in the wake of the Protestant (*see* PROTESTANTISM) Reformation and **Martin Luther**'s disavowal of the cloistered life. And yet, Kierkegaard understood the *Kloster* as a significant expression of Christian **faith** that had been wrongly denigrated by Protestants intent on conflating **Christianity** with **the social and political** establishment.

Kierkegaard's dialectical (*see* DIALECTIC) approach to monasticism can be summarized as follows. On the one hand, the willingness to give up earthly comfort and prosperity for a life devoted to **God**—long a staple of monastic discipline, given its emphases on **asceticism** and ordered **prayer**—demonstrates an appropriate degree of **passion** in relation to the **absolute**. Indeed, as Johannes Climacus argues in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, it is precisely this sort of commitment that is lacking in Christendom. Accustomed to **mediation**, modern people tend to scoff at the notion that **sacrifice** is an

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

indispensable component of Christian life. On the other hand, Climacus does not view the *Kloster* as the ideal site for practicing Christianity. His critique centers on the supposition that one's outer life can serve as a guarantor of one's **inner** conviction. In truth, Climacus argues, no finite act or object is capable of expressing an infinite commitment (*see* FINITUDE/INFINITY). Hence, in and of themselves, monkish outfits and devotional routines are not meritorious, despite the medieval assumption that monasticism is the highest expression of Christian **existence**.

This tension remains present throughout Kierkegaard's authorship. In late works such as ***The Moment***, Kierkegaard insists that the **imitation** of **Jesus Christ** is the standard by which Christian discipleship is measured, a standard that requires one to face **martyrdom** in the midst of the world and to spurn cozy refuge in the *Kloster* (*see* PIETISM). And yet, in an 1854 journal entry, he also writes, "Back to the monastery, from which Luther broke away, is the first cause for Christianity to take up." Like his own polemics against the Danish **state church**, it appears that Kierkegaard came to see monasticism as a **corrective** to the excesses of the bourgeois established order. *See also* INDIVIDUAL; METAPHYSICS; MYSTICISM; REST.

MONEY. Kierkegaard's relation to money (*Penge*) is a knotty topic for commentators. His parents, **Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard** and **Ane Sørensdatter Lund**, both grew up poor in Denmark's rural Jutland peninsula. Thus the hard labor and financial constraints of peasant life remained a lifelong influence on the Kierkegaard family, despite the fact that Michael Pedersen would later become one of Copenhagen's most affluent merchants. It is not surprising, then, that Søren Kierkegaard would develop a dichotomous attitude toward money. Like many among the nouveau riche, he enjoyed the privilege of money without ever getting comfortable with it. For example, Kierkegaard was known to have extravagant tastes, living in well-appointed apartments in central Copenhagen, running up significant expenses for fine meats, beer, wine, coffee, and tobacco, and hiring carriages for long rides outside of the city's congested streets. Kierkegaard's assistant **Israel Salomon Levin** once remarked that the magister's "way of life cost him astounding sums." At the same time, however, extant records indicate that Kierkegaard gave regularly to the poor, though precisely how much remains unclear. In the posthumously published ***The Point of View for My Work as an Author***, Kierkegaard recalls that his authorial productivity cost him the pleasure of a normal social life: "I almost never made visits, and at home one thing was strictly observed—unconditionally not to receive anyone except for the poor who asked for help." In an 1856 letter, **Hans Brøchner** seems to corroborate Kierkegaard's account, noting that Kierkegaard's inheritance had all but run

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

out upon his admission to **Frederik's Hospital** in October 1855: "He must have given away the greater portion of his fortune," Brøchner surmises.

Indeed, that Kierkegaard would have wrestled with his personal wealth and how to use it follows from his writings, particularly those penned in the wake of his literary skirmish with ***The Corsair***, a popular Danish periodical. In ***A Literary Review***, Kierkegaard argues that the reflective (*see* REFLECTION) mentality of **the present age** corresponds to society's newfound preference for paper currency: "An age without **passion** possesses no assets," Kierkegaard observes, "everything becomes, as it were, transactions in *paper money*." In ***Works of Love***, he contrasts **Christianity**'s emphasis on religious **inwardness** and on the **imitation** of **Jesus Christ** with the focal point of **worldliness**: "This is how we are brought up; from earliest childhood we are disciplined in the ungodly worship of money." Kierkegaard would later press this same criticism against the Danish **state church**, suggesting that the professionalization of the priesthood entails using Christian **apostles** and martyrs (*see* MARTYRDOM) to make money. Hence, for Kierkegaard, it is ultimately essential that Christians learn to shun the trappings of money, though, as noted, it remains an open question as to whether or not he was able to do so himself. *See also* CROWD/PUBLIC; PRESS; REST; TECHNOLOGY; TIVOLI.

MOOD. Kierkegaard uses the word "mood" (*Stemning*) on over 200 occasions in his authorship, indicating a temporary frame of mind or emotion. "Mood" has a general correspondence to "feeling" (*Følesle*), which occurs nearly 200 additional times and denotes an affective reaction to a particular state of affairs. Kierkegaard's utilization of these terms is most frequent during the first half of his authorship, especially in writings that concern the **aesthetic** sphere of **existence**. In ***Either/Or***, for example, mood is set in contrast to the stability of **ethical** commitment: whereas the latter stems from the immutable commands of **eternity**, moods are comparable to "storms," which blow up and then pass. In "To Need God Is a Human Being's Highest Perfection," later included in ***Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses***, Kierkegaard warns that **the self** gripped by **immediacy** is "in the service of the world" (*see* WORLDLINESS/SECULARISM) and thus is akin to "a stringed instrument in the hands of inexplicable moods [*Stemningers*]."

At the same time, however, the real danger of moods and feelings is that the self will allow itself to be governed by them, not that they exist at all. As Judge William puts it in the second part of *Either/Or*, "The person who lives ethically is also familiar with mood, but for him it is not the highest; because he has chosen himself infinitely, he sees his mood beneath him." The ethical person's mastery of mood is synonymous with **earnestness**: rather than

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

let the vicissitudes of life toss her about, she attends to that which grounds and steadies the self, seeking the unity of the eternal amid the inconstancy of **temporality**. It is with this in mind that, in "At a Graveside" (*see THREE DISCOURSES ON IMAGINED OCCASIONS*), Kierkegaard writes, "To think of oneself as dead is earnestness; to be a **witness** to the **death** of another is mood." Throughout life, then, one will inevitably fall into various moods or be subject to diverse feelings. After all, as Kierkegaard explains in ***A Literary Review***, one's **life-view** is not a pure, self-contained entity but, in fact, is filtered through feeling and **imagination**. The affective dimension of the self is thus essential to Kierkegaard's anthropology, albeit with the qualification that self-actualization depends on the subordination of these elements to ethical and **religious** imperatives. *See also* EXISTENTIALISM; METAPHYSICS; PHILOSOPHY; PSYCHOLOGY.

MOVEMENT. Kierkegaard uses the noun "movement" (*Bevægelse*) more than 500 times in his oeuvre, though not all of these occurrences are conceptually significant. Nevertheless, "movement" is a category that underlies many of Kierkegaard's most important philosophical contributions. Indeed, various writings from his early **pseudonymous** period indicate that he was dissatisfied with **Hegelianism**'s account of movement. In ***Philosophical Fragments***, Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus defines *Bevægelse* as a "change of coming into **existence**" whereby possibility is converted into **actuality**. For Climacus, this conception of movement is superior to that of Hegelian **mediation**: whereas the latter sees motion as a reconciliation of opposites in and for thinking, the former sees it as a creative transformation in and for existence—a restoration of Aristotle's notion of *kinēsis*. On this reading, possibility must give way to actuality, and therein lie the birth pangs of change. Movement, then, is not rational correlation but existential **passion**, **suffering**, and growth.

This kinetic conception of *Bevægelse* becomes central to Kierkegaard's understanding of **religious** life. In ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, Climacus again returns to the theme of movement, noting that **the self**'s process of becoming (*see* BEING/BECOMING) requires movement—first by way of an intensifying **inwardness** in relation to the possibility of an eternal **happiness**, second by way of the transcendent movement of divine **revelation**, by which **God** transforms the **individual**. Thus this final movement is not organic to the human being's own self-development; it is the miraculous (*see* MIRACLE) rebirth of a "new creature" (2 Cor. 5:17). *See also* DOUBLE MOVEMENT; GRACE; HISTORY; HOPE; PHILOSOPHY; *REPETITION*; RESIGNATION; ROMANTICISM; TEMPORALITY/TIME; WILL.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

MUSIC. Though not a musician himself, Kierkegaard was a great aficionado of music (*Musik*). In 1836, while a student at the **University of Copenhagen**, he played a role in the founding of Copenhagen's Music Society (Musikforeningen). At the request of Jørgen Henrik Lorck (1810–1895) and Edvard Collin (1808–1886), Kierkegaard edited the new society's bylaws, though subsequent recollections suggest (perhaps unsurprisingly) that he approached this task with unwelcome fastidiousness. In any case, the principal task of Musikforeningen was to organize concerts, including performances of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart's 1787 opera *The Rake Punished, or Don Giovanni* (*Il dissoluto punito, ossia il Don Giovanni*). *Don Giovanni* was a regular production at Copenhagen's Royal Theater (Det Kongelige Teater) for decades, including nearly annual performances during the second half of the 1830s. Kierkegaard was known to attend these shows, which featured a singspiel libretto by Lauritz Kruse (1778–1839), who translated the original Italian text into something darker and more brooding. At these performances Kierkegaard also witnessed Giovanni Battista Cetti (1794–1858), a Danish singer of Italian descent, who played the part of Don Giovanni with Lombardian dash.

This fusion of peril and sensuality would be developed in "The Immediate Erotic Stages or the Musical-Erotic" (*De umiddelbare erotiske Stadier eller det Musikalsk-Erotiske*), which appears in the first part of ***Either/Or***. Attributed to the **pseudonym** known only as "A," this piece argues that Mozart's *Don Giovanni* is the world's greatest work of **art**, precisely insofar as its musical composition corresponds to the very idea of the opera, namely, that of sensual **immediacy**. Don Giovanni is not so much an **individual** as a personification of sensuousness and, with it, of the very essence of *Musik*. For that reason, a novel or even a poem about Don Giovanni would be less effective, since his carnal vitality excludes the **ethical** implications of **language**, which emerge from its capacity to elicit **reflection**. Indeed, A even goes so far as to link music with the **demonic**, since sensuousness is defined by **spirit** precisely by being excluded by spirit. Whether or not Kierkegaard himself, however, would agree with every aspect of the analysis found in *Either/Or* is doubtful. After all, he had a great appreciation for **Christian** hymnody, especially the work of **Hans Adolph Brorson**. Nevertheless, "The Immediate Erotic Stages or the Musical-Erotic" remains the most detailed development of the concept of music in Kierkegaard's corpus. *See also* ART; THEATER.

MYNSTER, JAKOB PETER (1775–1854). Danish theologian who served as bishop of Zealand from 1834 to 1854. Born in Copenhagen, Mynster's early years were defined by **tragedy**: both of his parents died before his fifth birthday. He was subsequently raised by his stepfather, Frederik Ludvig

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Bang (1747–1820), a prominent doctor at **Frederik's Hospital** and the father of **Oluf Lundt Bang**. Mynster's stepfather was inclined toward **Pietism**, in terms of both its emphasis on devotion to **God** as well as in its association with civic **duty**, qualities that would later mark Mynster's episcopacy. After years of private instruction, Mynster attended the **University of Copenhagen**, graduating with a degree in theology in 1794. Subsequently, Mynster found work as a tutor and, following his ordination in 1801, as a pastor in the Danish **state church**. Gradually, he would distinguish himself among his fellow clergy. Highly regarded as a homiletician, Mynster managed to appease cultural elites without abandoning evangelical zeal. In 1823, he published *Sermons for Every Sunday and Holiday in the Year* (*Prædikener paa alle Søn- og Hallige-Dage i Aaret*), followed by the theological treatises *On the Concept of Christian Dogmatics* (*Om Begrebet af den christelige Dogmatik*, 1831) and *Observations Concerning the Doctrines of the Christian Faith* (*Betragtninger over de christelige Troeslærdomme*, 1833). On the strength of this output, combined with his wide-ranging personal appeal, Mynster succeeded Peter Erasmus Müller (1776–1834) as bishop of Zealand in September 1834.

Mynster's episcopal tenure was defined by his efforts to safeguard the state church in an era of political and religious change. In this sense, he may be rightly considered a conservative. As he saw it, the established order remained the best guarantor of national prosperity in general and **individual** virtue in particular. This stance pressed Mynster into various controversies. Perhaps most notably, he found himself in regular conflict with **Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig**, whose efforts to revitalize **Christianity** in Scandinavia won him many sympathizers, including **Peter Christian Kierkegaard**. Indeed, despite the fact that **Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard** had belonged to the Church of Our Lady (Vor Frue Kirke) and esteemed Mynster as a pastor, Peter Christian refused to carry out Mynster's 1842 ordinance to compel Baptist children to be christened by state-church clergy.

For a number of years, Søren Aabye Kierkegaard's stance in relation to Mynster was more amenable than that of his older brother. Like Mynster, Kierkegaard had reservations about the new Danish **constitution**, and, also like Mynster, Kierkegaard disliked the populist appeal of Grundtvigianism. Moreover, because his father admired Mynster, Kierkegaard wanted to support the bishop out of filial piety. At the same time, however, Kierkegaard recognized that he and Mynster offered different understandings of Christianity and its role in Danish **culture**. In an 1852 journal entry, Kierkegaard sums up their disagreement as follows: "What Mynster has fought for in opposition to me . . . has been to maintain this view: My proclamation, the Mynsterian approach, is earnestness and wisdom; the Kierkegaardian an odd, perhaps

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

remarkable, but an odd exaggeration. My position is: I represent a more authentic conception of Christianity than does Mynster." Indeed, the two spoke after publication of ***Practice in Christianity***, and Kierkegaard sought to convince Mynster to reorient the state church in accordance with Christian **truth**. "I said to him," Kierkegaard recalls in an 1851 journal passage, "You are gifted, eloquent, a man of character, dignity, years, and tradition. You are the only one in sight who can do it." But Mynster shrugged off Kierkegaard's recommendations, replying that it would be pointless for the **church** to try to govern the Danish public (*see* CROWD/PUBLIC) in a firm manner.

The tension between Kierkegaard and Mynster smoldered over the next few years. Kierkegaard took a hiatus from publishing after the release of ***For Self-Examination***, and Mynster carried on with his clerical duties, even preaching as late as Christmas 1853. However, the prelate fell ill a few weeks later and, despite a brief recovery, died suddenly on 30 January 1854. Mynster's passing was a significant event in Denmark: he had presided over the nation's church for two decades. Many obituaries and eulogies appeared, none more significant than the sermon published by **Hans Lassen Martensen** in *Berling's Times* (*Berlingske Tidende*) on 13 February 1854. In this panegyric, Martensen likened Mynster's legacy to that of other great Christian leaders, "from the days of the **Apostles** up to our own times." Infuriated that Martensen would compare the grand and contented bishop with those who had given their lives to **witness** to **Jesus Christ**, Kierkegaard spoke out against Martensen's eulogy, accusing him of willfully misrepresenting Mynster's legacy (*see MOMENT*, *THE*). "One does not need to be especially sharp," Kierkegaard writes, "to see . . . that Bishop Mynster's proclamation of Christianity (to take just one thing) tones down, veils, suppresses, omits some of what is most decisively Christian." With these words, Kierkegaard launched what would come to be known as his "attack upon Christendom," which, in fact, was not just condemnation of Christendom but of Mynster's whole episcopal tenure. Once a potential ally of the celebrated primate, Kierkegaard spent the last year of his own life decrying Mynster's refusal to concede the failings of established Christianity. *See also* IMITATION; KOFOED-HANSEN, HANS PETER (1813–1893).

MYSTICISM. While scholars lack consensus on how to define "mysticism," the term can be broadly understood to refer to religious beliefs and practices that concern an enhanced awareness of God's immediate and transformative presence. These beliefs and practices typically involve preparing for spiritual union with **God**, whether in terms of ascetical (*see* ASCETICISM) disciplines or contemplative exercises. A great deal of attention may also be paid to **art** and **language**, insofar as images and words can be seen as points

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

of entry into a relationship with God, albeit in such a way that, according to many mystics, they must be progressively abandoned. For God is ultimately a mystery—indeed, the word "mysticism" is derived from the Greek *mystikos*, meaning "secret" or "connected with the mysteries"—who lies beyond human affirmation and even human denial.

The history of Christian mysticism is long and storied. As early as Clement of Alexandria (c. 150–c. 215 CE), Christian writers referred to the "mystic things" (*ta mystika*) of **Christianity**, including the Bible and the sacraments. Subsequent authors and monastic orders (*see* MONASTICISM) came to develop spiritual exercises, often underpinned by a rich speculative **metaphysics**, designed to shepherd the believer toward the "mystical union" (*unio mystica*) mentioned above. Kierkegaard was familiar with many of these mystical sources. His broad theological education included figures such as Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE) and Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153 CE), both of whom feature mystical concepts and themes in their respective oeuvres. Moreover, by way of **Pietism**, Kierkegaard encountered a Protestant (*see* PROTESTANTISM) strain of mystical literature that, among other things, inflected the mystical tradition of **Catholicism** with a Lutheran (*see* LUTHER, MARTIN [1483–1546]) emphasis on the priority of **faith** over works. This grounding in premodern and early modern spiritual writings made Kierkegaard a sensitive and, in many cases, sympathetic interpreter of mysticism, despite the fact that, by his own era, the experiential component of mysticism had come to outstrip its ascetical, biblical, and sacramental roots. For many modern commentators, mysticism seemed to constitute an independent and often esoteric **religious** sphere.

To be sure, this latter viewpoint is reflected in the second part of ***Either/Or***, in which Judge William argues that mysticism tends to privilege the private experience of God over civic **duty**, an inclination that not only neglects the importance of **ethical** responsibility but also endangers the mystic's own path to self-actualization, imbuing it with an acosmic quality that runs counter to authentic religiousness. Yet, if the Judge identifies the pitfalls of an extreme form of mysticism, there are a host of constructive references to mystical concepts and figures elsewhere in Kierkegaard's corpus. For example, the writings attributed to Johannes Climacus and Anti-Climacus emphasize elements that markedly resemble those found in the Christian mystical tradition, including the **imitation** of **Jesus Christ**, **passion**, **resignation**, **rest**, **sacrifice**, and **suffering**. Moreover, the very name "Climacus" has mystical overtones: Kierkegaard adopted the name from the early Christian monk John Climacus (c. 579–649 CE), author of the mystical guidebook *The Ladder of Divine Ascent* (*Klímax*, c. 600 CE). In short, as with many thinkers emerging out of the Pietist tradition, Kierkegaard understood mysticism's stress on

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

existential **actuality** and **individual** accountability to be a needed **corrective** to established Christianity's preference for political (*see* POLITICS) expediency and intellectual conformity. *See also* CHURCH; DOCTRINE/DOGMA; PRAYER.

MØLLER, PEDER LUDVIG (1814–1865). Danish poet and literary critic. The son of a poor merchant, Møller grew up in the port city of Aalborg, situated at a narrow point on Limfjord, which slices through the northern tip of the Jutland peninsula. In 1832, Møller matriculated at the **University of Copenhagen** and immediately showed intellectual promise in a number of subjects. In time, he would gravitate toward **philosophy**, with a particular interest in aesthetics. Like Kierkegaard, Møller attended the lectures of **Hans Lassen Martensen**, **Poul Martin Møller**, and **Frederik Christian Sibbern**. Unlike Kierkegaard, he distanced himself from the artistic circle associated with **Johan Ludvig Heiberg**, preferring instead the more avant-garde poets of **Romanticism**. In 1840, Møller published *Lyrical Poems* (*Lyriske Digte*), and, a year later, his essay on French poetry won the university's gold medal. In fairly short order, he had emerged as a literary tastemaker and a much sought-after critic—one who coveted a prominent chair in aesthetics at the university. But Møller was ultimately too capricious for such a pursuit. He divided his attention among a number of papers and periodicals—for example, contributing to ***The Corsair*** and founding the aesthetic yearbook *Gæa*. His wanton lifestyle did him no favors either. Møller was a known philanderer, political agitator, and profligate, who once was refused membership in a student association due to his unsavory reputation.

The extent to which Kierkegaard and Møller knew one another personally is unclear. They likely would have crossed paths as students, and, read in a certain light, their early writings seem to betray mutual familiarity and aversion. Most notably, it has been held that "The Seducer's Diary," which concludes the first part of ***Either/Or***, is a thinly veiled philosophical critique and psychological investigation of Møller's sexual exploits. Nevertheless, the seething tension between the two authors did not come to a boil until December 1845, when Møller's lengthy article "A Visit to Sorø" appeared in *Gæa*. In this piece, Møller provides an overview of Kierkegaard's **pseudonymous** output, offering some praise (ironically or not) of *Either/Or*'s **aesthetic** material while thoroughly dismantling the recently published ***Stages on Life's Way***. In fact, Møller did more than criticize Kierkegaard's book; he suggested that it was the product of an unstable personality. Wounded, Kierkegaard fired back with an article in the *Fatherland* (*Fædrelandet*), in which his pseudonym Frater Taciturnus implies that Møller is closer to a hired hand than a serious critic. Moreover, in the same article, Taciturnus outed Møller

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

as a contributor to *The Corsair*, even hinting that Møller's brazen impudence was the driving force behind the controversial broadside: "For *ubi spiritus*, *ibi ecclesia*: *ubi* P.L. Møller, *ibi* '*The Corsair*,'" Taciturnus concludes.

The fallout from this dustup was significant. *The Corsair*, famously, began to caricature and mock Kierkegaard in its pages—an embarrassing experience that caused him to rethink the purpose of his authorship. Meanwhile, Kierkegaard's revelation of Møller's involvement with *The Corsair* meant that the latter could no longer be considered a serious candidate for the professoriate. Thus Møller took a traveling fellowship and left Denmark in 1846. He first relocated to Germany yet, in the early 1850s, settled in Paris. Despite continued success as an author and critic, Møller's lack of resources and years of decadence began to catch up to him. He fell ill in 1865, ultimately dying of syphilis-related encephalitis. *See also* GOLDSCHMIDT, MEÏR AARON (1818–1887); PRESENT AGE, THE.

MØLLER, POUL MARTIN (1794–1838). Danish *homme de lettres* and philosopher. Møller's father was the prominent churchman and philologist Rasmus Møller (1763–1842), who saw to his son's educational training. In 1812, Møller matriculated at the **University of Copenhagen** and completed his degree in theology in 1816. For the next several years, he took on a variety of positions—private tutor, chaplain to a mercantile ship, and educator—but his real vocation was writing. He penned aphorisms, poems, essays, and autobiographical stories. His most celebrated work was *A Danish Student's Adventure* (*En dansk students eventyr*), which he delivered to the student union in 1824. It was meant to present Møller's own student experiences in the style of books such as Sir Walter Scott's *Rob Roy* (1817). In 1826, Møller moved to Norway, where he taught philosophy at the Royal Frederick University (Det Kongelige Frederiks Universitet), today named the University of Oslo (Universitetet i Oslo). In 1831, he became chair of **philosophy** at the University of Copenhagen, where he gained a reputation as a brilliant yet eccentric mind—a proverbial "absent-minded professor" who was so immersed in thought that he neglected his own appearance and sometimes even lost track of what he was doing. An increasingly fierce critic of **Hegelianism**, Møller eschewed systematic projects in favor of those bearing personal significance, whether explorations of human **immortality** or translations of Homer's *Odyssey* (*Odýsseia*, c. eighth century BCE). The tumult of Møller's own life—his first wife died in 1835, leaving him heartbroken—only deepened these haphazard tendencies. Despite remarrying, Møller became ill with what was likely cancer, resigned his university position, and ultimately died in March 1838, just shy of his 45th birthday.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Like a number of other students at the university, Kierkegaard greatly admired Møller. He attended Møller's lectures during the first half of the 1830s, including a series on antique Greek philosophy. It appears that the two were also acquainted on a personal level. In an 1854 journal entry, Kierkegaard looks back on Møller's advice to him when he was a student, calling special attention to his teacher's cautionary words: "You are so thoroughly polemical that it is quite appalling." Elsewhere Kierkegaard notes that Møller's **humor** and integrity would never be forgotten. There is no doubt, at any rate, as to Møller's influence on Kierkegaard. In the first part of ***Either/Or***, Kierkegaard uses aphoristic "Diapsalmata" in order to depict an **aesthetic** worldview. Likewise, the philosophy of personality attributed to Judge William in the second part of *Either/Or* recalls Møller's preoccupation with the **ethical** development of the **individual** as opposed to the **objectivity** of the Hegelian **system**. Yet nowhere does Kierkegaard make his fondness for Møller clearer than in the dedication affixed to ***The Concept of Anxiety***, which, among other things, refers to the late professor as "the happy lover of Greek culture" and "the confidant of **Socrates**." With palpable tenderness, Kierkegaard concludes the dedication with the following words about Møller: "The object of my admiration, my profound loss." Such sincerity is all the more remarkable given the fact that *The Concept of Anxiety* is a pseudonymous (*see* PSEUDONYMITY) work. *See also CONCEPT OF IRONY*, *THE*; EXISTENCE; NIELSEN, RASMUS (1809–1884); SIBBERN, FREDERIK CHRISTIAN (1785–1872); SUBJECTIVITY.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

N

NAPOLEONIC WARS. A series of battles and confrontations between the French Empire (Empire Français), headed by military leader Napoléon Bonaparte (1769–1821), and an assortment of European powers, grouped into various "coalitions." Historians tend to disagree about the precise beginning of the Napoleonic Wars. What is clear is that, following Napoléon's coup d'état of 18 Brumaire (November 1799), the French Republic was turned into a virtual dictatorship and, by 1804, an imperial state. Napoléon's aggressive foreign policy—in particular, his reoccupation of Switzerland in 1802—heightened tensions between France and other European powers. In 1805, war broke out between the Empire Français and the so-called Third Coalition, led by the United Kingdom in the west and Russia in the east. Though Napoléon would prevail at first, defeating a combination of Russian and Austrian forces the Battle of Austerlitz in December 1805, this was but the beginning of a series of major conflicts. Indeed, it was not until the end of the Hundred Days War in July 1815, along with Napoléon's permanent exile to the remote island of Saint Helena, that the Napoleonic Wars came to an end.

As a small nation, Denmark found itself in an awkward position during this period of strife. As early as 1801, Danish merchants were adversely impacted by the United Kingdom's disruption of trade with France. Furthermore, after joining the League of the North—an alliance of seafaring countries that wanted to continue to do business with the French—Denmark found itself the object of British ire. On 2 April 1801, Vice Admiral Horatio Nelson (1758–1805) of the Royal Navy directed the bombardment of a smaller yet formidable Dano-Norwegian force anchored in Copenhagen harbor. Both navies sustained great losses, but Nelson ultimately prevailed. The situation would repeat itself in September 1807, albeit with more disastrous consequences for Denmark. Fearing that Napoléon might use Danish resources to take control of the Baltic Sea, the Royal Navy once again sailed to Copenhagen, hoping to persuade the Danish crown to side with Britain. When negotiations failed, Admiral James Gambier (1756–1833) shelled Copenhagen with Congreve rockets—a relatively new innovation, later memorialized by the line "And the rocket's red glare" in Francis Scott Key's poem "Defence of Fort M'Henry" (1814), which would become the national anthem of the United States—and

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

burned large swaths of the city to the ground. Not only did Denmark suffer severe casualties, but the Royal Navy absconded with dozens of Danish ships. The two countries would remain at war for several more years, crippling the Danish economy and eventually forcing Denmark to relinquish Norway to pro-British Sweden with the Treaty of Kiel (Kieltraktaten) in 1814.

Kierkegaard's father, **Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard**, was a prominent merchant in Copenhagen during the Napoleonic Wars. Remarkably, however, his property was spared significant damage during the 1807 Bombardment of Copenhagen, and his prosperity continued to grow in its aftermath. Yet, despite such unusual (and fortunate) circumstances, the Kierkegaard family nevertheless witnessed a great deal of hardship during and after the Napoleonic Wars, hardship that impinged on its domestic life in subtle but notable ways. For example, Søren Kierkegaard was **baptized** and confirmed in churches other than his home parish, since the cathedral of Copenhagen, long known as the Church of Our Lady (Vor Frue Kirke), was destroyed during the 1807 shelling. The new cathedral building would not be completed until 1829, just a year before Kierkegaard enrolled at the **University of Copenhagen**. *See also* CONSTITUTION, DANISH; HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1770–1831)/HEGELIANISM; POLITICS.

NATURE. Kierkegaard's understanding of and views about "nature" (*Natur*) vary in accordance with context. On a personal level, Kierkegaard was well known for taking long walks around Copenhagen, a practice that he claimed was essential to his literary productivity. "I walk my way to health," he once noted. "I have walked my way to my best ideas." So, despite being a lifelong resident of a capital city, Kierkegaard saw value in spending time outside, among the elements of nature. On occasion, moreover, Kierkegaard would venture beyond the streets and parks of Copenhagen to more remote natural areas. For example, in 1835, Kierkegaard spent roughly two months in northern Zealand, taking in the beauty of **Grib Forest**, Lake Esrum (Esrum Sø), and the North Sea. This was not a mere attempt to get away from the hustle and bustle of Copenhagen: Kierkegaard met with an ichthyologist, hiked, collected plants, and watched birds. It was also around this time that, in a letter to noted zoologist (and distant family relative) Peter Wilhelm Lund (1801–1880), Kierkegaard confessed to having an interest in professionally joining "all those who seek to explain and interpret the runic script of nature." Yet, while claiming to be "inspired by the natural sciences," Kierkegaard also told Lund that his real **passion** lay in investigating human **existence**, an investigation that can be illuminated, but never exhausted, by the scientific (*see* SCIENCE/SPECULATION) study of *Natur*. "Upon hearing the sounds

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

of nature in Ceylon . . . I am reminded of the sounds of the spiritual world," Kierkegaard explains.

This quote might stand as a précis of Kierkegaard's thinking about nature. In the highest sense, nature is capable of providing insight into humanity's relationship with **God**, who is the ultimate source of the created order (*see* CREATION). Indeed, when human beings neglect the patterns and rhythms of nature, they derive an illusory sense of separation from and even mastery over the natural world. This problem has been exacerbated in modernity, with its embrace of **technology** and its related drives toward industrialization and urbanization. In an 1852 journal entry, Kierkegaard notes, "Really, we need to live more with nature if for no other reason than to get more of an impression of God's majesty. Huddled together in the great cultural centers we have as much as possible abolished all overwhelming impressions." The outcome of this alienation from nature is, Kierkegaard concludes, a "lamentable demoralization." *See also* HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1770–1831)/HEGELIANISM; LOVE; METAPHYSICS; MIRACLE; PAGANISM; POLYTECHNIC, THE.

NECESSITY. Kierkegaard's conception of "necessity" (*Nødvendighed*) is rooted in **metaphysics**, but it bears important **ethical** and **religious** implications. In ***Philosophical Fragments***, Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** Johannes Climacus draws a sharp distinction between that which comes into **existence** and that which is necessary (*nødvendig*). The former involves an ontological change, whereas the latter excludes change altogether. "For the necessary *is*," Climacus asserts. To the extent, then, that a certain quality is said to be "necessary," it can be thought of as essential to a given thing. That is why, in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, Climacus critiques **Hegelianism** for failing to differentiate historical developments, which are always contingent, from necessary truths (*see* TRUTH) of **reason**.

Elsewhere Kierkegaard expands on this juxtaposition of necessity and human **freedom**. While the existing **individual** will encounter necessary features in certain aspects of life, she nevertheless is capable of freely exercising **choice** in the domain of ethics. Indeed, this capacity distinguishes **the self** from other creatures—that it can bring continuity to its own **history** by freely willing the ethical. In ***The Sickness unto Death***, Anti-Climacus deepens this line of thinking, arguing that necessity constitutes a core aspect of the **dialectic** of human self: "A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity." Hence, insofar as the self's task is to hold its components in equilibrium, it must simultaneously accept its necessary features—for example, that it was born in this place and during this period of **time**—as well as use the **imagination** to envision

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

possibilities for existential growth. Failure to sustain this balance results in **despair**. *See also* ACTUALITY; ANXIETY; FINITUDE/INFINITY.

NEGATION. Kierkegaard's use of "negation" (*Negation*) is both indebted to and critical of the **philosophy** of **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel**. Moreover, as is often the case, Kierkegaard draws on the figure of **Socrates** to define his position. For example, in ***The Concept of Irony***, Kierkegaard compares Socratic inquiry to negation in Hegelian **dialectic**. Both thinkers view the "negative" (*Negativ*) as a moment of opposition in relation to a given **actuality**. Yet, whereas Hegel understands negation as a crucial step in the systematic realization of a higher, positive unity, Socrates's position is that of "infinite absolute negativity," in which the subjective (*see* SUBJECTIVITY) thinker ironically (*see* IRONY) nullifies the established order in deference to that which lies beyond human comprehension and control.

In general, *The Concept of Irony* treats the tension between Hegel and Socrates in descriptive fashion. However, in later works, Kierkegaard comes to advocate for the priority of Socratic *Negation*. That is to say, when the existing thinker adopts a negative standpoint, she refuses the totalizing claims of human **reason** and presses toward the unknown. In ***Stages on Life's Way***, Kierkegaard's pseudonym Frater Taciturnus distinguishes between the **aesthetic**, which finds its terminus is positive outcomes, and the **religious**, which is unconcerned with external results. "I can also say in this way," Taciturnus adds, "the negative is higher than the positive." The religious **individual** must learn to abjure the temptation of finished products, since, for finite beings (*see* FINITUDE/INFINITY), "the negative infinity is the higher, and the positive is a dubious reassurance." With this in mind, Taciturnus likens the religious life to swimming "out on the deep, [with] 70,000 fathoms of water beneath." Relating to **God**, who transcends all human categories and concepts, is a vulnerable undertaking, made even more difficult by both corporate and individual **sin**. These are insights to which Kierkegaard would return throughout his oeuvre, albeit in a manner that slowly but surely moved away from the core philosophical problem and came to resemble the *via negativa* of Christian **mysticism**. *See also* CORRECTIVE; EXISTENCE.

NIELSEN, RASMUS (1809–1884). Danish philosopher and theologian who was appointed professor of moral **philosophy** at the **University of Copenhagen** in 1841, succeeding the late **Poul Martin Møller**. Though initially attracted to **Hegelianism**—and drawing Kierkegaard's derision in turn—Nielsen altered his philosophical project after reading Kierkegaard's pseudonymous treatise ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***. During the summer of 1848, moreover, Kierkegaard and Nielsen began taking walks together

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

and, for a time, became friends. Kierkegaard even wondered if Nielsen might one day be the executor of his posthumous papers.

Eventually, however, their relationship would sour. More sycophant than disciple, Nielsen portrayed himself as a champion of Kierkegaard's cause even as he borrowed freely from Kierkegaard's writings in his own works, a tendency that did not go unnoticed. "[My] writings are plundered in many ways," Kierkegaard notes in an 1849 journal entry, "the **pseudonyms** most of all, which he never cites, perhaps with deliberate shrewdness." Even worse, Nielsen's official position and professorial literary style threatened to subvert one of the key theses of Kierkegaard's oeuvre—that direct forms of **communication** inadequately facilitate existential development. Nevertheless, the two thinkers retained a common enemy in **Hans Lassen Martensen**. In fact, years before Kierkegaard's so-called attack upon Christendom, Nielsen harangued Martensen in print, culminating in the pseudonymous roman à clef *A Career in the Underworld* (*Et Levnetsløb i Underverdenen*, 1853). Though Kierkegaard reportedly distanced himself from Nielsen's vituperative novella, Martensen sensed that Kierkegaard was somehow behind it. Yet the influence was likely indirect. After all, when Kierkegaard launched his own literary assault (*see MOMENT*, *THE*) on the Danish **state church** in 1854, he did so in his own name. *See also* ANONYMITY; BOESEN, EMIL FERDINAND (1812–1881).

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

O

OBJECTIVITY. The word "objectivity" (*Objektivitet*) can take on many gradations of meaning, but it is generally associated with a mode of thinking in which an issue or a thing is approached and grasped independently of personal bias or influence. Consequently, people often view objectivity as a neutral form of knowledge or as an impartial state of mind. As Kierkegaard sees it, *Objektivitet* is, in one sense, a valid way of acquiring information about the world—a point evinced by the success of the physical sciences (*see* SCIENCE/SPECULATION). At the same time, however, he repeatedly expresses concern that objectivity has become the preferred epistemological method in all fields of inquiry. What may be useful in developing, say, an improved piece of **technology** is misleading and even dangerous when applied to human **existence**.

Kierkegaard vigorously presses this case in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***. According to **pseudonym** Johannes Climacus, the so-called objective thinker claims to abstract his own presuppositions and predilections from the process of obtaining knowledge. This tendency is said to permeate modern **philosophy**, though Climacus pays especial and critical attention to the thought of **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel**. As he sees it, such assertions of objectivity are not only false—after all, even the physical scientist comes to her job with certain interests and worries, which can easily compromise the objectivity of her methods or results—but they exclude or misunderstand aspects of human existence that cannot be comprehended in objective terms. For example, while the **religious** conception of an eternal **happiness** can be described objectively, the **individual** pursuit of such happiness is ultimately a matter of **subjectivity**, involving the qualitative **passion** of **faith**. Second, Climacus argues that, for all of its benefits, objectivity is no guarantor of **truth**. The person who seeks to know something objectively must in principle be open to revision, since it is always possible that new data will falsify what previously was thought accurate. Consequently, objectivity is an inadequate basis for something as personally significant as **ethical** and religious ideals. *See also* COMMUNICATION; CORRECTIVE; CULTURE; DEATH; INWARDNESS; REASON; REFLECTION; SELF, THE.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

OFFENSE. The Danish term *Forargelse* is derived from the verb *forarge*, meaning "to give offense to" or "to shock." Kierkegaard uses the term well over 150 times in his authorship, though he develops it as a concept in ***Practice in Christianity***—a pseudonymous (*see* PSEUDONYMITY) text that explores the significance of **Jesus Christ** for Christian discipleship. In biblical terms, the *Forargelse* presented by Christ is indeed a kind of shock, one that is akin to a stone over which one trips or to a trap into which one falls (Isa. 8:14). In the New Testament, the Apostle Paul argues that Christ represents a "stumblingstone" (Rom. 9:32) to those who seek righteousness in human works. Moreover, that the Son of God would die on the cross constitutes an "offence" (Gal. 5:11) both to those who seek **salvation** through **reason** and to those who seek salvation through **law**.

Practice in Christianity can be seen as a gloss on these biblical claims. According to Kierkegaard's pseudonym Anti-Climacus, genuine Christian **faith** first must pass through the possibility of *Forargelse*. He goes on to detail three forms of offense. The first form does not concern "Christ as Christ" but the fact that "he, the single **individual**, seems to be unwilling to subject or subordinate himself to the established order." Understood in these terms, whether or not Christ is the Son of **God** is immaterial. *Any* individual who would dare confront a worldly establishment would generate a related form of *Forargelse*, though Anti-Climacus is clear that Christ's "collision" with the powers-that-be is **religious** in nature. In fact, this aspect heightens the offense, since Christ does not argue for one sociopolitical system over another. On the contrary, he reminds the established order that it is historically contingent and, in doing so, scandalizes its leaders.

The second form of *Forargelse* constitutes the first of two "essential" offenses, which, according to Anti-Climacus, pertain to "Christ *qua* God-man" and thus obtain across sociohistorical contexts. In this case, the essential offense concerns "loftiness" (*Høiheden*) or the fact that "an individual human being speaks or acts as if he were God, declares himself to be God." One might assume that Christ's performance of **miracles** would demonstrate that he is divine. Yet, as Anti-Climacus points out, Christ himself "alludes to the miracles" and to his interpretation of Jewish Torah but nevertheless feels compelled to add, "And blessed is *he*, whosoever shall not be offended in me" (Matt. 11:6). The implication is that, even though astonishing miracles and authoritative teaching draw attention to Christ's person, they do not preclude the possibility of offense. And if this possibility is missing, the biblical testimony is abandoned and "**Christianity** . . . is fantasy [*Phantasteri*] in both respects—with respect to miracles and with respect to Christ." Any accurate rendering of Christ's life, then, must not shy away from "the situation of contemporaneity" (*Samtidighedens Situation*), whereby a docetic "fantasy

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

picture of Christ" is eschewed in favor of the New Testament Christ—"a lowly human being" who acted "in the character of being God."

The third and final form of *Forargelse*—and the second form of essential offense—has to do with "lowliness" (*Ringheden*). In this case, "one is not offended that [Christ] is God but that God is this man," that is to say, "a lowly, poor, **suffering**, and finally powerless human being." The tendency here is to assume that, if God were to become incarnate, it would only be in the guise of power and prestige. Thus Christ offends by not being the *kind* of divine being one would expect or prefer. He is neither a superhero nor even a man who slowly but surely overcomes a slew of earthly challenges. On the contrary, despite performing various signs and wonders, Christ winds up in the hands of the Roman authorities. This discrepancy—that he appears to be divine and yet subsequently suffers mockery and persecution—deeply offends human reason. Even Christ's most devoted followers abandoned him when faced with this incongruity, and this is the most profound torment that he had to endure.

By the time of his literary attack on the Danish **state church**, Kierkegaard was convinced not only that *Forargelse* was essential to true Christianity but that Christendom's deterioration was largely due to clerical attempts to suppress offense. Christ can only be the object of faith if he is also the "sign of offense." Hence, rather than make Christian **doctrine** palatable to mainstream secular culture (*see* WORLDLINESS/SECULARISM), the one who would communicate Christian **truth** must preserve the possibility of offense, a principle that Kierkegaard would put into practice in his late writings, especially in ***The Moment***. *See also* ABSURD; ACOUSTICAL ILLUSION; AUTHORITY; CHOICE; COMMUNICATION; HYPOCRISY; IMITATION; LOVE; MARTYRDOM; REVELATION; SACRIFICE.

OLSEN, REGINE (1822–1904). Kierkegaard's fiancée from September 1840 until October 1841. The youngest child of State Councillor Terkild Olsen (1784–1849) and his wife, Regine Frederikke Mailling (1778–1856), Regine grew up in a privileged, upper-middle-class home in Copenhagen. As was fitting, the Olsen children were brought up properly, with emphases on education, manners, and God-fearing piety. Regine herself would later recall her background with the Moravian Congregation of Brethren (Brødremenighed), whose emphases on edifying literature and the **imitation** of **Jesus Christ** influenced her own devotional habits. This predilection is notable, since Kierkegaard too had roots in **Pietism**, as well as in the upper bourgeoisie. It is not surprising, then, that he would one day identify Regine as an excellent match for **marriage**.

The two first met in May 1837, when Kierkegaard, then a university student, visited his friend Peter Rørdam (1806–1883) in Frederiksberg. It was

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

not, however, **love** at first sight. In an 1837 journal entry, Kierkegaard suggests he was initially smitten by his friend's younger sister Bolette Christine Rørdam (1815–1887). This detail makes sense, given that Regine was only fourteen years old upon first meeting Kierkegaard. Precisely how things unfolded between May 1837 and September 1840 remains hazy, but, in any case, Kierkegaard's interest in Regine became clear by August 1840. After she accepted his proposal a month later, the couple began to correspond and to meet regularly. Indeed, Kierkegaard's letters to his fiancée indicate genuine if also complex affection, and Regine's sole extant response—a pithy but flirtatious quotation from *The Fishermen* (*Fiskerne*, 1779) by Danish author Johannes Ewald (1743–1781)—implies that she was truly fond of her Kierkegaard. Nevertheless, as Kierkegaard's university responsibilities increased in early 1841, he slowly but surely distanced himself from Regine. On 11 August of the same year, he returned his engagement ring with a line that he would later reproduce in ***Stages on Life's Way***: "In the Orient, to send a silk cord was a death sentence for the recipient; here, to send a ring will likely be a death sentence for the person who sends it."

Regine was heartbroken, and she pleaded with Kierkegaard to reconsider his **decision**, invoking the memory of Kierkegaard's late father, **Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard**. Realizing that Regine's fidelity would not be easily shaken, Kierkegaard made a dubious **choice**: he aimed to convince Regine that he was no longer an **ethical** person and, in doing so, to free her of any responsibility for their breakup. But Regine would have none of it, and in October 1841 Kierkegaard was forced to have uncomfortable conversations with both Regine's father and with Regine herself. Kierkegaard stood his ground, albeit not without difficulty: "I spent the nights crying in my bed," he later recalled, "but by day I was my usual self, wittier and more flippant than ever." At last, the engagement was called off on Monday, 11 October 1841, and Kierkegaard soon became the subject of much gossip in Copenhagen—gossip that he did nothing to quell by making eye-opening allusions to his relationship with Regine in works such as ***Either/Or*** and *Stages on Life's Way*.

In time, however, the couple would arrive at a mutual understanding. For Kierkegaard, Regine became one of the key inspirations for his literary activity—a symbol (rightly or wrongly) of the genial **immediacy** and sensuous **passion** that Kierkegaard himself would never be able to enjoy. Consequently, their broken engagement constituted a **sacrifice** of **aesthetic** pleasure and ethical contentment, and it would come to haunt Kierkegaard's determination to pursue a **religious** calling. For Regine, the emotional tumultuousness of her relationship with Kierkegaard would stand in stark contrast to her future circumstances. In 1847, she married civil servant Johan Frederik "Fritz" Schlegel (1817–1896), who soon became the head of Denmark's

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

colonial office. In 1854, the couple moved to the Danish West Indies, where Schlegel served as governor. They returned to Copenhagen in 1860, several years after Kierkegaard's infamous attack on Denmark's **state church** (*see MOMENT*, *THE*) and his subsequent passing. Fritz died in 1896, and, in her later years, Regine was periodically asked to recount her relationship with Kierkegaard. She did so willingly, stressing that there were no hard feelings about the breakup and even recalling that Kierkegaard once told her that there is no marriage in heaven. In this way, she intimated that the two would be reunited in **eternity**. *See also* ANXIETY; BOESEN, EMIL FERDINAND (1812–1881); *FEAR AND TREMBLING*; MELANCHOLY; *REPETITION*; WOMEN.

ORTHODOXY. The Danish noun *Orthodoxie*, like its English cognate, is derived from the Greek term *orthodoxos* ("having the right opinion"). In ecclesiastical and theological contexts, orthodoxy typically indicates a correct understanding of Christian **doctrine**, particularly insofar as such an understanding is aligned with established traditions of biblical interpretation and catechetical instruction. Kierkegaard's interpretation and use of *Orthodoxie* varied according to context. At times, he was critical of those who would use their doctrinal orthodoxy as a tool for self-aggrandizement—a charge he would level at **Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig** and his followers, who achieved cultural and political influence by celebrating their adherence to the Apostles' Creed and by promoting a robust ecclesiology. In this way, Kierkegaard argued, Grundtvigians have their cake and eat it too: they claim apostolic (*see* APOSTLE) authority while simultaneously enjoying the benefits of political power. This was a mistake common among those who made their commitment to orthodoxy paramount, no matter their **church** background. Whenever orthodox belief is given priority over the **imitation** of **Jesus Christ**, the result is a diminishment of authentic **Christianity**. At the same time, however, Kierkegaard was adamant that the preservation of orthodox teaching is essential if Christianity is to resist subordination to the modern bourgeois order—a point that the Danish **state church** has failed to grasp. The divorce of orthodoxy from orthopraxy has resulted in a merely cognitive understanding of Christian doctrine when, in truth, what is needed is a recognition that orthodox teaching is meant to transform one's **existence** and to slowly but surely bring one's life into conformity with Christ's. In short, *Orthodoxie* should promote the **upbuilding** of the **individual** rather than serve as a cog in the wheel of an ideological **system** or a **social and political** establishment. *See also* CATHOLICISM; MARTYRDOM; MEDIATION; PARADOX; PROTESTANTISM; REVELATION; SCRIPTURE.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

OSTERMANN, JOHANNES ADREAS (1809–1888). Danish linguist, teacher, and politician. Ostermann was a student at the **University of Copenhagen** during the 1830s, graduating with a degree in philology in 1839. Though a teacher at the prestigious Metropolitan School (Metropolitanskolen), Ostermann was passionately involved in **politics**. In 1848, he was elected to represent Frederiksborg County at the Danish Constituent Assembly (Den Grundlovgivende Rigsforsamling), and, a year later, he became a member of parliament under the newly adopted Danish **constitution** (Grundloven). Such a role was of longstanding interest to Ostermann. Years before, while still a student, Ostermann delivered a paper to the **Student Association** titled "Our Latest Journalistic Literature" ("Vor nyeste Journalliteratur"). Published in the *Fatherland* (*Fædrelandet*) on 21 November 1835, Ostermann's piece critiqued the Danish government's censorship of the **press**. According to Ostermann, defenders of censorship are so worried about negative content that they overlook the benefits of this new communicative form. The print media has promoted general literacy and increased public (*see* CROWD/PUBLIC) engagement, despite the insalubrious material disseminated in certain gutter papers. Hence, in recognizing the greater good at hand, Danes should advocate for a free press.

On 28 November 1835, Kierkegaard presented a rebuttal of Ostermann's position to the Student Association. Titled "Our Journalistic Literature: A Study from Nature in Noonday Light" ("Vor Journal-Litteratur: Studium efter Naturen i Middagsbelysning"), Kierkegaard's lecture was intended to serve as a kind of "fact check," scrutinizing whether Ostermann's optimism about the press was well founded. With this in mind, Kierkegaard maintains that liberal spokesmen such Ostermann fail to see that the press is not actually a force of change. Rather, it is a passive entity, driven along by stronger influences, a point that Kierkegaard underlines by noting that the Danish monarchy permitted the formation of representative assemblies *prior* to the print media's demand for such reforms. But what, then, does the press actually accomplish? According to Kierkegaard, it does not lead to constructive development but, rather, disruptive distraction. A society shaped by journalism is indeed busier and more informed, but, as a result, it lacks order and purpose. While Kierkegaard did not publish this paper, he would return to these ideas elsewhere in his authorship, particularly in ***A Literary Review***. *See also* FREEDOM.

OTHER, THE. Kierkegaard's categories of "the other" (*det Andet*) and "otherness" (*Andethed*) are not as well developed as later treatments by theorists such as Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) and Emmanuel Lévinas (1906–1995). However, by way of his familiarity with the **dialectic** of **Georg Wilhelm**

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Friedrich Hegel, Kierkegaard was well aware that modern **philosophy** had increasingly conceived of the other as something to be annulled and subsequently taken up into a higher **identity**. This tendency, as Kierkegaard saw it, had grim ramifications for a number of disciplines, including **ethics** and theology. For example, the **individual**, as *det Andet*, is treated with violence whenever relegated to a mere numerical constituent of the **crowd**. Likewise, **God** is desecrated whenever the radical dissimilarity of divinity and **creation** is ignored in favor of an alleged philosophical reconciliation of the two. Famously, Kierkegaard elaborated on the latter point in his **pseudonymous** treatise ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, and, decades later, Swiss theologian **Karl Barth** would make it the linchpin of his attempt to renew modern Protestant (*see* PROTESTANTISM) dogmatics. Ultimately, then, Kierkegaard can be seen as a defender of the irreducible individuality of the other, whose *Andethed* should be respected as such and not viewed as a problem to be overcome. *See also* ABSOLUTE; DAMNATION; ENVY; IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE; LEAP; MEDIATION; METAPHYSICS; PARADOX; REVELATION.

OUTER. *See* INNER.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

P

PAGANISM. The English word "pagan" is derived from the Latin *paganus*, meaning "civilian" or "villager." In the wake of the life and ministry of **Jesus Christ**, "pagan" came to refer to a person who does not worship the **God** of **Judaism** and **Christianity**. In Danish, however, the word for "paganism" is *Hedenskab*, a Germanic term that originally indicated an uncultivated person, perhaps literally a "dweller of the heath." It is related to the English word "heathen." Thus both "pagan" and "heathen" bear pejorative connotations, suggesting the intellectual and moral primitivity of those who do not profess Christian **faith**.

In general, Kierkegaard's use of *Hedenskab* retains these critical undertones, though he nevertheless applies the term in various ways. For instance, he frequently cites **Socrates** as a philosophical touchstone, despite the fact that the Greek thinker predated Christianity and thus was "pagan" (*hedensk*). For Kierkegaard, Socrates's use of **dialectic** and **irony**, not to mention his passionate (*see* PASSION) yet humble pursuit of **truth**, prefigured his own efforts. On occasion, however, Kierkegaard points out deficiencies in Socrates's thinking. ***Philosophical Fragments*** juxtaposes Socrates's maieutic method with Christian **revelation**, and ***Works of Love*** is clear that a pagan such as Socrates could not have conceived of Christian **love**. For all of his greatness, Socrates was unable to transcend a pagan **life-view**.

In his later writings, Kierkegaard argues that even self-professed Christians can be thought of as pagans, insofar as their understanding of Christian **doctrine** has come primarily through the distortions of the **state church**. Far from confronting the transcendence of Jesus Christ, as given **witness** to in biblical and apostolic (*see* APOSTLE) teaching, these Christians live in a kind of natural simplicity, preferring **aesthetic** pleasure and the bonds of ethnicity over the universal claims of **ethical** and **religious** devotion. Kierkegaard's task was to expose and potentially to root out the ingress of pagan categories into the **church**. As Kierkegaard puts it in an 1854 journal entry, "What I am writing here is Christianly so true, so true, and Christianly it has to be said in this way; truly it is high time, for in the name of Christianity all

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

respect for Christianity has been lost on the largest possible scale, and Christianity has been degraded to the lowest paganism." *See also CHRISTIAN DISCOURSES*; ETERNITY.

PARADOX. Though Kierkegaard uses the term *Paradox* less than 200 times in his authorship, it is often grouped among his most significant concepts, a perception that may be related to the idiosyncratic status of paradox in **philosophy**. Derived from the Greek adjective *paradoxos*, meaning "contrary to expectation" or "incredible," the English noun "paradox" (like its Danish cognate) indicates a phenomenon or statement that contains a contradiction and yet may be true. One can encounter paradoxes in daily life—take, for example, the oft-repeated maxim that "you have to spend money to make money"—but paradox is also a prominent literary-cum-rhetorical device. In the New Testament, for example, **Jesus Christ** frequently teaches by way of paradox: "For whosoever will save his life shall lose it; but whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the gospel's, the same shall save it" (Mark 8:35); "If any man desire to be first, *the same* shall be last of all, and servant of all" (Mark 9:35). In these cases, Jesus employs paradox to capture his audience's attention, making astonishing claims that, understood in a certain way, contain an underlying logic. Yet, if paradox is a common tool for orators and poets, its role in philosophy is more controversial. The ancient Greek philosopher Zeno of Elea (c. 490–430 BCE) famously submitted a set of philosophical problems that remain debated. Intended to show that the claims of figures such as Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 535–475 BCE) resulted in absurdity, Zeno's paradoxes themselves have been viewed as either legitimate conundrums or mere ruses that can be solved by modern **science**.

Kierkegaard's use of paradox tends to be **religious** in nature, though it has significant philosophical implications. In ***Philosophical Fragments***, Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** Johannes Climacus maintains that human **reason** wants to discover its own limits, to think about that which it cannot properly conceive. This "unknown," which Climacus also associates with **God**, is the paradox that stokes the **passion** of thinking. Later, Kierkegaard would approach this matter in a more specific theological vein. Ascribed to the pseudonym Anti-Climacus, ***Practice in Christianity*** argues that **Jesus Christ** is the **absolute** paradox, insofar as divinity and humanity are united in his person. Reason cannot reconcile this contradiction, and thus one must respond with either **faith** or **offense**. Yet, as Kierkegaard already had insisted in the pseudonymous ***Fear and Trembling***, the person who has faith thereby makes herself an **exception** to the universal, resulting in the inscrutability of the believer to **the social and political** order, even and perhaps especially if that order seeks to unite Christianity and the world (*see* WORLDLINESS/SECULARISM). In

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

this way, the paradox serves as a spanner in the works of conventional wisdom and as a barb to those who would subordinate all of human **existence** to a rationally comprehensible **system**. *See also* ABSOLUTE; ACOUSTICAL ILLUSION; DIALECTIC; IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE; MEDIATION.

PASSION. Kierkegaard uses the word "passion" (*Lidenskab*) nearly 600 times in his authorship, and he employs the related terms "passionate" (*lidenskabelig*), "pathos" (*Pathos*), and "pathos-filled" (*pathetisk*) on hundreds of additional occasions. Etymologically, *Lidenskab* is derived from the German verb *leiden* ("to suffer"), and it indicates a powerful feeling that overcomes a person or a strong interest in or predilection for someone or something. The word *Pathos*, meanwhile, is derived from the Greek verb *pathein* ("to feel" or "to suffer") and literally means "that which befalls someone." Thus both *Lidenskab* and *Pathos* have implications of **suffering**, albeit with a slightly different points of inflection. The one who suffers, like the one who is passionate, is acted upon by an external entity. Yet suffering is often associated with the experience of hardship or pain, and passion is linked with a range of circumstances, including moments of sensual pleasure and poignant emotion.

Kierkegaard evinces a concern for passion throughout his authorship. The utilization of **pseudonymity**, particularly in his early writings, was intended to persuade readers through passional appeal as well as intellectual argumentation. Moreover, across a range of works, Kierkegaard describes how passion varies in accordance with a given stage of **existence**. Whereas the **aesthetic** is characterized by sensuous impulses, the **ethical** involves a heartfelt commitment to moral principles. Meanwhile, in ***Fear and Trembling***, Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** Johannes de silentio depicts Abraham as a figure whose **faith** in **God** is permeated by passion—a longing for God that entails an obedience so thorough that it renders Abraham an **exception** even to the universal dictates of society. As Kierkegaard's literary activity unfolded, he paid increasing attention to how **the social and political** conditions of a given **culture** can influence **individual** passion. In ***A Literary Review***, for example, he observes that "**the present age**" has substituted **reflection** for passion and, in the process, created a society of indolent consumerism. In his late periodical ***The Moment***, Kierkegaard polemically applied this analysis to the Danish **state church**, arguing that careerist clergy and bourgeois laity have drained **Christianity** of the passion demonstrated by **Jesus Christ** and his early followers. In short, while Kierkegaard does not believe that all passion is **religious**, he insists that true religion must be passionate, involving the whole person and not just a cognitive assent to sacred **doctrine**. *See also* IMITATION; IMMEDIACY; PATIENCE; REASON; RESIGNATION; SCIENCE/SPECULATION; WILL.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

PASTORAL SEMINARY. The Royal Pastoral Seminary (Det Kongelige Pastoralseminarium) was founded in January 1809 under the leadership of Friedrich Münter (1761–1830), the recently appointed bishop of Zealand, and prominent theologian Henrik Georg Clausen (1759–1840), who would soon become dean (*Stiftsprovst*) of the diocese of Zealand. The seminary's mission was to ensure proper training for clerical candidates, with special emphasis on practical considerations such as homiletics and **church** law. As Münter saw it, becoming a priest in the **state church** was not unlike becoming an attorney or a physician: it demanded professional training in addition to theoretical study. Yet this idea was not yet widely accepted, and the seminary experienced a number of immediate challenges. Attendance was not compulsory, and many potential students received exemptions from study. In the early 1840s, the curriculum was revised, though the seminary remained a source of controversy, buffeted by **the social and political** changes of the era. Questions about the direction and purpose of the Pastoralseminarium would extend well into the 20th century. Nevertheless, the seminary essentially continues to operate today as the National Church's Center for Training and Knowledge (Folkekirkens Uddannelses- og Videnscenter) and features campuses in Copenhagen and Aarhus.

Kierkegaard was a student at the Pastoralseminarium from November 1840 to February 1844. During this period, one of his main focal points was homiletical training. For example, in January 1841, he preached a trial sermon at Holmen's Church (Holmens Kirke) in the Gammelholm neighborhood of Copenhagen using Philippians 1:19–25 as his text. Later, his qualifying probational sermon was given at Trinitatis Church (Trinitatis Kirke) in Copenhagen's inner city, this time drawing on 1 Corinthians 2:6–9. The fact that Kierkegaard incorporated sermons and fragments of sermons into his published work (*see EITHER/OR*) doubtless stemmed from such experiences. Moreover, Kierkegaard recommended that his various signed writings (*see* DISCOURSE/DELIBERATION/SERMON) be read *aloud*, though he was also careful to state that his worked lacked the **authority** of ecclesiastical preaching.

In 1849, Kierkegaard approached Bishop **Jakob Peter Mynster** about teaching at the Pastoralseminarium. Mynster declined, suggesting instead that Kierkegaard accept a rural pastoral assignment. In a lengthy 1851 journal entry, Kierkegaard recounts that the possibility of taking a **church** position was bound up with the publication of his final pseudonymous (*see* PSEUDONYMITY) works, ***The Sickness unto Death*** and ***Practice in Christianity***. Both works could be seen as critiques of the Danish **state church**, and so Kierkegaard doubted that he could publish them and serve the church. He hoped that **God** would give him a clear and, in effect, conventional sense of

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

direction: "I prayed . . . that I might be appointed to the pastoral seminary," he notes. Yet such an appointment never came, and the books were released in 1849 and 1850, respectively. The path was now cleared for Kierkegaard's so-called attack upon Christendom (*see MOMENT*, *THE*), during which his interest in homiletics manifested itself in a different way: "Real preaching or proclamation means preaching on the street," as he put it in an 1851 journal passage. *See also* CLAUSEN, HENRIK NICOLAJ (1793–1877).

PATIENCE. For Kierkegaard, "patience" (*Taalmod* or *Taalmodighed*) belongs to a cluster of concepts associated with **passion**, **suffering**, and the **imitation** of **Jesus Christ**. In Danish, the words for patience are linked to the verb *tåle*, meaning "to bear" or "to put up with." Similarly, the English word "patience" can be traced back to the Latin noun *patientia*, signifying "the quality of enduring or suffering." Nevertheless, "patience" has an inward character that is not always true of suffering: one is said to wait patiently in traffic or for better weather, indicating an attitude of dignified forbearance, whereas suffering has connotations of external and intentional persecution.

In any case, it is in the **inner** sense of "bearing trials without complaint" that Kierkegaard makes patience a key theme of ***Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses***. Indeed, he devotes three discourses in total to the subject: "To Gain One's Soul in Patience" ("At erhverve sin Sjel i Taalmodighed"), "To Preserve One's Soul in Patience" ("At bevare sin Sjel i Taalmodighed"), and "Patience in Expectancy" ("Taalmod i Forventning"). The first was published on 6 December 1843 as the final **discourse** of *Four Upbuilding Discourses* (*Fire opbyggelige Taler*); the latter two were issued on 5 March 1844 and thus comprised the entirety of *Two Upbuilding Discourses* (*To opbyggelige Taler*). In effect, then, Kierkegaard dedicated three consecutive works to patience, thereby demonstrating its central role in his conception of **the self**.

Characteristically, Kierkegaard treats patience in dialectical (*see* DIALECTIC) fashion. As he writes in "To Preserve One's Soul in Patience," "patience is just as active as it is passive and just as passive as it is active." In the former sense, *Taalmodighed* is distinguished by a passionate willingness to be subject to **God**, the only **being** in whom the self can find **rest**. In the latter sense, *Taalmodighed* is that which enables the **individual** to detach from **worldliness** and to make progress toward the self's appropriate end. That patience is crucial for **upbuilding** means that it is also an aspect of **love**, the virtue by which God, whom Kierkegaard describes as "infinite patience," relates to humanity in and through the person of Jesus Christ.

***PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS*.** Kierkegaard issued *Philosophical Fragments or A Fragment of Philosophy* (*Philosophiske Smuler eller En*

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Smule Philosophi) on 13 June 1844. The book came out amid a burst of activity. Less than a week earlier, Kierkegaard had published *Three Upbuilding Discourses* (*Tre opbyggelige Taler*), and, on 17 June of the same month, he released two works simultaneously—***The Concept of Anxiety*** and ***Prefaces***. With the exception of *Three Upbuilding Discourses*, each of these works were ascribed to pseudonyms (*see* PSEUDONYMITY). Johannes Climacus was listed as author of *Philosophical Fragments* and Kierkegaard as editor—a last-minute decision on Kierkegaard's part, albeit one with notable ramifications. Kierkegaard had already written one book under the name "Johannes Climacus"—the unpublished *Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est*, which he dabbled with during 1842–1843—and he would come to attribute ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript*** to the same pseudonym. Thus three works in all comprise the Climacus canon, each representing a critical response to modern **philosophy**.

The overarching theme of *Philosophical Fragments* is **truth**. The title page itemizes the book's three epistemological questions: "Can a historical point of departure be given for an eternal consciousness; how can such a point of departure be of more than historical interest; can an eternal **happiness** be built on historical knowledge?" Climacus investigates these questions over several sections, culminating in a short "Moral" (*Moralen*), in which he sums up what the book has accomplished. In Climacus's view, *Philosophical Fragments* has successfully found an epistemological model that deviates from **Socrates**. Whereas the latter held that truth can be recollected (*see* RECOLLECTION) by the learner, Climacus's work "indisputably goes beyond the Socratic," exploring a "new organ" for knowledge—namely, **faith**. In the process, he has surveyed the implications of such an approach, including what it means to be taught by "the god" (*see* GOD) rather than a human pedagogue. Yet Climacus insists that his project has not advocated for the superiority of this **religious** epistemology, only that it is different. Yet, precisely because these two models are different, Climacus also claims to have shown that faith, which is conditioned by the god, has always been and always will be incommensurate with historical demonstrations, an outcome of the paradoxical (*see* PARADOX) collision between **eternity** and **temporality**.

Upon its release, *Philosophical Fragments* proved to be a modest success. While the book did not sell particularly well—even as late as 1847, more than half of its original print run remained unsold—it received a generally favorable review by Johan Frederik Hagen (1817–1859). However, Kierkegaard himself was dissatisfied with Hagen's review. According to Hagen, Climacus's use of **dialectic** is impressive, but it gives insufficient attention to the principle of **mediation** in **Hegelianism**. In an 1846 journal entry, Kierkegaard notes that, no matter how well intentioned, Hagen has utterly

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

missed the point of *Philosophical Fragments*, which was meant "specifically to battle against mediation." As Kierkegaard goes on to lament, "An author who really understands himself is better served by not being read at all." *See also* CONTEMPORANEITY; NECESSITY; *PRACTICE IN CHRISTIANITY*; REASON; REDOUBLING/REDUPLICATION; REVELATION.

PHILOSOPHY. Kierkegaard is often (if not always) labeled a "philosopher," and so it is not surprising that he himself examines philosophical questions and, at times, even engages in metadiscourse about the nature of philosophical activity. Such considerations permeate Kierkegaard's early writings, particularly in pseudonymous works such ***The Concept of Anxiety*** and ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, though they trail off later in his authorship. Nevertheless, one of the key points of tension in Kierkegaard's corpus is the one between objective (*see* OBJECTIVITY) thinking and subjective (*see* SUBJECTIVITY) actualization or, to cast it in the terms of the **history** of philosophy, between the Sophists and **Socrates**. Indeed, while it would be wrong to say that Kierkegaard altogether disapproved of philosophical **reflection**, he rightly can be considered a critic of a certain mode of *Philosophi*. That is to say, whereas Socrates's use of **dialectic** and **irony** kept open "the wound of negativity" (*see* NEGATION), the Sophists provided positive answers that eased the problems of human **existence**. Kierkegaard strongly prefers the former way of doing philosophy. In a Socratic mode, philosophy gives birth to **the self**'s exploration of and responsibility for its own beliefs and understanding of life. In a Sophistical mode, philosophy numbs subjectivity by ostensibly supplying answers to life's biggest questions.

Kierkegaard's analysis of **the social and political** conditions of modernity led him to conclude that Sophistry had overtaken Socratic thought. Under a diverse array of influences, including the popularity of **Hegelianism** and the rise of machine-driven **technology**, the modern world had fallen under the sway of **the system**. As a result, the **individual** had been reduced to a functional role in society. Kierkegaard's philosophical project was to present a **corrective** to this state of affairs. In terms of form, Kierkegaard's use of **pseudonymity** was meant to emulate Socratic dialectic, minimizing the **authority** of the *Philosoph* himself and instead highlighting a range of philosophical voices. In terms of content, Kierkegaard demonstrated a notable affinity for the philosophy of Greek antiquity—an affinity that, in addition to Socrates, also includes Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 535–475 BCE), Plato (c. 428–348 BCE), and Aristotle (384–322 BCE), among others. As Kierkegaard saw it, the concerns and concepts of Greek thought had been glibly dismissed by modern philosophers, who, in seeking to establish foundations for **science**, neglected to account for their own biases, interests, and presuppositions.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Indeed, in the tradition of Socrates, Kierkegaard insisted that philosophy runs aground on a number of perennial questions, many of which arise in the existential domains of **ethics** and **religiousness**. Philosophy can intervene in these fields but cannot comprehensively resolve them. Moreover, given its inherent boundaries, philosophy must concede that there are areas of human inquiry that it cannot properly examine—for example, the **doctrine** of a religious institution such as the **church**. This is because the *meaning* of certain religious teachings is lost on the one who stands outside of the discourse in question. As Kierkegaard's pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis argues in *The Concept of Anxiety*, the impersonal perspective of **metaphysics** lacks the **mood** appropriate to the dogmatic understanding of **sin**. Here, again, Kierkegaard's *Philosophi* is intended to police the limitations of philosophical understanding. *See also* HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1770–1831)/ HEGELIANISM; *PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS*; REASON; *SICKNESS UNTO DEATH*, *THE*.

PHISTER, JOACHIM LUDVIG (1807–1896). Danish actor known especially for his roles in the comedies of the great Danish playwright Ludvig Holberg (1684–1754). The son of a Copenhagen teacher, Phister was identified as a talented artist at a young age, excelling in dance and acting. In 1825, after several years of apprenticing at the Royal Theater (Det Kongelige Teater), Phister was given a role in Holberg's *The Pawned Peasant Boy* (*Den Pantsatte Bondedreng*, 1726). Additional opportunities followed, and, in 1830, he was appointed a royal actor. His career proved to be a success. Working with some of Denmark's best writers, including **Johan Ludvig Heiberg**, Phister was already considered a luminary of the Danish stage by his mid-40s: he was inducted into the Order of the Dannebrog (Dannebrogordenen) in 1852 and received the gold Medal of Merit (Fortjenstmedaljen) in 1884, just a few years before his final performance in March 1889.

A great fan of the **theater**, Kierkegaard was familiar with and appreciative of Phister's thespian talents. In particular, he viewed Phister as an astute observer of human **nature**, capable of incorporating keen psychological insights into otherwise **comic** roles. In 1848, as a companion piece to his series of essays on the actress **Johanne Luise Heiberg**, Kierkegaard wrote "Mr. Phister as Scipio" ("Hr. Phister som Captain Scipio"). This piece, which Kierkegaard finished but elected not to publish, focused on Phister's role of Captain Scipio in *Ludovic*, an *opéra comique* featuring a French-language libretto by Jules-Henri Vernoy de Saint-Georges (1799–1875) and music by Ferdinand Hérold (1791–1833). *Ludovic* premiered in 1833 and was frequently presented in Copenhagen during the latter half of the 1830s; it was last performed during Kierkegaard's life in June 1846. Attributed to the pseudonym Procul, "Mr.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Phister as Scipio" praises Phister as a "reflective actor" (*see* REFLECTION) who is keenly attentive to the contradictory elements of the character he is playing. In the role of *Ludovic*'s Captain Scipio, Phister simultaneously conveys Scipio's dignified military rank and his personal peccadilloes, the latter of which include a subtle penchant for drinking. According to Procul, while any actor could stumble around as if inebriated, Phister's **genius** lies in his understanding of **irony**: the audience realizes Scipio is a drunk by the efforts of the character, as played by Phister, to *conceal* his drunkenness. Phister thus gives a master class in the tension between the **inner** and the outer.

PIETISM. References to Pietism (*Pietismen*) are scarce in Kierkegaard's authorship, though this devotional movement within **Christianity** in general and **Protestantism** in particular had an inestimable influence on Kierkegaard's personal upbringing and subsequent literary career. With regard to the former, **Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard**'s roots in the rural Jutland region of Denmark kept his family in contact with Pietist clergy and congregations, both of whom sought to preserve traditional Christian teaching and practice over against the theological rationalism regnant in Europe's cosmopolitan centers. Indeed, emerging out of a strain of late medieval **mysticism** dating back to Meister Eckhart (c. 1260–c. 1328), Pietism emphasized that one's **faith** in **Jesus Christ** can never be reduced to **church** affiliation or cognitive assent to **doctrine**. On the contrary, as Pietist spiritual writer Johann Arndt (1555–1621) argued, "true Christianity" (*wahren Christenthum*) consists in viewing Jesus Christ as both "Savior" (*Heiland*) and "Exemplar" (*Vorbild*). That is to say, in order to practice Christianity in truth, one must strive to live as Christ did, albeit with a constant eye to the fact that the human being, as sinner (*see* SIN), cannot attain either holiness or **salvation** on his own. This latter emphasis was said to complement **Martin Luther**'s principle of "justification by faith alone" (*justificatio sola fide*). Pietism came to be an important and indeed wide-ranging cultural force in post-Reformation Europe, so much so that it eventually branched off into a number of subgroups, from the communally minded Herrnhut Unity of Brothers (Herrnhuter Brüdergemeine), also known as the Moravian Brethren, to the establishmentarian Halle Pietism common among **state church** clergy in countries such as Germany and Denmark.

Indeed, Kierkegaard was familiar with many facets of the Pietist movement. As a youth, he attended the Sunday evening services of Copenhagen's Moravian Congregation of Brothers (Brødremenighed), which flourished under the leadership of Johannes Christian Reuss (1778–1838). M. P. Kierkegaard was a member of the Moravian society's governing board, along with councilor of justice Johannes Boesen (1768–1859), father of **Emil Boesen**

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

(1812–1879). At the meetings of the Brødremenighed, Kierkegaard not only heard Reuss's preaching, well known in the city for its emphasis on **upbuilding**, but also encountered the hymns of **Hans Adolph Brorson** and a general liturgical emphasis on the so-called theology of the cross (*Kreuzestheologie*). As was prayed in a customary Moravian litany, "We wish to remain by the Cross, and to follow your **martyrdom** until we see you face to face."

During the 1830s, the reforming efforts of **Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig** began to draw away a large portion of Brødremenighed's membership, and, by 1848, the Moravian community was reduced to just a few dozen members. Still, throughout his life, Kierkegaard continued to observe a prominent rule of Pietist devotion—the regular reading of "upbuilding literature" (*Erbauungsliteratur*). His personal library contained a host of works by writers associated with Pietism such as Arndt, Gerhard Tersteegen (1697–1769), and even pre-Reformation Catholic (*see* CATHOLICISM) spiritual writers such as Johannes Tauler (c. 1300–1361) and Thomas á Kempis (c. 1380–1471). Kierkegaard frequently cites such authors, even though he does not specifically identify them with *Pietismen*. Moreover, Kierkegaard reworked many Pietist concepts and themes in his own writings, including upbuilding to the **imitation** of Christ. Given how central these ideas are to Kierkegaard's oeuvre, the following 1850 journal entry is hardly surprising: "Pietism (properly understood, not simply in the sense of abstaining from dancing and such externals, no, in the sense of witnessing for the truth and **suffering** for it, together with the understanding that suffering in this world belongs to being a Christian, and that a shrewd and secular conformity with this world is unchristian)—yes, indeed, pietism is the one and only consequence of Christianity." *See also* BARTH, KARL (1886–1968); COMMUNICATION; METAPHYSICS; REFLECTION; RUDELBACH, ANDREAS GOTTLOB (1792–1864); STRIVING.

POINT OF VIEW FOR MY WORK AS AN AUTHOR*, *THE*.** From the start, Kierkegaard's authorship produced interpretive challenges. In ***Either/Or, for example, Kierkegaard's multifarious use of **pseudonymity** raised questions about the book's ultimate meaning. Was *Either/Or*'s first part intended to lionize the poetic **melancholy** of the **aesthetic**, or was it a red herring in a work meant to lead the reader to the **ethical**? In an addendum to ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, Kierkegaard sought to clarify the role that pseudonymity had in his oeuvre, but, soon after, he began to sketch out a longer and more revealing explanation in his journals. He finished this work in late 1848, giving it the title *The Point of View for My Work as an Author* (*Synspunktet for min Forfatter-Virksomhed*). He considered releasing it as a companion volume to the second edition of *Either/Or*, which came out in May 1849.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

However, as he insists in an 1849 journal entry, publishing it would compromise his indirect method of **communication**, and thus it had to wait: “The book itself is true and in my opinion masterly. But a book like that can be published only after my **death**.”

Nevertheless, Kierkegaard could not abandon this idea so easily. In an April 1849 journal entry, he indicates that he was working on a new account of his “whole authorship.” Finally, on 7 August 1851, he published this work under the title *On My Work as an Author* (*Om min Forfatter-Virksomhed*), releasing it on the same day as *Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays* (*To Taler ved Altergangen om Fredagen*). *On My Work* is a streamlined version of *The Point of View*, and it has the character of a confession: it opens with an epigraph from the spiritual writings of Gerhard Tersteegen (*see* PIETISM), and its main body is titled “The Reckoning” (“Regnskabet”). And yet the book was met with general indifference, though Kierkegaard managed to discuss it with Bishop **Jakob Peter Mynster**, who claimed to have found it helpful. “It is a clue to the whole,” Mynster told Kierkegaard, “but spun later.”

After Kierkegaard’s death, **Peter Christian Kierkegaard** published *The Point of View for My Work as an Autho*r in 1859. Perhaps because it is a longer work, or perhaps because it succeeded Kierkegaard’s late polemics against the Danish **state church** (*see MOMENT*, *THE*), *The Point of View* received more substantive attention than its predecessor, including a review by **Andreas Gottlob Rudelbach**. In more recent years, it has garnered scholarly interest in the wake of the “hermeneutic turn” in 20th-century **philosophy**. Should one interpret Kierkegaard’s oeuvre in accordance with *The Point of View*, as those who subscribe to authorial intentionalism would argue? Or does Kierkegaard’s utilization of diverse and often conflicting pseudonyms render his production irreducibly complex and unstable, as proponents of deconstruction have maintained? *See also* AUTHORITY; CROWD/PUBLIC; LANGUAGE; *LITERARY REVIEW*, *A*; MONEY; POLITICS; UPBUILDING; WRITING.

POLITICS. The English word “politics,” like its Danish cognate *Politik*, can be traced back to the Aristotelian expression Πολιτικά, meaning “that which concerns the affairs of the polis.” Thus “politics” is a very broad term, which can refer either to the management of the state or to discussion about it. Kierkegaard uses the word *Politik* roughly 60 times in his authorship—a relatively small number, though what he does have to say is often pointed. The opening paragraph of “The Single Individual” (“Den Enkelte”), a short treatise that Kierkegaard added as a “supplement” (*Bilag*) to ***The Point of View for My Work as an Author***, might be seen as a summary of his perspective on politics: “In these times everything is politics. The viewpoint of the **re-**

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

ligious is worlds (*toto caelo*) apart from this, just as the starting point and ultimate goal are also worlds (*toto caelo*) apart, since the political begins on earth in order to remain on earth, while the religious, taking its beginning from above, wants to transfigure and then to lift the earthly to heaven."

This statement contains a number of key points. First, Kierkegaard does not dismiss politics altogether and, in fact, implies that it is a presupposition of human **existence**. His concern, rather, is that "everything is politics nowadays" (*I disse Tider er Alt Politik*). Here Kierkegaard does not provide a historical genealogy of modern political life, but, in writings such as ***A Literary Review***, he is clear that the arrival of the liberal state coupled with the **press** has ushered in a new era of political participation: what was once the province of an elite few is now a matter of extensive public interest. As a result, politics has come to dominate human affairs at the expense of other crucial activities and concerns, perhaps especially religious life. As he reiterates in an unpublished 1855 article, "Politics is all that occupies people, politics is all that people understand," and yet "political service and religious service relate to each other altogether inversely, inasmuch as politically everything turns on getting numbers of people on one's side, but religiously on having God on one's side." Second, and with this in mind, it is clear that Kierkegaard distinguishes between the locus of **authority** in politics and in **Christianity**. In the former, authority is constantly evolving in accordance with the conditions of **history**, **time**, and space. Thus political power is a "transitory factor," as Kierkegaard writes in ***Two Ethical-Religious Minor Essays***. In contrast, Christianity insists that **God** absolutely transcends **finitude** and thereby endures as the only true authority. For Christians, then, political questions and results, while not unimportant, are always secondary to the business of religion—namely, to overcome **despair**, **evil**, and **sin** through **faith** in the **grace** of God. Kierkegaard's ultimate critique of politics is that it reverses this order, giving priority to contingent matters and consigning religion to a realm of innocuous sentiment or rote assertion. Since many political issues are evanescent, stirring up heated debate in the media only to vanish in the next news cycle, Kierkegaard likens politics to a **comic** form of amusement: "Statecraft becomes a game. Everything revolves around getting shoes on the crowd . . . making noise, carrying torches, and armed, regardless . . . of whether it understands anything or not." As he sees it, the prerogative of **earnestness** is for the **individual** to pursue, with God's help, **ethical** and religious ideals—a task that, in all likelihood, will clash with the superficial aims of avaricious politicians and the inhuman crowd. *See also* AUTHORITY; CONSTITUTION, DANISH; CROWD/PUBLIC; CULTURE; LEVELING; PROTESTANTISM; SOCIAL AND POLITICAL, THE.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

POLYTECHNIC, THE. The Polytechnic Teaching Institute (Polyteknisk Læreanstalt) was founded in 1829 under the leadership of **Hans Christian Ørsted**, who sought to develop an institute of **technology** along the lines of the Polytechnic School (*École Polytechnique*) in Paris. The Polytechnic's original buildings were located in central Copenhagen in close proximity to the **University of Copenhagen**. Yet, as the institute continued to grow in stature and in enrollment, it relocated a number of times over the next century and a half, eventually settling in the suburb of Kongens Lyngby. Today it is known as the Technical University of Denmark (Danmarks Tekniske Universitet) or, more commonly, as DTU. It is considered one of the leading engineering universities in Europe.

Kierkegaard knew and liked Ørsted, and, in an 1835 draft of a letter to paleontologist and distant relative Peter Wilhelm Lund (1801–1880), Kierkegaard refers to Ørsted as an exemplar of the "tranquility" and "harmony" of the study of **nature**. Hence, on one level, Kierkegaard doubtless saw value in the founding of the Polytechnic as well as in the success of Ørsted's endeavors. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard does not mention Polyteknisk Læreanstalt in his authorship, and his 1837–1838 unpublished satire *The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars* (*Striden mellem den gamle og den nye Sæbekielder*) pokes fun at the institute's students, identified only as *Polyteknikere*. Kierkegaard intended the play to lampoon the hubris of the modern academy, particularly in its scholarly turn toward **Hegelianism** and **science**. In this connection, a "Polytechnic student" (*En Polytekniker*) speaks during a raucous assembly of the leaders of various emerging schools of thought. Yet it is notable the tech student's lone comment—"The state is a galvanic apparatus"—appears as a non sequitur, suggesting a crude and reductive response to matters that others treat with prolix intricacy. Thus Kierkegaard suggests that, whatever the merits of the Polytechnic, it is also contributing to the cacophonous profusion of information that ultimately paralyzes the **individual**'s quest for an authentic **existence**.

PRACTICE IN CHRISTIANITY. Attributed to the **pseudonym** Anti-Climacus, *Practice in Christianity* (*Indøvelse i Christendom*) was issued on 25 September 1850, a bit more than a year after the publication of ***The Sickness unto Death***, which was ascribed to the same pseudonym. This was not coincidental. Since 1847, Kierkegaard had been wrangling with how to publish a number of works that imbued his authorship with direct **religious** meaning. In some cases—for example, ***The Point of View for My Work as an Author***—he scrapped the idea of publication. Yet, with regard to the manuscripts for *The Sickness unto Death* and *Practice in Christianity*, he elected to adopt a new pseudonym, albeit one whose name simultaneously looked back to previous

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

writings. Whereas ***Philosophical Fragments*** and ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript*** were put out under the name Johannes Climacus, the new pseudonym was meant to indicate a higher or more elevated perspective. That is to say, the prefix "Anti-" implies a greater degree of Christian ideality and understanding. Thus Anti-Climacus ranks above or higher than Johannes Climacus.

In *The Sickness unto Death*, Anti-Climacus provides detailed analyses of both **despair** and **sin**. *Practice in Christianity* builds on the work of its predecessor, emphasizing the redemptive significance of **Jesus Christ** and how the Christian believer is called to express her **faith** by way of the **imitation** of Christ, even though this form of discipleship will provoke **offense**. In taking up these themes, *Practice in Christianity* marked the beginning of Kierkegaard's polemics against the Danish **state church**, which eventually would come to a head in ***The Moment***. In particular, *Practice in Christianity* aimed to wrest a confession from **church** leaders such as Bishop **Jakob Peter Mynster**, who, in Kierkegaard's eyes, had wrongly sought to accommodate **Christianity** to bourgeois **culture**. For that reason, Kierkegaard considered subtitling the book "A Contribution to the Introduction of Christianity into Christendom." Fatefully, this confession would not come, and *Practice in Christianity* would not receive much critical attention upon its release. Still, the book sold out its original print run, and a second edition was issued in 1855. For his own part, Kierkegaard felt that *Practice in Christianity* was a masterpiece. As he wrote in an 1849 journal entry, "It is the most perfect and truest thing I have written." *See also* ADMIRATION; CONTEMPORANEITY.

PRAYER. The word "prayer" (*Bøn*) turns up on almost 200 occasions in Kierkegaard's authorship, and the verb "to pray" (*at bede*) appears more than twice as many times. Needless to say, then, prayer and praying constitute a key aspect of Kierkegaard's writing, and, indeed, Kierkegaard himself wrote and included prayers in several of his own works. He never developed a systematic theology of prayer, but his understanding of prayer emerges in a number of writings. For example, in "One Who Prays Aright Struggles in Prayer and Is Victorious—in That God Is Victorious," an 1844 discourse that was later collected in ***Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses***, Kierkegaard notes that prayer must be done properly, requiring "a yielding of [oneself] in the inner being." But such a yielding is by no means easy. As Kierkegaard goes on, the one praying has to learn that the goal of his "struggle" is not to get something from **God** but, rather, to be "transfigured in God" and thus "to reflect the image of God." Indeed, this is why prayer does not gratify an **aesthetic** approach to **existence**, and, even for those of a **religious** mindset, it remains a lifelong challenge. It is better, then, to conceive of prayer as a habit com-

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

manded by **Jesus Christ** (Luke 18:1), and the one who faithfully adheres to this command will have her **faith** strengthened and her relationship with God deepened. In an 1853 journal passage titled "My Praying" ("Min Beden"), Kierkegaard admits that "it still is not really clear to me how I should pray." Yet, in a sense, this brings the concept of prayer full circle. As Kierkegaard explains, prayer is not a technology meant to procure earthly benefits; it is "a calm leaving of everything to God." *See also* IMITATION; MONASTICISM; MYSTICISM; PIETISM; UPBUILDING.

PREFACES. Kierkegaard published *Prefaces: Light Reading for People in Various Estates According to Time and Opportunity* (*Forord: Morskabslæsning for enkelte Stænder efter Tid og Lejlighed*) amid a flurry of literary activity. On 8 June 1844, he released *Three Upbuilding Discourses* (*see EIGHTEEN UPBUILDING DISCOURSES*), followed by ***Philosophical Fragments*** five days later. Then, on 17 June 1844, he issued ***The Concept of Anxiety*** along with *Prefaces*. If works such as *The Concept of Anxiety* proved tremendously influential, *Prefaces* has generally been ignored by commentators. Ascribed to the pseudonym (*see* PSEUDONYMITY) Nicolaus Notabene, *Prefaces* has a satirical and even whimsical character that stands in patent contrast to the **earnestness** of much of Kierkegaard's best-known work. The book itself is a compendium of unrelated prefaces, none of which is accompanied by a main body of text. And yet the fact that Nicolaus introduces this collection of prefaces with his own preface adds an additional layer of **irony**, ostensibly organizing that which fundamentally lacks organization.

Still, *Prefaces* is more than just a bit of fun. Kierkegaard directed both "Preface III" and "Preface IV" at **Johan Ludvig Heiberg**, who had published critical remarks about ***Either/Or*** and ***Repetition***. In turn, *Prefaces* can also be viewed as a sendup of **Hegelianism** in general, which, according to "Preface VII," has fomented a situation whereby "scholarship in our day has finished with everything . . . [and] forgotten the point of the whole thing." A key representative of Hegelian thought in Denmark was theologian and churchman **Hans Lassen Martensen**, and so it is not surprising that the Danish **state church** and its bourgeois sensibilities also take a ribbing. "That for which **Christianity** has striven through eighteen hundred years," Nicolaus quips, "is specifically to produce the cultured person, who is the fairest flower and richest unfolding of the Christian life." In *Prefaces*, as in Kierkegaard's authorship overall, the identification of Christianity with **culture** is a category error to which Danish leaders, on either side of the political (*see* POLITICS) spectrum, all too easily succumb. What makes *Prefaces* unique is how lightly it presses this critique, whereas Kierkegaard's later works, particularly ***The Moment***, resound with fervid and almost prophetic indignation.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

PRESENT AGE, THE. Kierkegaard's notion of "the present age" (*Nutiden*) is primarily associated with ***A Literary Review***. Indeed, the word itself has a generic meaning—literally, "now-time," similar to the German *Jetztzeit*—but in *A Literary Review* it takes on heightened significance. In one sense, "the present age" can be understood as a rough equivalent of the more common word "modernity," and, in fact, Kierkegaard also refers to "the modern time" (*den moderne Tid*) in *A Literary Review*. Consequently, *Nutiden* is a historical (*see* HISTORY) and temporal (*see* TEMPORALITY/TIME) signifier, which distinguishes contemporary affairs and circumstances from those of "antiquity" (*Oldtiden*).

While Kierkegaard had used the term *Nutiden* prior to *A Literary Review*, a series of events compelled him to sharpen what he meant by it. First, in 1845, **Thomasine Gyllembourg** issued her novel *Two Ages* (*To Tidsaldre*), which traces the differences between an older, revolutionary period and a current era of bourgeois contentment. Kierkegaard appreciated Gyllembourg's insights and began crafting a lengthy review of *Two Ages*, eventually developing his own analyses of "the age of revolution" (*Revolutions-Tiden*) and "the present age." Next, in the wake of his quarrel with **Peder Ludvig Møller**, which spilled over into the Danish **press** and led to Kierkegaard's ridicule in ***The Corsair***, Kierkegaard completed his review of *Two Ages* and, in effect, came to interpret the so-called *Corsair* affair in terms of his reading of *Two Ages*. As he saw it, the cagey prudence of *Nutiden* had sinister repercussions, undermining established social structures and cultivating interpersonal mistrust. The upshot is **the social and political** disorder known as **leveling**, whereby the nihilistic phantasm of the **crowd**, aided by the print media, comes to dominate common life. It is worth adding that Kierkegaard would by no means renounce this understanding of "the present age" in later years. For example, in ***The Point of View for My Work as an Author***, he explains that his authorship was developed against the backdrop of "an age of disintegration." Rather than elaborate on this point, Kierkegaard adds the following footnote: "For an interpretation of the present age, see, for example, *A Literary Review* by S.K., Copenhagen 1846, the last section." *See also* AUTHORITY; CORRECTIVE; ENVY; INNER; OBJECTIVITY; REFLECTION; REPENTANCE; SILENCE; TECHNOLOGY; VOTING.

PRESS. The English noun "press," like its Danish cognate *Presse*, is derived from the Latin verb *premere* ("to squeeze" or "to hold down") and, subsequently, the Old French verb *presser* ("to press upon"). As machine **technology** developed in the medieval era, "press" began to function as a gerundial noun, indicating an instrument that subjects various objects to external force. Hence, in the mid-15th century, when Johannes Gutenberg designed and

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

honed his device for mechanical movable type printing, it was dubbed a "printing press" (*Druckpresse*). Roughly a century later, as the printing press became a dynamic influence in Western society, the word "press" was broadened to agencies that produced printed matter on a mass scale. This meaning took root, and, by the 19th century, one could speak of "the press" as the sum total of publishing houses, with special emphasis on corporations that put out newspapers and periodicals. For that reason, it became increasingly common to collectively identify the journalists who write for such outlets as "the press." Today, after the advent of radio, television, and the Internet, "the press" is also frequently referred to as "the media."

Kierkegaard's interest in, and criticism of, the press spans the entirety of his oeuvre. A number of his writings were issued in papers such as **Johan Ludvig Heiberg**'s *Copenhagen's Flying Post* (*Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post*) and **Jens Finsteen Giødwad**'s the *Fatherland* (*Fædrelandet*), the latter of which became a more frequent vehicle as Kierkegaard's career progressed. And yet, from the start, Kierkegaard emerged as a skeptic about the **freedom** of the press. On 28 November 1835, he gave a talk at the **Student Association** questioning the claims of **Johannes Ostermann**, who had spoken on the benefits of a free press earlier that month. Similarly, during the first few months of 1836, Kierkegaard engaged in a journalistic dispute with prominent liberals **Orla Lehmann** and **Johannes Hage**, both of whom had asked the Danish public (*see* CROWD/PUBLIC) to sympathize with the challenges facing the burgeoning print media. In each of these cases, Kierkegaard's ripostes were laden with **irony** and sarcasm, though he did register several points that would later characterize his analysis of journalism. For example, he argues that **the present age** is confused about the nature of the press. It is a means neither for critical thought nor for **ethical** reform, both of which require **earnestness** and **patience**. On the contrary, the press fosters a harried and often incoherent **culture**, which struggles to distinguish futile **chatter** with determinate action. Kierkegaard would develop these critiques fully in ***A Literary Review***—a short but significant work that came out in the midst of his literary fracas with ***The Corsair***. *A Literary Review* argues that, in filling the void of a robust communal life, the press generates a society given over to **envy** and **leveling**. This is a dire and treacherous situation, and, as Kierkegaard concludes *A Literary Review*, he suggests that only an authentic **religiousness** can withstand it.

Curiously, during his late polemics against the Danish **state church**, Kierkegaard would use the press as an organ for his censure of figures such as Bishop **Jakob Peter Mynster**. But he never retracted his views on the press as such: "The matter of the press," he wrote in an 1854 journal entry, "is the deepest degradation of the human race, for it encourages revolt from below;

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

a monstrous weapon has been invented that is designed . . . to kill everything that amounts to something." Yet it may be that this ostensible contradiction was actually a considered line of attack. In ***The Moment***, Kierkegaard compares his mission to that of **Socrates**, who once sought to negate the established order precisely by its own instruments. *See also* ANONYMITY; COMMON MAN; CONSTITUTION, DANISH; DEER PARK; EARNESTNESS; EQUALITY; EVIL; GOLDSCHMIDT, MEÏR AARON (1819–1887); MONEY; OBJECTIVITY; *POINT OF VIEW FOR MY WORK AS AN AUTHOR*, *THE*; POLITICS; REFLECTION; SOCIAL AND POLITICAL, THE; VOTING.

PROTESTANTISM. It is difficult to find a short definition of "Protestantism" that is adequate. The word itself is derived from the Latin verb *protestari* ("to declare publicly"), though its current meaning has rich historical connotations. In the aftermath of **Martin Luther**'s *Ninety-Five Theses* (1517), various efforts were made to organize a new **church** along Lutheran lines. At the second Diet of Speyer (Reichstag zu Speyer), convoked on 15 March 1529, all states of the Holy Roman Empire were ordered to remain loyal to **Catholicism**. Yet several followers of Luther rejected this edict, and, after making their refusal public, they became known as "Protestants" (*Protestanten*). Over time, this particular usage of the term would expand to include all who sought to break from the See of Rome, though not all preferred the label "Protestant." For example, in Switzerland, the term "Reformed" (*la Réforme*) was generally favored, while many Germans, including Luther himself, liked "Evangelical" (*Evangelisch*) better. Whatever the case, by the 17th century, "Protestantism" and "protestant" were typically understood to indicate an opposition to Roman Catholicism in general and to papal authority in particular.

Kierkegaard makes more than 100 references to Protestantism (*Protestantisme* or *Protestantismen*) in his authorship, and he scatters a few additional remarks about the Reformation (*Reformation*). Needless to say, these references only scratch the surface of his interest in this aspect of **Christianity**, since a number of figures associated with Protestantism (above all, Martin Luther) turn up in his writings. Nevertheless, one can discern a general Kierkegaardian impression of Protestantism, irrespective of his evaluation of individual Protestant leaders and figures. First, it should be noted that, while raised in Denmark's Evangelical-Lutheran **state church**, Kierkegaard was by no means an uncritical apologist for the Protestant tradition. He maintained that Protestantism in **the present age** was in need of a **corrective**, and he was willing to concede that Catholicism was closer to Christian **truth** on certain points of **doctrine** and practice. Second, these concerns did not mean that he wished to abandon traditionally Protestant emphases on the primacy of **scrip-**

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

ture or the priority of divine **grace**. On the contrary, he sought to renew these emphases with an eye to the importance of the **imitation** of **Jesus Christ** for Christian discipleship. In fact—and this is the third feature of Kierkegaard's perspective on Protestantism—he aimed to reignite the **passion** characteristic of the early Protestant reformers, who, at least for a time, were willing to break from the medieval conflation of **faith** and **politics** and to reassert the singular power of the gospel. Aware of the dangers of **leveling**, Kierkegaard sought to bring about these changes via his literary artistry and indirect method of **communication**, though his late polemics against Denmark's established order (*see MOMENT, THE*) cannot help but recall Martin Luther's alleged words at the Diet of Worms (Reichstag zu Worms) in 1521: "Here I stand, I can do no other. God help me!" (*Hier stehe ich, ich kann nicht anders. Gott helfe mir!*). *See also* INNER; MYSTICISM; ORTHODOXY; PIETISM.

PSEUDONYMITY. Kierkegaard only refers to "pseudonymity" (*Pseudonymitet*) eight times in his authorship, despite his well-deserved reputation as a great practitioner of pseudonymous writing. Perhaps one reason for this incongruity is Kierkegaard's idiosyncratic use of pseudonymity. Whereas many authors have used a pseudonym to mask their real identity—for example, the English novelist Mary Ann Evans (1819–1880) published under the pseudonym George Eliot, so as to avoid her era's preconceived notions about **women**'s literature—Kierkegaard's pseudonyms are presented as independent fictional personae. In other words, as Kierkegaard makes clear in "A First and Last Explanation" ("En første og sidste Forklaring"), the brief addendum to ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, he does not want his own views to be confused with those of his pseudonyms: "What has been written, then, is mine, but only insofar as I, by means of audible lines, have placed the **life-view** of the *creating*, poetically actual individuality in his mouth. . . . I am impersonally or personally in the third person a *souffleur* who has poetically produced the authors." Thus each pseudonym that Kierkegaard "poetically produced" has his own unique authorial voice—a claim that, in the wake of postmodern literary theory, has provoked significant debate. For some commentators, Kierkegaard's use of pseudonymity generates a plurality of meaning in Kierkegaard's oeuvre, since one pseudonym serves to offset and perhaps to deconstruct the views of another. Other scholars have insisted that the authorial "fingerprint" of Kierkegaard himself is discernible in each pseudonym, adding that ***The Point of View for My Work as an Author*** makes clear that pseudonymity was part of a larger strategy, namely, to advance a **religious** perspective over time, with the pseudonyms often expressing **aesthetic** and **ethical** concerns that prepare the reader for authentic **Christianity**. On the whole, however, it has become standard to emphasize that there

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

is a dialectical (*see* DIALECTIC) balance in Kierkegaard's understanding of pseudonymity. Yes, many of the pseudonyms do present conflicting and even unreliable ideas, and this fact must be recognized and explored. On the other hand, these pseudonymous disparities must not be taken as the ultimate point of Kierkegaard's authorship, which bears notable signs of authorial intent. *See also* AUTHORITY; DISCOURSE/DELIBERATION/SERMON; GIØDWAD, JENS FINSTEEN (1811–1891); GOD; LANGUAGE; RECOLLECTION; RELIGIOUS/RELIGIOUSNESS; *STAGES ON LIFE'S WAY*; SUFFERING; UPBUILDING; WRITING.

PSYCHOLOGY. Kierkegaard does not make many references to "psychology" (*Psychologi*, *Psychologie*, and most frequently *Psychologien*) in his authorship, and yet scholars have called him a notable precursor to modern psychology. This ostensible contradiction is owing to a number of factors. First, while psychology had been an independent object of study at least since the 1732 treatise *Psychologia Empirica* by Christian Wolff (1679–1754), the field of experimental psychology, pioneered by figures such as Gustav Fechner (1801–1887) and Emil Kraepelin (1856–1926), had yet to emerge. Thus Kierkegaard predated the emergence of modern psychology and psychiatry, and his concern with **the self** and its psychical processes was bound up with disciplines such as **philosophy** and theology, which featured their own preexisting categories. In short, Kierkegaard had neither the means nor the vocabulary to develop a complete *Psychologi* by today's standards. At the same time, however, works such as ***The Concept of Anxiety*** and ***The Sickness unto Death*** make clear that they are meant to explore "the psychological" (*det Psychologiske*): not only do these texts explicitly refer to psychology in their respective subtitles, but they attempt to investigate mental states and disorders such as **anxiety** and **despair**. According to Vigilius Haufniensis, the **pseudonym** to whom *The Concept of Anxiety* is attributed, psychology is capable of shedding light on "**freedom**'s psychological attitudes," but it also must recognize its limitations. For while psychology can make observations about theological concepts such as **sin**, it cannot finally explain sin's nature, much less teach a person how to overcome sin. Psychology is one domain of knowledge among others, Vigilius adds, and it must not overstep its bounds. *See also* EVIL; EXISTENTIALISM; INNER; MELANCHOLY; MOOD; NATURE; *POINT OF VIEW FOR MY WORK AS AN AUTHOR*, *THE*; SCIENCE/SPECULATION; TEMPTATION.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

R

REASON. Kierkegaard has been associated with what Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) once termed the "Counter-Enlightenment" (*Gegen-Aufklärung*), because Kierkegaard sought to limit the scope of human reason. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to conclude that Kierkegaard was a proponent of irrationalism: his authorship, after all, uses logic and reason to advance its claims. Thus one must attend to the context in which Kierkegaard pressed his critique of "reason" (*Fornuft*).

In ***Fear and Trembling***, for example, Kierkegaard's pseudonym (*see* PSEUDONYMITY) Johannes de silentio challenges the idea, popularized by **Hegelianism**, that the rationally derived principles of society are guarantors of **the individual**'s relationship with **God**. Citing the biblical story of the "binding of Isaac" (Gen. 22:1–19), Johannes argues that God, as the **absolute**, is bound neither to human reason nor to social custom. For that reason, the person of **faith** may need to contravene the **ethical** canons of her **culture**, thereby appearing as a **paradox** to *Fornuft*. In ***Philosophical Fragments*** and ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, both ascribed to Johannes Climacus, the presuppositions and objectives of **philosophy** are explored and, in some cases, deconstructed. According to Climacus, even great thinkers such as **Socrates** fail to account for certain epistemological conditions, for example, the distortion of reason due to human **finitude** and **sin**. At the same time, however, Climacus views rational questions and objectives as stimulation for a critical existential **passion**: "To want to discover something that thought itself cannot think." This last point leads to what may be the overarching argument of the *Postscript*—that the primacy of **Christianity** in Danish culture, which stems from both historical (*see* HISTORY) accidents and rational justification, should not be used as an excuse to avoid the challenges of authentic **religiousness**. Too many people are willing to entrust the most enduring and profound matters of human **existence** to an impersonal **system** of thought, which, in turn, functions as a mediator of the God-human relationship. Under the guise of *Fornuft*, people are told that an eternal **happiness** is but a part of a network of human cares and concerns, each having a rationally demonstrable place in the system. But this is a mistake, which fallaciously conflates the divine and the human. "Existence itself is a system—for God, but it can-

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

not be a system for any existing **spirit**," writes Climacus. On this understanding, then, the ultimate task of reason is to sift through various philosophical claims and discern their validity, always discriminating between that which is knowable on human terms and that which is shrouded in mystery. *See also* EXCEPTION/UNIVERSAL; LEAP; MEDIATION; OBJECTIVITY; REFLECTION; REVELATION; TRUTH.

RECOLLECTION. The term "recollection" (*Erindring*) appears more than 200 times in Kierkegaard's authorship, with most of these occurrences clustered in the pseudonymous (*see* PSEUDONYMITY) writings of 1843–1846. For instance, in ***Repetition***, Constantin Constantius juxtaposes recollection with repetition: he associates the former with the Platonic idea of *anamnesis*, which maintains that human knowledge is acquired through the recollection of that which is eternally known, and the latter with modern **philosophy**, which "will teach that all life is a repetition." Yet, by book's end, Constantin is forced to admit that his attempt to go beyond recollection has failed, and neither option is capable of resurrecting what has been condemned to bygone days. In ***Stages on Life's Way***, William Afham argues that recollection is far more than just remembering something. After all, elderly people often struggle to remember day-to-day details but nevertheless demonstrate great capacity for recollection—an indication that *Erindring* serves to integrate past events and phenomena, thereby facilitating what William calls "the eternal continuity in life."

This quest for continuity can vary depending on one's **life-view**. In the **aesthetic** sphere of **existence**, recollection can be used to relish the pleasure of former experiences even as distasteful ones are strategically excluded. In the **ethical** sphere, recollection works in similar fashion, albeit with different import. In "Some Reflections on Marriage in Answer to Objections" ("Adskilligt om Ægteskabet mod Indsigelser"), ascribed to the pseudonym "A Married Man" (*En Ægtemand*), recollection is depicted as the means by which conjugal permanency is salvaged from the ravages of **temporality**. Here even the trivial moments of one's **marriage** are forged into a meaningful whole. Recollection also has its place in **religiousness**, particularly in the domain of **love**. As Kierkegaard argues in ***Works of Love***, Christian charity entails a benevolence shorn of self-interestedness, and thus the practice of recollecting a deceased loved one can teach a person how to love in the manner of **Jesus Christ**, remaining loyal and true even when the conditions of **finitude** tempt one to forget. Each of these examples show that, for Kierkegaard, *Erindring* plays a critical (if not salvific) role in the development of **the self**, though how and why one recollects will fluctuate in accordance with the

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

aims of one's existential sphere. *See also* FAITH; *PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS*; REPENTANCE; SOCRATES (c. 470–399 BCE)/SOCRATIC.

REDOUBLING/REDUPLICATION. Though the terms "redoubling" (*Fordoblelse* or *Fordobling*) and "reduplication" (*Reduplikation*) do not appear with great frequency in Kierkegaard's oeuvre, they are crucial to Kierkegaard's theory of **the self**. In ***Philosophical Fragments***, Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** Johannes Climacus observes that the human being, who has come into **existence** biologically, can also come into existence spiritually, the latter of which is a *Fordobling*. In ***Christian Discourses***, Kierkegaard expands on this notion, adding that the human being's uniqueness among **creation** lies in the possibility of redoubling: whereas an animal exists in accordance with its **nature**, the human being is capable of also relating to **eternity** and existing before **God** in and through **freedom**. Another important qualification of redoubling occurs in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***. According to Climacus, redoubling occurs when the **truth** a person knows is expressed in **actuality**.

Kierkegaard's understanding of *Reduplikation* is similar. In a series of 1847 journal entries, organized as part of a larger project on the relationship between **communication** and **ethics**, Kierkegaard proposes a unit on the issue of reduplication, which he defines pithily: "To be what one teaches." In a related note, he explains that ethical concepts are properly imparted in actuality, which is "the existential reduplication of what is said." This pedagogical necessity is "something that both antiquity and original **Christianity** thought about and followed through," though it has been forgotten in **the present age**, which places undue stress on **objectivity** and **reflection**.

Both redoubling and reduplication, then, converge on what might be termed the **inner** "layers" of the self. Human beings do not exist in sheer **immediacy**. Instead, they are capable of psycho-spiritual development, centering on the **decision** to apply what they know to their own lives. The refusal to do so, moreover, indicates the dark side of this freedom, pointing to the possibility of **despair** and **sin**. *See also* MARTYRDOM; SUBJECTIVITY; WITNESS.

REFLECTION. Kierkegaard's employs the term "reflection" (*Reflexion*) a bit more than 300 times in his authorship. Some of these usages are generic in nature. The word "reflection" is derived from the Latin verb *reflectere*, meaning "to bend back." Thus a mirror reflects light, inasmuch as light meets and returns from the mirror's surface. Likewise, when a person considers a question seriously, she is said to be reflective, insofar as she is cognizant of her mind's process of thinking.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Still, on a number of occasions, Kierkegaard utilizes *Reflexion* in a technical sense. Particularly in ***A Literary Review***, Kierkegaard argues that **the present age**, in its preference for **objectivity** and in its preoccupation with the **press** and **technology**, is characterized by reflection. This is a tendency that is evident in both **the individual** and in **social and political** life. Rather than relate to existential issues and questions with **immediacy** and **passion**, human beings now step outside of the flow of **nature**, as it were, and approach objects in a manner that privileges detached **reason**. Already in ***From the Papers of One Still Living***, Kierkegaard observes that this reflective mindset constitutes "an attack on the given **actuality**," calling into question traditional forms of life and thereby stripping **existence** of its beauty and mystery. "Like the primeval forests of old," Kierkegaard writes, "[such traditions] retreat before the plough of **culture** and the dawn of enlightenment, in order that on the cleared plains there cannot now be the slightest poetical shelter." This razing of primitivity facilitates the scientific (*see* SCIENCE/SPECULATION) mastery of reality, but, in the process, it drains the outer world of meaning and dulls the **inner** vitality of human beings. Kierkegaard holds **Hegelianism** responsible for popularizing this mode of *Reflexion*, and he aims to show that it leads to **leveling** and to nihilism. Indeed, as he sees it, one must first accept the iniquity of the present age before one can overcome it—a triumph that Kierkegaard believes must ultimately come through passionate **religiousness**. *See also* AESTHETIC; *CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS*; DECISION; PHILOSOPHY; REVOLUTION; SILENCE; SUBJECTIVITY; VOTING.

REITZEL, CARL ANDREAS (1789–1853). Danish publisher and bookseller. The son of working-class German-born parents, Reitzel took an apprenticeship in 1803 with bookseller Gerhard Bonnier (1778–1862). In 1819, Reitzel was able to open a publishing house of his own, calling it simply C. A. Reitzel's Bookstore (C. A. Reitzels Boghandel). After a modest start, it emerged as the foremost publishing house in Denmark, issuing works by several luminaries of the Danish intelligentsia, including **Hans Christian Andersen**, **Thomasine Gyllembourg**, and **Johan Ludvig Heiberg**. For over two decades (1827–1853), Reitzel's shop was located in the Royal Orphanage (Det Kongelige Vajsenhus), a building, situated just west of the **University of Copenhagen**, that was established by Frederik IV (1671–1730) to support various charitable enterprises. One such endeavor was the printing of Bibles and hymnals for the Danish **state church**. In Kierkegaard's era, Reitzels Boghandel was not just a place of business but also a rendezvous point for writers, critics, and other personages of Copenhagen's literary scene.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

It is not surprising, then, that Kierkegaard published many of his writings with Reitzel's, including major books such as ***Either/Or***, ***Fear and Trembling***, ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, and ***The Sickness unto Death***. Moreover, in an 1839 journal entry, Kierkegaard whimsically refers to Reitzel's as a destination for an afternoon walk. That is not to say that Kierkegaard's dealings with Reitzel himself always went smoothly. In an 1847 journal passage, Kierkegaard complains that Reitzel is "careless" in business, and extant correspondence between the two suggests that Kierkegaard was not always confident in Reitzel's bookkeeping. Still, Reitzel's son Christian Frederik Theodor Martin Reitzel (1828–1906) anonymously sent a manuscript to Kierkegaard at some point in 1851–1852, asking the great writer to evaluate and possibly to pen a "commendatory preface" to what was ostensibly a sensitive text. Kierkegaard's response is unknown, but the fact that Reitzel requested Kierkegaard's endorsement implies that the family held Kierkegaard in esteem. This feeling seems to have been mutual. Kierkegaard continued to publish with Reitzels Boghandel even after Reitzel died in June 1853. Indeed, the very last issue of ***The Moment*** was set to go to Reitzel's when, in October 1855, Kierkegaard was taken to **Frederik's Hospital** with his terminal illness. *See also* GIØDWAD, JENS FINSTEEN (1811–1891); *REPETITION*; *WORKS OF LOVE*.

RELIGIOUS/RELIGIOUSNESS. Kierkegaard uses a few different terms to denote "the religious" (*det Religieuse*, *det Religiøse*) and "religiousness" (*Religieusitet*, *Religiøsetet*) in his authorship. Still, despite this variance, there are a number features that characterize Kierkegaard's concept of the religious. First, he does not show significant interest in examining religion from a systematic, comparative, or cross-cultural standpoint; instead, he approaches *det Religieuse* from a broadly philosophical (*see* PHILOSOPHY) perspective, treating it as a key sphere of human **existence**. Second, given his concern with **subjectivity** writ large, Kierkegaard concedes that religiousness is a possibility for all human beings, regardless of their sociohistorical location. In other words, the religious sphere is not tantamount to an embrace of a particular body of **doctrine** or membership in a certain **church**. Third, the previous point notwithstanding, Kierkegaard implies that **Christianity** represents a distinct and indeed culminative expression of religious life.

Kierkegaard's use of **pseudonymity** entails that these qualities are examined in various ways in his oeuvre. Perhaps the most important discussion of religiousness in Kierkegaard's pseudonymous writings occurs in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, where Johannes Climacus distinguishes between what he calls "Religiousness A" and "Religiousness B." The former is not

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

revealed to human beings but, rather, is intrinsic to their **nature**, insofar as people desire and strive for **eternity** in various ways. It is through this quest for perfect **happiness**, which takes place amid the conditions of **finitude** and **temporality**, that humanity primordially seeks to attain divinity. And yet, Climacus argues, the challenge of Religiousness A is precisely that it stirs up a **passion** that cannot be satisfied by human beings themselves: finite means cannot fulfill infinite aims. In this way, Religiousness A prepares the way for Religiousness B, wherein the individual must confront the **paradox** of **God**'s appearance in time—a **revelation** of divine benevolence, albeit one that simultaneously exceeds human **reason** and thus forces a **choice** between **faith** or **offense**. This latter form of *Religieusitet* is identical to Christianity, thereby indicating its significance vis-à-vis other manifestations of the religious.

Nevertheless, it is intriguing that, in the works attributed to Kierkegaard himself, a strong distinction between these forms of religiousness is not always present. In an 1849 draft for *On My Work as Author*, Kierkegaard states that "the directly religious was present from the beginning" of his authorship. Similarly, in ***The Point of View for My Work as an Author***, Kierkegaard equates himself with a "religious author" whose task is to explain "what it means to become a Christian," a task that includes even his **aesthetic** writings. Here Kierkegaard's choice of vocabulary is characteristically unsystematic, though it is not inconsistent either. Inasmuch as he identifies religiousness with the existential pursuit of blessedness, it is a teleological project, which does not unfold automatically or magically but incrementally over a lifetime. For that reason, Kierkegaard often connects *det Religieuse* with **upbuilding**: whether or not one is a Christian per se, the basic structure of **the self** is the same, and it is oriented toward a happiness that **worldliness** cannot satisfy. And yet, precisely on this understanding, Kierkegaard can argue that authentic Christianity—rather than a parroting of Christian **doctrine**, as he found typical of the Danish **state church**—represents the apex of religious life. For only a devout relation to the **absolute** paradox is capable of breaking the bonds of immanence. *See also* ETHICS/ETHICAL; EXCEPTION/UNIVERSAL; IMITATION; INDIVIDUAL; INWARDNESS; REPENTANCE; *REPETITION*; SACRIFICE; SILENCE; *STAGES ON LIFE'S WAY*.

REPENTANCE. Kierkegaard uses two words that might be translated as "repentance." The first is *Anger* (also written in the definite form *Angeren*), and it occurs roughly 150 times in his authorship. The second is *Fortrydelse*, and it turns up on only 12 occasions. This discrepancy is significant. Whereas *Fortrydelse* signifies a general feeling of regret, *Anger* also implies an existential change of direction. In other words, while one can experience *Fortrydelse* about a failing or a mishap, only *Anger* conveys a newfound

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

willingness to concretely reorient one's life toward an **ethical** and **religious** mode of existence.

The process by which one comes to repent is bound up with **recollection**. In ***Stages on Life's Way***, Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** William Afham observes that merely remembering one's mistakes and transgressions is not enough to bring about repentance; rather, one needs to view oneself from the ideal standpoint of recollection, relating past events to one's present and future. The one who undertakes this mode of thinking will ask questions such as, Who am I? To whom do I owe my **existence**? What is my final destiny? From the perspective of **ethics**, one might answer these questions by referencing one's homeland or commitment to supporting its **social and political** aims. Perhaps such thoughts would lead a person to a renewed appreciation for civic duty—a kind of repentance. Yet, for Kierkegaard, *Anger* in its highest sense takes **God** as its object. From this **religious** point of view, repentance takes place whenever one recollects a personal contravention of divine law and, in turn, a divergence from God's **will**. In an 1850 journal passage, Kierkegaard notes that repentance is a key presupposition of **Christianity**, along with the importance of **suffering** for the **faith**. That Kierkegaard here is talking about a redirection of one's life, and not just a feeling of disappointment in one's failures, is made clear in an 1848 journal entry: "One often is or becomes conceited and self-important in his sadness. In relation to God, sorrow is essentially repentance [*Angeren*]—and when the sadness has lasted too long, it takes penitence [*Angeren*] to put sadness a little aside."

There is a polemical edge to this understanding of repentance. Kierkegaard was well aware that, in accordance with the thought of **Martin Luther**, the official **doctrine** of Denmark's **state church** placed notable emphasis on repentance. However, since priority was accorded to **Protestantism**'s embrace of **salvation** by **grace** alone (*sola gratia*), repentance was often understood as an **inner** disposition rather than as a call to a new way of living. Consequently, Kierkegaard advanced *Anger* as a **corrective** to the reflective (*see* REFLECTION) tendencies of **the present age**. *See also* COMMUNION; DAMNATION; DEMONIC; DOUBLE MOVEMENT; DYING TO; PIETISM; SIN.

REPETITION. Kierkegaard's composition of *Repetition: A Venture in Experimenting Psychology* (*Gjentagelsen: Et Forsøg i den experimenterende Psychologi*) was inseparable from his breakup with **Regine Olsen** in October 1841, an event that sparked a flurry of literary activity on Kierkegaard's part. ***Either/Or*** came out in February 1843, followed by the completion of *Two Upbuilding Discourses* (*To opbyggelige Taler*; *see EIGHTEEN UPBUILDING DISCOURSES*) in May of the same year. Then, as he first had done when

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

he and Regine separated, Kierkegaard visited Berlin again in order to write. This period abroad would spawn *Repetition* and ***Fear and Trembling***. Upon returning to Copenhagen, Kierkegaard would develop an additional series of **upbuilding** discourses, namely, *Three Upbuilding Discourses* (*Tre opbyggelige Taler*). In time, all three of these works would be published on the same day, 16 October 1843.

Naturally, at the heart of *Repetition* lies the concept of *Gjentagelsen* itself. In all walks of life, from **religious** ceremonies to sports training, people strive to do certain things again and again—in other words, to practice repetition. But why? Through the **pseudonym** Constantin Constantius, *Repetition* gives dramatic attention to the problem of repeating pleasurable **aesthetic** experiences. After beginning with a ponderous set of musings about repetition and **philosophy**'s related quest to understand **movement** and transition, Constantin determines to set aside **reflection** and to conduct a real-world experiment—to see if he can repeat the experiences of a previous trip to Berlin. However, as Constantin recounts, this effort proves less than successful. A plethora of factors, each bound up with **finitude** and **temporality**, serve to interrupt the continuity of existence. In one amusing scene, Constantin visits his favorite café in Berlin, but it is not as he remembered it: "I prize coffee. Perhaps the coffee was just as good as last time; one would almost expect it to be, but it was not to my liking. The sun through the café windows was hot and glaring; the room was just as humid as the air in a saucepan, practically cooking. A draft, which like the a small trade wind cut through everything, prohibited thoughts of any repetition." In light of such experiences, Constantin concludes that *Gjentagelsen* is impossible.

And yet, there are other forms of repetition. The second part of *Repetition* features several letters from a distraught character known only as "a young man" (*et ungt Menneske*). Recently separated from his beloved, the young man longs that she might return to him—a form of repetition. In this heartache, the young man compares himself to the biblical figure Job, who, after unthinkable **suffering**, received "twice as much as he had before" (Job 42:10). According to Constantin, who has become a confidant of the young man, there is an element of the **religious** in the young man's desire for repetition. In this sense, *Fear and Trembling* might be seen as a commentary on *Repetition*. Positively, the young man's anguished **love** is analogous to that of Jewish patriarch Abraham, whom **God** calls to **sacrifice** his only son (Gen. 22:2). Negatively, the young man lacks the **faith** of an Abraham or the conviction of a Job, rendering him an aesthetic simulacrum of these biblical heroes. In short, as *Repetition* comes to a close, Constantin's thesis that repetition is impossible seems only partially true. For the possibility of authentic religiousness has yet to be ventured.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Upon its release, *Repetition* did not sell particularly well. Indeed, nearly half of its original print run went unsold, and, in 1847, the leftover copies were remaindered to publisher **Carl Andreas Reitzel**. Contemporary critical reviews were similarly unenthusiastic, particularly in comparison to the fervent reception of *Either/Or*. Still, Kierkegaard continued to discuss the concept of *Gjentagelsen* in his journals and papers. In one 1855 journal entry, he even takes direct exception to the findings of Constantin, adding that "there nevertheless is a repetition, yes, it is very fortunate that there is a repetition." *See also* DUTY; EARNESTNESS; EXCEPTION/UNIVERSAL; INDIVIDUAL; RECOLLECTION; THEATER; WILL.

RESIGNATION. Derived from the verb *resignere*, the Danish noun *Resignation* bears dual connotations of action and emotion. On the one hand, the one who practices resignation gives up something, whether a commitment, goal, or **hope**. On the other hand, the resignation of something is never just a casual acquiescence, as if one's renunciation does not matter. Rather, it is a **decision**, entered into with **earnestness** and **passion**.

Kierkegaard uses the word *Resignation* dozens of times in his authorship, with the greatest concentration of references occurring in ***Fear and Trembling***, a text that functions as a kind of Midrashic reading of the *Akedah*, in which **God** calls Abraham to sacrifice his only son, Isaac (Gen. 22:1–14). According to Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** Johannes de silentio, even though Abraham's willingness to sacrifice Isaac appears to be a form of resignation, it is actually a demonstration of **faith**. Resignation, as Johannes explains, is a **movement** by which one surrenders finite satisfaction for the sake of an infinite (*see* FINITUDE/INFINITY) ideal. Such devotion makes one a "knight of infinite resignation" (*Uendelighedens Ridder*), since, from the perspective of **reason**, the goal is impossible in finite terms. To cite Johannes's example, the **love** of an ordinary lad for a princess may be unattainable in this life. And yet, if the lad were to dedicate his entire **existence** to this hope, his love would endure and, in the process, retain its infinite perfection. That is why Johannes praises the knight of infinite resignation: he gains **eternity** by way of repeated (*see* REPETITION) commitment—an astounding human achievement, which, far from contravening the universal (*see* EXCEPTION/UNIVERSAL), merits the empathy and praise of others. However, it is different with "the knight of faith" (*Troens Ridder*). As Abraham's example shows, the knight of faith's obedience to **God** may situate him outside of the **ethical** and, in turn, appear as a **paradox** or even as an **offense** to human understanding. Indeed, one aspect of the knight of faith's paradoxicality is his ostensibly absurd belief that he will receive the impossible even on earth.

Notably, in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus returns to the concept of resignation, albeit in a different

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

register. In his description of the **religious** life, Climacus argues that the person who properly seeks the highest **good** must thereby be willing to renounce relative ends for the sake of the **absolute**. Resignation, in other words, lies at the foundation of religiousness. Hence, while faith is higher than resignation, one cannot have faith without resignation. *See also* ABSURD; DOUBLE MOVEMENT; GUILT; MYSTICISM; SUFFERING.

REST. It is well known that Kierkegaard treats **striving** as essential to Christian discipleship; however, he is equally adamant that the goal of **Christianity** is "rest" (*Hvile* or *Ro*) in **God**. If the striving of **faith** is a necessary corollary to the conditions of **temporality**, the aspiration of faith is to find rest in **eternity**. As Kierkegaard writes in his 1855 discourse *The Changelessness of God* (*Guds Uforanderlighed*), when one tires of "earthly changefulness and alteration," then one looks for a place "to rest and to have a good rest" (*for at hvile og hvile ud*). Yet, in the end, this state is only possible in and through the divine life: "In God's changelessness there is rest [*Hvile*]!" Here Kierkegaard's invocation of "rest" is neither triumphalist nor passivistic. It is neither a matter of human achievement nor of mere capitulation. Rather, in a manner that echoes certain Pietist (*see* PIETISM) spiritual writers, who themselves were drawing on a theme within Christian **mysticism**, Kierkegaard is alluding to a state in which the believer is united with God—the so-called *unio mystica*.

That is not to suggest, however, that Kierkegaard details the precise nature of divine union. At times rest appears akin to eternal **happiness**; at other times it seems to be realizable in earthly life as an outcome of authentic faith. For example, in ***The Sickness unto Death***, Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** Anti-Climacus examines the various ways that **the self** can fall into **despair**. He describes the person of faith by way of contrast: "[This is] the formula for the state in which there is no despair at all: in relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it. This formula in turn . . . is the definition of faith." Just a few sentences earlier, Anti-Climacus also refers to this state as one of "balance and rest" (*Ligevægt og Ro*). It is notable, however, that "rests transparently" actually translates the curious Danish phrase *grunder gjennemsigtigt*—literally, "is grounded in a see-through manner." Thus Anti-Climacus suggests that faith's rest is tantamount to maintaining a clear connection to one's divine foundation, whereby the self's knowledge and **will** operate with continual reference to God. Here, too, it is intriguing that Christian mystics such as Johannes Tauler (c. 1300–1361), whom Kierkegaard read with particular appreciation, have insisted that each human being retains an **inner** "seed" or "spark" of the divine presence—what Tauler calls the "ground of the soul" (*Grund der Seele*).

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

See also BEING/BECOMING; COMMUNION; GUILT; JESUS CHRIST; JOY; LAW; MELANCHOLY; MOVEMENT; PATIENCE; REVELATION; SACRIFICE; SALVATION; SILENCE; TECHNOLOGY.

REVELATION. Kierkegaard was profoundly interested in the concept of "revelation," particularly inasmuch as it serves to circumscribe or relativize human knowledge and power in a number of ways. For example, in ***A Literary Review***, Kierkegaard notes that a historical (*see* HISTORY) era can convey a certain ideational "manifestation" or "revelation" (*Aabenbarelse*). The *Zeitgeist*, in other words, is not just shaped by people; it also shapes people. Kierkegaard extends this insight to other aspects of **culture**. ***Either/Or*** emphasizes that artworks "reveal" (*aabenbare*) ideas, just as **ethical** commitments reveal one's **life-view**. Here, again, something is brought to light that otherwise may lie beyond ordinary human recognition.

Nevertheless, Kierkegaard's greatest interest in this concept has to do with the revelation of **God** in the person of **Jesus Christ**—what he typically refers to as *Aabenbaring*. This interest is multifaceted. Kierkegaard's twin conception of **religiousness** makes a sharp distinction between religious actions and beliefs derived from human **reason** and those proceeding from God's *Aabenbaring*. Hence, while it is possible to philosophically (*see* PHILOSOPHY) examine the postulates and conclusions of immanent religiousness, divine revelation must be either received in **faith** or rejected. In "The Difference between a Genius and an Apostle" ("Om Forskjellen mellem et Genie og en Apostel"), the second treatise in ***Two Ethical-Religious Minor Essays***, Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** H.H. maintains that the one who conveys God's revelation does not to seek to persuade others by virtue of intellectual **genius** but, rather, by the **authority** entrusted in him by the deity. As H.H. puts it: "The one called by a revelation [*Aabenbaring*], to whom a **doctrine** is entrusted, argues on the basis that it is a revelation, on the basis that he has authority. I am not to listen to Paul because he is brilliant or matchlessly brilliant, but I am to submit to Paul because he has divine authority." Kierkegaard believed that the **reflection** of **the present age** had led to an erroneous confusion of ingenuity and apostolicity, characterized, among other things, by the speculative vitiation of Christian **doctrine**. Indeed, this issue lay at the root of Kierkegaard's late polemics against the Danish **state church**, an institution that, in his view, had forgotten that it is charged with preserving the transcendent paradoxicality of divine revelation. *See also* APOSTLE; INDIVIDUAL; REST.

REVOLUTION. The Latin term *revolutionem* ("a revolving") was first used to describe various patterns of **nature**, especially those of a celestial nature.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

While still retaining this meaning, *revolutionem* and its cognates were also applied to **social and political** vicissitudes by the 16th century. Significantly, in the late 18th century, the epochal changes in American and French life were dubbed "revolutions." In France, above all, the *Révolution française* did not just indicate new political leadership but the overthrow of the entire Ancien Régime, an administrative and social system that had dominated national affairs for centuries.

The term *Revolution* turns up about 20 times in Kierkegaard's corpus, though the more generic term *Oprør* ("uproar" or "rebellion") appears more frequently. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard's smattering of references to *Revolution* provide insight into his understanding of **politics**. During his student years, Kierkegaard tended to speak critically of revolution, observing that it often spreads in society like cholera. In ***Either/Or***, Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** Judge William echoes this sentiment, critiquing the supposition that whatever is new is better. Perhaps Kierkegaard's most well-known discussion of revolution occurs in ***A Literary Review***, in which he contrasts the present age with that of the "age of revolution" (*Revolutions-Tiden*). Curiously, in this text, the **passion** of revolution is contrasted favorably with the smug complacency of **the present age**, which prefers **reflection** to action. Nevertheless, as Kierkegaard writes in an 1848 journal entry, such revolutionary zeal is fundamentally flawed: "Exactly as I said of the French Revolution [*den franske Revolution*] . . . it was like an engagement made at a ball in a giddy moment when one did not know what he was doing." This suspicion of revolutionary motives was, doubtless, a significant factor in Kierkegaard's refusal to support the nationalistic uprisings of 1848. As he explained in an 1848 letter, revolutions are symptoms of an intellectual "vortex" that can only be stopped by a gadfly such as **Socrates**, an indication of how he understood his own role vis-à-vis the revolutions of recent memory. *See also* CROWD/PUBLIC; CULTURE; ENVY; HISTORY; INDIVIDUAL; SELF, THE; WILL.

ROMANTICISM. The word "Romance" is derived from the Latin *Romanicus*, meaning "of or in the Roman style." Thus it originally applied to languages developed from Latin, rather than those of a Germanic source. By the medieval period, Latin endured as the **language** of the **church**, government, and scholarship, while the vernacular Romance languages were favored in more popular contexts, including that of folk literature. Increasingly, the term "Romance" was applied to stories of **love** and **passion**, and, in the late 18th century, this tendency crystallized into an identifiable **aesthetic** movement. Over against the Enlightenment's preference for cool **objectivity** and immanent **reason**, Romanticism emerged as a confederacy of artists celebrating **imagination**, mystery, **spirit**, spontaneity, and **subjectivity**. These concerns

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

would eventually make their way into **philosophy**, with thinkers such as **F. W. J. von Schelling** emphasizing that knowledge of the essence of **nature** requires an emotional and intuitive immersion in the process. In this sense, Schelling's thought might be seen as a conceptualization of the Romantic tendency to picture life in terms of a **movement** from a state of alienation to a place of **happiness** or **rest**, albeit with no guarantee of actually arriving there.

Kierkegaard does not use the word "Romanticism" (*Romantik*) very often in his authorship, though a mere glance at the movement's interests suggests an influence on Kierkegaard's thinking. He seems to have paid the greatest attention to Romanticism during the late 1830s. In one 1836 journal entry, for example, Kierkegaard observes that "the romantic [*det Romantiske*] lies essentially in flowing over all boundaries." And yet, he was also intent to connect Romanticism to a feeling of disquiet, even **despair**: "The romantic in variety consists in this, that an unsatisfied need has evoked it, yet without finding any satisfaction in it." It is with this in mind that, in another 1836 journal passage, he implies that **Christianity** represents the fulfillment, and therefore the end, of Romantic longing. This juxtaposition of Romanticism with other **ethical** and **religious** perspectives constitutes a significant part of Kierkegaard's doctoral thesis, ***The Concept of Irony***, in which he tenders a critique of one of the leading figures of Jena Romanticism, the author Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829). Focusing on Schlegel's novel *Lucinde* (1799), which then scandalized audiences by exploring Schlegel's affair with a married woman, Kierkegaard argues that the book is characteristic of **irony** in the wake of German idealism. Adopting the "infinite poetic **freedom**" granted to the Romantic artist, Schlegel endeavors "to *annul* all ethics—not only in the sense of custom and usage, but all the ethics that is the validity of spirit, the mastery of the spirit over the flesh." Hence, as Kierkegaard goes on, Schlegel's irony leads to sensuous self-indulgence, and thus it stands in noted contrast to that of **Socrates**, whose "infinite absolute negativity" was in service to "a higher something that still is not." To be sure, it was Socratic irony that Kierkegaard ultimately sought to effect in his own authorship. However, in **pseudonymous** works such as ***Either/Or*** and ***Stages on Life's Way***, the desolate ennui and erotic yearning of *Romantik* is palpably conjured up, albeit with an eye to undermining it in the end. *See also* ART; BEING/BECOMING; HEIBERG, JOHANNE LUISE (1812–1890); JUDAISM; LIFE-VIEW; MELANCHOLY; MUSIC; SIBBERN, FREDERIK CHRISTIAN (1785–1872); SUFFERING.

RUDELBACH, ANDREAS GOTTLOB (1792–1862). Danish pastor and theologian. After a decorated stint at the **University of Copenhagen**, capped off with an 1822 doctoral dissertation called *De ethices principiis hucusque*

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

vulgo traditis (*On Ethical Principles Hitherto Commonly Handed Down*), Rudelbach traveled to Germany, Switzerland, and France. During this period, he recommitted himself to orthodox Lutheranism (*see* LUTHER, MARTIN [1483–1546]) and, upon returning to Denmark, began publishing *Theological Monthly* (*Theologisk Maanedsskrift*) with **Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig**. Rudelbach's association with the controversial Grundtvig made it all but impossible for him to receive an academic position. Consequently, he took a pastoral appointment in Blauchau, Saxony, though he remained in contact with many in Denmark, including fellow Grundtvigian **Peter Christian Kierkegaard**. After over a decade abroad, Rudelbach returned to Denmark in the 1840s. In the interim, he and Grundtvig had grown apart, particularly over the question of Christian nationalism. As Rudelbach saw it—and as Søren Kierkegaard himself would argue—Grundtvig had reduced **Christianity** to an "egoistic national concept." Still barred from a permanent university placement by figures such as **Henrik Nicolaj Clausen**, and increasingly estranged from Grundtvigian circles, Rudelbach retreated to the town of Slagelse in western Zealand, where he served as parish priest of Sankt Mikkels Kirke. He remained in this position until his death on 3 March 1862.

Kierkegaard and Rudelbach had much in common. Both stood athwart the theological rationalism and unruffled politesse favored in the Danish **state church**, yet both found reason to dissociate from the populist Grundtvigian movement. While Rudelbach was more academically invested in traditional Lutheran **doctrine** than Kierkegaard, they both had a fondness for the **upbuilding** literature characteristic of an older brand of Lutheran **Pietism**. For example, in 1848, Rudelbach penned the introduction to a new Danish edition of *The Imitation of Christ* (*De Imitatione Christi*) by Thomas à Kempis (c. 1380–1471). In "Introduction to the Reading of Thomas à Kempis" ("Indledning til Læsningen af Thomas à Kempis"), Rudelbach maintains that Thomas's work demonstrates that "the Christian life must be completed in a struggle, that the crown is only placed on those who, by their Savior's almighty assistance, have overcome the world." Hence, despite its original association with **Catholicism**, Rudelbach believes that *The Imitation of Christ* is essential for those who subscribe to **Protestantism**.

Kierkegaard himself owned this edition of Thomas's masterwork, rendered in Danish as *Om Christi Efterfølgelse*. Indeed, Rudelbach and Kierkegaard too were quite friendly during the late 1840s. Kierkegaard sent dedicated copies of ***The Sickness unto Death*** and ***Practice in Christianity*** to Rudelbach. In the latter case, Rudelbach replied with a thank-you note, adding that *Practice in Christianity* "strikes down all that Christianity that is slapped together by the state and by habit and exists in name only." Rudelbach also enclosed a copy of his recent book, *The Origin and Principle of the Evan-*

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

gelical Church's Constitution (*Den evangeliske Kirkeforfatnings Oprindelse og Princip*, 1849). This response, however, indicates an important difference between the two thinkers. Rudelbach, it seems, viewed Kierkegaard as an ally in his fight to return the state church to genuine Lutheran **orthodoxy**, a misunderstanding that led to a public disagreement.

In 1851, Rudelbach published *On Civil Marriage* (*Om det borgerlige Ægteskab*), in which he contended that civil unions would facilitate the separation of **church** and state, thereby disentangling Christianity from governmental influence. In doing so, he cited Kierkegaard as a fellow advocate for the separation of these two powers. On 31 January 1851, Kierkegaard issued a riposte in the *Fatherland* (*Fædrelandet*). Entitled "An Open Letter Prompted by a Reference to Me by Dr. Rudelbach" ("Foranlediget ved en Yttring af Dr. Rudelbach mig betræffende"), Kierkegaard's piece insists that the problem facing Christianity in **the present age** is of an **inner** nature. In other words, neither partisan canvasing nor adjustments to civil law will repair the church. What is needed is the eradication of nominal Christianity, which, regrettably, can be found among representatives of various political factions, even among those adhering to orthodoxy. Here Kierkegaard evokes the Pietist emphasis on spiritual renewal and the **imitation** of **Jesus Christ**, ironically in opposition to Rudelbach. *See also* MARRIAGE; POLITICS.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

S

SACRIFICE. The noun *Offer* turns up nearly 200 times in Kierkegaard's authorship, and the verb *offre* appears even more frequently, albeit in various conjugated forms. While these words are often translated as "sacrifice" and "to sacrifice," respectively—terms that are derived from the Latin *sacrificus*, denoting the performance of priestly functions—they actually have a broader significance. The Danish *offre* is cognate with the Latin *offerre*, which means "to present" or "to bring before," particularly in the form of assistance or gift. Consequently, the concept of *Offer* implies a kind of self-donation, wherein one gives up something for the sake of another.

This terminology spans Kierkegaard's oeuvre and, for that reason, can be difficult to pin down. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard generally moves from exploring the notion of "sacrifice" in an **aesthetic** mode to commending it in a **religious** one. For example, in the pseudonymous (*see* PSEUDONYMITY) ***Fear and Trembling***, Johannes de silentio ponders the biblical patriarch Abraham, who was confronted with the ultimate test of **faith**: "And it came to pass after these things, that God did tempt Abraham, and said unto him, Abraham: and he said, Behold, *here* I *am*. And he said, Take now thy son, thine only *son* Isaac, whom thou lovest, and get thee into the land of Moriah; and offer him there for a burnt offering upon one of the mountains which I will tell thee of" (Gen. 22:1–2). According to Johannes, Abraham's willingness to sacrifice Isaac stands as an **offense** to **reason**: insofar as Abraham places his obedience to **God** above his adherence to the **ethical** norms of society, he makes himself an **exception** to the universal. If, in faith, he believes that his sacrifice will *not* result in the loss of his son, he must nevertheless sacrifice his ability to be understood by others for the sake of God—a profundity at which Johannes can marvel but not comprehend. In subsequent works, Kierkegaard argues that **Christianity** requires its followers to make personal sacrifices out of religious devotion. Indeed, in books such as ***Works of Love*** and especially in the pseudonymous ***Practice in Christianity***, it is argued that the **imitation** of **Jesus Christ** is the epitome of Christian **love**. The implication is that Christian faith necessarily entails *Offer*. As Kierkegaard writes of the **apostles** in ***For Self-Examination***: "[They] resolved to love, to suffer, to

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

endure all things, to be sacrificed in order to save this unloving world." *See also* ATONEMENT; MONASTICISM; SUFFERING.

SALVATION. Kierkegaard employs the noun "Salvation" (*Frelse*) and the verb "to save" (*frelse*) throughout his authorship. It turns up in his doctoral dissertation, ***The Concept of Irony***, as well as in his final publication, ***The Moment***. Moreover, he periodically refers to **Jesus Christ** as "Savior" (*Frelser*). In one sense, Kierkegaard treats salvation as a common human concern. The word itself denotes liberation from a number of undesirable and indeed repugnant conditions: a nation might seek *Frelse* from an oppressive ruler, or a ship might seek salvation from a storm at sea. In ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** Johannes Climacus suggests that salvation is an immanent **religious** concern as well. All human beings, he maintains, have an implicit aspiration for a **happiness** that will endure for **eternity**, though not all will actively pursue this blessedness. It is this innate longing for the **absolute** that **Christianity** assumes. That is to say, Christian **faith** (or "Religiousness B") taps into the human desire to be saved from **death** and **despair** and, in turn, addresses it with the **paradox** of the eternal God's entry into **temporality**.

In a more theological vein, Kierkegaard's soteriology (or theory of salvation) follows in the tradition of figures such the Apostle Paul, Augustine of Hippo (354–430), and **Martin Luther**. Indeed, in an early 1834 journal entry, he wonders whether or not **Catholicism** and **Protestantism** are actually very different on soteriological questions: both insist that, on account of **sin**, human beings can only be eternally saved by the **grace** of **God**. But this anti-Pelagian standpoint, definitively worked out by Augustine centuries earlier, still leaves a number of challenging questions. For example, if human beings cannot be their own saviors, are they merely passive recipients of a seemingly random divine gift? Kierkegaard rejects this option, arguing instead that, in accordance with God's gift of **freedom**, human beings must come to accept (rather than earn) divine *Frelse*. The process by which one accepts or refuses God's grace is neither linear nor systematic. However, as Kierkegaard makes clear in works such as ***The Sickness unto Death***, it is typically bound up with the recognition that one is in a state of **sin** and, further, cannot attain salvation on one's own. In the manner of **Pietism**, a number of Kierkegaard's writings seek to foster this sin consciousness, sometimes in creatively subtle ways, sometimes more directly (*see* COMMUNICATION). In the latter part of his authorship, Kierkegaard frequently invoked the **imitation** of Christ—another key motif in Pietism—as the highest **ethical** and religious standard. In doing so, he hoped to encourage Christians to understand that the reception of divine grace is not a matter of course but requires constant **striving**. *See also* ATONEMENT; BAPTISM; DAMNATION; ETERNITY; INNER.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

SCHELLING, FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH VON (1775–1854). German philosopher who, along with Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) and **Georg Wilhelm Friederich Hegel**, is remembered as one the major figures of German Idealism. The son of an Orientalist teacher, Schelling was raised in Leonberg in the Duchy of Württemberg. In 1790, at the tender age of 15, he entered the nearby Tübinger Stift, a Lutheran (*see* LUTHER, MARTIN [1483–1546]) seminary. There he developed close friendships with Hegel and the poet Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843). During his time at the Stift, Schelling's interests migrated from patristics to **philosophy**, and he a took particular interest in the writings of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and Fichte. In 1798, Schelling's thinking would evolve again when he took a teaching position at the University of Jena. Through his association with the polymath Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832), Schelling became a key leader of the artistic and intellectual movement known as **Romanticism**. In 1800, he published his first major work, *System of Transcendental Idealism* (*System des transcendentalen Idealismus*), which was a key influence on the English poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834). Around this time, Schelling also resumed a close working relationship with Hegel. However, after Schelling moved to Würzberg, he and Hegel grew apart. Moreover, as the latter's star ascended, the two became estranged. For a number of years, Schelling was overshadowed by his erstwhile friend, though, ironically, he would assume Hegel's former chair of philosophy at Berlin in 1841. It was in this capacity that Schelling delivered his 1841–1842 lectures titled the "Philosophy of Revelation" ("Philosophie der Offenbarung"). The task of these lectures was twofold. First, Schelling set out to complete his philosophical program: whereas his early work was concerned with the essence of **reason**, his Berlin talks were meant to "positively" explore the world as such—its ontological and historical reality. Thus he would tackle topics such as **nature**, mythology, and religion, showing that **history** culminates in the **revelation** of **God** in **Jesus Christ**. Second, in so doing, Schelling would provide an answer to the predominance of Hegelianism, which many in the establishment felt had grown precarious—a so-called dragon's seed of "facile omniscience." Indeed, following Schelling's appointment, the German diplomat and scholar Christian Charles von Bunsen (1791–1860) proclaimed that Schelling did not arrive in Berlin as a professor but as "the philosopher chosen by God and called to be the teacher of this age."

Needless to say, then, expectations were high when Schelling's lectures began in late 1841. A number of Europe's brightest and most ambitious young thinkers were in attendance: Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876), Swiss cultural historian Jakob Burckhardt (1818–1897), German philosopher Friedrich Engels (1820–1895), German naturalist Alexander Humboldt (1769–1859), and possibly Engels's compatriot, German philosopher and

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

social critic Karl Marx (1818–1883). Kierkegaard was there too. "Schelling is lecturing to an extraordinary audience," Kierkegaard wrote **Emil Boesen** in December 1841. In other contemporaneous letters, Kierkegaard complains that the lecture hall was so crowded that it was difficult to hear, though, initially, he was elated that Schelling intended to relate philosophy to **actuality**. In a matter of weeks, however, Kierkegaard changed his opinion. In January 1842, Kierkegaard writes to Boesen: "Schelling's most recent lectures have not been of much significance." A few weeks later, in a puckish letter to **Peter Christian Kierkegaard**, Kierkegaard portrays Schelling as a haughty yet scatterbrained orator: "[Schelling] has now gotten the idea of lecturing longer than is customary, and therefore I have gotten the idea that I will not attend the lectures as long as I otherwise would have. Question: Whose idea is the better?" Kierkegaard returned to Copenhagen in early March 1842, glad that he had traveled to Berlin but ready to finish his first major work, ***Either/Or***.

Notably, Kierkegaard's views on Schelling's lectures in Berlin were not isolated. A few years later, the onetime philosophical prodigy resigned his professorship, embittered by the reception of his *Positivphilosophie*. Schelling died in Switzerland in 1854, though his influence would reappear in 20th-century **existentialism**. *See also* HAPPINESS; METAPHYSICS; MOVEMENT; REST.

SCIENCE/SPECULATION. Kierkegaard came of age during a period of immense growth in the "natural sciences" (*Naturvidenskaberne*) and in "science" (*Videnskab*) in general. He was also contemporary with some of Denmark's most important scientific pioneers, including astronomer Peter Andreas Hansen (1795–1874), zoologist Peter Wilhelm Lund (1801–1880), chemist William Christopher Zeise (1789–1847), and physicist **Hans Christian Ørsted**. On occasion, Kierkegaard confesses to a strong interest and deep respect for the sciences. In an 1835 letter to Lund, to whom he was distantly related, Kierkegaard states he admires scientists, including "all those who seek to explain and interpret the runic script of **nature**, ranging from him who calculates the speed of the stars . . . to him who describes the physiology of a particular animal, from him who surveys the surface of the earth." Such endeavors, insofar as they view "the component parts in their proper light," are both beneficial to humankind and edifying for the one who undertakes them. Interestingly, in this same letter, Kierkegaard nevertheless insists science cannot exhaustively explain the natural world, much less human life. In other words, natural phenomena can and should be studied with an eye to "the spiritual world" as well.

This last qualification might be seen as a précis of Kierkegaard's overarching evaluation of the sciences. As he sees it, scientific epistemology is

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

valid within its own sphere, but it is not **absolute**. And yet, as time passed, Kierkegaard increasingly worried that **the present age** had enthroned *Videnskab* as the only valuable form of knowledge: "The natural sciences have conquered," Kierkegaard complains in an 1850 journal entry, adding that theology has been marginalized. For Kierkegaard, this is a critical shift in modern life, precisely because it prioritizes knowledge acquired through disinterested means: "The scientist [*Videnskabsmanden*] and scholar has his personal life in categories quite different than his professional life." Whereas antique **philosophy** subordinated natural science to higher-order deliberations on the **ethical** and the **religious**, modern thought prefers to limit itself to the "details" of material reality. This triumph has been billed as "progress," but, for Kierkegaard, it represents degeneration. After all, inasmuch as science is concerned with sensorial data and empirical demonstration, it is an **aesthetic** discipline. If a **life-view** centered on sensuous self-gratification is plainly alarming for, say, a person struggling with drug addiction, it is less obviously so for a scientist. Yet, to the extent that the latter is using experimental knowledge to win renown and to procure material benefits, Kierkegaard would place both persons on the same existential continuum. Even worse, the ascendency of modern science creates an entire **culture** given over to **objectivity** and material reward. "Approaching something scientifically, esthetically, etc.," Kierkegaard remarks in an 1849 journal passage, "how easily a person is led into the conceit that he really knows something for which he has the word."

In this sense, science has a great deal in common with what Kierkegaard refers to as "speculation" (*Spekulation*). A term that crops up frequently in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, "speculation" is contrasted with **passion** and **subjectivity**. In a section titled "The Speculative Point of View" ("Den speculative Betragtning"), Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** Johannes Climacus argues that "the speculative thinker" treats phenomena as objectively interesting but personally irrelevant. For example, instead of asking whether or not she is a faithful Christian, the speculative thinker will ponder the **history of Christianity**, its status within a given nation, and the import of Christian **doctrine** in a changing world. For Climacus, this is erroneous on multiple levels. It pretends that "the speculator" (*Speculanten*) is capable of prescinding from his own cares and presuppositions—an impossibility, since the conditions of **finitude** (his sociohistorical location, his idiosyncratic predilections, and so on) underlie and influence his scholarship. Second, it distorts the meaning of ethical and religious concerns, which are properly understood as activities that demand the integration of body and mind. As Climacus points out, the self is a "synthesis of the temporal and the eternal," and thus "the speculator's untruth" consists in her illusory attempt "to be exclusively eternal

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

within time." *See also* CONTEMPORANEITY; EXISTENCE; FAITH; HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1770–1831)/HEGELIANISM; INDIVIDUAL; INNER; METAPHYSICS; PSYCHOLOGY; REASON; REFLECTION; SELF, THE; SYSTEM, THE; TECHNOLOGY.

SCRIPTURE. Kierkegaard's writings are permeated by references to "Scripture" (*Skriften*), "the Bible" (*Bibelen*), "biblical" (*bibelsk*), "God's Word" (*Guds Ord*), "Holy Scripture" (*hellige Skrift*), and so on. Moreover, he makes countless references to imagery and stories from Scripture. Though his study of the Bible was more devotional than scholarly, Kierkegaard was also aware of how the academic analysis of the Bible had changed in **the present age**. As a student, he attended lectures by **Henrik Nikolaj Clausen** on the New Testament, and his journals from this period demonstrate a familiarity with both the translation of the New Testament and the exegetical work of figures such as Johann Salomo Semler (1725–1791), Wilhelm Martin Leberecht de Wette (1780–1849), and Hermann Olshausen (1796–1839).

In and through these sources, Kierkegaard developed a critical, if not wholly unsympathetic, response to the rationalist hermeneutics emerging out of the Enlightenment. On this reading, the Bible was viewed as a repository of timeless **ethical** guidance cloaked in the peculiar and sometimes embarrassing language of a more primitive epoch—a strategy that, while appealing to bourgeois common sense, nevertheless subordinated biblical **truth** to the judgment of the interpreter. "The error [of rationalists]," Kierkegaard notes in an 1835 journal passage, "lies thus in the fact that when they find themselves in agreement with Scripture, they use it as the foundation, but otherwise not, and thus they rest on two incongruous positions." It is curious, if not contradictory, that Kierkegaard portrays the pseudonym Judge William in ***Either/Or*** as a biblical rationalist. Though he pays winsome lip service to the Bible's importance, the Judge is characterized by a reluctance to view the text as binding. Pericopes that he deems awkward or extreme are reworked in light of a **religious** vision made palatable to polite society.

In later texts such as ***Works of Love*** and ***For Self-Examination***, Kierkegaard clarifies his understanding of Scripture and, in the process, intensifies his critique of modern biblical hermeneutics. On the one hand, he makes clear that Scripture tenders ethico-religious principles that, despite often clashing with popular morality, demand obedience in and through **faith**. Perhaps most fundamentally, he insists that the **imitation** of **Jesus Christ**, plainly asserted in the Bible (John 13:34, 1 Cor. 11:1, 1 Pet. 2:21, etc.), is a Christian **doctrine** meant to govern all areas of the believer's life. Moreover, in contrast to the historical-critical study of the biblical canon, Kierkegaard maintains that the Bible is best read as if it were addressed to oneself. In the opening discourse

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

of *For Self-Examination*, titled "What Is Required in Order to Look at Oneself with True Blessing in the Mirror of the Word?" ("Hvad der fordres for til sand Velsignelse at betragte sig i Ordets Speil?"), Kierkegaard criticizes two types of readers of the Bible, those who disregard it as an "obsolete ancient book" and, albeit in fewer numbers, those who view it as an "extremely remarkable ancient book upon which one expends an amazing diligence, acumen, etc." In contrast, Kierkegaard recommends that people read Scripture with subjective (*see* SUBJECTIVITY) concern and **passion**, so that "you will read a fear and trembling into your soul" and thus "succeed in becoming a human being, a personality, rescued from being this dreadful nonentity into which we humans . . . have been bewitched, an impersonal, an objective something." Though marking out distinctive ground amid the dominant hermeneutical trends of his day, Kierkegaard's interpretive method ultimately owes a great deal to **Pietism**. Scripture is, in the end, given by **God** for spiritual **upbuilding**, not detached scholarly **reflection**. *See also* AUTHORITY; CHRISTIANITY/CHRISTENDOM; PROTESTANTISM.

SELF, THE. Kierkegaard uses the word "self," whether in the form of a noun (*Selv*) or in the form of a pronoun (*selv*), more than 7,000 times in his oeuvre. Not all of these uses are conceptually significant, but this total is nevertheless remarkable. It indicates Kierkegaard's preoccupation with the self, both as a locus of personal **striving** and as an object of philosophical analysis. Indeed, in pseudonymous (*see* PSEUDONYMITY) works such as ***The Concept of Anxiety*** and ***The Sickness unto Death***, as well as in signed **discourses** (*see EIGHTEEN UPBUILDING DISCOURSES*) such as "To Need God Is the Human Being's Highest Perfection" ("At trænge til Gud er Menneskets høieste Fuldkommenhed," 1844), Kierkegaard develops a robust theory of the self, demonstrating that it is a dynamic and relational structure rooted in **God**. This conception has a number of important implications. First, it signifies that the self is a kind of **movement**. It bears certain necessary characteristics but also is freely (*see* FREEDOM) capable of developing toward its ideal state: the "first self" can become a "deeper self." In *The Sickness unto Death*, Kierkegaard's pseudonym Anti-Climacus maintains that failure to progress toward the ideal denotes the ongoing presence of **despair** and **sin**, and therefore self-development is crucial to personal **happiness** and, finally, to **rest**. Insofar as the self is a relational structure, its growth depends on its ability to synthesize various relations. For example, the self is called to integrate its **eternity** and its **temporality** or those features that stem from limitless developmental possibilities on the one hand and those that hinge on given historical (*see* HISTORY) elements on the other. Still, this integration is only possible if the self recognizes from whence it came. Since the self neither

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

can nor did create itself, its own integration must align with the **will** of "the power that established it." In other words, the ideal toward which the self is developing—and hopefully will attain—must be both divinely ordained and concretely realized. *See also* COMMON MAN; FINITUDE/INFINITY; INDIVIDUAL; INNER; INWARDNESS; NECESSITY; SUBJECTIVITY.

SIBBERN, FREDERIK CHRISTIAN (1785–1872). Danish philosopher. The son of a physician, Sibbern was born and raised in Copenhagen. He matriculated at the **University of Copenhagen** in 1802, with a concentration on **law**. Eventually, he combined his legal studies with a range of other interests, including **philosophy**, **psychology**, and religion. After finishing his doctorate in 1810, Sibbern embarked on a kind of *Bildungsreise*, traveling abroad in order to meet some of the day's most significant thinkers—**F. W. J. Schelling** in Munich, Henrik Steffens (1773–1845) in Halle, and Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768–1834) in Berlin. Each of these figures was associated with **Romanticism**, and, upon his return to Denmark in 1813, Sibbern took up a philosophical program with obvious Romantic sympathies. He published *The Human Being's Spiritual Nature and Being* (*Mennsekets aandelig Natur og Væsen*) in 1819 and *Psychological Pathology* (*Psychologisk Pathologi*) in 1828, leading to a tenured professorship at the University of Copenhagen in 1829. During the 1830s, while Kierkegaard was a student at the university, Sibbern and **Poul Martin Møller** were known for their emphases on the totality of human **existence**, calling attention to the importance of **subjectivity** in philosophy. In this way, they constituted a notable opposition to **Hegelianism**. In 1845, Sibbern was named *Rektor* of the university, and he continued to teach well into his 80s. He finally retired in 1870, dying two years later.

Kierkegaard's relationship with Sibbern was complex. As a student, Kierkegaard was fairly close with Sibbern, both on a personal and on a professional level. In a pair of 1912 letters to the Danish philosopher Harald Høffding (1843–1931), Sibbern's daughter Augusta Sibbern Møller (1838–1933) recalls that Kierkegaard visited her father regularly, whether to sit by the fire or to take walks together. Indeed, as dean of the faculty of philosophy, Sibbern was tasked with guiding Kierkegaard's dissertation process, and, for that reason, he is named on Kierkegaard's magister diploma itself: "Frederik Christian Sibbern, Doctor of Philosophy, Professor in Ordinary and Knight of Dannebrog with the silver cross." It appears that the two were familiar enough that, when Kierkegaard broke off his engagement with **Regine Olsen**, Sibbern was deeply disappointed in his erstwhile student. In a letter from Berlin, dated Halloween 1841, Kierkegaard tells **Emil Boesen** that Sibbern and **Peter Christian Kierkegaard** had recently exchanged angry words:

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

"Sibbern [looked] for me the day before I left 'in order to give me a thorough dressing down,' since he too had now become convinced that I was an egotistical and vain man, an ironist in the worst sense. When he did not find me, Peter became the victim." Not long after, however, their friendship was somewhat mended, as Kierkegaard penned a lengthy letter to Sibbern in December 1841, conveying, among other things, his impressions of Schelling's Berlin lectures. Sibbern and Kierkegaard would remain in contact over the years, though their differences in temperament would resurface. Perhaps most notable in this connection was Sibbern's strong disapproval of Kierkegaard's late polemics against the Danish **state church**.

A similar tension permeated their relationship qua scholars. While Kierkegaard owned a number of Sibbern's works and clearly drew on his mentor's opposition to Hegelianism, he sharply criticizes Sibbern at times, especially the latter's foray into **the social and political** debates of the late 1840s. For his own part, Sibbern would look back on Kierkegaard as a brilliant yet unfocused thinker whose intellectual promise suffered on account of his egoism. *See also CONCEPT OF IRONY, THE*; *MOMENT, THE*.

SICKNESS UNTO DEATH*, *THE*.** Kierkegaard wrote *The Sickness unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening* (*Sygdommen til Døden: En christelig psychologisk Udvikling til Opvækkelse*) from March to May 1848. The first book published under the **pseudonym** Anti-Climacus—the second would be ***Practice in Christianity—*The Sickness unto Death* is nevertheless intimately related to a number of Kierkegaard's previous works. Like ***The Concept of Anxiety***, it is an exploration of the nature of **the self**, albeit with greater emphasis on the problem of **despair**. Like the signed 1844 **discourse** (*see EIGHTEEN UPBUILDING DISCOURSES*) "To Need God Is the Human Being's Highest Perfection" ("At trænge til Gud er Menneskets høieste Fuldkommenhed"), it seeks to shed light on how the self might overcome its **inner** discord and alienation from **God**. Ironically, while many commentators group *The Sickness unto Death* among Kierkegaard's most accomplished works, he himself was not comfortable with its form. In one 1848 journal entry, he observes that the book's rigorous **dialectic** clashes with its **upbuilding** intentions. For a significant period of time, he even pondered rewriting the work in the poignant style of a discourse. Nevertheless, when the second edition of ***Either/Or*** was released on 14 May 1849, Kierkegaard felt the need to issue a **religious** work as a counterpoise to *Either/Or*'s famed exploration of the **aesthetic**. Eventually, he settled on releasing *The Sickness unto Death* pseudonymously, lest readers erroneously associate the book's assured Christian ideality with Kierkegaard's own modest example.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

The Sickness unto Death, at any rate, is a labyrinthine study of despair and **sin**, with an eye to **faith** as the antidote to these spiritual sicknesses. As Anti-Climacus argues, all human beings are susceptible to despair, though their consciousness of this condition varies in accordance with a number of idiosyncratic factors. Moreover, from the standpoint of **Christianity**, despair is essentially sin, entailing a rejection of the self that God has willed into **existence**. If the sinner is one who, in despair and before God, does not want to be oneself, faith is the way of **being** in which the self relates properly to itself and to its creator (*see* CREATION) and thereby finds **rest**. "[This is] the formula for the state in which there is no despair at all," Anti-Climacus writes, "in relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it. This formula in turn . . . is the definition of faith." And yet, perhaps due to its convoluted structure and philosophical (*see* PHILOSOPHY) argot, *The Sickness unto Death* did not find a receptive audience upon its release on 30 July 1849. It would take the publication of *Practice in Christianity* a year later to call attention to the significance of Anti-Climacus, whose two works would lay the intellectual foundation for Kierkegaard's final attack on the Danish **state church**. *See also* FINITUDE/INFINITY; HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1770–1831)/HEGELIANISM; INDIVIDUAL; INWARDNESS.

SILENCE. Kierkegaard uses two words for "silence," both appearing about 250 times in his authorship. The first is *Stilhed*, indicating a "state without noise or sounds." The second is *Taushed*, a derivative of the verb *tie*, which means "to refrain from speaking." Broadly speaking, then, *Stilhed* is akin to **rest**: it is a condition that one might seek, say, during a walk in the woods (*see* GRIB FOREST) or in a chapel. *Taushed* is closer to a discipline, practiced, among other things, when a figure of **authority** is in charge, especially **God**.

For Kierkegaard, both types of silence are crucial for human **existence**, though he places notable stress on *Taushed*. In one 1852 journal entry, he observes that *Taushed* is needed to break the cycle of **reflection** that threatens to cripple **passion** and **decision** in **the present age**. As long as people heed the words of the "professor of the 1,000 'Why's,'" they will be unable to venture anything. Silence is needed if one is going to arrive at a decision. Similarly, in his short **upbuilding** collection *The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air: Three Devotional Discourses* (*Lilien paa Marken og Fuglen under Himlen: Tre gudelige Taler*), issued on the same day as the second edition of ***Either/Or***, Kierkegaard advises the reader to learn *Taushed* from "the silent teachers, the lily and the bird." This lesson is crucial, since, among created things (*see* CREATION) human beings are distinguished by **language**, a tremendous gift that too often is wasted on **chatter**. As Kierkegaard puts it,

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

"Because the human being is able to speak, the ability to be silent is an art, and a great art precisely because this advantage of his so easily tempts him." Later in this same piece, Kierkegaard adds that genuine and effectual speech is dependent on silence, insofar as silence allows the **individual** to attend to the right time to say something, an instant in which **eternity** and **temporality** come together and imbue **actuality** with divine meaning. Indeed, **the self** that cannot be silent is doomed to **despair**: "The misfortune in the lives of the great majority of human beings is this," Kierkegaard writes, "that they were never aware of the moment, that in their lives the eternal and the temporal are exclusively separated. And why? Because they could not be silent." With this in mind, it is significant that Kierkegaard did not publish a single word between the release of ***For Self-Examination*** in September 1851 and the launch of his so-called attack upon **Christendom** in December 1854. Thus a lengthy period of silence preceded Kierkegaard's outspoken polemics against the Danish **state church**, culminating in the appositely named periodical ***The Moment***. *See also* COMMUNICATION; INNER; INWARDNESS; REASON; TELEOLOGICAL SUSPENSION OF THE ETHICAL.

SIN. Kierkegaard uses the word "sin" (*Synd*) nearly 500 times in his authorship, thereby hinting at its importance for his thinking. At the same time, however, he does not speak of sin in univocal fashion but, instead, views it as a **universal** human condition that manifests itself in a variety of ways. Indeed, in keeping with **Scripture**, Kierkegaard affirms the Apostle Paul's claim, itself adopted from Psalm 14, that each and every human being is a sinner: "We have before proved both Jews and Gentiles, that they are all under sin; as it is written, There is none righteous, no, not one" (Rom. 3:9–10). In ***The Concept of Anxiety***, Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** Vigilius Haufniensis offers a lengthy analysis of the Christian **doctrine** of "original sin" (*Arvesynd*). Attempting to avoid the implication that sin is a genetic trait, passed down from Adam to the human race in the manner of, say, bipedalism and nucleic acid sequences, Vigilius argues that each **individual** is effectively a **repetition** of Adam: she bears the bodily and psychic dispositions that can lead to sin—above all, **anxiety**—but nevertheless is not predestined to sin. In other words, *Synd* emerges through human **freedom**. It is a **choice**, albeit one stemming from a disequilibrium within **the self**.

The Sickness unto Death is another text that pays sustained attention to the problem of sin. According to Kierkegaard's pseudonym Anti-Climacus, sin is essentially **despair** before **God**. That is to say, it "is the intensification of despair," rather than a particular act of wrongdoing. Consequently, as Anti-Climacus explains, one cannot remedy the state of sin simply by performing virtuous deeds. Rather, one must overcome it in and through **faith**,

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

which brings the self to the state contrary to *Synd*—namely, **rest** in God. An important implication of this juxtaposition of sin and faith is that, for Anti-Climacus, as for Kierkegaard, sin is surmounted only paradoxically (*see* PARADOX): it is not through the meritoriousness of good works but through the humble confession of powerlessness that one comes to depend wholly on God, who has assured **salvation** to those who trust in the **love** and mercy of **Jesus Christ**. In this contention, Kierkegaard clearly echoes the theology of **Martin Luther**, though his production of edifying literature, intended to rouse one's **inner** life, foster sin-consciousness, and encourage **repentance**, is especially reminiscent of **Pietism**. *See also* CREATION; DAMNATION; DEATH; DEMONIC; DYING TO; EVIL; EXISTENCE; FORGIVENESS; GOVERNANCE/PROVIDENCE; GRACE; MOOD; SUFFERING; TRAGEDY/TRAGIC; WORLDLINESS/SECULARISM.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL, THE. The English adjective "social" can be traced back to the Latin noun *socius*, meaning "companion" or "ally." Similarly, the English adjective "political" is derived from the Latin *politicus*, denoting that which concerns citizenship or the state. Though Kierkegaard had specific ideas with regard to modern **politics**, which he viewed as an outgrowth of various features of life in **the present age**, his general conception of the social and political is bound up with his understanding of "community" or "society" (*Samfund*). Though not a term that turns up with exceptional frequency—slightly less than 150 times across Kierkegaard's entire corpus—it has important implications for his understanding of **Christendom**, **church**, **culture**, the **individual**, politics, and so on.

First, Kierkegaard presupposes *Samfund* as a part of human life. In other words, whether due to cultural, geographical, or **religious** concerns, people will cluster into like-minded associations. These alliances may start out in casual fashion, but they can and often do assume a number of formal characteristics. For example, a pickup basketball game at a city park may soon evolve in a regular meeting, with set game times, certain rules of play, and an established hierarchy of leadership. In ***A Literary Review***, Kierkegaard describes what he sees as the foundation of communal development: "When individuals (each one individually) are essentially and passionately related to an idea and together are essentially related to the same idea, the relation is optimal and normative." The problem, however, is that most societies do not promote this "optimal" form of *Samfund*. At times, the role of the individual is forfeited for the sake of nominal or even blind adherence to social convention; at other times, the community lacks a determinate idea to which persons can relate and from which they can obtain meaning. In both cases, the growth of **the self** is hindered by its social context, thereby leading to a host of problems, from the tyranny of the **crowd** to the feral violence of **revolution**.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Indeed, starting with ***Either/Or***, Kierkegaard makes clear that his analysis of human **existence** has implications for social and political life. For example, Judge William maintains that society flourishes when institutions such as **marriage** and parenthood are properly ordered and supported. In other words, **universal** ethical norms underlie a healthy body politic. Yet, in works such as ***Fear and Trembling*** and ***Practice in Christianity***, this notion is called into question, with the implication that religious obligations can and sometimes do run counter to social and political expectations. The error of Christendom is that it fails to grasp this fundamental point: what society wills is not identical to what God wills. With this in mind, Kierkegaard emerged as an ardent critic of those who would seek to reform or to save Christianity by virtue of a strong *Samfund*—a conviction that he perceived in a number of his contemporaries, including the nationalistic firebrand **Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig** and the establishmentarian primate **Jakob Peter Mynster**. In contrast, Kierkegaard insists that the single individual personally devoted to religious virtues such as **forgiveness** and **love** represents the condition for genuine community, and thus his authorship repudiates social and political prominence in favor of reaching the solitary reader. Only when the individual accepts and understands the unique challenges of modernity, perhaps especially the phenomenon of **leveling**, can she indirectly serve the well-being of society writ large. *See also THE CORSAIR*; ENVY; EQUALITY; EVIL; GOD; HAPPINESS; JESUS CHRIST; MARTYRDOM; *MOMENT, THE*; MONASTICISM; PARADOX; STATE CHURCH; TECHNOLOGY; TELEOLOGICAL SUSPENSION OF THE ETHICAL; TIVOLI; TRUTH; VOTING.

SOCRATES (c. 470–399 BCE)/SOCRATIC. The Greek philosopher Socrates (Σωκράτης) was born into a well-off Athenian family and received an education fitting of his station. After distinguished service during the Peloponnesian War—a nearly 30-year conflict between Athens and Sparta, which finally ended when Athens surrendered in the wake of the Battle of Aegospotami (405 BCE)—Socrates dedicated himself to a kind of itinerant pedagogy. Unsightly and unkempt, he nevertheless gained a following due to his willingness to publicly question the Athenian establishment. Famously, the great Athenian playwright Aristophanes (c. 446–c. 386 BCE) lampooned Socrates in his comedy *The Clouds* (Νεφέλαι, 423 BCE), suggesting that his teaching amounted to no more than rhetorical stunts. Still, two of Socrates's disciples, the military historian Xenophon (c. 430–355 BCE) and the philosopher Plato (c. 428–347 BCE), sought to record their teacher's ideas. The latter's many works proved especially influential, though the extent to which the Platonic Socrates is actually a vehicle for Plato's own thinking remains a matter of scholarly debate. What is clear, in any case, is that Socrates became

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

such a nuisance to the ruling class of Athens that he was sentenced to death. Accused of disrespecting the gods and corrupting the youth, he was forced to drink poison hemlock, a fate that he met surrounded by his supporters, who had been hoping that he would try to escape.

That Kierkegaard was a great admirer of Socrates is well known. In ***The Concept of Irony***, Kierkegaard demonstrates a keen understanding of various aspects of Socrates's legacy, including an awareness of the hermeneutical and historiographical issues occasioned by Xenophon's and Plato's respective accounts of the philosopher's career. And yet Kierkegaard did not just have an academic interest in Socrates. He viewed his own situation in modern Copenhagen as analogous to that of Socrates in ancient Athens, and he endeavored to incorporate the "Socratic" (*socratisk*) into his authorship in a number of ways. For example, just as Socrates utilized **irony** in debates with figures such as rhetorician and sophist Protagoras of Abdera (c. 490 BCE–c. 420 BCE), so did Kierkegaard ironically engage his contemporaries. Both cast doubt on the integrity and **truth** of the established order, often through **dialectic** and questioning. But Socrates's influence on Kierkegaard went beyond philosophical tactics. Kierkegaard saw Socrates as the apex of what a thinker should aspire to be, placing him below only **Jesus Christ** in his pantheon of heroes. At times, he even speaks of Socrates with striking intimacy, calling him "a simple wise man of ancient times."

The contrast between this "simple" thinker and the grandiose ambition of modern systematicians such as **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel** was not lost on Kierkegaard. In an 1845 journal entry, Kierkegaard playfully sketches a meeting between Socrates and Hegel in the "underworld." When the former asks the latter about the "starting-point" of his **philosophy**, Hegel responds that he starts with no presuppositions. Socrates replies, "That's quite something! So perhaps you don't start at all?" This is a question that Kierkegaard would thereafter explore in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***. And yet, as Kierkegaard imagines it, Hegel does not understand the joke: "I not start," Hegel rebukes Socrates, "I who have written 21 volumes?" The matter would grow more serious during Kierkegaard's late polemics against the Danish **state church**. In works such as ***The Moment***, Kierkegaard sought to undermine ecclesiastical leaders by interrogating the extent to which their goals and values aligned with **Scripture**, particularly the life and teaching of Jesus. Hence, in an attempt to defend **Christianity** from Christendom, Kierkegaard notably adopted the pagan Socrates as his model: "The only analogy I have for what I am doing is Socrates," Kierkegaard wrote in September 1855, just a few weeks before being admitted to **Frederik's Hospital** with his mortal illness. "My task is the Socratic task of revising the definition of what it means to be a Christian." *See also* AUTHORITY; COMMUNICATION;

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

CORRECTIVE; FAITH; NEGATION; PAGANISM; *PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS*; REASON; RECOLLECTION; SUBJECTIVITY.

SPIRIT. Kierkegaard uses the word "spirit" (*Aand*) more than 800 times in his authorship. Derived from the Latin *animus*, meaning "rational soul" or "spiritual life," *Aand* is appropriately rich in connotations. It can indicate anything from "human consciousness" to "incorporeal supernatural being" to "divine life or power." Kierkegaard too utilizes the term in a variety of ways, sometimes contrasting it with **worldliness**, sometimes treating it as an aspect of **the self**, sometimes equating it with the process of **individual** growth. Moreover, Kierkegaard's understanding of **God**, formed by **Scripture** and ecclesial **doctrine**, recognizes the **Holy Spirit** as the third person of Trinity. Given this wide range of meaning, it is not surprising that *Aand* turns up all through Kierkegaard's authorship, in both signed and pseudonymous (*see* PSEUDONYMITY) works.

An early programmatic discussion of "spirit" comes in ***Either/Or***. According to Kierkegaard's pseudonym "A," **Christianity** does not seek to eliminate sensuality but, rather, qualifies it as a principle of *Aand*. Hence, from a Christian point of view, the human being *is* spirit, albeit in different modalities. Thus the task of the self is to set these diverse spheres of **existence** in a proper relationship. In the second part of *Either/Or*, Judge William argues that the **aesthetic** is an insufficient basis for spiritual development, precisely because its preoccupation with **immediacy** fails to incorporate the self's **eternity**. A synthesis of the eternal and the temporal (*see* TEMPORALITY/TIME), undertaken in and through **freedom**, is needed. The aesthetic must be incorporated into the **ethical** and, finally, the **religious**. Kierkegaard gives this notion definitive treatment in ***The Sickness unto Death***. Here, in a complex early passage, Kierkegaard's pseudonym Anti-Climacus states: "A human being is spirt. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what then is the self? The self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the relation's relating itself to itself in the relation; the self is not the relation but is the relation's relating itself to itself." Further, as Anti-Climacus explains, a balanced and happy (*see* HAPPINESS) self is one in which the task of self-relation is handled well, namely, by a synthesis of the self's temporal and eternal elements, with continual reference to God, from whom the self received its existence. With this in mind, *Aand* is not just what the self is; it is also what it does.

STAGES ON LIFE'S WAY. Kierkegaard began conceiving parts of *Stages on Life's Way: Studies by Various Persons* (*Stadier på Livets Vej: Studier af Forskjellige*) during the composition of ***Either/Or***, and, indeed, *Stages on Life's Way* might be viewed as a sequel to *Either/Or*. At the same time, how-

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

ever, *Stages on Life's Way* builds on themes from ***Fear and Trembling*** and ***Repetition*** and thus bears continuity with those works too. In short, a number of pseudonymous (*see* PSEUDONYMITY) figures from Kierkegaard's 1843 output reappear in *Stages on Life's Way*, which was published on 30 April 1845. The book's title page declares its various writings were "compiled, forwarded to the **press**, and published" by Hilarius Bookbinder, who, in a brief preface, explains that the text is actually a collection of "several books, probably by several authors." He wonders if the writings were shared among the members of a literary society, though he is not certain. In any case, *Stages on Life's Way* comprises three major sections: "'In Vino Veritas': A Recollection Related by William Afham" ("'In vino veritas': En Erindring efterfortalt af William Afham"); "Some Reflections on Marriage in Answer to Objections by A Married Man" ("Adskilligt om Ægteskabet mod Indsigelser af En Ægtemand"); and "'Guilty?'/'Not Guilty': A Story of Suffering: An Imaginary Psychological Construction by Frater Taciturnus" ("'Skyldig?'—'Ikke-Skyldig?' En Lidelseshistorie: Psychologisk Experiment af Frater Taciturnus"). To further complicate matters, Kierkegaard adds even more new characters to this pseudonymous bouillabaisse, including the Fashion Designer and Quidam. The upshot is a tome that resembles a philosophical-cum-poetic set of Matryoshka dolls, with a complex of voices nested one inside another. And yet, for all of its density, *Stages on Life's Way* is an apt and fairly straightforward title: the book's structure broadly corresponds to an exploration of the **aesthetic**, the **ethical**, and the **religious**, respectively, though it is notable that the text itself tends to describe these categories in the language of "sphere" (*Sphære*) or "spheres of existence" (*Existents-Sphærer*). This linguistic sleight of hand implies that human **existence** does not unfold in linear fashion in the manner of stages or steps; rather, it is marked by the interplay of existential possibilities that more closely resemble a Venn diagram, indicating points of continuity and discontinuity among the spheres.

A long and often challenging read, *Stages on Life's Way* was neither a critical nor a commercial success upon its release. In an 1845 journal entry, Kierkegaard suggests that this outcome was not accidental: where *Either/Or* titillated with its examinations of **melancholy** and seduction, *Stages on Life's Way* probes the darker and more ambiguous side of human **psychology**. Thus it represents a critical examination of **the self**, including portrayals of the masculine distortion of **love** and the seemingly interminable process of genuine **repentance**. The book remains one of Kierkegaard's least popular pseudonymous works, though it is famous for one thing: it provoked a vituperative review by **Peder Ludvig Møller** in December 1845, which, in turn, sparked Kierkegaard's intense and life-changing confrontation with ***The Corsair***, a satirical paper that Kierkegaard viewed as emblematic of the corruption of **the present age**. *See also* COMIC/COMEDY; DEMONIC; GRIB FOREST;

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

MARRIAGE; METAPHYSICS; RECOLLECTION; *THREE DISCOURSES ON IMAGINED OCCASIONS*.

STATE CHURCH. Since the time of King Harald Blåtand, who reigned during the late 10th century, **Christianity** has been associated with Denmark's ruling class. Initially, it was **Catholicism**, introduced by St. Ansgar in the ninth century, that dominated the Danish **church**. However, in the wake of **Martin Luther**'s reforms in the 16th century, **Protestantism** emerged as the nation's official religion. This transformation was inseparable from the Danish crown. King Christian III (1503–1559) was educated by Lutheran sympathizers and, in 1521, attended the Diet of Worms (Reichstag zu Worms), where he heard Luther speak. Impressed, he began implementing Protestant reforms in the provinces of Schleswig and Holstein, where he served as "chief executive" (*statholder*). When the Danish throne became vacant in 1533, a succession war known as the Count's Feud (Grevens Fejde) ensued, with Christian III eventually proving victorious in July 1536. In order to consolidate power, the new king almost immediately sought to eliminate opposition. Catholic bishops were arrested and their property confiscated. Then, on 30 October 1536, Christian III established the Danish state church—identified as the "People's Church" (Folkekirken) in the 1849 Danish **constitution**—in accordance with the Lutheran ordinances worked out by Martin Luther's right-hand man, Johannes Bugenhagen (1485–1558). The state church's role was further solidified by the "King's Law" (Kongeloven) of 1665, which bound Danish citizenship to membership in the established Lutheran church. **Religious** freedom was expanded with the 1849 Grundloven, which instituted a constitutional monarchy. Nevertheless, the Evangelical-Lutheran Church was retained as the official church of Denmark. Traditionally, the bishop of Zealand served as primate of the Danish state church, with Copenhagen's Church of Our Lady (Vor Frue Kirke) standing as the nation's cathedra of ecclesiastical authority. However, following the redistribution of the Diocese of Zealand in 1922, the bishop of Copenhagen was deemed "first among equals" (*primus inter pares*) in Denmark's episcopal hierarchy. Regardless, the supreme authority of the Danish state church remains the hereditary monarch, currently Margrethe II (1940–) of the House of Glücksburg.

It is well known that, over the last several months of his life, Kierkegaard publicly lambasted church officials such as Bishop **Jakob Peter Mynster** and Bishop **Hans Lassen Martensen**. Though these attacks sometimes became personal, Kierkegaard's ultimate grievance was with the state church writ large, a grievance expressed as early as ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***. Later, in works such as ***Practice in Christianity*** and ***For Self-Examination***, Kierkegaard's criticism grew more incisive and strident. He argued that the ecclesial establishment had indulged the people of Denmark,

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

declaring them "Christian" simply on account of their status as Danish citizens. Even worse, bishops, priests, and theologians materially benefited from this arrangement, receiving awards, honors, and generous remuneration. Rather than practice and preach the **imitation** of **Jesus Christ**, state-church leaders surreptitiously promoted **worldliness**. These complaints rose to a fever pitch in Kierkegaard's periodical ***The Moment***, which ridiculed the clergy and encouraged sincere Christians to stop attending the state church. Precisely how to interpret the uncompromising intensity of Kierkegaard's final writings remains hotly debated. In the manner of a **Socrates**, Kierkegaard may have intended to shock his audience and, in turn, to provide a **corrective** to lazy habits of thinking. On the other hand, he may have reached a point where the very possibility of church seemed unworkable, perhaps even repugnant. *See also* BALLE, NIKOLAI EDINGER (1744–1816); FAITH; OFFENSE; SIBBERN, FREDERIK CHRISTIAN (1785–1872).

STRIVING. The word "striving" (*Stræben*) appears almost 600 times in Kierkegaard's authorship. It is teleological in nature, indicating the expense of great effort to achieve a particular end. In many cases, Kierkegaard uses this term generically, but his most characteristic usage involves the passionate (*see* PASSION) quest for **truth**. Negatively, as Johannes Climacus argues in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, this goal is essentially unrealizable for an existing human subject (*see* SUBJECTIVITY). Positively, the continual striving after the truth deepens the **inner** life of the **individual**, making her receptive to its long-awaited advent. Thus striving is a key intellectual virtue: it drives the knower onward while keeping him humble.

Stræben also has important ramifications for **religiousness**. The person of **faith** must recognize that, on account of **sin**, the human being will inevitably confront the imperfection of her faith. Still, she must not succumb to **despair** but continue to strive for true faith. Herein lies a **paradox**. In grasping the eternal (*see* ETERNITY) nature of her striving, she comes to relate herself to **God**, whose **grace** alone is capable of fulfilling her *Stræben*. *See also* HISTORY; PIETISM; REST; SELF, THE; *SICKNESS UNTO DEATH*, *THE*; SYSTEM, THE; TEMPORALITY/TIME.

STUDENT ASSOCIATION. The Student Association (Studenterforeningen) at the **University of Copenhagen** was founded in July 1820. The impetus for this society emerged from a group of students at Regensen Hall—also known as the College of the Royal House (Collegium Domus Regiæ)—which had served as a dormitory for students in the faculty of theology since the time of King Frederik II (1534–1588), son of King Christian II (*see* STATE CHURCH). Led by journalist Carl Parmo Ploug (1813–1894) and poet

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Christian Winther (1796–1876), the Student Association grew from outdoor gatherings near Regensen's iconic lime tree to a proper institution that rented space on various premises around Copenhagen. During Kierkegaard's student years, the Student Association was situated on Holmens Kanal in a building that would eventually house the Danish Bank (Danske Bank). It would expand again in 1844, when it merged with a rival society called Academicum. During the late 1840s, the Studenterforeningen was generally associated with liberalism and, in turn, with support for the new Danish **constitution**.

Kierkegaard was active in the Student Association while at the university, particularly during the mid- to late 1830s. An 1835 journal passage indicates that he had been using the society's library for research. Then, on 28 November 1835, Kierkegaard spoke to the Studenterforeningen. His paper was titled "Our Journalistic Literature" ("Vor Journal-Litteratur"), and it was given in response to a recent talk by **Johannes Ostermann**. The two were debating the merits of a free **press**, with Kierkegaard adopting a skeptical (if not draconian) perspective. He remained a participant in the Student Association as late as December 1839, when he chaired a meeting at the Hotel d'Angleterre on Kongens Nytorv in central Copenhagen. The role did not suit him, however, and Kierkegaard later recalled adjourning it due to the group's obstreperousness. *See also* FREEDOM; HAGE, JOHANNES (1800–1837); LEHMANN, PETER MARTIN ORLA (1810–1870); LEVIN, ISRAEL SALOMON (1810–1883).

SUBJECTIVITY. Kierkegaard does not use the word "subjectivity" (*Subjektivitet*) a great deal in his authorship. However, insofar as he uses it as a synonym with **inwardness** and in contrast with **objectivity**, it is a concept that is implicit in a host of his writings. For Kierkegaard, subjectivity is bound up with **the self**. As an existing entity, the self is always developing in accordance with its exercise of **choice**. But how are choices made? The self cannot arrive at a crucial existential **decision** simply on the basis of intellectual **reflection**, since, in and of itself, **reason** has no basis for closure. After all, the thinker can always defer meaningful action for the sake of first achieving certainty or, at least, something close to it. Such an approach may make sense when, say, developing a new medication or surgical procedure, but Kierkegaard worries that this desire for objectivity has come to dominate **the present age**, so much so that the **ethical** and **religious** dimensions of existence are treated as matters of personal profit and public utility. For example, on this reading, one will pursue a moral course of action only if it can be materially demonstrated to provide clear benefit—an essentially calculative mindset.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

In response, Kierkegaard recommends *Subjektivitet*. That is to say, he stresses that the self must not only seek objective **truth** but also explore and draw on the affective quality of human life. This is because the possibilities that confront human beings are existentially "loaded," comprising not just abstract propositions but the lived experience of desire, fear, **hope**, and other types of emotion and **passion**. With this in mind, Kierkegaard's method of indirect **communication** sought to stir the **inner** life of the reader, thereby facilitating the proper frame of mind for deciding one's raison d'être. Moreover, in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** Johannes Climacus argues that inwardness and subjectivity are indispensable features of existential authenticity. "Subjectivity is truth," Climacus famously asserts. In this way, he indicates that a complete human person does not just objectively apprehend data or facts; she also subjectively reduplicates (*see* REDOUBLING/REDUPLICATION) truth in **actuality**. In this contention lies the seed of Kierkegaard's late attack on the Danish **state church**, an institution that, in his view, treated **Christianity** as if it were merely an objective matter and not a lifelong project demanding subjective appropriation, chiefly through the **imitation** of **Jesus Christ**. *See also* CONTEMPORANEITY; DOCTRINE/DOGMA; EXISTENCE; FREEDOM; GOOD; SOCRATES (c. 470–399 BCE)/SOCRATIC.

SUFFERING. The noun "suffering" (*Lidelse*) appears roughly 750 times in Kierkegaard's authorship, and the verb "to suffer" (*lide*) turns up at almost the same frequency. It is a concept, moreover, that recurs throughout his oeuvre, both in early pseudonymous (*see* PSEUDONYMITY) works such as ***Either/ Or*** and in late signed treatises such as ***The Moment***. However, despite this extensive range of use, a few texts present what might be considered paradigmatic Kierkegaardian accounts of human suffering. In the first part of *Either/ Or*, Kierkegaard's pseudonym "A" describes the poet as one whose "sufferings" (*Lidelser*) are converted into "beautiful music." Thus he indicates the **paradox** of **aesthetic** existence: it does not flourish in spite of, but because of, spiritual **despair**. That human beings suffer, undergoing the various depredations of **finitude**, is beautified by the artist and, in turn, enjoyed by the aficionado. **Imagination** seeks to evade, however temporarily, the agonies of **becoming**. In this understanding of art, which betrays the influence of late **Romanticism**, "A" suggests that an aesthetic **life-view** terminates in nihilism, an implication that is critically evaluated in *Either/Or*'s second part by the ethicist (*see* ETHICAL) Judge William.

Another major discussion of *Lidelse* is found in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, in which Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus equates the **religious** life with suffering, albeit in a markedly different way than

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

that of the artist. As Climacus sees it, the principal religious task involves unconditional **passion** for one's eternal **happiness**. However, this **absolute** relation to one's ultimate goal always manages to exceed what human beings can grasp. Even the physical and spiritual rigors of **monasticism** are put in service to relative ends such as worldly prestige. With this in mind, Climacus contends that the authentic religious **individual** will progressively come to realize her failure to relate to the absolute with absolute commitment. Thus one has to suffer, or endure, one's inability to truly renounce **immediacy** and **worldliness**. At its deepest level, this sorrowful recognition is understood as **guilt**, a step that, according to Climacus, brings one to the brink of Christian **faith**.

Climacus's phenomenology of religious suffering is permeated by a number of keen, if also **comic**, remarks about **Christendom**'s suppression of true religiousness. In later works, however, Kierkegaard applies these Climacan insights to the Danish **state church** in scandalous fashion. In "What Can Be Recollected Eternally?" ("Hvad der evigt lader sig erindre?"), the fourth article in the eighth edition of *The Moment*, Kierkegaard argues that, while "this world of lies and deception and skullduggery and mediocrity" often encourages people to shrewdly avoid suffering, the true Christian realizes that earthly **sin** is an opportunity for **salvation**, insofar as it affords one the chance to suffer in **imitation** of **Jesus Christ**: "Only one thing: to have suffered for the **truth**. If you want to take care for your eternal future, see to it that you come to suffer for the truth." While incendiary, this statement is nevertheless in harmony with prior conceptions of religious *Lidelse* in Kierkegaard's oeuvre: suffering is not a good in and of itself; it is the harrowing path on the way to **eternity**. *See also* APOSTLE; ATONEMENT; AUTHORITY; INNER; JOY; LEVELING; MARTYRDOM; MELANCHOLY; OFFENSE; PATIENCE; RESIGNATION; REST; *UPBUILDING DISCOURSES IN VARIOUS SPIRITS*; WITNESS.

SYSTEM, THE. In the *Phenomenlogy of Spirit* (*Phänomenologie des Geistes*, 1807), **Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel** states that his aim is to make **philosophy** into a **science**. "The true shape in which truth exists," Hegel writes, "can only be the scientific system of such truth." For Hegel, this means that philosophy should seek to comprehend the historically evolving consciousness of **truth**, thereby comprising a unified dialectical system. In this way, the mysteries of the universe reveal themselves, irresistibly yielding to the power of the human mind. Indeed, in the posthumously published *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History* (*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*, 1837), Hegel observes that, in its systematic mode, philosophy stands confidently before the world, "challenging [it] to exhibit

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

the same Reason which Subject [the Ego] possesses." As **Martin Heidegger** would later argue, *Das System* represents a demand for the **absolute** intelligibility of all beings.

In many respects, Heidegger's assessment was anticipated by Kierkegaard, especially in pseudonymous (*see* PSEUDONYMITY) texts such as ***Fear and Trembling*** and ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***. According to Johannes Climacus, to whom the *Postscript* is attributed, the very concept of a systematic philosophy is flawed. First, the systematician fails to distinguish between thinking *about* **existence** and existence as such. After all, even if one develops a totalizing schema of knowledge, one still has to carry on as an existing person, who cannot abstract himself from that which is happening—namely, existing. Second, Climacus argues that the system confuses the accumulation of knowledge with human well-being, but, in reality, **objectivity** alone cannot satisfy **subjectivity**. **The self** totally immersed in the system would have a vast amount of data at its disposal but no **actuality** in which to make it meaningful. Third, and following from the previous point, the system exchanges **passion** for information and, in the process, eliminates **striving**. Hence, as Climacus observes, *Das System* somehow manages to encompass all of life without having an **ethics** or without opening up the possibility of **eternity**. *See also* LEAP; REASON; TECHNOLOGY.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

T

TECHNOLOGY. Kierkegaard does not use the word *Teknologi* in his authorship, and the term *Teknik*, which corresponds to the Francophonic "technique," appears but once in his writings. Yet, on a linguistic and hermeneutical level, this point is fairly insignificant. After all, Kierkegaard's vocabulary predates the shared terminology of 20th-century discourse associated with the **philosophy** of technology. Nevertheless, as a keen observer of **social and political** changes, whose writings present a critical evaluation of **the present age**, it is not surprising that Kierkegaard touches on the question concerning technology without naming it as such. For example, in an 1846 journal entry, he remarks that modernity's focus on "discovery" (*Opdagelse*) costs massive amounts of **money** and countless hours of labor, albeit with a great deal of unrest (*see* REST) and wastefulness. With this in mind, he imagines the manufacture of a "giant microscope" that is quickly surpassed by an "even higher magnifying power," thereby rendering the first discovery obsolete. To be sure, Kierkegaard was well acquainted with the features and innovations of his era. In a number of writings, he comments on the urban character of the modern era, noting that the city's "bustling busyness" excludes a primitive relation to **nature**, celebrates mundane and often superficial diversions, and promotes an interpersonal "comparison" (*Sammenligning*) whereby values are developed in accordance with what other people think. Herein lies the root of the phenomenon of the **crowd**, which, for Kierkegaard, is fundamentally opposed to true **Christianity**. Such views, moreover, were not worked out *in abstracto*. Kierkegaard was a lifelong city dweller who experienced the arrival of a number of important modern technologies to Copenhagen, including various modes of popular transport (buses, railroads, etc.), public utilities (especially gas lighting), and above all mass information technology. Indeed, in both the telegraph and the **press**, Kierkegaard saw the groundwork for a **culture** given over to **chatter**, **hypocrisy**, **leveling**, and **reflection**. *See also* HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1889–1976); *LITERARY REVIEW*, *A*; OBJECTIVITY; SCIENCE/SPECULATION; SYSTEM, THE.

TELEOLOGICAL SUSPENSION OF THE ETHICAL. One of the key concepts of ***Fear and Trembling*** is the "teleological suspension of the

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

ethical" (*teleologisk Suspension af det Ethiske*). According to Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** Johannes de silentio, the biblical story of Abraham presents unique challenges to a number of **ethical** assumptions, particularly those rooted in **Hegelianism**. For instance, in commanding Abraham to **sacrifice** his only son, Isaac (Gen. 22:1–2), **God** plainly contradicts the prevailing norms of **the social and political** order. Is Abraham's faithfulness to God (Gen. 22:9–10), then, unethical? This is the question that Johannes wants his readers to ponder, though he is reticent to give a definite answer. Instead, he presses a conundrum: are the ethical norms of society universally binding, or are there situations in which one might represent an **exception** to the universal? In other words, is there an end (or telos) for which the ethical standards of society are rightly suspended? For Johannes, this is by no means a question of whether or not one can indiscriminately kill in God's name—an obvious nonstarter. Rather, it is something far more nuanced, involving the possibility that sometimes ethical expectations—such as the care of a father for a son—are best fulfilled beyond the purview of the human order. After all, according to **Scripture**, Abraham's **faith** that God would not rescind his promise to exalt his posterity is proven true, and Isaac's life is not only preserved but blessed. This is a profound **paradox**, which confounds **reason** and produces **silence**—a sign that **religious** life is hardly a facile convention, as many suppose in **the present age**. It is an ongoing challenge for the **individual**.

TEMPORALITY/TIME. Kierkegaard's interest in "temporality" (*Timelighed*) and "time" (*Tid*) is multifaceted, involving a range of fields. In terms of **philosophy**, Kierkegaard associates time with the problem of **movement** in general. This is because markers of time—past, present, and future—report a change in one's condition. "I once lived in London," one might say, "but now I live in Philadelphia." Such statements indicate that the **individual** is always situated in time, which, in ***The Concept of Anxiety***, is described as "an infinite succession" of discrete moments. The sum total of these atoms of time constitutes the domain of *Timelighed*, in which the affairs of the world (*see* WORLDLINESS/SECULARISM) unfold. Thus day-to-day business is conducted with an eye to *Tid*, entailing calendars, clocks, and such, though why one moment should matter more than another is arbitrary and relative. "On time is late," as the saying goes, but this dictum only obtains from the perspective of the one saying it. It is not a necessary characteristic of time as such. In this regard, temporality is qualitatively different than **eternity**, which is the domain of **God** and, consequently, of essential and unchanging meaning.

In terms of **psychology**, Kierkegaard insists that **the self** must take account of its temporal state. For example, in ***The Sickness unto Death***, Kierkeg-

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

aard's **pseudonym** Anti-Climacus argues that the self is a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal. Consequently, if the self is to avoid **despair**, it must attend to its position in time—locating itself in a particular period of **history**, existing in the present as a conscious individual, and **striving** to become the best version of itself in the future. However, this process can only be undertaken if the self also realizes that it is not defined by temporality, which, as noted, is ephemeral and random. Such a self would never transcend the **aesthetic**; that is why it must also integrate the eternal, which offers a stable point of orientation.

Herein lies the **ethical** and **religious** significance of time. When the temporally situated individual consciously relates to the eternal, an ordinary moment of time becomes "the moment" (*Øieblikket*) wherein time and eternity meet. The possibility of this intersection is testified to in **Christianity**, which teaches that God has entered into **creation**, preeminently in the incarnation of **Jesus Christ**. For the one thoroughly immersed in temporality, this "fullness of time" (Gal. 4:4–6) is an impossibility. However, for the person of **faith**, it is an **actuality**. With this in mind, it is significant that Kierkegaard's final writings against the Danish **state church** were collectively referred to as ***The Moment***. *See also* ANXIETY; DECISION; DIALECTIC; FINITUDE/INFINITY; LIFE-VIEW; NATURE.

TEMPTATION. It is well known that, given his interest in **psychology**, Kierkegaard gives sustained attention to **inner** states such as **anxiety** and **despair**. This overarching interest encompasses related conditions such as "temptation" (*Fristelse*). In an 1849 journal entry, which puts ***The Concept of Anxiety*** and ***The Sickness unto Death*** into conversation, Kierkegaard observes that temptation increases in proportion to anxiety: the more anxiety, the greater the temptation. This conception is significant because it locates the source of **sin** within **the self**. For example, as Kierkegaard reads the biblical story of the Fall (Gen. 3:1–24), the real power of the serpent (or "the tempter") does not lie in what he offers or in what he looks like; it is that he is able to generate anxiety in Adam and Eve.

Elsewhere Kierkegaard implies that there is a hierarchy of temptation. Whether or not **God** tempts human beings is a thorny subject in **Scripture**. On the one hand, the so-called Binding of Isaac (Gen. 22:1–19), which forms the basis of Kierkegaard's ***Fear and Trembling***, states that God tempts or tests the patriarch Abraham. On the other hand, it is written in the Epistle of James: "Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted with **evil**, neither tempteth he any man" (James 1:1–13). Moreover, in the Lord's Prayer, **Jesus Christ** himself asks "Our Father" to "lead us not into temptation" (Matt. 6:9–13). These various usages are

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

complex, not least because there is debate about how to translate Koine Greek words such as *peirasmon* ("trial" or "temptation"). According to Kierkegaard, distinguishing between "temptation" and "spiritual trial" (*Anfægtelse*) can shed light on this question. Whereas *Fristelse* involves anxiety about innate attractions, *Anfægtelse* has to do with anxiety about one's relationship with God. Thus the latter is "a whole quality higher" than the former, insofar as it indicates an almost mystical (*see* MYSTICISM) struggle, wherein God seems to simultaneously summon and abandon the **individual**. With this in mind, Kierkegaard's conception of *Anfægtelse* resembles that of **Martin Luther**'s notion of *Anfechtung*: one desires union with God but feels unfit for and even repulsed by the idea. Notably, in an 1850 journal passage, Kierkegaard remarks that **faith** is the means by which temptation and spiritual trial are overcome. In both cases, anxiety is dispelled by attributing the challenge to a loving God: "The believer . . . believes that God does it in order that he shall meet the test." *See also* AESTHETIC; CHATTER; EXISTENCE; FINITUDE/INFINITY; REPENTANCE; WOMEN.

THEATER. Kierkegaard's interest in "theater" (*Theater*) and "drama" (*Drama*) was deeply personal. During the 1830s and 1840s, he was a regular presence at the Royal Danish Theater (Det Kongelige Theater). Founded in 1748 and located at Kongens Nytorv, the Royal Danish Theater came to flourish during the reign of King Frederik VI, who was crowned in 1808. For the next 30 years, the theater stood as a testimony to the king's attempts to rebuild Danish **culture**, which had fallen on hard times since the **Napoleonic Wars**. Indeed, many of Denmark's greatest artists and minds were associated with the Royal Theater during this period, including **Johan Ludvig Heiberg**, **Hans Christian Andersen**, and ballet master August Bournonville (1805–1879). However, when Denmark adopted a new **constitution** in 1849, the Royal Theater's maintenance was passed to the state, a move that led to the theater's decline during the remainder of Kierkegaard's lifetime.

Kierkegaard's familiarity with *Theater* and *Drama* is evident in his writings. In the first part of ***Either/Or***, Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** "A" presents a pair of essays that touch on the nature of drama. In ***Repetition***, there are references to Berlin's Königstädter Theater (Königsstädtisches Theater), and, according to Kierkegaard's pseudonym Constantin Constantius, it is a place that fires the imagination: "There is probably no young person . . . who has not at some time been enthralled by the magic of the theater and wished to be swept along into that artificial actuality." However, that the theater is a place of **aesthetic** gratification would resurface, polemically, in Kierkegaard's late writings. In an 1851 journal entry, Kierkegaard comments on the assumption that public adherence to ecclesiastical **doctrine** is adequate for Christian

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

faith: "If it is assumed that speaking is sufficient for the proclamation of **Christianity**, then we have transformed the **church** into a theater and can have an actor learn a sermon and splendidly, masterfully deliver it with facial expressions, gesticulations, modulation, tears, and everything a theater-going public might desire." The coup de grâce comes in ***The Moment***, in which Kierkegaard contrasts the Danish **state church** with the theater: whereas the latter acknowledges upfront that it provides aesthetic diversion, "the church . . . is a theater that in every way dishonestly seeks to conceal what it is." *See also* HEIBERG, JOHANNE LUISE (1812–1890); HUMOR; MUSIC; PHISTER, JOACHIM LUDVIG (1807–1896); TIVOLI; TRAGEDY/TRAGIC.

THREE DISCOURSES ON IMAGINED OCCASIONS. Kierkegaard's first major pseudonymous work was ***Either/Or***, and its release in February 1843 was soon followed by the publication of *Two Upbuilding Discourses* (*To opbyggelige Taler*) in May 1843. Kierkegaard would make this a recurring pattern over the first few years of his authorship, culminating with the appearance of *Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions* (*Tre Taler ved tænkte Leiligheder*) on 29 April 1845 and ***Stages on Life's Way*** a day later—the former issued under his own name, the latter a prominent example of his use of **pseudonymity**. Kierkegaard's next major work was to be ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, which, at that time, he anticipated would be his last.

Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions was the product of Kierkegaard's idea to write edifying discourses (*see EIGHTEEN UPBUILDING DISCOURSES*) for various occasions or "situations" in life. In other words, they are imaginative (*see* IMAGINATION) re-creations of settings that, in turn, highlight the existential questions pertaining to them. After considering a number of possibilities for this work, Kierkegaard settled on three such occasions—a confession, a wedding, and a funeral. Each of these settings serves as a counterbalance to backdrops in *Stages on Life's Way*. For example, the book's first **discourse**, "On the Occasion of a Confession" ("Ved Anledningen af et Skriftemaal"), commends quiet and solitude in order to nourish the **religious** life, while the first major part of *Stages on Life's Way* takes place at a lavish **aesthetic** banquet. Though Kierkegaard was clearly enthusiastic about this material—a number of the reflections on **silence**, **marriage**, and **death** in *Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions* would turn up elsewhere in his authorship—the book did not sell even half of its original print run. Perhaps the most notable contemporary review of the work was issued pseudonymously by the journalist Mendel Levin Nathanson (1780–1868), who printed a rumor that had been circulating among the Danish literati—that Kierkegaard was responsible for the spate of pseudonymous works that began with *Either/Or*. *See also* BEING/BECOMING; MOOD.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

TIVOLI. Founded by Danish army officer Georg Carstensen (1812–1857), who had traveled widely as a young man, Tivoli was meant to provide Copenhagen with an amusement park rivaling Jardin de Tivoli in Paris and Vauxhall Gardens in London. In point of fact, Carstensen originally named his park "Tivoli og Vauxhall," though "Vauxhall" would be dropped in 1878. The park was constructed in an area that, at that time, lay outside of Copenhagen's city gates, accessible via Vesterport. It opened on 15 August 1843 to significant fanfare. Carstensen's plan was to draw crowds with an eclectic mix of exotic and novel attractions, and so the park featured everything from mechanical rides to artistic performances, restaurants, cafés, and fireworks. One could enter the park either by purchasing a day pass or by paying a subscription rate. Further, in order to continue making money during the winter, Carstensen envisioned a "Winter Tivoli" (Vinter-Tivoli) known as the "Casino Theater" (Casinoteatret) in February 1847. Initially intended to feature bazaars and socials, the building was converted into a full-time **theater** within a couple of years, catering to a more popular (and coarse) audience than the Royal Danish Theater (Det Kongelige Teater). Casinoteatret was also put to use in **politics**, serving as the location for liberal rallies in advance of the new Danish **constitution** of 1849. And yet, despite his innovations, Carstensen returned to military service in 1848 and left Tivoli in poor shape. The park survived, however, and remains not only a popular attraction in Denmark but one of the most visited amusement parks in all of Europe. The Casino Theater fared much worse, closing in 1937 and finally being razed in 1960.

Kierkegaard makes a number of references to Tivoli in his authorship, especially in his journals. He tends to associate the park with the rise of the **crowd** in **the present age** and, by association, with a modern fixation on **money** and **technology**. As Kierkegaard's pseudonym (*see* PSEUDONYMITY) Johannes Climacus puts it in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, "The financiers of Tivoli value **eternity** so little, since it is the nature of eternity to be always the same, and soberness of **spirit** is recognizable by its knowing that change in the external is diversion." In later years, Kierkegaard brackets together the superficiality of Tivoli and the Danish **state church**, setting it in stark contrast to the **earnestness** of true **Christianity**. Why bother with the **imitation** of **Jesus Christ**, Kierkegaard suggests in an 1855 journal entry, when the state gives people eternal **salvation** *and* Tivoli? In this way, Tivoli comes to represent the deification of **the social and political** order. *See also* WORLDLINESS/SECULARISM.

TRAGEDY/TRAGIC. The word "tragedy" denotes a dramatic poem or play that has an unhappy resolution. The origins of this genre of **theater** go back at least to the work of Greek playwright Aeschylus (c. 525–c. 456 BCE), whose

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

trilogy the *Oresteia* (458 BCE) is acclaimed as the earliest and one of the finest examples of tragedy. According to Greek philosopher Aristotle (384–322 BCE), the goal of tragedy is to effect catharsis, to purge the emotions by arousing condolence and dread.

In various forms, Kierkegaard frequently uses the terms *Tragedie* and *tragisk* in his authorship, sometimes with specific reference to the dramaturgical category, at other times in broader fashion so as to indicate a particular aspect of **existence**. With regard to the former, for example, the first part of ***Either/Or*** contains a substantial essay—"The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama: A Venture in Fragmentary Endeavor" ("Det antike Tragiskes Reflex i det moderne Tragiske: Et Forsøg i den fragmentariske Stræben"). With regard to the latter, Kierkegaard treats the tragic as a feature of the **aesthetic** and the **ethical** that can only find resolution in the **religious**. Perhaps the most famous articulation of this problem is found in ***Fear and Trembling***, in which Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** Johannes de silentio contrasts the **faith** of Abraham with various exemplars of ethical *Tragedie*, whose appalling yet heroic deeds arouse universal (*see* EXCEPTION/UNIVERSAL) sympathy but, in effect, refuse the reconciling **happiness** of **eternity**. *See also* COMIC/COMEDY; DOUBLE MOVEMENT; GUILT; SIN.

TRIAL. *See* TEMPTATION.

TRUTH. The word "truth" (*Sandhed*) turns up nearly 2,000 times in Kierkegaard's writings, and the word "true" (*sand*) makes an additional 500 appearances, numbers that indicate the importance of this concept for his thinking. The most central, and likely the most famous, discussion of truth in Kierkegaard's authorship occurs in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, which is attributed to the **pseudonym** Johannes Climacus. For Climacus, truth can be viewed from two standpoints, that of **objectivity** and that of **subjectivity**. The former is featured in **science** and in certain strands of **philosophy**, especially **Hegelianism**; the latter is presupposed and, ideally, foregrounded in **ethical** and **religious** matters. According to Climacus, **the present age** has elevated objective truth over subjective truth and, in doing so, depleted the **passion** essential to human flourishing. Moreover, while objective truth may lead to certain improvements in humanity's material well-being—as the development of **technology** has demonstrated—it is incapable of achieving a divine perspective on the whole of **existence**. As Climacus insists, the modern quest for a comprehensive **system** is as quixotic as it is hubristic, for objective truth is always already approximate, compromised by personal assumptions, biases, and desires.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Another key discussion of *Sandhed* is found in ***Practice in Christianity***, albeit with a different point of emphasis. According to Kierkegaard's pseudonym Anti-Climacus, the **revelation** of **Jesus Christ** conveys far more than an objective **doctrine** to which Christians are bound to assent. Insofar as Christ is the incarnation of **God**, he himself embodies the truth. In other words, his life *is* the truth; he is "the way, the truth, and the life" (John 14:6). For that reason, as Anti-Climacus goes on, authentic Christianity entails the **redoubling** of Christian teaching in one's own life. This is a theme that Kierkegaard repeats in his late polemics against the Danish **state church**. Whereas ecclesiastical leaders have focused on Christian truth in an objective sense, they have neglected its critical subjective sense, which finds definitive expression in the **imitation** of Christ. *See also* DUTY; EARNESTNESS; HUMOR; INNER; LEVELING; MARTYRDOM; *PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS*; SOCRATES (c. 470–399 BCE)/SOCRATIC; WITNESS.

TWO ETHICAL-RELIGIOUS MINOR ESSAYS. Kierkegaard's work on *Two Ethical-Religious Minor Essays* (*Tvende ethisk-religieuse Smaa-Afhandlinger*) unintentionally began with his collection of writings on **Adolph Peter Adler**, a Danish priest who claimed to be the recipient of divine **revelation**. In 1872, well after Kierkegaard's **death**, his *Book on Adler* (*Bogen om Adler*) would be published. Yet, in 1847–1848, Kierkegaard had but a smattering of drafts and essays related to Adler, including "On the Difference between a Genius and an Apostle" ("Om Forskjellen mellem et Genie og en Apostel"), which had been conceived as a supplement to the *Book on Adler*. After considering various options, Kierkegaard elected to publish this piece along with a new essay, "Does a Human Being Have the Right to Let Himself Be Put to Death for the Truth? A Posthumous Work of a Solitary Human Being: A Poetical Venture" ("Har et Menneske Lov til at lade sig ihjelslaae for Sandheden? Et eenligt Menneskes Efterladenskab: Digterisk Forsøg"). The latter piece, Kierkegaard notes in an 1847 journal entry, was drafted in a mere eight hours and thus needed to be "very carefully written in fair copy." Moreover, the prolix subtitle of "Does a Human Being Have the Right to Let Himself Be Put to Death for the Truth?" indicates Kierkegaard's choice to release these two treatises collectively under a pseudonym (*see* PSEUDONYMITY). He settled on "H.H.," the meaning of which has proven obscure to commentators. The book was sent to the publisher on Kierkegaard's birthday in 1849 and issued two weeks later on 19 May.

In a number of ways, *Two Ethical-Religious Minor Essays* is a curious addition to Kierkegaard's corpus, a point that he himself acknowledges. In an 1849 journal passage, he suggests that the book sits uneasily in relation to the **dialectic** between pseudonymous and signed works: "'Two Ethical-Religious

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Essays' does not belong to the authorship in the same way; it is not an element in it but a point of view." This peculiarity is further intimated in the one-sentence Preface (*Forord*) to the work: "These two essays probably will essentially be able to interest only theologians." Indeed, these writings do not seem to represent a particular sphere of **existence**; they are neither **aesthetic** nor **upbuilding**. Instead, they analyze key doctrinal (*see* DOCTRINE/DOGMA) questions regarding **Jesus Christ**, **martyrdom**, **suffering**, the **church**, **God**, and **revelation**. *See also* AUTHORITY; FAITH; IMITATION; POLITICS.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

U

UNIVERSAL, THE. *See* EXCEPTION/UNIVERSAL.

UPBUILDING. The category of "upbuilding" (*Opbyggelse*) is a crucial feature of Kierkegaard's authorial strategy, in addition to being a significant concept in its own right. In later works such as ***The Point of View for My Work as an Author***, Kierkegaard insists that the two-pronged nature of his authorship—pseudonymous (*see* PSEUDONYMITY) works on the one hand, signed ones on the other—was in service to facilitating the **religious** development of human beings. It was, in other words, an exercise in *Opbyggelse*. He uses this term instead of "catechetical" or "dogmatic" for a number of reasons. First, inasmuch as Kierkegaard was not an ordained minister in the Danish **state church**, he believed that he lacked the **authority** to teach **doctrine** per se. However, as a "religious author," he could help the **individual** actualize what she already knows about **Christianity** from **church** teaching. Thus "upbuilding" involves translating **objectivity** into **subjectivity**, a process that, for Kierkegaard, entails a nuanced approach to **communication**. Second, and following from the previous point, *Opbyggelse* seeks to develop and to strengthen the spiritual (*see* SPIRIT) excellences that make the passionate (*see* PASSION) appropriation of Christian doctrine possible. In ***Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses***, this effort centers on several virtues, including **faith**, **love**, **patience**, and prayerfulness (*see* PRAYER). Further, in ***Works of Love***, Kierkegaard clarifies that his understanding of upbuilding is derived from **Scripture**. Just as the Apostle Paul insists that love edifies or upbuilds (1 Cor. 8:1), so does Kierkegaard identify the upbuilding with love: wherever love is, *Opbyggelse* is there too. In this sense, upbuilding has connotations that recall **mysticism**. As Kierkegaard puts it: "Everything can be upbuilding in the same sense as love can be everywhere present." To find the upbuilding in everything, then, is akin to seeing **God** in everything, since, after all, God is the "source of all love in heaven and on earth." *See also* CHOICE; DECISION; DIALECTIC; DYING TO; ETERNITY; FINITUDE/INFINITY; GOOD; GUILT; HAPPINESS; IMAGINATION; JESUS CHRIST; PIETISM; SALVATION; SELF, THE; TRUTH.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

UPBUILDING DISCOURSES IN VARIOUS SPIRITS. Though Kierkegaard had planned to conclude his authorship with ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***, the fallout from his fracas with ***The Corsair*** spurred him to change his plans. Rather than take a rural pastorate, he elected to stay in Copenhagen and challenge the established order with his pen: "I stand resolved and rooted to the spot in a way I have never been," Kierkegaard wrote in an 1847 journal entry. He worked on a variety of projects at this time, from developing a series of lectures on **communication** to exegeting a novel in ***A Literary Review***. Moreover, after stockpiling a number of **religious** writings, he decided to publish them as a collection titled *Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits* (*Opbyggelige Taler i forskjellig Aand*). The book is divided into three main parts: (1) "An Occasional Discourse" ("En Leiligheds-Tale"), (2) "What We Learn from the Lilies in the Field and from the Birds of the Air: Three Discourses" ("Hvad man lærer af Lilierne paa Marken og af Himmelens Fugle: Tre Taler"), and (3) "The Gospel of Sufferings: Christian Discourses" ("Lidelsernes Evangelium: Christelige Taler"). Each respective part (*Afdeling*) might be seen as a stage of inward (*see* INWARDNESS) deepening, whereby the **individual** comes ever closer to the Christian (*see* CHRISTIANITY/CHRISTENDOM) ideal, culminating in the **paradox** of finding **happiness** amid **suffering**.

Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits did not receive a great deal of critical attention. According to the Grundtvigian (*see* GRUNDTVIG, NIKOLAI FREDERIK SEVERIN [1783–1872]) priest and theologian Nicolaus Ludvig Helveg (1818–1883), Kierkegaard's fondness for **dialectic** prevents the book from meeting its **upbuilding** intentions. But Helveg's assessment did not prove enduring. In 1938, American philosopher and Quaker theologian Douglas V. Steere (1901–1995) translated and separately published "An Occasional Discourse" as *Purity of Heart Is To Will One Thing*. Since that time, *Purity of Heart* has arguably become Kierkegaard's best-known **discourse**. In his "Translator's Note" to the book's second edition, Steere says that it "will continue to minister and to minister faithfully" those in spiritual need. *See also* CHOICE; EARNESTNESS; *EIGHTEEN UPBUILDING DISCOURSES*; GUILT; IMITATION; PIETISM; *PRACTICE IN CHRISTIANITY*; *WORKS OF LOVE*.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

V

VOTING. Kierkegaard uses a variety of nouns that can be translated as "voting," particularly *Stemme*, *Ballotation*, and *Votum*. While these usages vary in context and in import, they generally reflect his evaluation of various facets of **the present age**, including the **crowd**, **politics**, the **press**, and **technology**. Many of these issues came to head in the late 1840s, when Danish leaders debated and eventually adopted a new **constitution**, thereby ending the absolute monarchy. Kierkegaard doubted that these developments would make for a better **social and political** order, not least because they viewed voting as an ideal means of solving civil disputes. Indeed, for Kierkegaard, that figures such as **Socrates** and **Jesus Christ** were persecuted by those with a numerical advantage demonstrates that **truth** is not tantamount to the rule of a majority (*Majoriteten*). According to Christian **doctrine**, truth comes from **God** and is revealed in **Scripture**. The best a government can do, then, is approximate divinely ordained principles, and it certainly cannot determine what is true by external measures such as voting. In ***A Literary Review***, Kierkegaard expands on this critique, arguing that, through the print media, the modern citizen tends to confront an important **decision** as a matter for protracted and often tedious **reflection**, often followed by a vote whereby personal responsibility is handed over to a representative. Not only does this process inhibit concrete **individual** engagement in civic affairs, but it renders political representatives subservient to an illusory abstraction—namely, public opinion. Finally, and perhaps most dangerous of all, the proclivity for voting confirms that **leveling** has become the basic principle of life in the present age: the **authority** of heroes, saints, and even **God** has been nullified by the vox populi. This flattening of difference—implicit in the notion that every vote is the same—has led to a crisis of meaning.

That said, Kierkegaard explicitly refuses to advocate for **revolution**, whether as a return to absolute monarchy or as push for a theocracy. As he sees it, **Christianity** can be practiced no matter the **outer** environment. In **imitation** of **Jesus Christ**, the person of **faith** is called to **witness** to the truth in **suffering** rather in earthly power. *See also* SOCRATES (c. 470–399 BCE)/SOCRATIC.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

W

WESTERGAARD, ANDERS CHRISTENSEN (1818–1867). Farmhand, domestic worker, policeman, and jailer who served as Kierkegaard's attendant from 1844 until the early 1850s. Westergaard was born and raised in Denmark's rural Jutland region, where he was brought up as a laborer. His name first appears on the Danish military service record in 1839, and he spent time on active duty during the late 1840s. Nevertheless, after moving to Copenhagen in 1843–1844, he took a service position in Kierkegaard's home. Westergaard married in 1853 and worked primarily as a policeman for the rest of his life. Poignantly, he died in same year that his only son was born.

Kierkegaard was very fond of Westergaard. In a number of journal entries, he indicates that Westergaard's help was invaluable. In 1847, Kierkegaard wrote a letter of recommendation on Westergaard's behalf. It is nothing short of glowing, describing Westergaard as "sober, moral, always mentally alert, unconditionally dependable." Practical where his employer was given to flights of fancy, Westergaard was particularly adept at managing Kierkegaard's day-to-day affairs. It is indeed striking, if not necessarily consequential, that Kierkegaard's health began to deteriorate after Westergaard left his employ. *See also* COMMON MAN; HAPPINESS; LUND, ANE SØRENSDATTER (1768–1834).

WILL. Kierkegaard makes hundreds of references to the "will" (*Villie*) and "willing" (*Villen*) in his authorship. Related to the Old English *willa*, *Villie* denotes the driving force in consciousness that encourages one to bring potential resolutions to **actuality**, even in the face of external pressure or **inner** doubts. "Will" is a complex topic in Kierkegaard's thinking, as in **philosophy** writ large. First, Kierkegaard gives the will an important role in the development of **the self**. This role is indirectly indicated on the title page of Kierkegaard's first major work, ***Either/Or***, which cites the English poet Edward Young (c. 1683–1765): "Is reason then alone baptized, are the passions pagans?" Indeed, for Kierkegaard, the self cannot be reduced to **reason**; it does not confront **ethical** questions or **religious** longings as matters of mere **reflection**. On the contrary, the self can only arrive at a **decision** by virtue of the *Villie*, which is activated by an assortment of cares and interests. Thus the

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

will is never an indifferent *liberum arbitrium*; its **movement** is animated by **passion**, which is akin to a desire that the individual nourishes and upholds over **time**. Since **aesthetic** desires tend to evanesce, the will is most fully grounded and sustained when it strives for **eternity**, a perspective that Kierkegaard elaborates on in ***Concluding Unscientific Postscript***.

Elsewhere Kierkegaard sharpens this point, making the will central to one's spiritual transformation. In "An Occasional Discourse," the first part of ***Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits***, Kierkegaard contrasts the "double-minded" person with one who wills only one thing. While the former's intentions are scattered among a variety of wants—as when one wills the good in order to receive material benefit or earthly prestige—the latter wills the good for its own sake and, in doing so, achieves self-integration. Echoing the thought of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), Kierkegaard commends willing one thing as a goal for all other selves. In this way, he lays out what Kant calls a "categorical imperative" (*kategorischer Imperativ*) for human beings and maps out a path from human **freedom** to divine beatitude: the person who chooses to will one thing does so in such a way that *Villen* finds its terminus in **God**, who alone is able to support and to fulfill the needs of the self. *See also* CHOICE; DESPAIR; EARNESTNESS; FAITH; FINITUDE/INFINITY; GOOD; GOVERNANCE/PROVIDENCE; IMAGINATION; INDIVIDUAL; LEAP; *REPETITION*; REST; REVOLUTION; *SICKNESS UNTO DEATH*, *THE*; WRITING.

WITNESS. Kierkegaard's conception of "witness" (*Vidne*) is associated with his understanding of **martyrdom**. This association is not unusual: the English word "martyr" is cognate with the Greek *martyros*, which literally means "witness." Nevertheless, Kierkegaard's use of *Vidne* in his late writings is distinctive and thus demands consideration in its own right. In ***Practice in Christianity***, Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** Anti-Cliamcus inaugurates a claim that was to define the final stage of Kierkegaard's authorship: Christian **faith** is marked by the **imitation** of **Jesus Christ**. Since Christ was **truth** incarnate, it follows that the disciple must also incarnate the truth, a notion that is described as **redoubling**. To be a Christian, in other words, entails not just a verbal testimony or witness to ecclesial **doctrine**; it entails a witness in **actuality**, in body as well as in word.

Famously, after the death of Bishop **Jakob Peter Mynster**, Kierkegaard's understanding of *Vidne* would become the subject of great controversy. As early as "The Thorn in Flesh" ("Pælen i Kjødet"), which was published in ***Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses***, Kierkegaard had used the expression "witness to the truth" (*Sandhedens Vidne*) to describe an **apostle**. But

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

years later, in an accidental yet remarkable **irony**, **Hans Lassen Martensen** eulogized Mynster as a "witness to the truth," who belongs to "a chain of truth-witnesses" that "stretches from the days of the apostles until our day." For Martensen, Mynster's status as a witness to the truth follows from his episcopal standing in the Danish **state church**. He was not commenting so much on Mynster's holiness as on his role as a historical bearer of **church** tradition and **doctrine**. In contrast, Kierkegaard viewed Mynster as a kind of **genius**, whose deft careerism allowed him to climb to Denmark's highest ecclesiastical office. And yet, Kierkegaard added, such worldly (*see* WORLDLINESS/SECULARISM) talent should not be confused with the redoubling of Christian truth in one's own **existence**. As Kierkegaard puts it in "Was Bishop Mynster a 'Witness to the Truth,' One of 'the True Witnesses to the Truth'—Is This the Truth?" ("Var Biskop Mynster et 'Sandhedsvidne', et af 'de rette Sandhedsvidner'—er dette Sandhed?"), published in the *Fatherland* (*Fædrelandet*) on 18 December 1854, "Bishop Mynster a truth-witness! You who read this, you certainly do know what is Christianly understood by a truth-witness, but let me remind you of it, that it unconditionally requires **suffering** for the doctrine." Implicit here is a claim that Kierkegaard would expand on in ***The Moment***—that true **Christianity** has been suppressed and even endangered by Christendom. Thus it is crucial that the categories be clearly demarcated. The **authority** of the *Sandhedsvidne* is derived from his personal commitment to Christ, which places him in **paradox** with the prevailing **culture**. Therefore, the real Christian truth witness belongs to the militant church attested in **Scripture**, not to the triumphant church of Christendom. *See also* EARNESTNESS; EQUALITY; INNER; VOTING.

WOMEN. Kierkegaard's views on "women" (*Kvinder* or *Qvinder*) are at once ambiguous and fixed. On the one hand, he asserts that, before **God**, there is **equality** between women and men. As he puts it in an 1844 journal entry, "Every **religious** view, like every more profound philosophical view, sees women . . . as essentially identical with man." On the other hand, as a man of privilege in 19th-century Europe, Kierkegaard fell into the custom of essentializing women and, for that matter, men. "Christianity does indeed make man and woman equal," he notes in an 1854 journal passage, "but it still does not change their natural qualifications." In some cases, Kierkegaard believes that women have "natural" advantages over men. In ***Either/Or***, for example, Kierkegaard's pseudonym (*see* PSEUDONYMITY) Judge William characterizes women as "the most pure and perfect," capable of representing both the spiritual and the sensuous. In an 1854 journal entry, which includes observations already adumbrated in ***The Sickness unto Death***, Kierkegaard

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

praises the selflessness of women, adding that the highest realization of the religious demonstrates a balance between "masculine intellectuality" and "feminine submissiveness."

Unsurprisingly, however, such comments also have a dark underbelly. One 1854 journal entry, which reads as a pained yet dubious justification for his broken engagement with **Regine Olsen**, states that women are egotistical, albeit not on purpose; hence, the best thing a man can do is avoid **marriage**, which is "egotism's proper enterprise." Another passage from the same period suggests that women represent the **aesthetic** and erotic aspects of human **existence**, and that is precisely why they present a **temptation** to men. Women, he adds in another 1854 journal entry, have a "dangerous rapport with **finitude**," and men, in the throes of desire, confuse this trait with **eternity**. These sentiments were expressed not long before Kierkegaard's late polemics against the Danish **state church**, a detail that does not seem incidental. Indeed, Kierkegaard was clearly aware that the points made in these journal passages clashed with some of his earlier published material. Speaking about Judge William, Kierkegaard writes, "What the Judge . . . says in his way about women is to be expected from a married man who, ethically inspired, champions marriage." The Judge, in other words, has been compromised. Yet, even if this position is taken at face value, it is hard to square Kierkegaard's own touching ode to a mother's love in ***Works of Love*** with his late claim that motherhood is a further vehicle for feminine egotism.

Making matters even more complicated are Kierkegaard's actual relationships with women. Even if one brackets his brief yet tumultuous engagement with Regine, there are peculiarities. For example, Kierkegaard does not mention his mother, **Ane Sørensdatter Lund**, in his writings but, reportedly, was stricken with grief upon her **death**. Moreover, while Kierkegaard's use of gender stereotypes is largely derived from mainstream European **culture**, he was not thereby deterred from admiring women artists such as **Thomasine Gyllembourg** and **Johanne Luise Heiberg**. But his appreciation for their aesthetic **genius** should not be confused with sympathy for **social and political** equality between the sexes. As he had implied in his satire "Another Defense of Woman's Great Abilities" ("Ogsaa et Forsvar for Qvindens høie Anlæg"), which was issued during his student years, Kierkegaard remained skeptical that granting more career opportunities to women would end well. In his view, it would only serve to muddle the differences between men and women—differences that, as has been seen, he understood to be a function of **nature**. *See also* BREMER, FREDERIKA (1801–1865); FIBIGER, ILIA (1817–1867).

WORKS OF LOVE. A standout among Kierkegaard's signed material, *Works of Love: Some Christian Deliberations in the Form of Discourses* (*Kjerlighe-*

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

dens Gjerninger Nogle christelige Overveielser i Talers Form) was largely written in conjunction with a lecture series on **communication**. As Kierkegaard records in an 1847 journal entry, "I now would like to give a series of twelve lectures on the **dialectic** of communication. After that, twelve lectures on erotic **love**, friendship, and love." While his lectures on communication were ultimately shelved, Kierkegaard released his writings on **love** on 29 September 1847. Though the finished product, *Works of Love*, is ostensibly similar to ***Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses***, its subtitle indicates that it is actually a collection of "deliberations" (*Overveielser*). In a journal entry from this period, Kierkegaard clarifies that a "deliberation" is not so much about **upbuilding** as about provocation: the recipient of a deliberation does not already know what is at issue; her "comfortable way of thinking" must be turned "topsy-turvy with the dialectic of truth." In particular, *Works of Love* seeks to draw a distinction between erotic love (*Elskov*) and charitable love (*Kjerlighed*). Whereas the former is innate in human beings, centering on various natural or preferential relations (whether toward a parent, friend, or spouse), the latter is rooted in the teachings and example of **Jesus Christ**. According to Kierkegaard, these two loves are not necessarily incompatible: the person drawn to another by, say, similar interests or sexual attraction can nevertheless have his love perfected by adhering to the Christian commandment: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" (Matt. 22:39). At the same time, however, much of *Works of Love* highlights the tension between *Elskov* and *Kjerlighed*, particularly in an environment given over to **worldliness**.

Published by **Carl Andreas Reitzel**, the initial print run of *Works of Love* was the standard 500–525 copies, though the book proved quite successful and appeared in a second edition in 1852. Nevertheless, *Works of Love* received scant critical attention. In this regard, it may be telling that the book's most prominent reviewer, Mendel Levin Nathanson (1780-1868), editor of *Berling's Times* (*Berlingske Tidende*), praised Kierkegaard for his "trenchancy" in proclaiming "the Law and the requirement." These topics likely seemed out of place in the contemporary **religious** milieu. In fact, in a journal entry dated 4 November 1847, Kierkegaard writes of an awkward encounter with Bishop **Jakob Peter Mynster**, which he chalks up to the primate's displeasure with *Works of Love*. "I have never done the slightest thing to win his favor and support," Kierkegaard concedes, "but it would have made me indescribably happy to have him agree with me—for his sake as well, because that I am right I know best of all—from his sermons." Posterity has tended to judge *Works of Love* more favorably, not least due to its uncompromising association of **Christianity** with **ethical** ideality. *See also* CONSCIENCE; DESPAIR; DISCOURSE/DELIBERATION/SERMON; EQUALITY; FINITUDE/INFINITY; FORGIVENESS; GOD; HOPE;

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

IMITATION; INWARDNESS; LANGUAGE; LAW; LUTHER, MARTIN (1483–1546); MONEY; PAGANISM; RECOLLECTION; SACRIFICE; SCRIPTURE; WOMEN.

WORLDLINESS/SECULARISM. Kierkegaard uses the word *Verdslighed* almost 200 times in his authorship. Its most literal English translation is "worldliness," though it has also been rendered "secularism." In either case, the term's basic meaning is the same: to be "worldly" (*verdslig*) is to devote oneself to the present **aesthetic** and material order, thereby repudiating or ignoring the **inner** life of the **spirit**. In short, the worldly person is dedicated to **temporality** rather than to **eternity**, to **the present age** or *saeculum* rather than to that which belongs to **God**.

Kierkegaard frequently juxtaposes *Verdslighed* with **Christianity**. In ***Practice in Christianity***, Kierkegaard's **pseudonym** Anti-Climacus argues that there is a fundamental heterogeneity between the Christian **church** and the world, so much so that Christendom's union of church and state must be seen as anathema. Indeed, in the wake of his literary conflict with ***The Corsair***, Kierkegaard increasingly came to emphasize this point. While the leaders of the Danish **state church** enjoyed prestigious roles in the **social and political** order, **Jesus Christ** himself was persecuted by the worldly authorities of his day, an example that his early followers imitated (*see* IMITATION), often resulting in **martyrdom**. Kierkegaard viewed this dissimilarity between the establishmentarian churches of modern **Protestantism** and the radical **witness** of the early church as a sign that Christianity itself had become *verdslig*. As Anti-Climacus puts it, "Woe to the Christian Church when it will have been victorious in this world, for then it is not the Church that has been victorious but the world. Then . . . the world has won, and Christianity has lost." *See also* CONSCIENCE; CULTURE; DYING TO; ENVY; INDIVIDUAL; OFFENSE.

WRITING. In ***The Point of View for My Work as An Author***, Kierkegaard attempts to explain how he has been able to write so prolifically. His answer, in short, is **God**. "What was this pen not able to present!" Kierkegaard marvels, adding that his immense literary productivity demonstrates "what a human being's weakness is capable of with [God's] help." The author of nearly 80 publications in his lifetime—a number of which are exceptional in length—as well as a staggering amount of unpublished material, Kierkegaard has been viewed as someone for whom writing (*Skrift*) was not just an occupation or a pastime but a deep-seated **passion**. Some commentators have even speculated that he may have suffered from hypergraphia. Etiologically, this condition is associated with temporal lobe epilepsy, though Kierkegaard

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

himself was not a known epileptic. Perhaps closer to the mark, then, was Kierkegaard's own explanation, which stated writing helped him ward off **melancholy** and conform to God's **will**. "Only when I am writing do I feel just fine. Then I forget all the disagreeable things in life, all the sufferings, then I am at home with my thoughts and am happy," he explains in an 1847 journal passage.

This suggestion is reiterated in *The Point of View*, albeit in theological rather than psychological **language**. As Kierkegaard portrays it, God has shielded him from drowning in an "abundance of thoughts," due to which he might write "incessantly day and night and yet another day and night, because there is wealth enough." This may sound like a quintessential "good problem to have," but Kierkegaard likens it to a form of **despair**, whereby possibility overwhelms **necessity**. "Give a person a creative talent like that," Kierkegaard quips, "and then such frail health, and he surely will learn to **pray**." Indeed, Kierkegaard learned to manage such furious intellectuality by viewing his work as "devotion to God." In this way, he exchanged his "winged pen" for a "slower pen," disciplining his turbulent **imagination** for pious service. "I have basically lived like a scribe [*Skriver*] in his office. From the very beginning I have . . . at every moment sensed that it was not I who played the master but that it was someone else who was the master . . . sensed it with indescribable bliss when I related myself to him and the work in unconditional obedience." For Kierkegaard, then, writing was a means of combating personal **suffering** in and through **faith**, so that his creative energy might be channeled for the sake of **eternity** and, with it, a modicum of earthly **happiness**. *See also* CULTURE; SOCIAL AND POLITICAL, THE.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use



ØRSTED, HANS CHRISTIAN (1777–1851). Danish chemist, physicist, and philosopher. Ørsted grew up in modest circumstances in the town of Rudkøbing, which is located on the western coast of the island of Langeland. Along with his brother Anders Sandsøe Ørsted (1778–1860), who would go on to become prime minister of Denmark in 1853–1854, Ørsted was educated in an ad hoc fashion: he learned how to read from the wife of a local perruquier, and he picked up the basics of **science** from apprenticing in his father's pharmacy. In 1793, Ørsted matriculated at the **University of Copenhagen**, where he excelled in a variety of subjects. In 1799, he completed his doctorate in **philosophy**, focusing on the work of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804).

Nevertheless, Ørsted would soon make his mark as a scientist. After a significant period abroad, he returned to Copenhagen and quickly established himself as an expert in physics and chemistry, a reputation that was permanently secured when, in 1820, he confirmed that there is a direct relationship between electricity and magnetism. This discovery of electromagnetism was a boon to the development of modern **technology**, including the invention of the telegraph in the 1830s. To be sure, Ørsted was the obvious choice to direct the new **Polytechnic** in 1829. In later years, Ørsted would demonstrate the diversity of his interests and talents: he became involved in **politics**, emerging as a prominent advocate for a free **press**, and he was a writer of poetry and prose. A man of sincere yet idiosyncratic **religiousness**, Ørsted's last major project was *The Spirit in Nature* (*Aanden i Naturen*, 1850), which sought to show that **nature** testifies to the presence of a higher order of **reason**, of which **God** is the author.

Kierkegaard liked and respected Ørsted. In an 1835 letter, Kierkegaard refers to Ørsted as a "chord that nature has sounded in just the right way." At the same time, however, Kierkegaard bristled at the suggestion that Ørsted's thought was the best that Denmark had to offer, an assumption that, in an 1846 journal passage, Kierkegaard ascribes to the insularity and mundaneness of Danish **culture**. And yet Kierkegaard did not seem to hold a grudge against Ørsted himself. In an 1849 journal entry, Kierkegaard uses a crass

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

joke, attributed to Ørsted, to illustrate the hubris of academic theology. As Kierkegaard quips, “The saying that Councillor H. C. Ørsted told me is a good one: When a lark wants to fart like an elephant, it has to blow up.” *See also* LEHMANN, PETER MARTIN ORLA (1810–1870).

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Appendix A
Kierkegaard's Writings

The following inventory of Kierkegaard's writings provides only Danish titles, though English-language equivalents can be found in the chronology. Whether a published work is attributed to a pseudonym or to Kierkegaard himself is specified. Writings not published during Kierkegaard's lifetime are grouped under their approximate date of composition.

PUBLISHED WRITINGS

1834

- 17 December: "Ogsaa et Forsvar for Qvindens høie Anlæg" by A, in *Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, Interimsblad*, 34, columns 4–6.

1836

- 18 February: "Kjøbenhavnspostens Morgenbetragtninger i Nr. 43" by B, in *Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, Interimsblad*, 76, columns 1–6.
- 12 March: "Om Fædrelandets Polemik" by B, in *Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post, Interimsblad*, 82, columns 1–8.
- 15 March: "Om Fædrelandets Polemik" by B, in *Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post*, *Interimsblad*, 83, columns 1–4.
- 10 April: "Til Hr. Orla Lehmann" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post*, *Interimsblad*, 87, columns 1–8.

1838

- 7 September: *Af en endnu Levendes Papirer: Udgivet mod hans Villie* by S. Kierkegaard.

1841

- 29 September: *Om Begrebet Ironi med stadigt Hensyn til Socrates* by S. A. Kierkegaard.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

1842

- 12 June: "Aabent Skriftemaal" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 904.

1843

- 20 February: *Enten—Eller: Et Livs-Fragment, Første Deel, indeholdende A.'s Papirer* by Victor Eremita.
- 20 February: *Enten—Eller: Et Livs-Fragment, Anden Deel, indeholdende B.'s Papirer, Breve til A* by Victor Eremita.
- 27 February: "Hvo er Forfatteren af Enten-Eller" by A.F. . . . , in *Fædrelandet*, 1162.
- 5 March: "Taksigelse til Hr. Professor Heiberg Fædrelandet" by Victor Eremita, in *Fædrelandet*, 1168.
- 16 May: *To opbyggelige Taler* by S. Kierkegaard.
- 16 May: "En Lille Forklaring" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 1236.
- 16 October: *Frygt og Bæven: Dialektisk Lyrik* by Johannes de silentio.
- 16 October: *Gjentagelsen: Et Forsøg i den experimenterende Psychologi* by Constantin Constantius.
- 16 October: *Tre opbyggelige Taler* by S. Kierkegaard.
- 6 December: *Fire opbyggelige Taler* by S. Kierkegaard.

1844

- 5 March: *To opbyggelige Taler* by S. Kierkegaard.
- 8 June: *Tre opbyggelige Taler* by S. Kierkegaard.
- 13 June: *Philosophiske Smuler eller En Smule Philosophi* by Johannes Climacus, ed. by S. Kierkegaard.
- 17 June: *Begrebet Angest. En simpel psychologisk-paapegende Overveielse i Retning af det dogmatiske Problem om Arvesynden* by Vigilius Haufniensis.
- 17 June: *Forord: Morskabslæsning for enkelte Stænder efter Tid og Lejlighed* by Nicolaus Notabene.
- 31 August: *Fire opbyggelige Taler* by S. Kierkegaard.

1845

- 29 April: *Tre Taler ved tænkte Leiligheder* by S. Kierkegaard.
- 30 April: *Stadier på Livets Vej: Studier af Forskjellige* by Hilarius Bogbinder.
- 9 May: "En Erklæring og Lidt til" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 1883.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

- 19 May: "En flygtig Bemærkning betræffende en Enkelthed i Don Juan" (I) by A, in *Fædrelandets Feuilleton*, 1890.
- 20 May: "En flygtig Bemærkning betræffende en Enkelthed i Don Juan" (II) by A, in *Fædrelandets Feuilleton*, 1891.
- 27 December: "En omreisende Æsthetikers Virksomhed, og hvorledes han dog kom til at betale Gjæstebudet" by Frater Taciturnus, in *Fædrelandet*, 2078.

1846

- 10 January: "Det dialektiske Resultat af en literair Politi-Forretning" by Frater Taciturnus, in *Fædrelandet*, 9.
- 28 February: *Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift til de philosophiske Smuler: Mimisk-pathetisk-dialektisk Sammenskrift, Existentielt Indlæg* by Johannes Climacus.
- 30 March: *En literair Anmeldelse:* To Tidsaldre*, Novelle af Forfatteren til "En Hverdags-historie"* by S. Kierkegaard.

1847

- 13 March: *Opbyggelige Taler i forskjellig Aand* by S. Kierkegaard.
- 29 September: *Kjerlighedens Gjerninger: Nogle christelige Overveielser i Talers Form* by S. Kierkegaard.

1848

- 26 April: *Christelige Taler* by S. Kierkegaard.
- 24 July: *Krisen og en Krise i en Skuespillerindes Liv* (I) by Inter et Inter, in *Fædrelandet*, 188 (feuilleton).
- 25 July: *Krisen og en Krise i en Skuespillerindes Liv* (II) by Inter et Inter, in *Fædrelandet*, 189 (feuilleton).
- 26 July: *Krisen og en Krise i en Skuespillerindes Liv* (III) by Inter et Inter, in *Fædrelandet*, 190 (feuilleton).
- 27 July: *Krisen og en Krise i en Skuespillerindes Liv* (IV) by Inter et Inter, in *Fædrelandet*, 191 (feuilleton).

1849

- 14 May: *Lilien paa Marken og Fuglen under Himlen: Tre gudelige Taler* by S. Kierkegaard.
- 19 May: *Tvende ethisk-religieuse Smaa-Afhandlinger* by H.H.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

- 30 July: *Sygdommen til Døden: En christelig psychologisk Udvikling til Opvækkelse* by Anti-Climacus, ed. by S. Kierkegaard.
- 13 November: *"Ypperstepræsten"—"Tolderen"—"Synderinden," tre Taler ved Altergangen om Fredagen* by S. Kierkegaard.

1850

- 25 September: *Indøvelse i Christendom. Nr. I. II. III.* by Anti-Climacus, ed. by S. Kierkegaard.
- 20 December: *En opbyggelig Tale* by S. Kierkegaard.

1851

- 31 January: "Foranlediget ved en Yttring af Dr. Rudelbach mig betræffende" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 26.
- 7 August: *Om min Forfatter-Virksomhed* by S. Kierkegaard.
- 7 August: *To Taler ved Altergangen om Fredagen* by S. Kierkegaard.
- 10 September: *Til Selvprøvelse Samtiden anbefalet* by S. Kierkegaard.

1854

- 18 December: "Var Biskop Mynster et 'Sandhedsvidne', et af 'de rette Sandhedsvidner'—er dette Sandhed?" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 295.
- 30 December: "Derved bliver det!" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 304.

1855

- 12 January: "En Opfordring til mig fra Pastor Paludan-Müller" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 10.
- 29 January: "Stridspunktet med Biskop Martensen; som, christeligt, afgjørende for det i Forveien, christeligt seet, mislige kirkelige Bestaaende" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 24.
- 29 January: "To nye Sandhedsvidner" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 24 (feuilleton).
- 20 March: "Ved Biskop Mynsters Død" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 67.
- 21 March: "Er dette christelig Gudsdyrkelse eller er det at holde Gud for Nar? (Et Samvittighedsspørgsmaal [for at lette min Samvittighed.])" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 68.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

- 22 March: "Hvad der skal gøres."—det skee nu ved mig eller ved en Anden" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 69.
- 26 March: "Den religieuse Tilstand" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 72.
- 28 March: "En Thesis—kun een eneste" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 74.
- 30 March: " 'Salt' thi 'Christenhed' er: Christendoms Forraadnelse; 'en christen Verden' er: Affaldet fra Christendommen" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 76.
- 31 March: "Hvad jeg vil?" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 77.
- 7 April: "I Anledning af et anonymt Forslag til mig i dette Blads" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 81.
- 11 April: "Var det rigtigst nu at 'standse med Klemtningen'?" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 83.
- 11 April: "Christendom med kongelig Bestalling og Christendom uden kongelig Bestalling" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 83 (feuilleton).
- 27 April: "Hvilken grusom Straf!" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 97.
- 10 May: "Et Resultat" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 107.
- 10 May: "En Monolog" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 107 (feuilleton).
- 15 May: "Angaaende en taabelig Vigtighed lige over for mig og den Opfattelse af Christendom, som jeg gjør kjendelig" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 111.
- 16 May: "Til det nye Oplag af *Indøvelse i Christendom*" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 112.
- 24 May: *Dette skal siges; saa være det da sagt* by S. Kierkegaard.
- 24 May: *Øieblikket*. Nr. 1 by S. Kierkegaard.
- 26 May: "At Biskop Martensens Taushed er 1) christeligt uforsvarligt; 2) latterlig; 3) dumklog; 4) i mere end een Henseende foragtelig" by S. Kierkegaard, in *Fædrelandet*, 120.
- 4 June: *Øieblikket*. Nr. 2 by S. Kierkegaard.
- 16 June: *Hvad Christus dømmer om officiel Christendom* by S. Kierkegaard.
- 27 June: *Øieblikket*. Nr. 3 by S. Kierkegaard.
- 7 July: *Øieblikket*. Nr. 4 by S. Kierkegaard.
- 27 July: *Øieblikket*. Nr. 5 by S. Kierkegaard.
- 23 August: *Øieblikket*. Nr. 6 by S. Kierkegaard.
- 30 August: *Øieblikket*. Nr. 7 by S. Kierkegaard.
- 1 September: *Guds Uforanderlighed. En Tale* by S. Kierkegaard.
- 11 September: *Øieblikket*. Nr. 8 by S. Kierkegaard.
- 24 September: *Øieblikket*. Nr. 9 by S. Kierkegaard.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

UNPUBLISHED WRITINGS

1840

- "Et Øieblik, Hr. Andersen!" by S. Kierkegaard.

1842–1843

- *Johannes Climacus eller De omnibus dubitandum est: En Fortælling* by Johannes Climacus.

1844

- "Polemik mod Heiberg" by Constantin Constantius.

1846

- *Bogen om Adler* by Petrus Minor.

1848

- *Synspunktet for min Forfatter-Virksomhed: En ligefrem Meddelelse, Rapport til Historien* by S. Kierkegaard.
- "Hr. Phister som Captain Scipio (i Syngestykket *Ludovic*): En Erindring og for Erindringen" by Procul.

1849

- "Den bevæbnede Neutralitet eller Min Position som christelig Forfatter i Christenheden: Tillæg til *Synspunktet for min Forfatter-Virksomhed*" by S. Kierkegaard.

1851

- *Dømmer selv! Til Selvprøvelse Samtiden anbefalet* by S. Kierkegaard.

1855

- *Øieblikket. Nr. 10* by S. Kierkegaard.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

JOURNALS AND PAPERS

Among Kierkegaard's unpublished writings are an abundance of journal entries (the first dating from 1833), letters, sketches, incomplete writings, and miscellaneous papers. In 1865, a decade after Kierkegaard's death, Hans Peter Barfod organized this vast amount of literature into a network of categories, now known collectively as Kierkegaard's "journals and papers."

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Appendix B
Kierkegaard's Pseudonyms

Kierkegaard used pseudonyms during most of his literary career, starting with A in 1834 and concluding with Anti-Climacus in 1850. Yet his various pseudonyms should neither be taken in univocal fashion nor as mere noms de plume. Rather, they were meant to present different existential points of view while, at the same time, distancing Kierkegaard himself from the reader. In this way, as Kierkegaard saw it, the reader would be able to consider whether or not these diverse perspectives are germane and true without Kierkegaard's imposition, a form of maieutic pedagogy or "indirect communication" that the Dane associated with Socrates.

With this in mind, the following index of pseudonyms is divided into two overarching categories: those to whom Kierkegaard ascribed authorial or editorial responsibility for entire volumes, and those who are featured characters *within* larger works. This distinction is more formal than substantive. Kierkegaard did not assign his pseudonymous characters a role subordinate to his pseudonymous authors and editors, and it is clear that just as the latter are at times little more than croquis (e.g., B, and perhaps even Vigilius Haufniensis), so can the former be well developed and, indeed, quintessential Kierkegaardian characters (e.g., Johannes the Seducer, Quidam). Nevertheless, the author/character distinction is worth bearing in mind, if only to underline that Kierkegaard's pseudonymous authorship goes deeper than substituting clever Latin names for his own. On the contrary, his unique oeuvre is populated by a range of figures, each with a part to play in the whole.

AUTHORS/EDITORS

A: Kierkegaard's most frequently used newspaper anonym. Following a contemporary literary trend, Kierkegaard assigned his first published article, "Another Defense of Woman's Great Abilities" (1834) to "A," who appears to be a social traditionalist and opponent of the nascent liberal demand for equality between the sexes. Whether or not Kierkegaard himself held these views is debatable, though it is fair to assume that A was meant to represent the conventional view among Danish men, particularly in the upper classes.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

In 1845, Kierkegaard used A once again in "A Cursory Observation Concerning a Detail in *Don Giovanni*" (1845), another newspaper article. This time, however, the anonym displayed a marked aesthetic sensibility and, in all likelihood, was not meant to reflect the A of "Another Defense of Woman's Great Abilities." Rather, the authorial perspective of this A, combined with his interest in Mozart's famous 1787 opera, suggests a connection to the A of *Either-Or* (see below).

B: Author of "The Morning Observations in *The Copenhagen Post* No. 43" (1836) and "On the Polemic of the *Fatherland*" (1836). Curiously, Kierkegaard employs this anonym to critique the frequent anonymity used in journalistic debates about press freedom and political reform. In fact, Kierkegaard later took responsibility for the writings ascribed to B, noting that there is a significant difference between literary anonymity and efficaciously working for social change.

One Still Living (En Endnu Levende): Author of *From the Papers of One Still Living* (1838), an extended review of Hans Christian Andersen's novel *Only a Fiddler* (*Kun en Spillemand*, 1837). Though the title page lists Kierkegaard as the author of this work, the review itself makes clear that composition should be ascribed to "One Still Living." The meaning of this appellation has been debated: perhaps it is a reference to the numerous deaths among Kierkegaard's family and friends; perhaps it is a form of self-critique, identifying the author as one who, like Andersen, has failed to die to immediacy in order to take on a richer and more enduring *Weltanschauung*. Notably, Kierkegaard's journals and papers indicate that he considered using One Still Living for other writings, including his unfinished and unpublished play *The Battle between the Old and the New Soap Cellars*.

Victor Eremita: Editor of *Either-Or* (1843) and author of "A Word of Thanks to Professor Heiberg" (1843). The name itself means "Victorious Hermit," and the monastic allusion seems to correspond to Kierkegaard's later remark that he was "religiously in the monastery" during *Either-Or*'s composition. At the same time, however, Victor Eremita is also an aesthete and an ironist, and his variability suggests that he is a nexus between Kierkegaard's existential spheres. Notably, he also returns as a character in *Stages on Life's Way* (see below).

A.F. . . . : Author of "Who Is the Author of *Either-Or*?" (1843). The abbreviation stands for "By the Author" (*Af Forfatteren*) and, for that reason, can be seen as a reference to Victor Eremita, who compiled *Either-Or*. On the other

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

hand, the article in question argues that trying to reduce the authorship of *Either-Or* to a single person is not only difficult but ultimately unhelpful: the reader's focus should be on the book's existential import, rather than on the person from whom it originated. With this in mind, the anonym "A.F. . . ." is used ironically, undermining the very concept it ostensibly denotes.

Johannes de silentio: Author of *Fear and Trembling* (1843). The name literally means "John the Silent," and it is one of three Kierkegaardian pseudonyms to bear the name "Johannes" (John). It is hard to know if this appellation is meant to allude to the various "Johns" of the Bible (John the Baptist, John the Evangelist, and so on), or if Kierkegaard chose it due to its societal prevalence. The reference to "silence" is seemingly more straightforward, as the book centers on the biblical story of Abraham and Isaac (Genesis 22) and on how it raises ethico-religious problems that cannot be made intelligible to civil society. On a deeper level, however, de silentio's treatment of this theme gestures toward Kierkegaard's own ineffable *Akedah*—that he had to sacrifice his engagement to Regine Olsen in order to pursue the religious life at its highest. With this in mind, it is not surprising that Kierkegaard also considered attributing *Fear and Trembling* to "Simon Stylites," the name of a fifth-century Syrian Christian ascetic who lived for 37 years on a small platform atop a high pillar, thereby indicating his radical, if mystifying, devotion to God.

Constantin Constantius: Author of *Repetition* (1843). Kierkegaard originally planned to call him "Victorinus Constantinus de bona speranza," a reference to the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa, famed both for its treacherous seas and favorable tidings as the gateway to the Indian Ocean. Accordingly, the name was meant to suggest the paradoxes of navigation, its coincident trials and hopes. "Constantin Constantius" retains these nautical connotations, inasmuch as its repetitious formulation gestures toward the book's claim that constancy and persistence (*constantia*) in life will guide one to happiness. Intriguingly, however, Kierkegaard fashions Constantin Constantius as a speculative ironist who is curious about the existential possibility of "repetition" but unwilling to actually venture it. In this way, he resembles other Kierkegaardian pseudonyms who fail to attain their objects of study.

Johannes Climacus: Author of *Philosophical Fragments* (1844) and of *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (1846). The name is taken from an actual person, namely, the patristic monk and writer John Climacus or John of the Ladder. Though Kierkegaard had toyed with the idea before (e.g., Simon Stylites), this is the only directly historical name in the Dane's ensemble

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

of pseudonyms. The real-life John Climacus is still revered for his spiritual manual *The Ladder of Divine Ascent*, which, divided into 30 chapters or "steps," outlines the climb from self-renunciation to genuine contemplative peace (*hesychia*). The overarching theme of spiritual ascent also characterizes the writings of Kierkegaard's eponymous pseudonym; however, unlike his namesake, Kierkegaard's Climacus largely approaches religion from an epistemological and psychological standpoint. In particular, Kierkegaard's Climacus says that he is a "humorist"—an indicator that he is on the path toward authentic religiousness yet paradoxically estranged from it, inasmuch as he is unsure if ethico-religious ideality can be fulfilled by finite and sinful human beings.

Petrus Minor: Author of the posthumously published *The Book on Adler*, written and revised from 1846 to 1848. A self-styled "critic," Petrus Minor takes up the case of Adolph Peter Adler, a Danish clergyman and scholar who claimed to have had a personal experience of divine revelation. For Petrus, Adler's assertion serves as an occasion to clarify a number of key Christian concepts, especially those concerning "authority" and "revelation." Indeed, the name "Petrus" itself may be a nod to Peter the Apostle, arguably the most important disciple of Jesus of Nazareth and, in turn, an early caretaker of Christian teaching. At the same time, however, "Minor" underlines the pseudonym's philosophical, rather than dogmatic, relation to the questions at hand.

Vigilius Haufniensis: Author of *The Concept of Anxiety* (1844). The name literally means "The Watchman of the Harbor" but is often rendered "The Watchman of Copenhagen," since the Danish *København* is a compound of *køber* ("merchant") and *havn* ("harbor"). For that reason, and inasmuch as Kierkegaard considered publishing the book under his own name, it is possible that "Vigilius Haufniensis" is little more than proxy nomenclature. After all, Kierkegaard was fond of likening his own authorial task to that of one monitoring the proverbial "signs of the times," whether in the guise of an undercover police agent or a fire marshal. On the other hand, certain distinct features of Haufniensis's persona do emerge. In contrast to the lyricism of a Johannes de silentio or the dash of a Johannes Climacus, Haufniensis presents himself as a detached psychologist, that is to say, as one who observes and ponders the vicissitudes of ordinary existence. In particular, he considers the phenomena of anxiety, guilt, and sin, and occasionally he exhibits such an acute sympathy that his professed neutrality is called into question.

Nicolaus Notabene: Author of *Prefaces* (1844). The surname "Notabene" is derived from the Latin phrase *nota bene* ("note well"), which is fre-

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

quently used to draw the reader's attention to a certain matter at hand. In particular, the abbreviated form of *nota bene* ("N.B.") is commonly added to the margins of legal documents, academic papers, and so on. This fringe quality is likely the inspiration behind the pseudonym "Nicolaus Notabene." Indeed, *Prefaces* is a satirical work, which takes aim at the hubris of Hegelian system building, especially in its Danish iteration. As an author struggling to make headway in the stultifying atmosphere of Copenhagen's literati, Notabene composes prefaces to books otherwise unfinished, a nod toward life's ersatz, incomplete qualities. Perhaps with that in mind, Notabene also refers to himself as "N.N.," which corresponds to another Latin phrase, *nomen nescio* ("I do not know the name"). Notabene is thus a "John Doe," a note on the margins of the system who, precisely as such, represents a protest against it.

Hilarius Bookbinder (Hilarius Bogbinder): Compiler and publisher of *Stages on Life's Way* (1845), which serves a kind of sequel to *Either/Or*. Just as Victor Eremita finds a series of papers and then arranges and publishes them as *Either/Or*, so does Hilarius Bookbinder come across a package of handwritten papers and issue them as a single volume. And yet Hilarius's text is even more dialogical than its predecessor, inasmuch as it contains not only a trio of "studies" authored by various personae, but also a number of additional characters, some appearing for the first time in Kierkegaard's authorship, others returning to the fore. The name "Hilarius Bookbinder" is itself at once puzzling and straightforward. Scholars have linked it to historical figures as diverse as the patristic theologian Hilary of Poitiers, whose most famous text (*De Trinitate*) concerns triunity, as well as Kierkegaard's personal bookbinder N. C. Møller, who kept a shop on Gråbrødretorv in Copenhagen. At the same time, however, the name clearly and simply alludes to Hilarius's stated vocation, that of one who binds together the ideas and reflections of others.

Frater Taciturnus: Author/editor of the final section of *Stages on Life's Way*, together with a pair of newspaper articles central to Kierkegaard's notorious row with *The Corsair*. The name "Frater Taciturnus" means "Silent Brother," though the pseudonym's diary-like novella "'Guilty?'/'Not Guilty'" is uncomfortably and, at times, almost comically longwinded. It would appear, then, that Frater Taciturnus's alleged silence has more to do with his role as an "observer" or as a kind of "street inspector," who seeks to detect certain patterns in human behavior but does not resolve them in and for his own existence. Hence, despite his interest in themes of guilt and sin, Frater resembles a religious poet more than one who is truly religious.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Inter et Inter: Author of "The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress" (1848). Meaning "Between and Between," the name seems to correspond to the unique standing of "The Crisis," an aesthetic work published *between* the religious (and nonpseudonymous) writings *Christian Discourses* and *The Lilies of the Field and the Birds of the Air*. Thus Inter et Inter represents Kierkegaard's ongoing commitment—ostensibly muted since his 1846 row with *The Corsair*—to composing aesthetic, pseudonymous works alongside religious ones. There is additional symmetry in the fact that "The Crisis" focuses on the theater and that, just as dramatic productions feature intermissions, so is "The Crisis" an aesthetic intermission amid Kierkegaard's recent religious production. Since little else is disclosed about Inter et Inter, other than his distinctive mode of theater criticism, these extratextual factors seem to best explain the pseudonym's origin.

Procul: Author of the posthumously published "Phister as Captain Scipio (in the Comic Opera *Ludovic*): A Recollection and for Recollection" (1848). Like Inter et Inter, Procul is a theater critic, though his interest lies in comedy. For Procul, whose name means "away" or "from a distance," one of the most interesting aspects of comic acting is *how* one communicates with the audience without directly showing or stating one's meaning. In particular, Procul attends to the performance of the great Danish actor Joachim Ludvig Phister, whose portrayal of the shoddy Captain Scipio in *Ludovic* accentuates a number of comic contradictions, including the fact Scipio always appears drunk even though he never overtly drinks. In other words, Phister reveals something about Scipio in *indirect* fashion, indeed, from a distance. Thus what Procul sees and values in Phister's performance is precisely the communicative art that Kierkegaard sought to instantiate in and through his own pseudonymous personae. Procul's piece, then, is part homage, part authorial self-disclosure.

H.H.: Author of *Two Ethical-Religious Minor Essays* (1849). The initials "H.H." do not seem to have an obvious referent, though the writings ascribed to H.H. occupy a distinct position in Kierkegaard's authorship. Not only are they described as "ethical-religious essays" (as opposed to say, discourses or deliberations), but, according to the title page, they are issued posthumously. In other words, H.H. is Kierkegaard's only *dead* pseudonym. Why Kierkegaard gave this singular figure such an impenetrable name is perplexing: he had, in fact, considered attributing this text and others written during the same period to a host of pseudonyms. That he settled on a pair of initials, rather than on a name as such, is perhaps indicative of the extent to which he identified with H.H.'s concerns, a correspondence underscored by some

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

of the autobiographical flourishes that slip into H.H.'s first essay, "Does a Human Being Have the Right to Let Himself Be Put to Death for the Truth?" "Once upon a time there was a man," H.H. opens. "As a child he had been strictly brought up in the Christian religion." Hence, not only does H.H. recall Kierkegaard's own upbringing, but he looks ahead to Kierkegaard's next major authorial task—to expose the corruption and confusion plaguing Danish Christianity in particular and Christendom in general.

Anti-Climacus: Author of *The Sickness unto Death* (1849) and *Practice in Christianity* (1850). The name "Anti-Climacus" is, quite clearly, bound up with the earlier pseudonym "Johannes Climacus." This association is fitting, as collectively they are responsible for what may be Kierkegaard's most significant pseudonymous writings. That should not imply, however, that there is unbroken connection between the two. In one sense, "Anti-" is meant to indicate contrast. While Johannes Climacus is a religious seeker, Anti-Climacus represents the standpoint of ethical-religious maturity. But this point highlights another facet of the prefix. Insofar as Anti-Climacus has a superior relation to Christianity, Anti-Climacus precedes or is "before" (as in the Latin *ante*) Johannes Climacus.

CHARACTERS

A: An aesthete and connoisseur of psychosomatic pleasure, to whom Victor Eremita attributes several anonymous writings in the first part of *Either-Or*. A is also the intended recipient of the epistolary treatises of Judge William, who suggests that A is youthful and thus in need of moral guidance. Nevertheless, A is clearly a reflective figure whose multifaceted portrayal of the aesthetic life is meant to be persuasive, even seductive.

Judge William (Assessor Wilhelm): A Danish magistrate, husband, and father who is named as the author of two major essays in the second part of *Either-Or*. He is also a featured character in *Stages on Life's Way*, where he is referred to as "A Married Man" (En Ægtemand). The Judge's principal task is to mount a defense of the ethical over against that of the aesthetic. More specifically, he argues that a life of civil service, framed in terms of familial-cum-social duty and conventional religious devotion, is the ideal occasion for the harmonization of self's dialectical elements and, for that reason, an antidote to the volatility of a life dedicated to superficial pleasure. And yet, while championing such an ethic, the Judge also acknowledges the need for a deeper form of religiousness, thereby indicating the limitations of the ethical.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Johannes the Seducer (Johannes Forføreren): Ostensibly the author of "The Seducer's Diary" in the first part of *Either-Or*, though Victor Eremita raises the possibility that Johannes the Seducer is a pseudonym of A, adding a further layer of confusion to the issue of *Either-Or*'s authorship. Johannes the Seducer also appears as a character in *Stages on Life's Way*, participating in the banquet that lies at the center of "In Vino Veritas." His name, it turns out, is a fitting one. In both *Either-Or* and *Stages on Life's Way*, Johannes presents as a deceiver and a misogynist who reduces women to objects of pleasure and feels no compunction about tempting them to yield to his desires. For that reason, the name "Johannes" is a nod toward the legendary figure of Don Juan/Don Giovanni. And yet, whereas Don Juan seduces by way of his powerful virility, Johannes does so through reflective manipulation, patiently wheedling his victim to do his bidding. In this way, he is the quintessential modern seducer, a denizen of the modern "age of reflection" and what may be its most recognizable expression, the bourgeois, technological city.

Victor Eremita: Though known principally as the editor of *Either-Or*, Victor Eremita also appears as a character in "In Vino Veritas," the first major section of *Stages on Life's Way.* In the latter text, Victor is an invited speaker at the banquet, where he discourses on the tension between the inner and the outer, arguing for a life dedicated to interior cultivation and enjoyment amid humdrum daily tasks. He is at once an advocate for and an exemplification of subtlety, even secrecy.

Jutland Pastor (Præst i Jylland): An old friend of Judge William's who has since gone on to pastor a rural church in the Jutland region of Denmark. According to the Judge, he and the Jutland pastor continue to write one another, and in a recent letter the pastor has enclosed a sermon titled "The Upbuilding That Lies in the Thought That in Relation to God We Are Always in the Wrong." The Judge claims that this sermon expresses his ideas better than he himself has been able to, and that is why he is using it to conclude his correspondence with A. Given the solemnity of the sermon's title, it is worth noting that, according to the Judge, the Jutland pastor has a winsome, even ebullient personality, despite (or perhaps because of) spending a great deal of time alone on the Jutland heath, meditating.

Johannes Climacus: Johannes Climacus is widely known as the author of *Philosophical Fragments* and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, but he is also the protagonist of *Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est*, a philosophical novella that Kierkegaard worked on, but did not finish, during the years 1842–1843. The primary goal of *Johannes Climacus* is to satirize

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Cartesian skepticism by way of the existential conundrums of a 21-year-old university student named Johannes Climacus. Climacus assumes that philosophy is to be lived out and not merely idle speculation. And yet, when he tries to apply Descartes's maxim to "doubt everything" (*omnibus dubitandum*), he stumbles upon a number of self-contradictions and falls into despair. In this sense, Johannes Climacus the character overlaps with Johannes Climacus the author: both contend that, in the end, speculative philosophy is incapable of producing human happiness.

Constantin Constantius: Author of *Repetition*, but also a character in "In Vino Veritas," the first major section of *Stages on Life's Way*. As relayed by William Afham, it is Constantin who, after some debate among the participants, organizes and directs the banquet, chooses the motto *in vino veritas*, and secures a country home on the outskirts of Copenhagen (most likely the town of Ordrup) in which to dine. Later, Constantin serves as the second of five speakers, each of whom is to discourse on the subject of erotic love. In keeping with his perspective in *Repetition*, Constantin approaches the subject in an aesthetic-cum-ironic vein, arguing that, as the object of male Eros, woman is a "jest" and thus lies somewhere between the aesthetic and the ethical. For him, in other words, the difference between the sexes must not be conflated, lest woman's position threaten the social order. At last, it is Constantin who closes the banquet and orders the demolition of its site.

The Fashion Designer (Modehandleren): A character in "In Vino Veritas," the first major section of *Stages on Life's Way*. The Fashion Designer is the fourth of five speakers, following Victor Eremita and preceding Johannes the Seducer. He runs a fashion boutique in Copenhagen and, in this capacity, claims to have garnered insight into the nature of woman. In particular, he believes that the man who wants to master erotic love must understand that it is simply a matter of "fashion" (*Moden*). He even describes how women come to his store before weddings, more concerned with how they look than with any Christian aspect of the ceremony. Indeed, as he sees it, fashion is what is truly sacred to women, and so men must be wary of getting involved. At the same time, however, he is happy to exploit this weakness, not only for profit but also because he derives pleasure from doing so, a sign of his defiant form of despair.

A Married Man (En Ægtemand): Author of "Some Reflections on Marriage in Answer to Objections," the second major section of *Stages on Life's Way*. In actuality, the name "A Married Man" is a pseudonym of Judge William, to whom the major writings of the second part of *Either/Or* are

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

ascribed. Kierkegaard had intended A Married Man's contribution to stand as a counterpoint to "In Vino Veritas" in an independent volume known (rather insipidly) as "The Wrong and the Right." However, this plan was scrapped, supposedly by Hilarius Bookbinder, who combined "In Vino Veritas," "Some Reflections on Marriage," and "'Guilty?'/'Not Guilty'" in order to comprise *Stages on Life's Way*.

Quidam: The alleged author of "'Guilty?'/'Not Guilty,'" the third and final part of *Stages on Life's Way*. However, the title page of "'Guilty?'/'Not Guilty'" lists Frater Taciturnus as the author, and, indeed, Frater Taciturnus admits in his "Letter to the Reader" that he has "conjured up" (*manet frem*) the character of Quidam. The name "Quidam" is taken from the Latin *quidam*, which means "a certain person" or "somebody" in its masculine form. This lack of specificity is doubtless intentional, as "'Guilty?'/'Not Guilty'" is effectively a diary written by someone coming to grips with a broken engagement. In particular, it appears that, in and through the figure of Quidam, Frater Taciturnus is exploring how personal mistakes (in this case, a broken engagement) position one at the crossroads between humbly accepting one's own guilt and thereby seeking forgiveness, or proudly delaying repentance in order to calculate the degree of one's culpability. Thus Quidam's dilemma stands as a striking parallel to Kierkegaard's own breakup with Regine Olsen.

William Afham (Wilhelm Afham): The title page of "In Vino Veritas" lists "William Afham" as the one who "related" or "later told" (*efterfortalt*) the story of the banquet hosted by Constantin Constantius. Accordingly, "In Vino Veritas" is designated as "A Recollection" (*En Erindring*), though this terminology is not as straightforward as it seems. After all, William Afham is not documented as one of the banquet's orators, nor is he listed as an attendee in a different capacity (maître d', server, etc.). It may be that William is meant to resemble Aristodemus of Cydathenaeum, a figure mentioned in Plato's *Symposium*, whose firsthand account of Agathon's banquet provides the basis for Apollodorus's extant retelling, though, curiously, Aristodemus is not recorded as a speaker at the event. On the other hand, it may be that William has poetically fabricated (or "recollected") the whole event. After all, his name literally means William "Of him" or "By him," and indeed Johannes Climacus does suggest in *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* that *Stages on Life's Way* has a single author. Yet, if this surmise is true, perhaps "William Afham" is the pseudonym closest to Kierkegaard himself, *by whom* the entire pseudonymous authorship has come into being.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

The Young Man (Det unge Menneske): A central character in *Repetition* and one of the banquet orators in *Stages on Life's Way*. There may be at least two historical points of reference for the Young Man. In *Repetition*, he is struggling to cope with a failed relationship, and in this way he quite clearly resembles Kierkegaard himself, who wrote *Repetition* in the immediate aftermath of his breakup with Regine Olsen. Moreover, in both *Repetition* and *Stages on Life's Way*, he has a curious friendship with Constantin Constantius, one that, due to its incongruities in age and temperament, may be meant to resemble that between Alcibiades and Socrates. Whatever the case, it is clear that the Young Man's impassioned and ingenuous romanticism contrasts with Constantin's manipulative irony. However, this disparity is particularly evident in *Repetition*, since by the time of *Stages on Life's Way*, the Young Man has come to lament erotic love's sway over human life.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Bibliography

CONTENTS

Introduction 293
I. Works by Søren Kierkegaard 295
II. Select Multivolume Series on Kierkegaard's Life, Thought, and Influence 296
III. Select Works Published on Kierkegaard, 2017–2021 302
Biographical/Introductory Material 302
Single-Volume Comentaries 302
Kierkegaard and Love 302
Kierkegaard and Aesthetics 303
Kierkegaard and Ethics 303
Kierkegaard and Religion 303
Kierkegaard and Other Figures 305
Other Studies 308

INTRODUCTION

As noted in the preface, the resources available to the student of Kierkegaard have been greatly expanded over the last 20 to 30 years, so much so that the rationale for a book such as this one has changed. In decades past, prior to the wide availability of international book series, not to mention the arrival of the Internet, readers of Kierkegaard would have needed direct access to a university library in order to dig deeply into the Dane's oeuvre. Nowadays all one needs is a good Wi-Fi connection, and PDFs can be delivered to one's email inbox, bibliographic information organized on WorldCat, treatises read on an ebook platform, and biographical information found on Wikipedia. What was once hard is now easy. Indeed, to echo Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus, things may have gotten *too* easy. There is a surfeit of information, and it is increasingly difficult to know how to manage it. For the burgeoning scholar, the challenge is knowing where to begin. For the veteran, it is a matter of keeping up: if you thought you were the first person to ponder an article on Kierkegaard and, say, the English novelist David Lodge (1935–), think again! Do a Google search, and academic articles, blog posts, book reviews, magazine profiles, and YouTube discussions all appear in an instant. Of course, it is impossible to as-

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

sess the value of so much material. The problem of "fake scholarship" is perhaps less impactful than that of "fake news," but it is no less real.

The overarching goal of this project, then, is to provide a substantial yet reliable foundation on which to build an understanding of Kierkegaard. Even if this dictionary wanted to be exhaustive, it could not be in a single volume. Besides, as mentioned, a project of immense scope would only double down on the primary difficulty facing the researcher today. The same applies to the present bibliography. Simply put, if one were looking for a comprehensive Kierkegaard bibliography, one should go to Section II below and volume 19, tomes I–VII of the 21-volume book series Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources (KRSRR). Volume 19 was published in 2016 and 2017. It was edited by Peter Šajda and Jon Stewart and features dozens of collaborators. As a group, they have produced systematic bibliographies of works on Kierkegaard in 41 different languages, from Afrikaans to Ukrainian. For good measure, they even added two tomes (VI and VIII, to be exact) of bibliographies on figures relevant to Kierkegaard studies.

Every Kierkegaard researcher owes Stewart a debt of gratitude for his vision for and execution of KRSRR. Indeed, I count myself fortunate to have contributed to a number of tomes in the series. It is truly a milestone in Kierkegaardiana. But acknowledging this fact only begins to address how a project such as this one should proceed. With particular regard to the bibliography, one has to ask, if it cannot be a multivolume catalog featuring works in over 40 languages—after all, such an effort would be redundant at best—what *should* it be? There is no perfect answer to this question, but, in good Kierkegaardian fashion, one must make a decision in the face of uncertainty. Thus I have opted for simplicity. Below are a few bibliographic catalogs that, in my opinion, would put any student of Kierkegaard on the right path when undertaking research. Of course, the right path is not the only path. If one were going to New York City from Philadelphia, one would need to head north, a general orientation that can be accomplished in a multitude of ways. Still, should one say, "I-95 north is a good way to get to New York City from Philly," that would be useful information. It would put one on the right path, even if one were to eventually exit off of I-95 and take a more idiosyncratic route.

This analogy should not be pressed too far—anyone who has regularly traveled the New Jersey Turnpike knows that comparisons to I-95 are not exactly flattering—but I hope it conveys the purpose in what follows. Below are a number of works that might be considered "standard" in Kierkegaard scholarship. These are the kind of texts that should be owned or, at least, readily available to the researcher. In them one will find key resources that will deepen one's understanding of Kierkegaard and provide a terminus a quo for discussion and debate regarding the Dane's significance. In addition, I have included a supplementary bibliography of Anglophone work published on Kierkegaard from 2017 to 2021, the years not covered by the KRSRR. Doubtless this list is not exhaustive, but it should sufficiently demonstrate that research on Kierkegaard is proceeding apace, confirming that the Dane's ideas and insights remain as pertinent and provocative as they did well over 150 years ago.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

I. WORKS BY SØREN KIERKEGAARD

In Danish

Søren Kierkegaards Papirer. Edited by P. A. Heiberg, V. Kuhr, and E. Torsting. Vols. I–XI-3. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag, 1909–1948.

Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter. Edited by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn et al. Vols. 1–28. Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 1997–2013.

In English

Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers. Edited and translated by Howard Hong and Edna Hong. Vols. 1–7. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967–1978.

Kierkegaard's Writings. Edited and translated by Howard Hong and Edna Hong. Vols. 1–26. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978–2000.

1. *Early Polemical Writings: From the Papers of One Still Living; Articles from Student Days; The Battle between the Old and the New Soap Cellars* (1990)
2. *The Concept of Irony; Schelling Lecture Notes* (1989)
3. *Either/Or I* (1987)
4. *Either/Or II* (1987)
5. *Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses* (1990)
6. *Fear and Trembling; Repetition* (1983)
7. *Philosophical Fragments; Johannes Climacus* (1985)
8. *The Concept of Anxiety* (1980)
9. *Prefaces* (1997)
10. *Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions* (1993)
11. *Stages on Life's Way* (1988)
12. *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (2 vols.) (1992)
13. *The Corsair Affair; Articles Related to the Writings* (1982)
14. *Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age, a Literary Review* (1978)
15. *Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits* (1993)
16. *Works of Love* (1995)
17. *Christian Discourses; The Crisis; and A Crisis in the Life of an Actress* (1997)
18. *Without Authority: The Lily of the Field and the Bird of the Air; Two Ethical-Religious Minor Essays; Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays; An Upbuilding Discourse; Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays* (1997)
19. *The Sickness unto Death* (1980)
20. *Practice in Christianity* (1991)
21. *For Self-Examination; Judge for Yourself!* (1990)
22. *The Point of View: The Point of View for My Work as an Author; Armed Neutrality; On My Work as an Author* (1998)

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

23. *The Moment and Late Writings: Articles from the Fædrelandet*; *The Moment; This Must Be Said, So Let It Be Said; Christ's Judgment on Official Christianity; The Changelessness of God* (1998)
24. *The Book on Adler* (1998)
25. *Kierkegaard: Letters and Documents* (1978)
26. *Cumulative Index* (2000)

Kierkegaard's Journals and Notebooks. Edited by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Alastair Hannay, David Kangas, Bruce H. Kirmmse, George Pattison, Vanessa Rumble, and K. Brian Söderquist. Vols. 1–11. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007–2020.

II. SELECT MULTIVOLUME SERIES ON KIERKEGAARD'S LIFE, THOUGHT, AND INFLUENCE

Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana. Edited by Niels Thulstrup and Marie Mikulová. Vols. 1–16. Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel, 1978–1988.

1. *Kierkegaard's View of Christianity* (1978)
2. *The Sources and Depths of Faith in Kierkegaard* (1978)
3. *Concepts and Alternatives in Kierkegaard* (1980)
4. *Kierkegaard and Speculative Idealism* (1979)
5. *Theological Concepts in Kierkegaard* (1980).
6. *Kierkegaard and Great Traditions* (1981)
7. *Kierkegaard and Human Values* (1980)
8. *The Legacy and Interpretation of Kierkegaard* (1981)
9. *Kierkegaard Literary Miscellany* (1981)
10. *Kierkegaard's Teachers* (1982)
11. *The Copenhagen of Kierkegaard* (1986)
12. *Kierkegaard as a Person* (1983)
13. *Kierkegaard and the Church of Denmark* (1984)
14. *Kierkegaard's Classical Inspiration* (1985)
15. *Kierkegaard Research* (1987)
16. *Some of Kierkegaard's Main Categories* (1988)

International Kierkegaard Commentary. Edited by Robert L. Perkins. Vols. 1–24. Macon: Mercer University Press, 1999–2010.

1. *Early Polemical Writings* (1999)
2. *The Concept of Irony* (2001)
3. *Either/Or, Part I* (1996)
4. *Either/Or, Part II* (2007)
5. *Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses* (2003)

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

6. *Fear and Trembling, and Repetition* (1993)
7. *Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus* (1994)
8. *The Concept of Anxiety* (1985)
9. *Prefaces and Writing Sampler and Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions* (2006)
10. *Stages on Life's Way* (2000)
11. *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments* (1997)
12. *The Corsair Affair* (1990)
13. *Two Ages* (1984)
14. *Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits* (2005)
15. *Works of Love* (1999)
16. *Christian Discourses: The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress* (2007)
17. *Without Authority* (2007)
18. *The Sickness Unto Death* (2001)
19. *Practice in Christianity* (2004)
20. *For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourself!* (2002)
21. *The Point of View* (2010)
22. *The Moment and Late Writings* (2009)
23. *The Book on Adler* (2009)

Kierkegaard Studies. Monograph Series. Edited by Heiko Schulz, Jon Stewart, Karl Vestrynge, and Peter Šajda. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997–2022.

1. *Kierkegaard Revisited*: *Proceedings from the Conference "Kierkegaard and the Meaning of Meaning It," Copenhagen, May 5–9, 1996* (1997)
2. *"Poor Paris!" Kierkegaard's Critique of the Spectacular City* by George Pattison (1999)
3. *Kierkegaards Begriff der Wiederholung: Eine Studie zu seinem Freiheitsverständnis* by Dorothea Glöckner (1998)
4. *Äußerung: Studien zum Handlungsbegriff in Søren Kierkegaards "Die Taten der Liebe"* by Ulrich Lincoln (2000)
5. *Kierkegaard's Category of Repetition: A Reconstruction* by Niels Nymann Eriksen (2000)
6. *Ist Glauben wiederholbar? Derrida liest Kierkegaard* by Tilman Beyrich (2001)
7. *Kierkegaard und Wittgenstein: "Hineintäuschen in das Wahre"* by Mariele Nientied (2003)
8. *Kierkegaard und Schelling: Freiheit, Angst und Wirklichkeit* by Jochem Hennigfeld and Jon Stewart (2003)
9. *Theory and Practice in Kant and Kierkegaard* by Ulrich Knappe (2004)
10. *Kierkegaard and His Contemporaries: The Culture of Golden Age Denmark*, edited by Jon Stewart (2003)
11. *Schleiermacher und Kierkegaard: Subjektivität und Wahrheit*, Proceedings from the Schleiermacher-Kierkegaard Congress in Copenhagen, October

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

2003, edited by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Richard E. Crouter, Theodor Jørgensen, and Claus-Dieter Osthövener (2006)
12. *Sich verzehrender Skeptizismus: Läuterungen bei Hegel und Kierkegaard* by Markus Kleinert (2005)
13. *Kierkegaards "Furcht und Zittern" als Bild seines ethischen Erkenntnisbegriffs* by Joachim Boldt (2006)
14. *Vielstimmige Rede vom Unsagbaren: Dekonstruktion, Glaube und Kierkegaards pseudonyme Literatur* by Jochen Schmidt (2006)
15. *The Kierkegaardian Author: Authorship and Performance in Kierkegaard's Literary and Dramatic Criticism* by Joseph Westfall (2007)
16. *Ethische Selbstverständigung: Kierkegaards Auseinandersetzung mit der Ethik Kants und der Rechtsphilosophie Hegels* by Smail Rapic (2007)
17. *Autopsia: Self, Death, and God after Kierkegaard and Derrida* by Marius Timman Mjaaland, translated by Brian McNeil (2008)
18. *Kierkegaard und Schleiermacher* by Andreas Krichbaum (2008)
19. *The Passion of Infinity: Kierkegaard, Aristotle, and the Rebirth of Tragedy* by Daniel Greenspan (2008)
20. *Kierkegaard deiktische Theologie* by Michael O. Bjergsø (2009)
21. *Between Nihilism and Faith: A Commentary on Either/Or* by Karsten Harries (2010)
22. *Kierkegaard und Fichte: Praktische und religiöse Subjektivität*. Edited by Jürgen Stolzenberg and Smail Rapic (2010)
23. *Das gelingende Gutsein:* Über *Liebe und Anerkennung bei Kierkegaard* by Sergio Muñoz Fonnegra (2010)
24. *Band 1: Studien zur Rezeption Søren Kierkegaards* by Heiko Schulz (2011)
25. *Der Rückstoß der Methode: Kierkegaard und die indirekte Mitteilung* by Philipp Schwab (2012)
26. *Schopenhauer—Kierkegaard: Von der Metaphysik des Willens zur Philosophie der Existenz*, edited by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Lore Hühn, Søren R. Fauth, and Philipp Schwab (2012)
27. *Beschädigte Ironie: Kierkegaard, Adorno und die negative Dialektik kritischer Subjektivität* by Asaf Angermann (2014)
28. *Band 2: Studien zur Philosophie und Theologie Søren Kierkegaards* by Heiko Schulz (2014)
29. *Geist und Unsterblichkeit: Grundprobleme der Religionsphilosophie und Eschatologie im Denken Søren Kierkegaards* by István Czakó (2015)
30. *Apriorische Gewissheit: Das Glaubensverständnis des jungen Kierkegaard und seine philosophisch-theologischen Voraussetzungen* by Gerhard Schreiber (2014)
31. *Kierkegaardian Essays: A Festschrift in Honour of George Pattison*, edited by Claire Carlisle and Steven Shakespeare (2022)
32. *Die Wiederholung der Philosophie: Kierkegaards Kulturkritik und ihre Folgen* by Hjördis Becker-Lindenthal (2015)
33. *Ein rätselhaftes Zeichen: Zum Verhältnis von Martin Heidegger und Søren Kierkegaard* by Gerhard Thonhauser (2016)

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

34. *Entweder* ästhetisch*—oder religiös? Søren Kierkegaard textanalytisch* by Henrike Fürstenberg (2017)
35. *Kierkegaard's Existential Approach*, edited by Arne Grøn, René Rosfort, and K. Brian Söderquist (2017)
36. *Innerlichkeit: Struktur- und praxistheoretische Perspektiven auf Kierkegaards Existenzdenken* by Matthias Engmann (2017)
37. *Angst und Entängstigung: Kierkegaards existenzdialektischer Begriff der Angst, dessen systematischer Hintergrund und philosophiegeschichtliche Wirkung* by Deng Zhang (2018)
38. *Divine Suspense: On Kierkegaard's "Frygt og Bæven" and the Aesthetics of Suspense* by Andreas Seland (2018)
39. *Salto mortale: Deklinationen des Glaubens bei Kierkegaard* by Gloria Dell'Eva (2020)
40. *Kierkegaard and Issues in Contemporary Ethics* by Mélissa Fox-Muraton (2020)
41. *Kierkegaard und Nietzsche: Initialfiguren und Hauptmotive der Existenzphilosophie* by Oliver Victor (2021)
42. *Grundlinien zum Systeme der Aesthetik (1824) und andere kunstphilosophische Schriften* by Johan Ludvig Heiberg, edited by Klaus Müller-Wille (2022)

Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception, and Resources. Edited by Jon Stewart. New York: Routledge, 2007–2018.

1, Tome 1. *Kierkegaard and the Bible: The Old Testament*, edited by Jon Stewart and Lee C. Barrett (2016)
1, Tome II. *Kierkegaard and the Bible: The New Testament*, edited by Jon Stewart and Lee C. Barrett (2010)
2, Tome I. *Kierkegaard and the Greek World: Socrates and Plato*, edited by Jon Stewart and Katalin Nun (2016)
2, Tome II. *Kierkegaard and the Greek World: Aristotle and Other Greek Authors*, edited by Jon Stewart and Katalin Nun (2016)
3. *Kierkegaard and the Roman World*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
4. *Kierkegaard and the Patristic and Medieval Traditions*, edited by Jon Stewart (2008)
5, Tome I. *Kierkegaard and the Renaissance and Modern Traditions: Philosophy*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
5, Tome II. *Kierkegaard and the Renaissance and Modern Traditions: Theology*, edited by Jon Stewart (2009)
5, Tome III. *Kierkegaard and the Renaissance and Modern Traditions: Literature, Drama, and Music*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
6, Tome I. *Kierkegaard and His Germanic Contemporaries: Philosophy*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
6, Tome II. *Kierkegaard and His Germanic Contemporaries: Theology*, edited by Jon Stewart (2017)

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

6, Tome III. *Kierkegaard and His Germanic Contemporaries: Literature and Aesthetics*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
7, Tome I. *Kierkegaard and His Danish Contemporaries: Philosophy, Politics and Social Theory*, edited by Jon Stewart (2009)
7, Tome II. *Kierkegaard and His Danish Contemporaries: Theology*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
7, Tome III. *Kierkegaard and His Danish Contemporaries: Literature, Drama, and Aesthetics*, edited by Jon Stewart (2009)
8, Tome I. *Kierkegaard's International Reception: Northern and Western Europe*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
8, Tome II. *Kierkegaard's International Reception: Southern, Central and Eastern Europe*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
8, Tome III. *Kierkegaard's International Reception: The Near East, Asia, Australia and the Americas*, edited by Jon Stewart (2017)
9. *Kierkegaard and Existentialism*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
10, Tome I. *Kierkegaard's Influence on Theology: German Protestant Theology*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
10, Tome II. *Kierkegaard's Influence on Theology: Anglophone and Scandinavian Protestant Theology*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
10, Tome III. *Kierkegaard's Influence on Theology: Catholic and Jewish Theology*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
11, Tome I. *Kierkegaard's Influence on Philosophy: German and Scandinavian Philosophy*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
11, Tome II. *Kierkegaard's Influence on Philosophy: Francophone Philosophy*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
11, Tome III. *Kierkegaard's Influence on Philosophy: Francophone Philosophy*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
12, Tome I. *Kierkegaard's Influence on Literature, Criticism and Art: The Germanophone World*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
12, Tome II. *Kierkegaard's Influence on Literature, Criticism and Art: Denmark*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
12, Tome III. *Kierkegaard's Influence on Literature, Criticism and Art: Sweden and Norway*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
12, Tome IV. *Kierkegaard's Influence on Literature, Criticism and Art: The Anglophone World*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
12, Tome V. *Kierkegaard's Influence on Literature, Criticism and Art: The Romance Languages, Central and Eastern Europe*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
13. *Kierkegaard's Influence on the Social Sciences*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
14. *Kierkegaard's Influence on the Social-Political Thought*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
15, Tome I. *Kierkegaard's Concepts: Absolute to Church*, edited by Steven M. Emmanuel and William McDonald (2013)
15, Tome II. *Kierkegaard's Concepts: Classicism to Enthusiasm*, edited by Steven M. Emmanuel and William McDonald (2014)
15, Tome III. *Kierkegaard's Concepts: Envy to Incognito* (2014)

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

15, Tome IV. *Kierkegaard's Concepts: Individual to Novel*, edited by Steven M. Emmanuel, William McDonald, and Jon Stewart (2014)
15, Tome V. *Kierkegaard's Concepts: Objectivity to Sacrifice*, edited by Steven M. Emmanuel, William McDonald, and Jon Stewart (2015)
15, Tome VI. *Kierkegaard's Concepts: Salvation to Writing*, edited by Steven M. Emmanuel, William McDonald, and Jon Stewart (2015)
16, Tome I. *Kierkegaard's Literary Figures and Motifs: Agamemnon to Guadalquivir*, edited by Katalin Nun and Jon Stewart (2014)
16, Tome II. *Kierkegaard's Literary Figures and Motifs: Gulliver to Zerlina*, edited by Katalin Nun and Jon Stewart (2014)
17. *Kierkegaard's Pseudonyms*, edited by Katalin Nun and Jon Stewart (2015)
18, Tome I. *Kierkegaard Secondary Literature: Catalan, Chinese, Czech, Danish, and Dutch*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
18, Tome II. *Kierkegaard Secondary Literature: English, A–K*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
18, Tome III. *Kierkegaard Secondary Literature: English, L–Z*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
18, Tome IV. *Kierkegaard Secondary Literature: Finnish, French, Galician, and German*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
18, Tome V. *Kierkegaard Secondary Literature: Greek, Hebrew, Hungarian, Italian, Japanese, Norwegian, and Polish*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
18, Tome VI. *Kierkegaard Secondary Literature: Portuguese, Romanian, Russian, Slovak, Spanish, and Swedish*, edited by Jon Stewart (2016)
19, Tome I. *Kierkegaard Bibliography: Afrikaans to Dutch*, edited by Peter Šajda and Jon Stewart (2016)
19, Tome II. *Kierkegaard Bibliography: English*, edited by Peter Šajda and Jon Stewart (2016)
19, Tome III. *Kierkegaard Bibliography: Estonian to Hebrew*, edited by Peter Šajda and Jon Stewart (2016)
19, Tome IV. *Kierkegaard Bibliography: Hungarian to Korean*, edited by Peter Šajda and Jon Stewart (2016)
19, Tome V. *Kierkegaard Bibliography: Latvian to Ukranian*, edited by Peter Šajda and Jon Stewart (2016)
19, Tome VI. *Kierkegaard Bibliography: Figures A to H*, edited by Peter Šajda and Jon Stewart (2017)
19, Tome VII. *Kierkegaard Bibliography: Figures I to Z*, edited by Peter Šajda and Jon Stewart (2017)
20. *The Auction Catalogue of Kierkegaard's Library*, edited by Katalin Nun and Jon Stewart (2019)
21, Tome I. *Cumulative Index: Index of Names, A–K*, edited by Katalin Nun and Jon Stewart (2017)
21, Tome II. *Cumulative Index: Index of Names, L–Z*, edited by Katalin Nun and Jon Stewart (2019)
21, Tome III. *Cumulative Index: Index of Subjects, Overview of the Articles in the Series*, edited by Katalin Nun and Jon Stewart (2017)

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

III. SELECT WORKS PUBLISHED ON KIERKEGAARD, 2017–2021

Biographical/Introductory Material

Barrett, Lee C. *T&T Clark Reader in Kierkegaard as Theologian*. London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2018.
Buben, Adam J., Eleanor Helms, and Patrick Stokes. *The Kierkegaardian Mind*. New York: Routledge, 2019.
Carlisle, Clare. *Philosopher of the Heart: The Restless Life of Søren Kierkegaard*. London: Allen Lane, 2019.
Chaning-Pearce, Melville. *Søren Kierkegaard: A Study*. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2019.
Edwards, Aaron P., and David J. Gouwens, eds. *T&T Clark Companion to the Theology of Kierkegaard.* New York: T&T Clark, 2019.

Single-Volume Commentaries

Conway, Daniel W. *Kierkegaard's* Fear and Trembling*: A Critical Guide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.
Hanson, Jeffrey. *Kierkegaard and the Life of Faith: The Aesthetic, the Ethical, and the Religious in* Fear and Trembling. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017.
Martens, Paul Henry. *Reading Kierkegaard I:* Fear and Trembling. Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2017.
Noble, Brittany Pheiffer. *An Analysis of Søren Kierkegaard's* Fear and Trembling. London: Routledge, 2017.
Shafaie, Shirin. *An Analysis of Søren Kierkegaard's* The Sickness Unto Death. London: Routledge, 2017.

Kierkegaard and Love

Krishek, Sharon. "Kierkegaard on Impartiality and Love." *European Journal of Philosophy* 25, no. 1 (2017): 109–28.
———. "Kierkegaard's Notion of a Divine Name and the Feasibility of Universal Love." *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 57, no. 4 (2019): 539–60.
Lahaie, Myka S. H. "Kierkegaard and Gift: The Problem with 'Kenotic Love' in Light of Kierkegaard's 'Gift Theory.'" *Modern Theology* 36, no. 2 (2020): 336–57.
Lippitt, John. *Love's Forgiveness: Kierkegaard, Resentment, Humility, and Hope*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020.
Lysemose, Kasper. "A Place for God: Deconstructing Love with Kierkegaard." *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 87 (2020): 5–26.
Marcar, G. P. "Søren Kierkegaard and the Impossibility of (Un)Forgiveness: Another Look at Love, Mercy, and Reconciliation in Kierkegaard's Theological Ethics." *Journal of Religious Ethics* 47, no. 4 (2019): 716–34.
Raudanski, Tomer. "Kierkegaard's Secret Politics of Anguish and Love." *Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook* 24 (2019): 165–92.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Smith, Suzanne. “From Tyrant to Martyr: Politics and Love in Kierkegaard.” *Perspectives on Political Science* 46, no. 3 (2017): 209–17.

Surmann, Darren. *Kierkegaard and the Political Theory of Love: Love Is a Revolution*. London: Routledge, 2018.

Kierkegaard and Aesthetics

Bunkenborg, Kristian. *Kierkegaard and the Tragic: Aesthetic Entries into the Concepts of Modernity, Self, and Freedom*. Copenhagen: Faculty of Theology, University of Copenhagen, 2020.

Hannay, Alastair. *Kierkegaard: Existence and Identity in a Post-Secular World*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020.

Matthis, Michael J. “Process as Reality: Kierkegaard’s Aesthetic Approach to the Ethical.” *Continental Philosophy Review* 51, no. 1 (2018): 23–41.

Ramazzotto, Nicola. “The Ambiguity of Mimesis: Kierkegaard between Aesthetic Fantasy and Religious Imitation.” *Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook* 25, no. 1 (2020): 85–110.

Schönbaumsfeld, Genia. “The Aesthetic as Mirror of Faith in Kierkegaard’s *Fear and Trembling*.” *European Journal of Philosophy* 27, no. 3 (2019): 661–74.

Ziolkowski, Eric. *Kierkegaard, Literature, and the Arts*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2018.

Kierkegaard and Ethics

Fox-Muraton, Melissa. *Kierkegaard and Issues in Contemporary Ethics*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2020.

Hay, Sergia. *Ethical Silence: Kierkegaard on Communication, Education, and Humility*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2020.

Matthis, Michael J. “Process as Reality: Kierkegaard’s Aesthetic Approach to the Ethical.” *Continental Philosophy Review* 51 (2018): 23–41.

Słowikowski, Andrzej. “Crossroads of Forgiveness: A Transcendent Understanding of Forgiveness in Kierkegaard’s Religious Writings and Immanent Account of Forgiveness in Contemporary Secular and Christian Ethics.” *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 87 (2020): 55–80.

Tepić, Jugoslav Vuk. 2019. “Ethical and Ontological Dimension of Kierkegaard’s Perception of Freedom.” *Filozofija i Drustvo* 30, no. 4 (January 2019): 610–22.

Kierkegaard and Religion

Barnett, Christopher B. *Søren Kierkegaard: Discourses and Writings on Spirituality*. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2019.

Cockayne, Joshua. “Contemporaneity and Communion: Kierkegaard on the Personal Presence of Christ.” *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 25, no. 1 (2017): 41–62.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

———. *Contemporary with Christ: Kierkegaard and Second-Person Spirituality*. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2020.

Evans, C. Stephen. *Kierkegaard and Spirituality: Accountability as the Meaning of Human Existence*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2019.

———. *Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self: Collected Essays*. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2020.

———. *Kierkegaard's Fragments and Postscript: The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus*. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2018.

Granzeier, Frank. *Dialectical Freedom as Found in Søren Kierkegaard's Religious Works*. Murrells Inlet, SC: Covenant Books, 2018.

Huls, Jos, O. Carm, and Rebecca Braun. *Being Seen in God: (Human Hiddenness and) Kierkegaard's Call to Gaze in the Mirror of the Word*. Leuven: Peeters, 2017.

Kangas, David J. *Errant Affirmations: On the Philosophical Meaning of Kierkegaard's Religious Discourses.* New York: Bloomsbury, 2018.

Kemp, R. S., and Michael Mullaney. "Kierkegaard on the (Un)Happiness of Faith." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 26, no. 3 (2018): 475–97.

Kline, Peter. "Imaging Nothing: Kierkegaard and the Imago Dei." *Anglican Theological Review* 100, no. 4 (2018): 697–720.

———. *Passion for Nothing: Kierkegaard's Apophatic Theology*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2017.

Lappano, David. *Kierkegaard's Theology of Encounter: An Edifying and Polemical Life*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Magnusson, Agust Ingvar. *Kierkegaard and Eastern Orthodox Thought: A Comparative Philosophical Analysis*. Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2019.

Maughan-Brown, Frances. *Lily's Tongue: Figure and Authority in Kierkegaard's Lily Discourses*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2020.

Minister, Stephen, J. Aaron Simmons, and Michael Strawser, eds. *Kierkegaard's God and the Good Life*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017.

Palmer, Elizabeth. *Faith in a Hidden God: Luther, Kierkegaard, and the Binding of Isaac*. Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2017.

Pallippadan, Biju. *Does Faith Heal Anxiety? The Inter-relation among Faith, Anxiety and Freedom in the Philosophical Writings of Søren Kierkegaard*. Delhi: Media House, 2018.

Schreiber, Gerhard. *Happy Passion: Studies in Kierkegaard's Theory of Faith*. Berlin: Peter Lang, 2018.

Słowikowski, Andrzej. "Crossroads of Forgiveness: A Transcendent Understanding of Forgiveness in Kierkegaard's Religious Writings and Immanent Account of Forgiveness in Contemporary Secular and Christian Ethics." *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 87, no. 5 (2020): 55–80.

Sponheim, Paul R. *Existing Before God: Soren Kierkegaard and the Human Venture.* Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2017.

Stark, Michael. *Untruth: Musings with Kierkegaard on Christian Living in a Fractured World.* Minneapolis: Augsburg Books, 2020.

Tavilla I. "Some Notes about the Biblical Influence on Kierkegaard's Theory of Stages." *European Journal of Science and Theology* 13, no. 1 (2017): 87–94.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Thomas, J. Heywood. "Kierkegaard on Prayer." *New Blackfriars* 98, no. 1077 (2017): 501–9.
Tyson, Paul G. *Kierkegaard's Theological Sociology: Prophetic Fire for the Present Age*. Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2019.
Walsh, Sylvia. *Kierkegaard and Religion: Personality, Character, and Virtue*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.

Kierkegaard and Other Figures

Hannah Arendt

Holst, J. "Retrieving Experience: On the Phenomenology of Experience in Hegel and Kierkegaard, Arendt and Gadamer." *Open Philosophy* 2, no. 1 (2020): 480–90.
Korsgaard, Morten Timmermann, and Mathias Mogensen Aldinger. "The Educator's Diary: Arendt and Kierkegaard on Progressivism and the Educational Relation." *Educational Theory* 68, nos. 4–5 (2018): 513–27.

Saint Augustine of Hippo

Doody, John, Kim Paffenroth, and Helene Tallon Russell, eds. *Augustine and Kierkegaard.* New York: Lexington Books, 2017.
Hefner, Craig A. "'In God's Changelessness There Is Rest': The Existential Doctrine of God's Immutability in Augustine and Kierkegaard." *International Journal of Systematic Theology* 20, no. 1 (2018): 65–83.

Walter Benjamin

Pao, Lea. "Mitteilung as an Information Concept: Kierkegaard and Benjamin." *Seminar, a Journal of Germanic Studies* 54, no. 3 (2018): 308–27.

Dietrich Bonhoeffer

Valčo, Michal. "The Value of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Theological-Ethical Reading of Søren Kierkegaard." *European Journal of Science and Theology* 13, no. 1 (2017): 47–58.
Verhagen, Koert. "God, the Middle Term: Bonhoeffer, Kierkegaard, and Christ's Mediation in Works of Love." *Religions* 11, no. 2 (2020): 78.
Gilles Deleuze
Jampol-Petzinger, Andrew. "Faith and Repetition in Kierkegaard and Deleuze." *Philosophy Today* 63, no. 2 (2019): 383–401.
———. "Kierkegaard as a Thinker of Deleuzian Immanent Ethics." *Symposium* 24, no. 1 (2020): 118–37.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Bob Dylan

Barnett, Christopher B. *Bob Dylan and the Stages of Existence*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2022.

Michel Foucault

Ohaneson, Heather C. "Voices of Madness in Foucault and Kierkegaard." *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 87 (2019): 27–54.
Sigmund Freud
Botero, Jesús María Dapena. 2018. "Kierkegaard, Freud, Lacan, Nasio and the Repetition." *Revista Científica Arbitrada De La Fundación MenteClara* 3, no. 2 (2018): 33–40.

René Girard

Bellinger, Charles K. *The Kierkegaard-Girard Option*. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2019.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

Millay, Thomas J. "Concrete and Otherworldly: Reading Kierkegaard's *Works of Love* alongside Hegel's Philosophy of Right." *Modern Theology* 34, no. 1 (2018): 23–41.
Watts, Daniel. "Kierkegaard and the Limits of Thought." *Hegel Bulletin* 39, no. 1 (2018): 82–105.

Martin Heidegger

Barnett, Christopher B. *Kierkegaard and the Question Concerning Technology.* New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019.
Logstrup, K. E., and Robert Stern. *Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's Analysis of Existence and Its Relation to Proclamation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.

Muhammad Iqbal

Ozturk, Sevcan. *Becoming a Genuine Muslim: Kierkegaard and Muhammad Iqbal*. New York: Routledge, 2020.

Carl Jung

Compaijen, Rob. *Kierkegaard, MacIntyre, Williams, and the Internal Point of View*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
Cook, Amy. *Jung and Kierkegaard*. London: Routledge, 2019.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Immanuel Kant

Helms, Eleanor. "Hope and the Chaos of Imagination in Kant and Kierkegaard." *History of European Ideas* (2020): 1–14.

Morgan, Jeff. *The Single Individual and the Search of Hearts: A Retrieval of Conscience in the Work of Immanuel Kant and Søren Kierkegaard*. London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2020.

Nisenbaum, Karin. "Practical Knowledge and the Subjectivity of Truth in Kant and Kierkegaard: The Cover of Skepticism." *European Journal of Philosophy* 26, no. 2 (2018): 730–45.

Emmanuel Levinas

Pickett, Howard. *Rethinking Sincerity and Authenticity: The Ethics of Theatricality in Kant, Kierkegaard, and Levinas*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2017.

Reed, Robert C. "Spiritual Trial in Kierkegaard: Religious Anxiety and Levinas's Other." *International Journal of Philosophy and Theology* 80, nos. 4–5 (2019): 495–509.

Martin Luther

Alfsvag, Knut. "'With God All Things Are Possible': Luther and Kierkegaard on the Relation between Immutability, Necessity and Possibility." *Neue Zeitschrift fur Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* 60, no. 1 (2018): 44–57.

Boehmer, D. "The Capax in a New Key: Kierkegaard's Development of Classical Lutheran Christology." *Toronto Journal of Theology* 33, no. 1 (2017): 31–41.

Coe, David Lawrence. *Kierkegaard and Luther*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books/ Fortress Academic, 2020.

Palmer, Elizabeth. *Faith in a Hidden God: Luther, Kierkegaard, and the Binding of Isaac*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2017.

Karl Marx

Aroosi, Jamie. *The Dialectical Self: Kierkegaard, Marx, and the Making of the Modern Subject.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019.

———. "The Ethical Necessity of Politics: Why Kierkegaard Needs Marx." *Toronto Journal of Theology* 34, no. 2 (2018): 199–212.

Brittain, Christopher Craig. "Love as Power and Powerlessness: Kierkegaard and Adorno Revisited." *Toronto Journal of Theology* 33, no. 1 (2017): 43–62.

Ortega-Villasenor, H. "Kierkegaard and Marx: Concurrences for a More Harmonious Life." *Journal of Ethnic and Cultural Studies* 8, no. 1 (2021): 26–42.

Shaul, Dylan. "Adorno on Kierkegaard on Love for the Dead." *Idealistic Studies* 49, no. 2 (2019): 189–213.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Paul Ricoeur

Damgaard, Iben. "Through Hermeneutics of Suspicion to a Rediscovery of Faith: Kierkegaard's Pamphlet 'What Christ Judges of Official Christianity' in Relation to Ricœur's 'Religion, Atheism and Faith.'" *Studia Theologica—Nordic Journal of Theology* 72, no. 2 (2018): 198–216.

Socrates

Kaftański, Wojciech. "The Socratic Dimension of Kierkegaard's Imitation." *Heythrop Journal* 58, no. 4 (2017): 599–611.

Sneller, Rico. "Kierkegaard on Socrates' Daimonion." *International Journal of Philosophy and Theology* 81 (2020): 87–100.

Watts, Daniel. "The Problem of Kierkegaard's Socrates." *Res Philosophica* 94, no. 4 (2017): 555–79.

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Barros, Wagner. "A Confusion of Spheres: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein on Philosophy and Religion." *Kalagatos* 10, no. 20 (2017): 417–33.

Christensen, Anne-Marie Søndergaard. "The Philosopher and the Reader: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein on Love and Philosophical Method." *European Journal of Philosophy* 28, no. 4 (2020): 876–91.

Schönbaumsfeld, Genia. "'Meaning-Dawning' in Wittgenstein's Notebooks: A Kierkegaardian Reading and Critique." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 26, no. 3 (2018): 540–56.

Watts, Daniel. "Rule-Following and Rule-Breaking: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein." *European Journal of Philosophy* 25, no. 4 (2017): 1159–85.

Other Studies

Aumann, Antony. *Art and Selfhood: A Kierkegaardian Account*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2019.

Barnett, Christopher B. "The 'Lonely Game': Baseball, Kierkegaard, and the Spiritual Life." *Horizons* 47, no. 1 (2020): 1–23.

Barrett, Lee, and Peter Šajda, eds. *Kierkegaard in Context: A Festschrift for Jon Stewart*. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2019.

Bravo, Nassim. "The Faust Project in Kierkegaard's Early Journals." *Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook* 25 (2020): 171–92.

Brinkerhoff Young, Daniel.W. 2017. "Kierkegaard on Time and the Limitations of Imaginative Planning." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 94, no. 1 (2017): 144–69.

Carlsson, Ulrika. *Kierkegaard and Philosophical Eros: Between Ironic Reflection and Aesthetic Meaning*. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2021.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Carron, Paul. "Turn Your Gaze Upward! Emotions, Concerns, and Regulatory Strategies in Kierkegaard's Christian Discourses." *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 84 (2018): 323–43.

Cockayne, Joshua. *Contemporary with Christ: Kierkegaard and Second-Personal Spirituality*. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2020.

Das, Saitya Brata. *Political Theology of Kierkegaard*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020.

de Vries, Patricia. *Algorithmic Anxiety in Contemporary Art: A Kierkegaardian Inquiry into the Imaginary of Possibility*. Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures, 2019.

Dickinson, T. Wilson. *Exercises in New Creation from Paul to Kierkegaard*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.

Dueck, Jeffrey Forbes. *The Visionary Kierkegaard: Deconstruction and the Visual Arts*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2018.

Gerdes, Hayo. *Søren Kierkegaard: Leben und Werk*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2019.

Gołębiewska, Maria. "The Phenomenal Aspects of Irony According to Søren Kierkegaard." *Open Theology* 6, no. 1 (2020): 606–22.

Gron, Arne, Rene Rosfort, and K. Brian Soderquist, eds. *Kierkegaard's Existential Approach*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2017.

Hamer, Russell. *Understanding Kierkegaard's Parables*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2021.

Hongladarom, Soraj. "Anonymity and Commitment: How Do Kierkegaard and Dreyfus Fare in the Era of Facebook and 'Post-Truth'?" *AI & Society* 34 (2018): 289–99.

Jaarsma, Ada S. *Kierkegaard after the Genome: Science, Existence and Belief in This World*. New York: Springer International, 2017.

Johansson, Viktor. "Pedagogy and Polyphonic Narrativity in Søren Kierkegaard." *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 53, no. 4 (2019): 111–22.

Johnson, Daniel M. "When Life Becomes a Game: A Moral Lesson from Søren Kierkegaard and Bernard Suits." *Sport, Ethics and Philosophy* 13, nos. 3–4 (2019): 419–31.

Kemp, Ryan S., and Christopher Lacovetti. *Reason and Conversion in Kierkegaard and the German Idealists*. New York: Routledge, 2020.

Klausen, Soren Harnow. *Søren Kierkegaard: Educating for Authenticity*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International, 2018.

Leone, George. *Kierkegaard's Existentialism: The Theological Self and the Existential Self*. Cheyenne, WY: Urlink Print & Media, 2020.

Manheimer, Ronald. *Kierkegaard as Educator*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2021.

Martin, J. G. "The Category of the Single Individual in Kierkegaard." *European Journal of Science and Theology* 13, no. 3 (2017): 99–108.

McCabe, Kevin Patrick. "The Wound That Heals: Disability and Suffering in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard." *Journal of Disability & Religion* 21, no. 1 (2017): 43–63.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Millay, Thomas J. *You Must Change Your Life: Søren Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Reading.* Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2020.

Mooney, Edward F. *Living Philosophy in Kierkegaard, Melville, and Others: Intersections of Literature, Philosophy, and Religion.* New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020.

Örmény, Francisc-Norbert. "The Nothingness of the Anguish in Søren Kierkegaard's Work as Modernity's Infernal Redemption." *Journal of Education Culture and Society* 6, no. 1 (2020): 11–19.

Piety, M. G. *Ways of Knowing: Kierkegaard's Pluralist Epistemology*. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2018.

Perkins, Robert L. *Truth Is Subjectivity: Kierkegaard and Political Theology, a Symposium in Honor of Robert L. Perkins*. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2019.

Plunkett, Erin. "Kierkegaard and the Matter of Philosophy: A Fractured Dialectic." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 48, no. 1 (2017): 88–90.

Sharvit, Gilad. "History and Eternity: Rosenzweig and Kierkegaard on Repetition." *Jewish Studies Quarterly* 26, no. 2 (2019): 162–98.

Sirven, Roberto, and Silas Michael Morgan. *Kierkegaard and Political Theology*. Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2018.

Stan, Leo. *Selfhood and Otherness in Kierkegaard's Authorship: A Heterological Investigation*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2017.

Stewart, Jon. *Søren Kierkegaard: Subjectivity, Irony, and the Crisis of Modernity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Surmann, Darren. *Kierkegaard and the Political Theory of Love: Love is a Revolution*. London: Routledge, 2018.

Taylor, Mark C. *Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of Time and Self.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019.

Thompson, Curtis L. *Kierkegaard Trumping Trump: Divinity Resurrecting Democracy*. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2019.

Vaskovic, Petr. "A Path to Authenticity: Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky on Existential Transformation." *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 87, no. 1 (2019): 1–28.

Westfall, Joseph. *Authorship and Authority in Kierkegaard's Writings*. New York: Bloomsbury, 2018.

Wicks, Robert. *Introduction to Existentialism: From Kierkegaard to the Seventh Seal*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019.

Žalec, Bojan. "Kierkegaard and the Ethics of Sacrifice as Part of the Ethics of Love." *European Journal of Science and Theology* 14, no. 3 (2018): 1–11.

———. "Kierkegaard's Method, Edification, and Moral Grammar of Christian Virtues." *European Journal of Science and Theology* 14, no. 6 (2018): 47–54.

———. "Preferential and Non-preferential Love in Light of Kierkegaard's Thought." *European Journal of Science and Theology* 13, no. 2 (2017): 179–89.

———. "The Relevance of Kierkegaard for Political Thought: Violence and the Divine Command." *European Journal of Science and Theology* 13, no. 3 (2017): 75–87.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

About the Author

Christopher B. Barnett (B.S., University of Alabama at Birmingham, 1999; M.A., St. John's College, 2001; M.Div., Garrett-Evangelical Theological Seminary, 2004; D.Phil., University of Oxford, 2008) is professor of theology at Villanova University, where he specializes in modern theology, Christian spirituality, the philosophy of technology, and the relation between theology and the arts. He has lectured on Kierkegaard in a variety of academic settings, and, in 2016, he cohosted the international conference Kierkegaard, Augustine, and the Catholic Tradition. Among other professional associations, he has served as guest researcher at the Unitätsarchiv in Herrnhut, Germany, and at Søren Kierkegaard Forskningscenteret in Copenhagen, and he is a member of the Søren Kierkegaard Society USA.

In addition to numerous articles and book chapters, Dr. Barnett has published three monographs: *Kierkegaard, Pietism and Holiness* (2011), *From Despair to Faith: The Spirituality of Søren Kierkegaard* (2014), and *Kierkegaard and the Question Concerning Technology* (2019). He also edited, introduced, and translated *Søren Kierkegaard: Discourses and Writings on Spirituality*, which came out in the seminal book series Classics of Western Spirituality (CWS) in 2019. Furthermore, he has coedited two books: *Theology and the Films of Terrence Malick* (2016) and *Scorsese and Religion* (2019). His next monograph is *Bob Dylan and the Spheres of Existence* (2022), which uses Kierkegaard's theory of existential spheres—the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious—to interpret the singer-songwriter's multifaceted career and oeuvre.

Born in Tullahoma, Tennessee, and raised in Birmingham, Alabama, Dr. Barnett has lived in the Philadelphia area since 2012.

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

EBSCOhost - printed on 2/12/2023 6:24 AM via . All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use